Fighting a Just War today from lessons of WW II

[Ridgerunner]

You’re right, and it is as I often say here, history is complex. It is a lot of either/and/or.

Several points:

The actual state of Japan’s fortunes in the war was largely unknown below the highest level of command and government. The efforts taken to hide the true results of Midway from general knowledge being a case in point as to how this was taken. The true state of affairs, as revealed in August, took the populace generally by surprise.

Large numbers of those at a high level of authority realized, at varying times, that it was highly unlikely that the Japanese could defeat the US, in any traditional, meaningful way. Indeed, the Japanese game plan in the war was a little ad hoc, from the first, with the main goal being to acquire a large amount of buffering territory, comprising the requisite resources to maintain their military capability, and defend this, while waiting for the US to negotiate, ending hostilities with Japan’s empire intact, and western influence in the Pacific basically gone. Central to this was the idea that the US would tire of the war, not possessing the racial virtues of Yamato, plus the concept, varying in application throughout the war, but central to the Japanese thinking, of the “decisive battle”. Midway, in Japan’s eyes was to be such a battle. From there on, that concept always drove Japanese strategy, again in an ad hoc fashion (the next decisive battle would be the decisive battle). There would be, at some point, a battle that would break the US will to continue the sacrifices. At the very end, this concept was behind the ketsugo plan. The idea of the decisive battle in Japanese planning had gone from that of a naval battle against the US fleet approaching Japan, after hostilities had begun, to the idea of a suicidal, unrestrained battle for each inch of the Home Islands, where, finally the US would back down from the bloodbath necessary to defeat Japan, and negotiate an end to the war on (it was assumed) at least a minimally acceptable level for Japan. This was the status of the Japanese strategy as of August 45. The aim was to ensure the continuance of the kokutai, and of the inviolability of the Home Islands, the position of the ruling structures, including the military, and, at best, the retention of some portions of the Japanese conquest, in China, Korea and a few other places. This was the position of the Anami group.

Even this position recognized that, in any traditional sense, the war was “lost” (note that even those who accepted this had varying ideas about what this meant). The power structure (the Supreme Committee for Conduct of the War, and several ancillary persons, plus the Emperor) were ready for a cessation of the war, to preserve the national polity. What was at issue was how much bargaining room did they have. What they were not in agreement on was the idea of surrender, pre the bombs.What the bombs did was put an end to the idea that the Japanese had any means to control how the war ended, save to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Which, as even some of the Japanese ruling group could see, was not quite unconditional surrender. In this sense, I’d call the effect of the bombs military, political, and psychological.

I’ve noted before something Max Hastings said, in his RETRIBUTION ( a pretty good book on this general subject). Hastings said that the Japanese had no realistic sense of the connection between the state of the war at a given point and their ability to control/manipulate the end game. They lived in a fantasy world, fashioned from their culture and its assumptions, as developed in the pre war twentieth century, where their spiritual strength was always decisive over mere material strength, in the end. That conviction, and their actions over 15 years, cost them dearly. But not as much as it would have, given any other possible end game. And, as Marquis Kido asserted, it was the Nagasaki bomb that permitted a surrender; not in the sense of “face”, but in the sense of grasping at any meaningful ability to perpetuate the national polity.

I think we have discussed Yamamoto before. I see nothing to support anything along the lines you are suggesting.

Bottom line: we agree on the bottom line.

GKC

Just a quibble at the edges here. I don’t see how the Japanese leaders could have reasonably believed their 'spiritual strength" would be sufficient much after Midway. They got their heads handed to them by Zhukhov in 1939. Yes, the Soviets were, at least until 1943, uncertainly able to prevail over Germany. But they had to be aware, after that, that the Soviets would prevail, were aggressively inclined in the Far East and could be a very strong enemy. In addition, U.S. production of materiel was, by Midway, already exceeding Japanese production and on the rise, and they had to know that. It was soon apparent that the U.S. (less so the Brits, but still in) was entirely willing to fight a two-front war, and if it became a one-front war against Japan?

On the other hand, I can’t really argue against the proposition that at least some Japanese leaders might have thought perhaps they could salvage something in China. Realizing this is at least partly anecdotal, the Japanes gentleman of whom I spoke earlier told me there was no serious effort by Japan at all, near the end, to remove its soldiers from China, though there were some efforts at resupply. Granted, Japan’s ability to get its soldiers back was minimal. But to not even try when there was a strong likelihood the home islands would be invaded? I can’t now remember the numbers, but it was upward of a million Japanese soldiers still in China when the war ended.

The man of whom I spoke considered himself, and rightly, extremely fortunate to have been able to surrender to western forces instead of to the Soviets. But it was a near thing for him, and the whole “dividing up” process was pretty arbitrary.

 

[GKC]

Just a quibble at the edges here. I don’t see how the Japanese leaders could have reasonably believed their 'spiritual strength" would be sufficient much after Midway. They got their heads handed to them by Zhukhov in 1939. Yes, the Soviets were, at least until 1943, uncertainly able to prevail over Germany. But they had to be aware, after that, that the Soviets would prevail, were aggressively inclined in the Far East and could be a very strong enemy. In addition, U.S. production of materiel was, by Midway, already exceeding Japanese production and on the rise, and they had to know that. It was soon apparent that the U.S. (less so the Brits, but still in) was entirely willing to fight a two-front war, and if it became a one-front war against Japan?

On the other hand, I can’t really argue against the proposition that at least some Japanese leaders might have thought perhaps they could salvage something in China. Realizing this is at least partly anecdotal, the Japanes gentleman of whom I spoke earlier told me there was no serious effort by Japan at all, near the end, to remove its soldiers from China, though there were some efforts at resupply. Granted, Japan’s ability to get its soldiers back was minimal. But to not even try when there was a strong likelihood the home islands would be invaded? I can’t now remember the numbers, but it was upward of a million Japanese soldiers still in China when the war ended.

The man of whom I spoke considered himself, and rightly, extremely fortunate to have been able to surrender to western forces instead of to the Soviets. But it was a near thing for him, and the whole “dividing up” process was pretty arbitrary.

Nomonhan. Just got a new book on it.

It was believed because it was an article of faith. It was an article of faith that weakened, as reality intruded, but it was operative, in many levels of the society, to the end. As to the Soviets, there were actually factions that wanted to take advantage of the Soviets situation in 1942, to start the Northward advance, that had been debated before the Southern strategy was started. But generally, the Japanese wanted no no part of the Soviets. Which is why the announcement that the treaty between the Soviets and Japan would not renewed, in early 1945, was a shock. Which didn’t prevent the unauthorized attempt to approach the Soviets, in late July, to see if there was a possibility of them using their good offices as a go between for the negotiations that the peace faction wanted to pursue. A dream world. The Soviets had their own plans but it wasn’t clear what they were until 8 Aug.

While it was an article of faith, it wasn’t what drove the Japanese powers that were to prolong the fight. Not in the sense of final traditional victory. But because of the Yamato spirit, they were able to offer the gyokusai, the shattering of the jewels, in essence a nationwide willingness to make, in effect, a kamikaze offering of the nation, the so-called 100 million (actually around 72 million). It was that spiritual strength that was relied upon to defeat the effete materialists. Logical? Of course not. Something that not all, and progressively fewer, accepted? Sure. Operative to the last minute? Yes.

What you said about the Kwantung Army is not correct, with all due respect to your source. It was systematically stripped of its best combat units, which were sent (not all got there, of course), in the last year or so, to reinforce precisely the Home Islands, particularly Kyushu, as well as the Philippines, and was a hollow force with mostly ill-trained recruits, when the Soviets attacked in Aug.

The story of the Soviet attacks, what territory they wanted, what territory they got (through conquest, Primarily large chunks of Manchuria, parts of China, Korea, lower Sakhalin Island, and the Kuriles), and the casualties that resulted, after the Japanese had actually surrendered, is an interesting topic in itself. They wanted half of Hokkaido, for example. Didn’t get it.

GKC

 

[tomarin]

The story of the Soviet attacks, what territory they wanted, what territory they got (through conquest, Primarily large chunks of Manchuria, parts of China, Korea, lower Sakhalin Island, and the Kuriles), and the casualties that resulted, after the Japanese had actually surrendered, is an interesting topic in itself. They wanted half of Hokkaido, for example. Didn’t get it.

The Japanese are still pretty mad about the Russians grabbing the Kuriles at the tail-end of the war. I’m glad they didn’t get their clutches on Hokkaido.

 

[GKC]

The Japanese are still pretty mad about the Russians grabbing the Kuriles at the tail-end of the war. I’m glad they didn’t get their clutches on Hokkaido.

MacArthur told them to buzz off. Since their amphibious capability was nil, they did.

They also wanted joint occupation powers in Japan, as in Germany. Based on their roughly 15 days of combat (which was what got them the land they stood on). Truman told them to buzz off.

GKC

 

[tomarin]

MacArthur told them to buzz off. Since their amphibious capability was nil, they did.

They also wanted joint occupation powers in Japan, as in Germany. Based on their roughly 15 days of combat (which was what got them the land they stood on). Truman told them to buzz off.

GKC

The only imaginable response to that request would be a telegram consisting of simply “Ha ha ha ha ha!”

 

[GKC]

The only imaginable response to that request would be a telegram consisting of simply “Ha ha ha ha ha!”

And an offer to let them tour Hiroshima.

GKC

 

[tomarin]

And an offer to let them tour Hiroshima.

GKC

That too.

 

[Ridgerunner]

Nomonhan. What you said about the Kwantung Army is not correct, with all due respect to your source. It was systematically stripped of its best combat units, which were sent (not all got there, of course), in the last year or so, to reinforce precisely the Home Islands, particularly Kyushu, as well as the Philippines, and was a hollow force with mostly ill-trained recruits, when the Soviets attacked in Aug.

Not sure what part of what I said about the Kwantung Army was incorrect. What I said was (or tried to say) that I doubted the commonly accepted view that it was “out of control” prior to the war, and more or less pulled Japan into aggression in China. From what I have read, and from the Japanese gentleman said to me, I very much doubt that was the case.

I am not questioning that there were Strike North and Strike South factions, or that the Emperor ultimately favored the latter. That, however, does not mean the Kwantung Army was out of control or that the leadership was somehow opposed to taking control of Manchuria or much of China, for that matter.

I don’t particularly doubt that some of the best units in China were cannibalized late in the war. They were, like the Misty Lagoon fliers who also “cut their teeth” in China, the most experienced and seasoned. Late in the war, Japan (like Germany) was running out of its best troops and fliers. But the fact remains that Japan had over a million soldiers in China when the war ended. Whether or not that represented a last-ditch hope that somehow some gains in China would be retained is not something about which I have an opinion. I allowed only that it was possible, in response to your expressed opinion that some Japanese maintained hope of retaining some part of the empire.

Perhaps I can be persuaded that it was a “hollow force”. Nevertheless, the U.S. rearmed some of them when U.S. forces were attacked by Communist Chinese, and they proved themselves able to repel the Communists, saving both themselves and their American captors.

 

[GKC]

Not sure what part of what I said about the Kwantung Army was incorrect. What I said was (or tried to say) that I doubted the commonly accepted view that it was “out of control” prior to the war, and more or less pulled Japan into aggression in China. From what I have read, and from the Japanese gentleman said to me, I very much doubt that was the case.

I am not questioning that there were Strike North and Strike South factions, or that the Emperor ultimately favored the latter. That, however, does not mean the Kwantung Army was out of control or that the leadership was somehow opposed to taking control of Manchuria or much of China, for that matter.

I don’t particularly doubt that some of the best units in China were cannibalized late in the war. They were, like the Misty Lagoon fliers who also “cut their teeth” in China, the most experienced and seasoned. Late in the war, Japan (like Germany) was running out of its best troops and fliers. But the fact remains that Japan had over a million soldiers in China when the war ended. Whether or not that represented a last-ditch hope that somehow some gains in China would be retained is not something about which I have an opinion. I allowed only that it was possible, in response to your expressed opinion that some Japanese maintained hope of retaining some part of the empire.

Perhaps I can be persuaded that it was a “hollow force”. Nevertheless, the U.S. rearmed some of them when U.S. forces were attacked by Communist Chinese, and they proved themselves able to repel the Communists, saving both themselves and their American captors.

From what I have read (re: the first para) that was most definitely the case, but that wasn’t the subject I was speaking of. That was your statement, from your acquaintance, that there was no serious effort by Japan at all, near the end, to remove its soldiers from China, though there were some efforts at resupply. It is possible that two things are being mixed here: the Japanese Army in China, and the particular Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Both were used as reinforcements for other Pacific fronts, but after the* Ichigo* offensive in SW China was approved, from Jan 44 on, the Kwantung Army alone supplied almost the entirety of the reinforcements. It is the Kwantung Army alone I’m speaking of. By Jan 45, eleven of its front line divisions had been sent to other areas. After Okinawa was lost, the Kwantung Army was basically abandoned to its own devices for the last two months of the war. Drea (IN THE SERVICE OF THE EMPEROR:ESSAYS ON THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY and JAPAN’S IMPERIAL ARMY:ITS RISE AND FALL, 1853-1945) puts the strength of the KA, in July 1945, at 700,000, ill-trained and ill-equipped. I have seen higher figures, (up to 1.3 million), but the combat effectiveness is always rated poor. The Russians, around 1.5 million, cut them to pieces, in less than 2 weeks of fighting.

I recall mention in a number of places, of the use, by Americans and British, particularly in the Burma/South China areas, of captured Japanese troops for policing duties, but that didn’t involve combat against Chinese Communists. Given the state of the Japanese forces, after their defeat by the Russians, where were the Communists opposed by the Japanese, post-surrender? How did they protect American troops against the Communist Chinese? It almost sounds familiar, too. But it doesn’t sound like anything that would have occurred in the Kwantung Army area.

Nothing I’m asserting is not conventional wisdom. And my hobby reading has convinced me that it is accepted conventional wisdom for a reason.

 

[Ridgerunner]

From what I have read (re: the first para) that was most definitely the case, but that wasn’t the subject I was speaking of. That was your statement, from your acquaintance, that there was no serious effort by Japan at all, near the end, to remove its soldiers from China, though there were some efforts at resupply. It is possible that two things are being mixed here: the Japanese Army in China, and the particular Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Both were used as reinforcements for other Pacific fronts, but after the* Ichigo* offensive in SW China was approved, from Jan 44 on, the Kwantung Army alone supplied almost the entirety of the reinforcements. It is the Kwantung Army alone I’m speaking of. By Jan 45, eleven of its front line divisions had been sent to other areas. After Okinawa was lost, the Kwantung Army was basically abandoned to its own devices for the last two months of the war. Drea (IN THE SERVICE OF THE EMPEROR:ESSAYS ON THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY and JAPAN’S IMPERIAL ARMY:ITS RISE AND FALL, 1853-1945) puts the strength of the KA, in July 1945, at 700,000, ill-trained and ill-equipped. I have seen higher figures, (up to 1.3 million), but the combat effectiveness is always rated poor. The Russians, around 1.5 million, cut them to pieces, in less than 2 weeks of fighting.

I recall mention in a number of places, of the use, by Americans and British, particularly in the Burma/South China areas, of captured Japanese troops for policing duties, but that didn’t involve combat against Chinese Communists. Given the state of the Japanese forces, after their defeat by the Russians, where were the Communists opposed by the Japanese, post-surrender? How did they protect American troops against the Communist Chinese? It almost sounds familiar, too. But it doesn’t sound like anything that would have occurred in the Kwantung Army area.

Nothing I’m asserting is not conventional wisdom. And my hobby reading has convinced me that it is accepted conventional wisdom for a reason.

I do not assert that the Kwantung Army was particularly effective as a force in Manchuria at the end of the war. I have no idea, and therefore no reason to question your assessment of it. If they were outnumbered two to one as you say, one would not expect them to be terribly effective, particularly if they had no longer been supplied for some time and if they had no combat objectives other than self-preservation locally. And, of course, by then Soviet weaponry was greatly superior.

Nor do I know whether re-arming of Japanese soldiers occurred in Manchuria. I have only read that it happened in China. I do recall my acquaintence having said that he and others in his particular unit (how many, I don’t know) came very close to being captured by the Soviets but by some fluke were captured by Americans instead. If he told me exactly how that happened, I no longer remember what he said about it.

I do remember he said he and the others were well-treated by the Americans and were shipped back to Japan very quickly. He said nothing about he or his comrades being re-armed, and my impression was that they surrendered, were disarmed, fed and given medical treatment and sent back to Japan without much delay.

The only conventional wisdom I questioned is the one about how the KA was, in the invasion of Manchuria and its expansion, “out of control” of the Japanese leaders who counted and was doing it “on its own”, led by renegade officers.

 

[GKC]

I do not assert that the Kwantung Army was particularly effective as a force in Manchuria at the end of the war. I have no idea, and therefore no reason to question your assessment of it. If they were outnumbered two to one as you say, one would not expect them to be terribly effective, particularly if they had no longer been supplied for some time and if they had no combat objectives other than self-preservation locally. And, of course, by then Soviet weaponry was greatly superior.

Nor do I know whether re-arming of Japanese soldiers occurred in Manchuria. I have only read that it happened in China. I do recall my acquaintence having said that he and others in his particular unit (how many, I don’t know) came very close to being captured by the Soviets but by some fluke were captured by Americans instead. If he told me exactly how that happened, I no longer remember what he said about it.

I do remember he said he and the others were well-treated by the Americans and were shipped back to Japan very quickly. He said nothing about he or his comrades being re-armed, and my impression was that they surrendered, were disarmed, fed and given medical treatment and sent back to Japan without much delay.

The only conventional wisdom I questioned is the one about how the KA was, in the invasion of Manchuria and its expansion, “out of control” of the Japanese leaders who counted and was doing it “on its own”, led by renegade officers.

Fair enough. Your ultimate point we seem to differ on, but, as compared to the interest I take in, and the effort I exert with respect to, correcting the subject usually discussed in threads such as this, I don’t think its worth pursuing.

GKC