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Fuerza
Guest
It’s not “through” and “and” that you need to compare. It’s “through” and “from”…
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8eofilos
Guest
Well everyone here should consider that the New Testament was written in Ancient Greek and then translated to Latin.
Latin is a very poor language with very limited possibilities and can not be compared to the Ancient Greek.
God waited all these millenniums for the Greeks to be ready to Glorify Him properly and bring out His Word Properly.
John 12. 20-23
Disagree???
M
Mickey
Guest
Oh we understand okay—we just do not agree.
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bobzills
Guest
Through and from are not the same.
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Ghosty
Guest
They don’t carry precisely the same meaning, but they don’t contradict each other; “and”, in its generality, contains the specificity of “through”. “Human” and “person” aren’t the same thing either, but “human” can be understood with the implication of “person” in mind, and so long as this understanding is upheld then in the context of a discussion with those terms when someone said “human” then “person” would be implied and lumped together with it.
If the Latins only said “and”, or said that “and” is not mean to be understood as “through”, then you’d have a point for concern. Since “and” has always been understood and maintained as being understood with the specific meaning of “through”, however, this concern is based on absolutely no grounds at all.
Peace and God bless!
A
Alethiaphile
Guest
And I would think that a simple English class might reveal that “and” does not equal “through”. They have different connotations. “Through” connotes an instrumentality, not an origin. When I say “I came into New York City from Jersey, through the Holland Tunnel” that makes sense.; saying I came from Jersey and the Holland Tunnel means something else, and is pretty much nonsensical.
The problem is accentuated when you add the language of Lyons and Florence that “…and the Son” means “equally” and “as from one principle”. The meaning is clear: the Father and Son acted together, equally, in spirating the Spirit. That contradicts the sense of “through”.
A
Alethiaphile
Guest
I disagree. The contrast is between “from the Father and the Son” and “from the Father through the Son”.
A
Alethiaphile
Guest
It absolutely does not. Suppose my father’s ethnic background is Irish and my mother’s is Italian. I can quite intelligibly say “I come from Irish and Italian stock”. But if I say “I come from Irish stock, through Italian stock” it clearly means something different, it implies somehow my Italian background isn’t as important as my Irish background. It could be construed as something of an insult to Italian ancestors, whereas the first sentence could not.
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Alethiaphile
Guest
First, prior to Lyons and Florence this could be argued, and I believe the Filioque was capable of an Orthodox interpretation until that point. However, the addition of clarifying language such as “equally” and “as from One Principle” clearly excludes any sense of “through”.
Second, if what you say is true, then why the centuries-old resistance by Rome to simply replacing “and” with “through”? If they were synonymous, except that “through” is more precise, then it should be a no-brainer, since specificity is always to be desired, and it is the less specific term that is divisive.
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Ghosty
Guest
You’re talking about something that simply can’t be compared to the Trinity, since “Italian” and “Irish” are two different things, while the Divine Nature is a single thing.
A more apt, but still insufficient, analogy would be your being from your father, through your mother. You can equally say that you are from your father, from your father and your mother, and from your father through your mother. All are accurate expressions, with each one more specific than the previous, and they don’t contradict eachother.
In fact, in ancient times when it was believed that the entire human “seed” was from the father (with the mother being the receiver and “soil” for the complete seed), this is precisely the analogy that was used to describe the procession of the Holy Spirit “from the Father and the Son”, as can be seen by the example of St. Thomas Aquinas:
newadvent.org/summa/1036.htm#article3
Obviously this can’t be used with the modern understanding of sperm and egg, but given the science of the day it accurately described the understanding of how something could be fully from one thing (Adam is the source of human nature, both generally and specifically in the case of Abel), fully from two things (Abel proceeds entirely from Adam and Eve, not part from one, and part from another), and fully from one thing through another (the entire procession of Abel from Adam to independent life is through Eve; Abel does not exist in any other way than through and from Eve).
This has always been emphasized in Latin theology, so any claims that Latin theology confuses the mediating Spiration with the Source, based on the language “and the Son”, is wrongheaded and proven so by history.
Peace and God bless!
M
malphono
Guest
Thank you, Ghosty, for the reference to the Angelic Doctor. It’s quite specific and to the point of this thread. Wouldst that it could put to rest the never-ending dispute about filioque, but of course it won’t.
A
Alethiaphile
Guest
This “more apt” analogy proves exactly the same point that mine did. To say you are “from your father through your mother” would be considered 1. A very strange manner of speaking, and 2 Sexist, making your mother some sort of secondary parent, a mere conduit for your father’s seed. This would rightly be considered demeaning to your mother, and, as such, not at all equivalent to saying “from my father and my mother”.
The fact this type of sexist conception (pardon the pun) prevailed at the time of St. Thomas, and was endorsed by St. Thomas, who, on natural scientific matters, was a man of his time, does not make it any more valid.
A
Alethiaphile
Guest
From St. Thomas Aquinas through Ghosty (Which in itself illustrates my point: you wouldn’t say “From St. Thomas Aquinas and Ghosty”
):
But if we consider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons.
I don’t see how this solves the problem. St. Thomas specifically says the Spirit proceeds “mediately, as from the Son”. This is fine; I think most Orthodox would find that acceptable; I certainly would, as I find “through” accpetable. But, again, this comes before the decrees of Lyons and Florence which add “equally from the Father and the Son” and “as from One Principle”. As I’ve said before, I don’t see how this language can be considered as but being directly antithetical to the adverb “mediately” or the preposition “through”.
I understand your point that there was a prevalent notion in Latin theology, as evidenced in the passage from St. Thomas, of a mediate origination or procession which would make “and” functionally equivalent to “through”. Again, I just don’t see how this works with the “equally” and “one principle” language, unless you want to regard that language as a superfluous gloss on “and”, and I cannot do that. There is an old and venerable principle in Anglo-American legal tradition, which I’m guessing goes back to Roman law, which states that, where at all possible, in interpreting any law or legal document, effect is to be given to all the language, and leaving any terms as mere surplusage is highly disfavored. I don’t see how solemn theological pronouncements deserve any less. These were serious and learned men who used this language, and, in my view, they must be presumed to have meant something significant when they used terms like “equally”, etc.
):But if we consider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons.
I don’t see how this solves the problem. St. Thomas specifically says the Spirit proceeds “mediately, as from the Son”. This is fine; I think most Orthodox would find that acceptable; I certainly would, as I find “through” accpetable. But, again, this comes before the decrees of Lyons and Florence which add “equally from the Father and the Son” and “as from One Principle”. As I’ve said before, I don’t see how this language can be considered as but being directly antithetical to the adverb “mediately” or the preposition “through”.
I understand your point that there was a prevalent notion in Latin theology, as evidenced in the passage from St. Thomas, of a mediate origination or procession which would make “and” functionally equivalent to “through”. Again, I just don’t see how this works with the “equally” and “one principle” language, unless you want to regard that language as a superfluous gloss on “and”, and I cannot do that. There is an old and venerable principle in Anglo-American legal tradition, which I’m guessing goes back to Roman law, which states that, where at all possible, in interpreting any law or legal document, effect is to be given to all the language, and leaving any terms as mere surplusage is highly disfavored. I don’t see how solemn theological pronouncements deserve any less. These were serious and learned men who used this language, and, in my view, they must be presumed to have meant something significant when they used terms like “equally”, etc.
A
Alethiaphile
Guest
I withdraw this part of this post; I realize now that your point wasn’t to vindicate this notion of mediate parenthood by the mother ( although your use of this example in your previous post still indicates you believe it has some sort of validity) but to show that was current in Latin theology and could be applied to the Filioque controversy. I address this in my immediately previous post.
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Fuerza
Guest
There’s not really any room for opinion here. “From the Father and the Son” should be read as “From the Father and (from) the Son”. Thus you must compare “from” and “through”. Your disagreement doesn’t change the reality.
A
Alethiaphile
Guest
“Filioque” literally means “and the Son”. Florence said the Father and the Son proceeded the Spirit “as from One Principle”, so it is the Father and the Son acting together, not the Father proceeding the Spirit and the Son also proceeding the Spirit from a different direction. Everyone I have read except for you agrees the distinction is between “and” and “through”. Sorry.
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Ghosty
Guest
The “equally” and “from one principle” are from St. Thomas Aquinas; both expressions are used in the very page I linked to above. They are how one expresses “through the Son” as St. Thomas did.
and:
This is understood as being identical to the mediative role expressed for the Son, not contrary to it. When Lyons and Florence used Aquinas’ language to describe the Filioque, they were in no way breaking with the mediative role of the Son, but using the same language as Aquinas to express this important distinction.
So either St. Thomas Aquinas didn’t recognize this glaring contradition within the very same Question of the Summa, or your interpretation of the terms is incorrect. Considering the fact that all tradition before and since has made the same distinction and emphasis as Aquinas, I would submit that it is your interpretation of the terminology that is in error, and it is not a contradiction in his argument.
Peace and God bless!
T
tdgesq
Guest
And Augustine states the same thing nearly 900 years before Aquinas:
If, therefore, that also which is given has him for a beginning by whom it is given, since it has received from no other source that which proceeds from him; it must be admitted that the Father and the Son are a Beginning [Principium] of the Holy Spirit, not two Beginnings; but as the Father and Son are one God, and one Creator, and one Lord relatively to the creature, so are they one Beginning relatively to the Holy Spirit. newadvent.org/fathers/130105.htm
And the Son is born of the Father; and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally, the Father giving the procession without any interval of time, yet in common from both [Father and Son]. newadvent.org/fathers/130115.htm
Compare to the Council of Florence:
The Latins asserted that they say the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not with the intention of excluding the Father from being the source and principle of all deity, that is of the Son and of the holy Spirit, nor to imply that the Son does not receive from the Father, because the holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, nor that they posit two principles or two spirations; but they assert that there is only one principle and a single spiration of the holy Spirit, as they have asserted hitherto. piar.hu/councils/ecum17.htm
If, therefore, that also which is given has him for a beginning by whom it is given, since it has received from no other source that which proceeds from him; it must be admitted that the Father and the Son are a Beginning [Principium] of the Holy Spirit, not two Beginnings; but as the Father and Son are one God, and one Creator, and one Lord relatively to the creature, so are they one Beginning relatively to the Holy Spirit. newadvent.org/fathers/130105.htm
And the Son is born of the Father; and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally, the Father giving the procession without any interval of time, yet in common from both [Father and Son]. newadvent.org/fathers/130115.htm
Compare to the Council of Florence:
The Latins asserted that they say the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not with the intention of excluding the Father from being the source and principle of all deity, that is of the Son and of the holy Spirit, nor to imply that the Son does not receive from the Father, because the holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, nor that they posit two principles or two spirations; but they assert that there is only one principle and a single spiration of the holy Spirit, as they have asserted hitherto. piar.hu/councils/ecum17.htm
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Fuerza
Guest
I think the problem is that you don’t quite understand what I’m saying. Maybe on Monday I’ll have a chance to explain. Have a good weekend.
A
Alethiaphile
Guest
First, I must respectfully disagree with your reasoning in the last sentence. Certainly Tradition before Aquinas recognized, where it recognized any contribution by the Son towards the eternal procession of the Spirit at all, a distinction between the immediate role of the Father and the mediate or instrumental role of the Son, but it is not at all clear that Traditon recognized the other term of the potential contradiction, that is, the language of Father and Son spirating the Spirit “equally” and “as one principle” That idea is certainly in St. Augustine and the western theologians following him, but that is not “all tradition”. Therefore, I do not believe there is the heavy presumption against a contradiction that you attempt to lay.
And here is the contradiction, as I see it: St. Thomas clarifies in Article 4 that the Father and Son are “one principle” of the Holy Ghost in precisely the sense that they act in virtue of one power. However, to immediately or originally spirate the HS, as the Father does, and to mediately spirat the HS, as the Son does, cannot be one and the same power. To do something originally, and to do something mediately, are clearly two different types of actions, even if the element of time is taken out of it.
This becomes clearer when we consider what St. Thomas says in the previous article, where he justifies the use of “From the Father through the Son”. In order to respond to objections, he makes clear in the main article in what sense “through” is used:
“Sometimes, however, that which is covered by this preposition “through” is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition “through” sometimes denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through the king.”
In each of these examples, the king and his bailiff and the artisan and the hammer, the snese of “through” is that of an instrumentality, and the powers are not identical. The power of a bailiff is not that of a king; the king has his powers absolutely, and any powers the bailiff has he has by delegation from the king. This is even clearer in the illustration of the artisan and the hammer. The power of the artisan and the “power” of the hammer are clearly not the same; the artisan has the power to pound material into shape by swinging an instrument, such as the hammer, with his arm; the hammer has the power to effect a pounding by being swung by the artisan. The artisan’s power lies in being active, the hammer’s in being passive. It would torture language out of all recongition to say that the artisan and the hammer have “the same power”.
St. Thomas seemingly deals with this by defining the “through” relationship thusly: “Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, which has the same meaning.”
This account of “through” (in the phrase starting “because”) could be squared with the king-bailiff analogy; “through” is used in the sense of delegation of a power. The problem is, when a power is delegated, say from a king to a bailiff, the king and the bailiff do not both exercise it. When king directs a bailiff, for example, to lock up a prisoner, the king does not himself proceed to lock up the prisoner, and he doesn’t go down to the dungeon with the bailiff to do it together. The whole point of the delegation is to have the bailiff do it, so the king doesn’t have to.
Much less does it accord with the artisan-hammer analogy. The artisan doesn’t give the hammer his power to swing a hammer in his arm, he gives it power to form a shape by swinging it himself.
Notice also that this account of the Father “giving” His power of spiration to the Son is incompatible with St. Thomas’s description of the Spiration in Article 4, reply to objection 1: “But if we consider the “supposita” of the spiration, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both.”
This description, of course, is taken from St. Augustine. The problem is it requires that Son’s power of spiration be the Son’s love for the Father. However, the Son can’t receive that from the Father; He can receive the Father’s love for him, but He can’t receive what must be His own free action. Furthermore, the Son’s love for the Father cannot be the same as the Father’s love for the Son, so they can not be one and the same power, as is required for “as from one principle”.
I will elaborate further when I have the time, but I think I have laid out a good argument that Aquinas’s attempt to reconcile a procession “from Father and the Son as one principle” and “From the Father through the Son” is not successful. I look forward to your considered response to it. Joe
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