Fighting a Just War today from lessons of WW II

[tqualey]

Hi, Ridgerunner,

No argument about that - accuracy was never great - and usually ‘in the area’ was about as good as most of the guys got, given the equipment and the flying conditions. So, I think this could be a ‘given’ for further discussion.

So, ‘given’ poor marksmenship - what were the Allies aiming at in general and what was Sir Harris encouraging his men to hit over and over again? Even with poor marksmenship, the Allies did significant damage to civilian targets - and this met the goal set by Harris. Contrast this with the tye of ‘accuracy’ used by the ‘Buzz Bombs’ that flew over England and simply fell from the air when they ran out of fuel. These weapons did significant damage to English cities with almost exclusive civilian populations. Maybe it could be said that both sides were into terror bombing.

So, vast areas of English and German cities were laid waste, deaths in the millions and the areas set up for starvation, disease and futher suffering leading to death of both combatants and non-combatants. Gen. Grant was right, “War is hell”. Do we have war crimes here or not? The charge of a crime, in this case, really needs to focus on the law covering war - not just the amount of damage done. While the murdering of prisoners in concentration camps was a war crime back then, I do not think the bombing qualifies.

Here is another item. The US just did not suddenly use atomic bombs on Japan. As I undeerstand the situation, all efforts were made to arm the civilian population (maybe with sticks and stones) to repel the US landing. Truman made two attempts to have Japan surrender unconditionally because the war was over. Yet, Japan refused, and given the devestation before the bombing of Hiroshima, this is very strange. After, Hiroshima, however, the desire of the generals to continue fighting, claiming that this bomb was a fluke and that the US could not do it again, lead to the bombing of Nagasaki.

It was at this time that Japan surrendered. My understanding is that both cities had military items, but these were considered minor contrasted with other cities. I am glad Truman made the decision he did! And, I thank God that I had nothing to do with it - and have only benefitted from his decisive action.

God bless

I wonder how possible it was to avoid some of these civilian casualties. I recall reading that British night bombers’ accuracy was only within about five miles. If so, and even if it was within a quarter mile, even within an eighth of a mile, the bombing was only approximate. So what was the choice? Bomb with the inaccuracy of the time or not bomb at all?

I don’t particularly doubt that some of the allies thought “terror bombing” would be effective in ending the war. Turns out that wasn’t so. But I suspect for most allied planners, it wasn’t the purpose, and that the real question was “approximate or nothing”.

 

[tqualey]

Hi, GKC,

Thanks for the correction …

God bless

General Sherman, not General Grant.

As to Japan, as you may recall, this is one of my areas of study. In brief, you are correct, as far as you go. But I dearly hope the history of that end-game to WWII is not going to start another run here. I’m way over 500 posts, over the past 5 years, on it, already. I’d gladly not have to teach it again.

GKC

 

[ColdComfort]

General Sherman, not General Grant.

As to Japan, as you may recall, this is one of my areas of study. In brief, you are correct, as far as you go. But I dearly hope the history of that end-game to WWII is not going to start another run here. I’m way over 500 posts, over the past 5 years, on it, already. I’d gladly not have to teach it again.

GKC

I’ll check the archives. Thanks for the reference on Dresden.

 

[GKC]

I’ll check the archives. Thanks for the reference on Dresden.

Any time.

The threads that I remember, and that I took part in, ran back about 5 years, in several forums including this one.

The subject of the end game in the Pacific Theater in WWII has been a serious study area for me, running back about 19 years. I deal only in the history; what happened. Others deal with other aspects. And I vow each year not to participate. Then do so.

GKC

 

[CollegeStinks]

I don’t think you can generalize that WMDs are inherently evil. Last time I checked destructive power alone doesn’t render something evil. Afterall, the Lord God has infinitely more power than all the atomic weapons in the world put together. He has the capacity to destroy the entire universe in a single instant if He wanted. But He certainly isn’t evil.

If you have tens of thousands of enemy combatants spread out in a desert hundreds of miles long, void of any civilians, and detonate a WMD in the middle of it to eliminate all the enemies at once, I don’t think any wrong is done here.

Even if there are cities within the radius, if the intent of dropping the bombs are to kill the combatants and not the civilians yet some civilians do in fact die, the act can still be licit provided that the cause is within an acceptable proportion to civilian deaths. If you have a monster fortress near a city, so long as you target the fortress and not the city, the act can still be morally licit, even if the city is damaged and innocent people die. This wasn’t the aim of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both of those were dropped on plain cities with the intent to kill as many innocent civilians as possible to put stress on the government. That’s the only reason we can argue that the bombings were wrong, not because they were atomic weapons. It would have been just as wrong if we sent foot soldiers in to slaughter the same number of civilians.

 

[GKC]

I don’t think you can generalize that WMDs are inherently evil. Last time I checked destructive power alone doesn’t render something evil. Afterall, the Lord God has infinitely more power than all the atomic weapons in the world put together. He has the capacity to destroy the entire universe in a single instant if He wanted. But He certainly isn’t evil.

If you have tens of thousands of enemy combatants spread out in a desert hundreds of miles long, void of any civilians, and detonate a WMD in the middle of it to eliminate all the enemies at once, I don’t think any wrong is done here.

Even if there are cities within the radius, if the intent of dropping the bombs are to kill the combatants and not the civilians yet some civilians do in fact die, the act can still be licit provided that the cause is within an acceptable proportion to civilian deaths. If you have a monster fortress near a city, so long as you target the fortress and not the city, the act can still be morally licit, even if the city is damaged and innocent people die. This wasn’t the aim of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both of those were dropped on plain cities with the intent to kill as many innocent civilians as possible to put stress on the government. That’s the only reason we can argue that the bombings were wrong, not because they were atomic weapons. It would have been just as wrong if we sent foot soldiers in to slaughter the same number of civilians.

The intent of using the 2 bombs was to cause the quickest possible end to the war, with the fewest possible casualties, by demonstrating to the Anami clique (the Four Conditions group) in the * Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi*, that they could not achieve any of their goals, through the Ketsugo defense plan, and would be forced to accept the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration. Which was what happened. The deaths of the civilians, as the deaths of the military, as the destruction of such war capacity as was destroyed, which resulted, was the means to that end.

GKC

 

[tqualey]

Hi, CS,

When we uniformed armies fighting one another - one can clearly see who is on your side and who isn’t. No argument there.

When you have plain clothes civilians - old men, women and children being trained to fight uniformed soldiers, things stop being as clear. And, arguments quickly mount. Strapping on suicide vests to children to go and be killed as the bomb they are wearing kills others is probably older than WW II - but, we can at least identify that such actions took place and that these usually considered non-combatants have taken on the role of combatants.

My basic concern is that in WW II, we had several dictatorial leaders who simply wanted the world their way, and remove those who did not see things their way. Maybe my ‘moral compass’ is too close to a magnet … but, bombing civilians who are being trained as combatants does not appear to me as morally wrong. (All war and every aspect of it will certainly qualify as evil.)

I am really not sure just how exactly we are to morally fight an immoral aggressor. I am confident that locking people up as prisoners in concentrations and killing them is immoral. Bombing those who do this as they continue to wage war is not immoral.

As I see it, Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent a different case then what you have presented.

****"Hiroshima was the headquarters of the Fifth Division and Field Marshal Shunroku Hata’s 2nd General Army Headquarters, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan. It was also a communications center, a storage point, an assembly area for troops, and was a military-industrial center powered by the mass-scale forced labour of Koreans known as hibakusha. The Hiroshima island of Edajima hosted the Navy Elite Academy. Kure, around 20 km from Hiroshima, was also known for a military port and navy factories. The famous giant warship, Yamato, was constructed in Kure. The material and labour for Kure came from Hiroshima.

Nagasaki was one of the largest sea ports in southern Japan and had wide-ranging industrial importance. Ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials were manufactured there. The Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works was located there. Mitsubishi produced over 10,000 Zero fighters and the battleship Musashi." **** abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread410875/pg1

I really do this was black/white - it would make it so much easier to sort out. As it stands, many of the concerns we have today are a solid shade of grey! The snag comes in when we look at the fighting going on today - and the wars of tomorrow. Actually idetifying moral choices will be that much more difficult if we can not do so with a war that ended 66 years ago!

God bless

I don’t think you can generalize that WMDs are inherently evil. Last time I checked destructive power alone doesn’t render something evil. Afterall, the Lord God has infinitely more power than all the atomic weapons in the world put together. He has the capacity to destroy the entire universe in a single instant if He wanted. But He certainly isn’t evil.

If you have tens of thousands of enemy combatants spread out in a desert hundreds of miles long, void of any civilians, and detonate a WMD in the middle of it to eliminate all the enemies at once, I don’t think any wrong is done here.

Even if there are cities within the radius, if the intent of dropping the bombs are to kill the combatants and not the civilians yet some civilians do in fact die, the act can still be licit provided that the cause is within an acceptable proportion to civilian deaths. If you have a monster fortress near a city, so long as you target the fortress and not the city, the act can still be morally licit, even if the city is damaged and innocent people die. This wasn’t the aim of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both of those were dropped on plain cities with the intent to kill as many innocent civilians as possible to put stress on the government. That’s the only reason we can argue that the bombings were wrong, not because they were atomic weapons. It would have been just as wrong if we sent foot soldiers in to slaughter the same number of civilians.

 

[triumphguy]

The good guys won.

They did what they had to do.

They are heroes in my eyes.

I had teachers who flew in Lancaster bombers. My parents were bombed (and survived). I had relatives at Dunkirk and Normandy.

The good guys won.

End of/

 

[tqualey]

Hi, Triumphguy,

Excellent post!

We owe these ‘good guys’ not only our lives, but our way of life.

God bless

The good guys won.

They did what they had to do.

They are heroes in my eyes.

I had teachers who flew in Lancaster bombers. My parents were bombed (and survived). I had relatives at Dunkirk and Normandy.

The good guys won.

End of/

 

[GKC]

Hi, CS,

When we uniformed armies fighting one another - one can clearly see who is on your side and who isn’t. No argument there.

When you have plain clothes civilians - old men, women and children being trained to fight uniformed soldiers, things stop being as clear. And, arguments quickly mount. Strapping on suicide vests to children to go and be killed as the bomb they are wearing kills others is probably older than WW II - but, we can at least identify that such actions took place and that these usually considered non-combatants have taken on the role of combatants.

My basic concern is that in WW II, we had several dictatorial leaders who simply wanted the world their way, and remove those who did not see things their way. Maybe my ‘moral compass’ is too close to a magnet … but, bombing civilians who are being trained as combatants does not appear to me as morally wrong. (All war and every aspect of it will certainly qualify as evil.)

I am really not sure just how exactly we are to morally fight an immoral aggressor. I am confident that locking people up as prisoners in concentrations and killing them is immoral. Bombing those who do this as they continue to wage war is not immoral.

As I see it, Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent a different case then what you have presented.

****"Hiroshima was the headquarters of the Fifth Division and Field Marshal Shunroku Hata’s 2nd General Army Headquarters, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan. It was also a communications center, a storage point, an assembly area for troops, and was a military-industrial center powered by the mass-scale forced labour of Koreans known as hibakusha. The Hiroshima island of Edajima hosted the Navy Elite Academy. Kure, around 20 km from Hiroshima, was also known for a military port and navy factories. The famous giant warship, Yamato, was constructed in Kure. The material and labour for Kure came from Hiroshima.

Nagasaki was one of the largest sea ports in southern Japan and had wide-ranging industrial importance. Ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials were manufactured there. The Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works was located there. Mitsubishi produced over 10,000 Zero fighters and the battleship Musashi." **** abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread410875/pg1

I really do this was black/white - it would make it so much easier to sort out. As it stands, many of the concerns we have today are a solid shade of grey! The snag comes in when we look at the fighting going on today - and the wars of tomorrow. Actually idetifying moral choices will be that much more difficult if we can not do so with a war that ended 66 years ago!

God bless

Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate military targets, as your quote points out. In addition, Hiroshima was the port of embarkation for the troops being shipped to Kyushu, the site of the planned initial DOWNFALL landing, Operation Olympic. Hiroshima had probably the highest ratio of military to civilians of any major Japanese city. Around 45,000 military were in the city that August day.

Though both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate military targets, the targeting of the cities upon which the A bombs were to be used was calculated to achieve the greatest shock possible to the Japanese, to cause an end to the resistance of the war faction of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (lots of history involved). The anticipated death of the civilians in those cities was a part of that shock effect. They did not target civilians, or the military targets, as an ends in themselves. They targeted cities, as they had done in the preceding 5 months with the B-29 raids, with a devastating new weapon, the economy of which (1 plane/1 bomb/1 day), was expected to shock the Japanese and break their will, with the intended aim of the end of the war, in the least amount of time, with the fewest casualties. Which was what transpired.

GKC

 

[Ridgerunner]

Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate military targets, as your quote points out. In addition, Hiroshima was the port of embarkation for the troops being shipped to Kyushu, the site of the planned initial DOWNFALL landing, Operation Olympic. Hiroshima had probably the highest ratio of military to civilians of any major Japanese city. Around 45,000 military were in the city that August day.

Though both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate military targets, the targeting of the cities upon which the A bombs were to be used was calculated to achieve the greatest shock possible to the Japanese, to cause an end to the resistance of the war faction of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (lots of history involved). The anticipated death of the civilians in those cities was a part of that shock effect. They did not target civilians, or the military targets, as an ends in themselves. They targeted cities, as they had done in the preceding 5 months with the B-29 raids, with a devastating new weapon, the economy of which (1 plane/1 bomb/1 day), was expected to shock the Japanese and break their will, with the intended aim of the end of the war, in the least amount of time, with the fewest casualties. Which was what transpired.

GKC

I once read an interesting take on all of this. Maybe it’s true, maybe not. Anyway, this writer went deeply into the Japanese concept of themselves as a sort of “divine people”; special and superior to all others. Obviously, this made the sort of racism they exhibited during the war an easy way to think. And, to this day, it’s nearly impossible to become a Japanese citizen if one is not ethnic Japanese.

Anyway, this whole business of the “sacred people” was tied in with the concept of a heirarchy among that people, with the emperor at the top, both in this life and in the next. Because it was the emperor’s otherworldly function to reign over Japanese, there had to be Japanese, and the emperor was deemed the protector of the race.

The atomic bombs at least seemed to threaten the existence of the Japanese people entirely, thus breaking the sacred chain of descent from the mythical godlike progenitors of that people. It was ONLY because of this threat that the emperor and his clique could surrender while still saving face. The surrender was not because they were beaten, but to save the sacred race from annihilation.

And, there is some evidence the Japanese government knew about American development of the bomb and did not surrender after the first bomb. It was only because the supply did not seem limited that the face-saving device could be used.

Interesting way to see it.

 

[GKC]

I once read an interesting take on all of this. Maybe it’s true, maybe not. Anyway, this writer went deeply into the Japanese concept of themselves as a sort of “divine people”; special and superior to all others. Obviously, this made the sort of racism they exhibited during the war an easy way to think. And, to this day, it’s nearly impossible to become a Japanese citizen if one is not ethnic Japanese.

Anyway, this whole business of the “sacred people” was tied in with the concept of a heirarchy among that people, with the emperor at the top, both in this life and in the next. Because it was the emperor’s otherworldly function to reign over Japanese, there had to be Japanese, and the emperor was deemed the protector of the race.

The atomic bombs at least seemed to threaten the existence of the Japanese people entirely, thus breaking the sacred chain of descent from the mythical godlike progenitors of that people. It was ONLY because of this threat that the emperor and his clique could surrender while still saving face. The surrender was not because they were beaten, but to save the sacred race from annihilation.

And, there is some evidence the Japanese government knew about American development of the bomb and did not surrender after the first bomb. It was only because the supply did not seem limited that the face-saving device could be used.

Interesting way to see it.

This is more or less accurate.

GKC

 

[Ridgerunner]

This is more or less accurate.

GKC

In a weird way then, it might be argued that dropping the atomic bombs “did the Japanese a favor” in giving the leadership a way to end the war without losing face and without requiring the Japanese people to defend every inch of the “sacred islands” with their lives in order to save face.

 

[GKC]

In a weird way then, it might be argued that dropping the atomic bombs “did the Japanese a favor” in giving the leadership a way to end the war without losing face and without requiring the Japanese people to defend every inch of the “sacred islands” with their lives in order to save face.

Several of the "peace " faction in the Japanese government said precisely that, after the war, that it was a God-send. But it wasn’t face that they were worried about. It was the kokutai, the national polity, primarily the role of the Emperor.

GKC

 

[Ridgerunner]

Several of the "peace " faction in the Japanese government said precisely that, after the war, that it was a God-send. But it wasn’t face that they were worried about. It was the kokutai, the national polity, primarily the role of the Emperor.

GKC

I am guessing you know your history better than I do. But at least in what I read, it seemed there were different things at different levels. Yes, preservation of the emperor system was important, and acceptance of that by the U.S. (sulla tavola, but not officially), was a key ingredient in their ability to surrender, it being the central pin of the whole social order in Japan. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the emperor and the princes of the blood, “surrender” was still unacceptable in itself, preservation of the emperor system or not. They could not “surrender” and particularly not to barbarians, but they could “save the sacred race”. That, they could do. And though the Japanese people knew it was, in fact, a surrender, they could accept the emperor’s doing it for that ostensible reason.

Hard to know, and I am sure there were many variations in thought, and the secrecy and indirection of the Japanese in authority exacerbated that. Years ago, I had the pleasure of meeting, entirely by chance, an elderly man who had served in the Kwantung Army. He said some very interesting things about that experience and the role of the “royals” and other personalities in it. He was very pointed in saying he felt Hirohito was the biggest war criminal of all, responsible for the war and how it was conducted, as, he said, many soldiers serving in China did. But he added that younger Japanese did not, and more or less accepted the key elements of the American version MacArthur and the American government put together…about the emperor being a figurehead, powerless in the hands of the generals, and so on.

Of all the things he said about that, one particularly struck me. Lots of planes came and went from Tokyo all the time, he said. But when one flew in bearing the chrysanthemum symbol, the soldiers knew they were going to be ordered to initiate a new offensive deeper into China. And it was always true, and it was always terrible.

 

[GKC]

I am guessing you know your history better than I do. But at least in what I read, it seemed there were different things at different levels. Yes, preservation of the emperor system was important, and acceptance of that by the U.S. (sulla tavola, but not officially), was a key ingredient in their ability to surrender, it being the central pin of the whole social order in Japan. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the emperor and the princes of the blood, “surrender” was still unacceptable in itself, preservation of the emperor system or not. They could not “surrender” and particularly not to barbarians, but they could “save the sacred race”. That, they could do. And though the Japanese people knew it was, in fact, a surrender, they could accept the emperor’s doing it for that ostensible reason.

Hard to know, and I am sure there were many variations in thought, and the secrecy and indirection of the Japanese in authority exacerbated that. Years ago, I had the pleasure of meeting, entirely by chance, an elderly man who had served in the Kwantung Army. He said some very interesting things about that experience and the role of the “royals” and other personalities in it. He was very pointed in saying he felt Hirohito was the biggest war criminal of all, responsible for the war and how it was conducted, as, he said, many soldiers serving in China did. But he added that younger Japanese did not, and more or less accepted the key elements of the American version MacArthur and the American government put together…about the emperor being a figurehead, powerless in the hands of the generals, and so on.

Of all the things he said about that, one particularly struck me. Lots of planes came and went from Tokyo all the time, he said. But when one flew in bearing the chrysanthemum symbol, the soldiers knew they were going to be ordered to initiate a new offensive deeper into China. And it was always true, and it was always terrible.

No, this was not in play, at the last. Whatever his position from the beginning, Hirohito had moved to supporting ending the war at least by June, and the 2nd gozen kaigan on Aug 10 was arranged (in violation of the usual policy) to permit him to direct the acceptance of the Potsdam accord, by sleight of hand.

The sticking points between the peace faction of the Supreme Committee on the Conduct of the War, and the Anami/Four Condition group there, was primarily based on the continuance of the kokutai, of which the role of the Emperor was the main point. No one at that level could seriously deny that the war was lost. The question was how much could be salvaged, by conducting the* ketsugo* defense plan against the invasion that was known to be coming, to avoid unconditional surrender, war trials, disarmament, and occupation. All part of maintaining the national polity. Of which the Emperor was the main point. It is not a case of assuming the innocence of the Emperor throughout the war. It was a question of what was to be done, in July/August 1945: accept the Potsdam Declaration, or attempt to negotiate a better settlement by drawing out the bloodbath, as had been rehearsed on Okinawa.

Bergamini, in his massive work, takes a “Hirohito was guilty” approach. We may have discussed it before; I did with someone here. But whether he was or was not, and to what degree, at the end, in the last 3 months, the end game played out as I have said. Or, at least, my 19+ years of reading in the area, and my roughly 100 books on the topic have so convinced me. Not likely to stumble over something that turns that around.

Bottom line. The 2nd bomb ended Anami’s resistance to accepting the Potsdam Declaration. It was his clique’s opposition that drew the resolution out. When it ended, so did the war.

Added:

A quick search and I see it was you that discussed Bergamini with me. I am still of the same opinion.

GKC

 

[tqualey]

Hi, GKC,

Seriously, can you think of any military action that had only one military objective (besides ‘to win’)?

Peaceful civilian life is complex enough as to why we really do something. Most of us have a ‘good’ reason for doing something - and the ‘real’ reason for why we did it.

The fact that, ‘… Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate targets…’ really should end and serious the discussion about the morality of targets. These cities were not just cities in the civilian sense but encampments of enemy forces that also had civilians.

The next compicating fact is that just what does one do with an enemy who continues to fight? Fight back is all that I can think of - but, apparently, there are other ideas on this… Japan was honestly beaten before any atomic bomb was even tested much less dropped on human beings - but, they were training civilians to fight US troops during the invasion. Looking at the European Theater - we see the 1944-45 Battle of the Bulge - where a defeated German army was ordered into battle by Hitler with the false idea that they could win against the Allies. They simply did not have the fuel or air support to do what they needed to do - yet, they fought on… and the Allies fought back, won and advanced to Berlin.

As I see it, there is not a lot of difference between civililans being trained to carry on the war and soldiers continuing to fight the way - if the war is going to be won, then both groups must be treated alike.

We owe so much to those who fought against the repression of Germany and Japan - these criticism honestly do not seem justified at all.

God bless Truman and all who fought agaist oppression.

God bless

Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate military targets, as your quote points out. In addition, Hiroshima was the port of embarkation for the troops being shipped to Kyushu, the site of the planned initial DOWNFALL landing, Operation Olympic. Hiroshima had probably the highest ratio of military to civilians of any major Japanese city. Around 45,000 military were in the city that August day.

Though both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate military targets, the targeting of the cities upon which the A bombs were to be used was calculated to achieve the greatest shock possible to the Japanese, to cause an end to the resistance of the war faction of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (lots of history involved). The anticipated death of the civilians in those cities was a part of that shock effect. They did not target civilians, or the military targets, as an ends in themselves. They targeted cities, as they had done in the preceding 5 months with the B-29 raids, with a devastating new weapon, the economy of which (1 plane/1 bomb/1 day), was expected to shock the Japanese and break their will, with the intended aim of the end of the war, in the least amount of time, with the fewest casualties. Which was what transpired.

GKC

 

[GKC]

Hi, GKC,

Seriously, can you think of any military action that had only one military objective (besides ‘to win’)?

Peaceful civilian life is complex enough as to why we really do something. Most of us have a ‘good’ reason for doing something - and the ‘real’ reason for why we did it.

The fact that, ‘… Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate targets…’ really should end and serious the discussion about the morality of targets. These cities were not just cities in the civilian sense but encampments of enemy forces that also had civilians.

The next compicating fact is that just what does one do with an enemy who continues to fight? Fight back is all that I can think of - but, apparently, there are other ideas on this… Japan was honestly beaten before any atomic bomb was even tested much less dropped on human beings - but, they were training civilians to fight US troops during the invasion. Looking at the European Theater - we see the 1944-45 Battle of the Bulge - where a defeated German army was ordered into battle by Hitler with the false idea that they could win against the Allies. They simply did not have the fuel or air support to do what they needed to do - yet, they fought on… and the Allies fought back, won and advanced to Berlin.

As I see it, there is not a lot of difference between civililans being trained to carry on the war and soldiers continuing to fight the way - if the war is going to be won, then both groups must be treated alike.

We owe so much to those who fought against the repression of Germany and Japan - these criticism honestly do not seem justified at all.

God bless Truman and all who fought agaist oppression.

God bless

It becomes a little more complicated (not that I disagree with your basic points; I don’t) given the revolutionary nature of the bombs. What was done to the two cities, as legitimate military targets in the same sense that the other cities, particularly the 6 cities that had been targeted between Mar and July 45, were, differed not some much in kind, but in efficiency. The amount of damage/destruction/death done by either of the bombs was comparable to about a week+ of dedicated B-29 raids with conventional weapons. And Japan had survived 5 months of this sort of bombing. But this was done, this time, in one day, with one plane. As I have stressed, while the cites were legitimate military targets, it was neither the destruction of the resources or people (civilian or military) that were in them that was the point of using the 2 bombs. The point of using them was to demonstrate that a new situation was facing Japan. That the attempt to negotiate a kinder, gentler end to the war (for Japan), by increasing the total butcher’s bill for defeating them, would not work. The 2nd bomb made this obvious, and the war ended. The quickest method of stopping the killing, for the fewest total casualties possible, for all concerned, save only if we had surrendered to them, had been used.

GKC

 

[Ridgerunner]

No, this was not in play, at the last. Whatever his position from the beginning, Hirohito had moved to supporting ending the war at least by June, and the 2nd gozen kaigan on Aug 10 was arranged (in violation of the usual policy) to permit him to direct the acceptance of the Potsdam accord, by sleight of hand.

The sticking points between the peace faction of the Supreme Committee on the Conduct of the War, and the Anami/Four Condition group there, was primarily based on the continuance of the kokutai, of which the role of the Emperor was the main point. No one at that level could seriously deny that the war was lost. The question was how much could be salvaged, by conducting the* ketsugo* defense plan against the invasion that was known to be coming, to avoid unconditional surrender, war trials, disarmament, and occupation. All part of maintaining the national polity. Of which the Emperor was the main point. It is not a case of assuming the innocence of the Emperor throughout the war. It was a question of what was to be done, in July/August 1945: accept the Potsdam Declaration, or attempt to negotiate a better settlement by drawing out the bloodbath, as had been rehearsed on Okinawa.

Bergamini, in his massive work, takes a “Hirohito was guilty” approach. We may have discussed it before; I did with someone here. But whether he was or was not, and to what degree, at the end, in the last 3 months, the end game played out as I have said. Or, at least, my 19+ years of reading in the area, and my roughly 100 books on the topic have so convinced me. Not likely to stumble over something that turns that around.

Bottom line. The 2nd bomb ended Anami’s resistance to accepting the Potsdam Declaration. It was his clique’s opposition that drew the resolution out. When it ended, so did the war.

Added:

A quick search and I see it was you that discussed Bergamini with me. I am still of the same opinion.

GKC

I do not dispute your superior scholarship on the subject. However, I am not entirely sure the two thoughts are mutually exclusive. When speaking of a “peace faction” within the ranks of those who actually had any power or influence, one has to think of it in terms of WHY they wanted peace. Were they truly of a pacific mind, or did they think it was an expedient they had better pursue? While some might not have recognized it as early as some, it would have been difficult at a point for any Japanese “in the know” to be unaware the war was going to be lost, and perhaps earlier than we often think. Upon that realization, what would be the most intelligent course?

And, of course, one needs to consider the degree to which anyone realizing the war was going to be lost, dared to say it openly, no matter what his power or position was. There are those who believe Yamamoto, for instance, realized it was “game over” after Midway. To whom could he/did he say it? Was his possible “suicide by Lightning” a protest? Was it “suggested”?

Regardless, it does appear you and I are in agreement that the atomic bombs allowed Japanese leadership a way to end the war that had theretofore been elusive to them. If that’s so, then the actual effect of the bombs was political, and discussion of their necessity in purely military terms is only academic.

 

[GKC]

I do not dispute your superior scholarship on the subject. However, I am not entirely sure the two thoughts are mutually exclusive. When speaking of a “peace faction” within the ranks of those who actually had any power or influence, one has to think of it in terms of WHY they wanted peace. Were they truly of a pacific mind, or did they think it was an expedient they had better pursue? While some might not have recognized it as early as some, it would have been difficult at a point for any Japanese “in the know” to be unaware the war was going to be lost, and perhaps earlier than we often think. Upon that realization, what would be the most intelligent course?

And, of course, one needs to consider the degree to which anyone realizing the war was going to be lost, dared to say it openly, no matter what his power or position was. There are those who believe Yamamoto, for instance, realized it was “game over” after Midway. To whom could he/did he say it? Was his possible “suicide by Lightning” a protest? Was it “suggested”?

Regardless, it does appear you and I are in agreement that the atomic bombs allowed Japanese leadership a way to end the war that had theretofore been elusive to them. If that’s so, then the actual effect of the bombs was political, and discussion of their necessity in purely military terms is only academic.

You’re right, and it is as I often say here, history is complex. It is a lot of either/and/or.

Several points:

The actual state of Japan’s fortunes in the war was largely unknown below the highest level of command and government. The efforts taken to hide the true results of Midway from general knowledge being a case in point as to how this was taken. The true state of affairs, as revealed in August, took the populace generally by surprise.

Large numbers of those at a high level of authority realized, at varying times, that it was highly unlikely that the Japanese could defeat the US, in any traditional, meaningful way. Indeed, the Japanese game plan in the war was a little ad hoc, from the first, with the main goal being to acquire a large amount of buffering territory, comprising the requisite resources to maintain their military capability, and defend this, while waiting for the US to negotiate, ending hostilities with Japan’s empire intact, and western influence in the Pacific basically gone. Central to this was the idea that the US would tire of the war, not possessing the racial virtues of Yamato, plus the concept, varying in application throughout the war, but central to the Japanese thinking, of the “decisive battle”. Midway, in Japan’s eyes was to be such a battle. From there on, that concept always drove Japanese strategy, again in an ad hoc fashion (the next decisive battle would be the decisive battle). There would be, at some point, a battle that would break the US will to continue the sacrifices. At the very end, this concept was behind the ketsugo plan. The idea of the decisive battle in Japanese planning had gone from that of a naval battle against the US fleet approaching Japan, after hostilities had begun, to the idea of a suicidal, unrestrained battle for each inch of the Home Islands, where, finally the US would back down from the bloodbath necessary to defeat Japan, and negotiate an end to the war on (it was assumed) at least a minimally acceptable level for Japan. This was the status of the Japanese strategy as of August 45. The aim was to ensure the continuance of the kokutai, and of the inviolability of the Home Islands, the position of the ruling structures, including the military, and, at best, the retention of some portions of the Japanese conquest, in China, Korea and a few other places. This was the position of the Anami group.

Even this position recognized that, in any traditional sense, the war was “lost” (note that even those who accepted this had varying ideas about what this meant). The power structure (the Supreme Committee for Conduct of the War, and several ancillary persons, plus the Emperor) were ready for a cessation of the war, to preserve the national polity. What was at issue was how much bargaining room did they have. What they were not in agreement on was the idea of surrender, pre the bombs.What the bombs did was put an end to the idea that the Japanese had any means to control how the war ended, save to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Which, as even some of the Japanese ruling group could see, was not quite unconditional surrender. In this sense, I’d call the effect of the bombs military, political, and psychological.

I’ve noted before something Max Hastings said, in his RETRIBUTION ( a pretty good book on this general subject). Hastings said that the Japanese had no realistic sense of the connection between the state of the war at a given point and their ability to control/manipulate the end game. They lived in a fantasy world, fashioned from their culture and its assumptions, as developed in the pre war twentieth century, where their spiritual strength was always decisive over mere material strength, in the end. That conviction, and their actions over 15 years, cost them dearly. But not as much as it would have, given any other possible end game. And, as Marquis Kido asserted, it was the Nagasaki bomb that permitted a surrender; not in the sense of “face”, but in the sense of grasping at any meaningful ability to perpetuate the national polity.

I think we have discussed Yamamoto before. I see nothing to support anything along the lines you are suggesting.

Bottom line: we agree on the bottom line.

GKC