I’m not sure what you’re asking.What about an intention being equivalent to a deed?
Ohh–sorry! Now I see that you’re referring to your prior post in which you cited Aquinas.What about an intention being equivalent to a deed?
We need to look at the entire relationship of Faith and Reason, not just a single example. I think that Fides et Ratio, the beautiful encyclical of Pope John Paul II, brings the subject in to perfect crystal clarity. It isn’t very long and it is available here: vatican.va/edocs/ENG0216/_INDEX.HTMIs there anyone else in these forums who can understand my conflict?
An intention is more than a thought. To form an intention means to make an act of will. If you intend to rob a bank but don’t because you turn up and there is a big police presence or they have installed camera’s then your intention is foiled but you are still culpable for it. If the thought flits through your mind that it would ease your financial burdens if you robbed a bank then you haven’t formed an intent and so not sinned. Action is always preceded by an act of will. If the act of will is not made then the act of fact is not committed. Therefore it is the act of will that is morally culpable.If someone intends to rob a bank, but doesn’t, he is not culpable. By the same token, if someone intends to help a person up from a fall, but walks right by, she has not done a good deed.
Thank you for that suggestion. I am indeed currently reading Fides et Ratio for the second time. It has been helpful and incisive, but has not thus far provided any clarification on this particular issue for me.We need to look at the entire relationship of Faith and Reason, not just a single example. I think that Fides et Ratio, the beautiful encyclical of Pope John Paul II, brings the subject in to perfect crystal clarity
I have not read this; thank you for the suggestion. Next on the reading list!On this narrower part of it, Pope Benedicts Encycle Deus Caritas Est, provides some wonderful insights. It is available here: vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html
So how would this fit into my scenario? If a person indulges in a 10 minute fantasy of a romantic interlude with hunky James Bondsman Daniel Craig, but has **no intention whatsoever **of actually committing adultery, according to Jesus’ teaching, it’s still the same as actually committing adultery!!An intention is more than a thought. To form an intention means to make an act of will…
Therefore it is the act of will that is morally culpable.
I understand that. We must do the right thing for the right reason in the right way.Look at it from the other point of view. If you crash a car into a pedestrian and s/he dies then the consequences of the act are terrible whatever the intention you formed while driving. If however you were obeying the law and only crashed because the pedestrian ran in front of you intending to be hit then you are not morally guilty of their death. On the other hand if you drove directly at them intending to hit them and they died then the consequence is identical to the first case but because your intention is different so too is your moral culpability.
Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin.
Reply to Objection 1. All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.
Reply to Objection 2. Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezekiel 43:23) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man.
and newadvent.org/summa/2074.htm#7 is worth checking out’Reply to Objection 3. Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement.
But where the boundary lies between simply noticing someone’s sexual values and being attracted to them in a sinful way is not always easy to discern. What is the difference between an innocent interest in another person’s physical appearance and a lustful thought? Here Wojtyla offers some very helpful insights.
He seems to identify three general stages in the battle against sensual egoism. First, one may experience a spontaneous sensual reaction. At this stage, one happens to notice the sexual values of another person’s body and reacts to those values spontaneously. For example, a handsome man walks into a cocktail party and catches the eye of a woman he has never met, while the man notices the woman’s attractive features and finds himself drawn to her throughout the evening. The sexual values of the opposite sex often present themselves spontaneously like this. We notice them and find ourselves interested in them. This is not lust; nor is it sinful. It simply means we are human and have human sensual desire. As Wojtyla explains, sensuality “merely orients the whole psyche towards the sexual values, awakening an interest in or indeed an ‘absorption’ in them” (p. 148). As we have seen previously, such sensual desire is given by God to draw persons together in love. Indeed, it can serve as “raw material” for authentic love if the sensual attraction to the other person’s body leads to a deeper level of commitment to the person himself or herself — not just his or her sexual values.
Lustful Thoughts?
However, Wojtyla warns us of how easy it is to move from the first stage of simple interest in the sexual values of another person to the second stage of hankering after them in one’s heart as a potential object of sensual pleasure. Wojtyla calls this second stage sensual concupiscence. At this point, something within the person begins to stir: a desire for the sexual values of the other person’s body as an object to enjoy. Now the sexual values are not simply an object of interest, but an actual object of sensual desire in our hearts. Something in us “begins to strive towards, to hanker after, that value” and we “desire to possess the value” (p. 148).