I think definition of terms is required. In what way is the difference between ācreatingā offspring and ācreatingā other things defined? I think this needs to be carefully defined so we can establish shared terminology.
I agree.
On one hand, what the beaver does, vis-a-vis a dam, is ācreationā in its weakest sense. The beaver is simply taking existing materials, manipulating them, and and transforming them to another form, with another purpose. He hasnāt ācreatedā the materials themselves, nor has he ācreatedā the dam; rather, he has collected components and assembled them. From an Aristotelian perspective, there certainly has been āchangeā; however, that change isnāt generation (i.e., coming into being). There is an aspect of it thatās a change in form: the tree is transformed into a wooden dam.
On the other hand, when a beaver (or any other living being) ācreatesā offspring, we see an entirely different kind of process. Here, thereās the transformation of a part of oneās being, into something that has the potential to become part of the process of generation: an oak tree creates an acorn, an amoeba splits and transforms itself into two amoebae, or an animal creates a sperm cell or egg cell. Having set the process in motion, then, using already existing materials (per se), there is more than just transformation taking place: instead, there is the generation of a new individual, of the same genus and species as the parent. Where there was one individual, now there are two. Aristotle would identify this as a āchangeā, noting that the change was a ācoming into beingā.
Finally, we have the notion of creation
ex nihilo. This is radically different than either of the previous two processes. It is unlike the first: the materials do not exist previously, and are not generated from existing beings. They are not simply transformed, but truly created. In addition, the process is not one of generation from parent to child: God does not have a physical being, so there is no physical generation. (A theological explanation would also likely note that there is the creation of a soul in humans; although there is an affinity between the human soul and the spirit of God (āimage and likenessā, as it goes), this is also not an instance of generation: God isnāt splitting part of himself off in order to create humans.)
The first two, I donāt have to posit ā we can agree they exist, right? I could see where you might want me to provide some sort of assertion for the third, but for the moment, since weāre just defining terms, can we defer that consideration?
For the sake of argument, then, letās call the first āconstructionā, the second āgenerationā, and the third ācreationā. Fair enough?
Of course if itās just about the final product then humans can ācreateā beavers too, using a lab and test tubes.
(Note that, when a human makes a ātest tube beaverā, this isnāt really the human participating in āgenerationā: that generative capacity still remains something that belongs to a beaver, but the human simply acts as a catalyst ā in fact, I think we could say that the human engages in āconstructionā, setting up the conditions (but not actually performing) the āgenerationā that takes place by virtue of the potency of the living beaver cells.)