Filioque, One Principle, "From" as "Through"

[Ghosty]

Rohzek: Citing a Reformed theologian doesn’t really support your claims about Latin teaching. St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, directly contradicts your claim. Do you have any writings by Latin theologians that support your claim? Here is a passage from Aquinas (emphasis mine):

The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and soul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these is this particular man distinguished from all other men.*** Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other persons***. Hence this name “Father,” whereby paternity is signified, is the proper name of the person of the Father.

The Council of Florence also explicitly states that it is the Father is the “source and principle of all deity”, among many other statements of the same kind.

If Begetting was not specific to the Father alone, but was of the Divine Essence, then the Father could not be distinguished by Begetting. St. Thomas here is actually exactly mirroring St. Gregory’s statement in the previous citation, namely that it is relations of origin that define the Persons.

I’m afraid I can’t address what a Reformed theologian says regarding the Trinity; he may be misrepresenting Latin theology, or he may simply be expressing it poorly. I’m concerned only with the actual Catholic teachings on the matter.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Ghosty]

It is a subtle but important thing that the persons are the subsisting relations themselves.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and not by the relation.
Reply to Objection 1: The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.
sacred-texts.com/chr/aquinas/summa/sum044.htm

Indeed, and thanks for bringing this up. Not only are the relations of origin specific to the Persons and not of the Divine Essence, they are the only things specific to the Persons, and indeed the Persons are identified by/as these relations. This is why all three of their names are relational names.

It is impossible that the very thing that distinguishes a Person is common to the Divine Essence. That is a contradiction.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Wandile]

As for the second part, I ask that you please include a larger section of it, as I cannot find it myself in order to check the context.

The second quote explains perfectly what the first quote was trying to say. Here is a larger passage :

"…,are not the Arians confuted on every side? And especially by John, that the Son is in the Father in one way, and we become in Him in another, and that neither we shall ever be as He, nor is the Word as we; except they shall dare, as commonly, so now to say, that the Son also by participation of the Spirit and by improvement of conduct came to be Himself also in the Father. But here again is an excess of irreligion, even in admitting the thought. For He, as has been said, gives to the Spirit, and whatever the Spirit has, He has from the Word.

The Arians believed that the Son became who he was because of the participation of the Holy Spirit in him as the Holy Spirit does with us. Thus he admonishes them by saying we will never be as the Son is for St Athanasius says in the same passage :

"…Not then as the Son in the Father, so also we become in the Father; for the Son does not merely partake the Spirit, that therefore He too may be in the Father; nor does He receive the Spirit, but rather He supplies It Himself to all; and the Spirit does not unite the Word to the Father , but rather the Spirit receives from the Word. And the Son is in the Father, as His own Word and Radiance; but we, apart from the Spirit, are strange and distant from God, and by the participation of the Spirit we are knit into the Godhead

Further when he says “For He, as has been said, gives to the Spirit, and whatever the Spirit has, He has from the Word.”, we have to admit the truth that whatever the Spirit has includes His existence, that is, it includes His essence and hypostasis. Ergo St. Athanasius explicitly taught that the Father, through and with the Son, communicates consubstantial divinity and thus gives existence to the Holy Spirit, without prejudice to the Father being the principle without principle as the spirit is from him immediately and from the son mediately. He does this highlight how unlike us who are only in God through partaking in the Spirit, the Christ is not in God in the same manner And proves this by showing how the Spirit is actually from the Son and receives from the Son everything that he is. St Hilary also explicitly pointed out that to proceed from the Father and to receive from the Son must be regarded as one and the same thing.

This is hardly clear. If anything, it just simply reaffirms that all of them share the same substance, as he is speaking of nature. It does not speak of where the the personhood of the Holy Spirit is derived from. It is merely making the statement that the essence of the Holy Spirit derives from both. Without further context, I don’t see what else I could derive from this.

 

[Rohzek]

Rohzek: Citing a Reformed theologian doesn’t really support your claims about Latin teaching. St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, directly contradicts your claim. Do you have any writings by Latin theologians that support your claim? Here is a passage from Aquinas (emphasis mine):

The Council of Florence also explicitly states that it is the Father is the “source and principle of all deity”, among many other statements of the same kind.

If Begetting was not specific to the Father alone, but was of the Divine Essence, then the Father could not be distinguished by Begetting. St. Thomas here is actually exactly mirroring St. Gregory’s statement in the previous citation, namely that it is relations of origin that define the Persons.

I’m afraid I can’t address what a Reformed theologian says regarding the Trinity; he may be misrepresenting Latin theology, or he may simply be expressing it poorly. I’m concerned only with the actual Catholic teachings on the matter.

Peace and God bless!

A Reformed theologian is not by that very virtue necessarily wrong. And quite frankly, Catholicism and Protestantism are both Latin branches of Christianity. If you want to argue that they now hold different ideas regarding the Trinity and the Filioque, then I think that is an argument well worth pursuing. At any rate, we can set him aside since we are only concerned with present-day Catholicism.

As for Florence, I am still at a loss of its vagueness. Is it making this proclamation about the Essence of the Father or the Person of the Father? I think this is the essential question that has to be answered.

As for Aquinas, again, I do not think Aquinas or other scholastics fully distinguished between the Persons and the Essence. Vico’s second post on page one has what I believe a critical passage in this regard. Perhaps I am simply misunderstanding something here.

Let me first state this, before I ask a question: I know that the Filioque is NOT advocating a double procession. It clearly does not, and that has been argued since the very origins of the controversy. So now the question: How does Latin theology otherwise maintain the monarchy of the Father with the additional Filioque clause without believing that the Son is begotten from the Essence of the Father?

Now your objection might be to the last statement/question, that that is self-contradictory because then it destroys any act of distinguishment between the persons. But it is my understanding that this complication is avoided if one accepts the idea that distinguishing Person from Essence is simply not possible. However, distinguishing Persons from each other is possible. Therefore, one could argue that the Son is begotten of both the person and the essence of the Father. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the essence and person of the Father. The Holy Spirit also only proceeds from the essence of the Son, but not the person. But if you argue that the Holy Spirit proceeds from also the essence and the person of the Son, then I must simply again ask as to how you then can possibly maintain the monarchy of the Father?

If I have this whole thing wrong, then please correct me.

 

[Rohzek]

So apparently my supposition is wrong according to this Catholic theologian:

“Rather, in the Filioque, a third possibility is presented in regard to the procession of the Spirit. For, as the West confesses, the Spirit does not proceeds as an action of the consubstantial Nature (Substance) or as the act of only one Divine Person divorced from any other. Rather, He proceeds from the act of one Divine Person (the Father) with the Personal participation of another Divine Person (the Son). If such a Personal participation is impossible for Father and Son, since (so someone might say) it excludes the Person of the Spirit from Their consubstantial communion, then it must also be impossible for the Father (as a only one Person within the consubstantial Trinity) to act in any Personal capacity on His own, thus making Him unable to beget the Son (or to spirate the Spirit). Yet, no Eastern Orthodox (or Catholic) would ever maintain such a thing. In reality, the Spirit is not excluded from the consubstantial communion accounting for His own procession, given that this is an eternal and simultaneous reality –that is, the Father’s eternal begetting of the Son is the very same arch as His spirating of the Spirit. The Speaker (the Father) Who eternally utters the eternal Word (the Son) simultaneously releases (spirates) the eternal Breath (the Spirit) –a Breath released because of the utterance of the eternal Word, and so with the eternal Word’s intrinsic participation (i.e., “through the Son”). Thus, the entire consubstantial nature of God is involved; but the Spirit’s procession is brought about (in a collective sense) via the participation of two Persons (the Father and the Son) within that consubstantial nature” - catholic-legate.com/articles/filioque.html

So at this point, I am still left wondering then how the monarchy of the Father is maintained in this Trinitarian schema. I’ve read the article, but I am still confused. If possible, please refer back to this article in order to guide me along in this, although it is not necessary.

 

[Ghosty]

Rohzek: First off let me commend and thank you for reading up on the subject and being open to amending your understanding. It’s been a long time since I’ve had a discussion on this topic and it is a pleasure to see someone who is willing to look these things up with an open mind!

As for Reformed theology vs. Catholic theology, while Reformed theology broke off from Latin theology, it truly did “break off” and has not maintained any formal connection to Latin teaching. Indeed, the fundamental split between the Church and the Reformers had to do with profound theological differences, and after the split the divisions only multiplied. While some there may be similarities between the theologies of some Reformed theologians and theological traditions in the Church, these similarities can’t be relied upon; Catholic theologians are still subject to correction by Tradition and the Church, while Reformed theologians are not. Since Reformed theologians don’t answer to a body that maintains Apostolic Tradition, they are free to make any declarations and promote any idea they like, which is not the case with Catholics.

I will have more time later to get into the Monarchy of the Father, but for now I’ll just point you back towards the illustration by St. John of Damascus. In the analogy of the spring-river-sea the spring alone is the ultimate source of all water. The river and sea are water because of the nature of the spring, and they exist only by the action of the spring. While the sea does flow from both the spring and river together, and from the perspective of the sea there can be said to be a single flow of water into it, the distinction between river and spring is maintained. They are distinct by virtue of their relationship with each other, regardless of their unity from the perspective of the sea. Although the spring shares its nature and even the flowing forth of water with the river, it remains the source of all water, and the sole, fundamental origin of the flow. The river participates in the flowing of water from spring to the sea, and the sea does not form without the river, but the river is forever distinct from the spring by virtue of its own origin.

In short, we don’t look at the relationship of the river and the sea to find the distinguishing feature of the spring, rather we look at the relationship between the spring and the river. Seeing that they are truly distinct while sharing their nature and flow of water we can then evaluate the origin of the sea. While looking at the sea we can say that there is a single flow of water, a single “procession”, and that the spring and river are fully united in this flow, and indeed can be said to operate as one when taking the perspective of the sea alone, but this does not jeopardize the distinct characters of the spring and river, nor does it eliminate the unique distinction of the spring as the sole source of all water. Even when we say that the spring does not supply the sea without the river, and that they supply the water equally, the unique distinction of the spring remains inviolate.

I think you’ll find that if you meditate on this analogy, and replace spring-river-sea with Father-Son-Holy Spirit, you can begin to understand better the Latin conception. It might even be helpful to read some of the Latin writings about the Trinity, specifically from the Council of Florence, and replace the names of the Divine Persons with the names from the analogy and see how it fits together rather seamlessly.

Hope that helps for now. I’ll write more later when I have time!

God bless!

P.S. Regarding the distinction between Person and Essence, it occurs to me that this illustration may help on that issue as well. We would not say that there is a distinction between river (person) and water (essence), but rather between river and spring. The river is water, and the water is the same from the spring and the river, and yet the spring and the river remain distinct. We don’t look for a difference between water and river (there is none) to uniquely identify the river, rather we look at its relationship to the spring. The water is identical for all three, but they retain their unique identifiers based on their participation in the water.

 

[Cavaradossi]

Here’s a link to the fuller context of the quote from St. John of Damascus. It really doesn’t address the issue in depth, but I was simply using his words as illustration.

St. Gregory of Nyssa, however, is much more explicit in “Not Three Gods”, which can be found here. Of particular interest is this passage, found on page 10 of that website:

That passage from St Gregory of Nyssa in particular has been mistranslated.

 

[Ghosty]

That passage from St Gregory of Nyssa in particular has been mistranslated.

I know that the term “first” has been added in the English, but is because the Greek term is much more specific than the equivalent English. Do you have a translation you prefer?

Peace and God bless!

 

[Richca]

****:
Richa: It is incorrect to say that the there is no distinction in Latin theology between Essence and Person. If that were the case then the Son would beget Himself. It would also mean that there are either three Gods, as there are three Persons and therefore three Essences, or else there would be One Person that presents Himself in three manners.

Peace and God bless!

Hello ghosty,

Aquinas is very clear that in God the essence is the same as the person (cf. ST, I, q.39, art.1). He is also clear that the relations in God are the same as the essence (cf. ST, I, q.28, art.2). As the CCC#255 states: “Indeed, everything in them is one where there is no opposition of relationship” (Council of Florence). Between the Divine Relations and the Divine Essence, no relative opposition exists. Consequently, the only distinction that can be found in the one God are the relations which are four in number, namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Of these four, only three are really distinct, namely, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration or procession.

 

[Ghosty]

Hello ghosty,

Aquinas is very clear that in God the essence is the same as the person (cf. ST, I, q.39, art.1). He is also clear that the relations in God are the same as the essence (cf. ST, I, q.28, art.2). As the CCC#255 states: “Indeed, everything in them is one where there is no opposition of relationship” (Council of Florence). Between the Divine Relations and the Divine Essence, no relative opposition exists. Consequently, the only distinction that can be found in the one God are the relations which are four in number, namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Of these four, only three are really distinct, namely, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration or procession.

Yes, but it is precisely these distinctions that we are speaking of. It is not the Essence that begets, but the Father. The Father is Paternity. If the Essence begets, then the Son both begets and is begotten, and the Holy Spirit begets the Son, but this would eliminate the very distinction of Persons that Aquinas is speaking of.

To use the Council of Florence’s terms, the opposition of relationship is the way we identify Divine Persons, so we can’t attribute any of these relationships to the common Essence.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Richca]

Now your objection might be to the last statement/question, that that is self-contradictory because then it destroys any act of distinguishment between the persons. But it is my understanding that this complication is avoided if one accepts the idea that distinguishing Person from Essence is simply not possible. However, distinguishing Persons from each other is possible. Therefore, one could argue that the Son is begotten of both the person and the essence of the Father. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the essence and person of the Father. The Holy Spirit also only proceeds from the essence of the Son, but not the person. But if you argue that the Holy Spirit proceeds from also the essence and the person of the Son, then I must simply again ask as to how you then can possibly maintain the monarchy of the Father?

If I have this whole thing wrong, then please correct me.

hello rohzek,

To understand catholic theology and the catholic teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit, I don’t think you have to concern yourself with distinguishing between the divine essence and the persons. As I mentioned in a previous post, catholic theology does not distinguish the divine persons from the divine nature else we would have another distinction in the Trinity besides the persons or relations. We only distinguish the persons from one another in their relations of origin. The idea that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the essence of the Son but not the person of the Son is not going to fly. For the essence of the Son which is the essence of the Father is the same as the person of the Son. Simply put, the Father is from no one, the Son is from the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit is from both. As far as worrying about how to maintain the monarchy of the Father, which I don’t believe He is much worried about, the Father is the source and origin of the Trinity. I don’t think anyone denies this.

 

[Vico]

A Reformed theologian is not by that very virtue necessarily wrong. And quite frankly, Catholicism and Protestantism are both Latin branches of Christianity. If you want to argue that they now hold different ideas regarding the Trinity and the Filioque, then I think that is an argument well worth pursuing. At any rate, we can set him aside since we are only concerned with present-day Catholicism.

As for Florence, I am still at a loss of its vagueness. Is it making this proclamation about the Essence of the Father or the Person of the Father? I think this is the essential question that has to be answered.

As for Aquinas, again, I do not think Aquinas or other scholastics fully distinguished between the Persons and the Essence. Vico’s second post on page one has what I believe a critical passage in this regard. Perhaps I am simply misunderstanding something here.

Let me first state this, before I ask a question: I know that the Filioque is NOT advocating a double procession. It clearly does not, and that has been argued since the very origins of the controversy. So now the question: How does Latin theology otherwise maintain the monarchy of the Father with the additional Filioque clause without believing that the Son is begotten from the Essence of the Father?

Now your objection might be to the last statement/question, that that is self-contradictory because then it destroys any act of distinguishment between the persons. But it is my understanding that this complication is avoided if one accepts the idea that distinguishing Person from Essence is simply not possible. However, distinguishing Persons from each other is possible. Therefore, one could argue that the Son is begotten of both the person and the essence of the Father. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the essence and person of the Father. The Holy Spirit also only proceeds from the essence of the Son, but not the person. But if you argue that the Holy Spirit proceeds from also the essence and the person of the Son, then I must simply again ask as to how you then can possibly maintain the monarchy of the Father?

If I have this whole thing wrong, then please correct me.

Catholic Encyclopedia discusses the filioque double procession:The dogma of the double Procession of the Holy Ghost from Father and Son as one Principle is directly opposed to the error that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, not from the Son. Neither dogma nor error created much difficulty during the course of the first four centuries.
Maas, A. (1909). Filioque. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
newadvent.org/cathen/06073a.htm

Catechism of the Catholic Church252 The Church uses

• (I) the term “substance” (rendered also at times by “essence” or “nature”) to designate the divine being in its unity,
• (II) the term “person” or “hypostasis” to designate the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the real distinction among them, and
• (III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church shows that* filioque* was taught as a dogma before the Symbol of 381 was accepted at the Council of Chalcedon.247 The affirmation of the *filioque *does not appear in the Creed confessed in 381 at Constantinople. But Pope St. Leo I, following an ancient Latin and Alexandrian tradition, had already confessed it dogmatically in 447,76 even before Rome, in 451 at the Council of Chalcedon, came to recognize and receive the Symbol of 381. The use of this formula in the Creed was gradually admitted into the Latin liturgy (between the eighth and eleventh centuries). The introduction of the filioque into the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed by the Latin liturgy constitutes moreover, even today, a point of disagreement with the Orthodox Churches.

 

[thinkandmull]

He says it because in the Father is unity, in the Son equality, and in the Holy Spirit the harmony of unity and equality.

So are you wondering about specific attributes of the persons, why in the Father is unity, in the Son equality, and in the Holy Spirit harmony? Remember that the divine persons are the relations and that person is essence, in the Trinity.

Augustine says in the Trinity “all equal because of the Son”. The Son is equal to the Father because of the Father.

Could you help me understand Aquinas also when he says "“Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the thing understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator”. Shouldn’t it be either “as the one understood” or “of the one understanding”?

 

[tomarin]

I too struggle with the Filioque problem, maybe I am being thick.

I know what we Catholics pray but is there a summary for the non-super intelligent?

There’s this. (I did purchase it, haven’t read it yet - maybe when I’m on the beach in Florida in a few weeks.)

 

[Vico]

Augustine says in the Trinity “all equal because of the Son”. The Son is equal to the Father because of the Father.

Could you help me understand Aquinas also when he says "“Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the thing understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator”. Shouldn’t it be either “as the one understood” or “of the one understanding”?

One, equal, and in concord (harmonious) are the terms used. (See Augustine below.)

• Unity is appropriated to the Father ( the “principle without principle”),
• Equality is appropriated to the Son (the “principle from a principle”)
• Concord is appropriated to the Holy Ghost (“He proceeds from two”)
• The word is the likeness of what is understood.
• The generated is the likeness of the generator.

Augustine, On Christian Doctrine

CHAP. 5.–THE TRINITY THE TRUE OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT.

In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the harmony of unity and equality; and these three attributes are all one because of the Father, all equal because of the Son, and all harmonious because of the Holy Spirit.

 

[thinkandmull]

“In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the harmony of unity and equality; and these three attributes are all one because of the Father, all equal because of the Son, and all harmonious because of the Holy Spirit.”

So the attributes of unity, equality, and harmony are all “equal because of the Son”. What does that mean?

“The word is the likeness of what is understood.” What do you mean? What is understood by the Father is the Son. You’re saying their is an idea between Them?

 

[Vico]

“In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the harmony of unity and equality; and these three attributes are all one because of the Father, all equal because of the Son, and all harmonious because of the Holy Spirit.”

So the attributes of unity, equality, and harmony are all “equal because of the Son”. What does that mean?

“The word is the likeness of what is understood.” What do you mean? What is understood by the Father is the Son. You’re saying their is an idea between Them?

Rather, what is understood by the Son (generated) is the Father (generator).

St. Thomas Aquinas wrote on “The second consideration of God regards Him as “one.”” (my titles and division):For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life.
Unity

Now “unity” is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive their unity from the Father.

Equality

But if the other persons be removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son.

Concord* or Union***

Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united.

 

[Gara3987]

I’m sure this has all been hashed out in plenty of prior discussions, sorry…
What does the Church mean when she says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle, by one spiration? Also, I’ve heard some claim that the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son can be interpreted as meaning “through” the son - how is that reconcilable with saying the Spirit proceeds from both, equally, as from one principle?

Thanks!

Cum autem venerit Paraclitus, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, Spiritum veritatis, qui a Patre procedit, ille testimonium perhibebit de me ; Joan. ⅹⅴ. 26]

But when the Paraclete cometh whom I will send from the Father, the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall give testimony of me: [John. ⅹⅴ. 26]](http://haydock1859.tripod.com/id108.html)
Whom I will send. The Holy Ghost is sent by the Son: therefore he proceedeth from him also, as from the Father; though the schismatical Greeks think differently; (Bristow) otherwise, as Dr. Challoner says, he could not be sent by the Son.

This may also help : Filioque

 

[Vico]

Cum autem venerit Paraclitus, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, Spiritum veritatis, qui a Patre procedit, ille testimonium perhibebit de me ; Joan. ⅹⅴ. 26]

But when the Paraclete cometh whom I will send from the Father, the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall give testimony of me: [John. ⅹⅴ. 26]](http://haydock1859.tripod.com/id108.html)
Whom I will send. The Holy Ghost is sent by the Son: therefore he proceedeth from him also, as from the Father; though the schismatical Greeks think differently; (Bristow) otherwise, as Dr. Challoner says, he could not be sent by the Son.

This may also help : Filioque

The is called the economic procession which is not disputed. The basis of the internal procession has no scriptural basis, rather comes from the ecumenical councils use of consubstantial.

 

[Wandile]

The is called the economic procession which is not disputed. The basis of the internal procession has no scriptural basis, rather comes from the ecumenical councils use of consubstantial.

Yes but in Catholic theology the interactions of the Persons of the Godhead in time mirror their interactions in eternity. Hence as so the Son sends the Spirit in time, so too does He eternally