First-Cause Argument for Existence of God

[hurst]

EnterTheBowser:

hurst:

The point here is that any power that exists could not have come from “total nothingness”, and so is somehow derived from that which must have always been. Therefore, even after somehow causing it to begin, it also must continue to keep it in existence.

I do not see how this follows. For example, let’s say that billiard ball A strikes billiard ball B, causing B to move. Afterwards I destroy B - is it then true that A stops moving?

I think you meant to ask whether if you destroyed A, B would stop moving. The answer is No. But that example involves a transfer of kinetic energy. If kinetic energy ceased to exist, then they would all stop. And thus I would say that kinetic energy is something that did not always exist, and must therefore be something that was derived somehow.

EnterTheBowser:

But maybe this isn’t what you mean. In that case, here is something else to consider: in order to have power over something, I would need to be able to do something to interfere with it. Now, in what way would this eternal something have that sort of power over something else? It would have that power, I suppose, if it were to stop causing this other something to be.

I would agree that the eternal something must have power to stop causing the other something to be.

EnterTheBowser:

But it seems to be incapable of that - the very nature of this eternal something is that it must necessarily cause these other things - that is, in a sense, the whole point.

I don’t see how it follows that “it must necessarily cause these other things”. It is true that it did actually cause other things, because we observe them. But that doesn’t mean it had to do so. It could have caused something else, or nothing else.

As an example, we can cause a whistle. We can start it, and we can stop it. The whistle does not exist of itself. It is formed by our mouth and the blowing of air, after we decide to do it.

In fact, the very fact that there are things that have not always been is an indication that the eternal something must have some kind of a “will”, able to decide to cause something to begin to be.

EnterTheBowser:

hurst:

… there are natural laws that no one seems to be able to destroy or circumvent (though people do try).

Again, I do not think it follows from the fact that physical laws are apparently constant that this eternal something is omnipotent.

That they are constant was not the issue, but that they cannot be destroyed by us is. I was giving an example of such power. But I see that served no purpose, since you missed what I showed before as to why it must be omnipotent.

As I said before more than once, it is omnipotent in that the existence of any kind of power can be traced back to it. It is the ultimate source for any power, because there is nothing else to trace it to.

EnterTheBowser:

hurst:

I don’t think it would think like us. However, in order for us to do our thinking, we have to somehow or other participate in that which must have always existed.

Why?

Because we only exist insofar as we exist in that which has always existed. Why? Because nothing else has always existed, and so anything new must somehow be made from nothing while participating in the something.

As a simplistic example, imagine you were a blob of dough, and formed yourself into the shape of a donut. You have now “created” a hole that did not “exist” before. And yet nothing substantially new exists. You know all about the hole, even though you are not the hole. The hole “exists”, but not of itself. Anything the hole is able to do can only be because you enabled and allowed it, for example changing shape. Note - this is only an illustrative example that shows how a dependent existence might participate in a substantial existence.

EnterTheBowser:

Well, if we mean different things by the word “God,” this is understandable. So I might as well ask: what is an exhaustive definition of God?

Now that is a good question.

As you see, I am generally trying to avoid the issue of semantics by discussing what we can naturally know. Any faith has to be based on natural knowledge, as I quoted previously. For us to have a good foundation for faith, we have to have accurate knowledge. As far as I am concerned, it doesn’t matter whether we ever call it “God”. What matters is facing the reality of it. The reality we can naturally know and recognize is what will form the basis from which we build our faith.

It just so happens that the Catholic Church does establish a certain definition for “God”, to an extent, but not exhaustive. And I am not sure if it would be helpful at this point to delve on various definitions until we come to an understanding of what we can naturally know about existence in general.

hurst

 

[PLP]

martino:

im not sure i even know what you are talking about now. give me an example of something that is not caused.

It is logically impossible for everything that exists (whatever that is) to be caused.

(I don’t have more time; I couldn’t access the forums this morning and I have work to do.)

 

[EnterTheBowser]

hurst:

This is interesting. I did not call it “that which necessarily exists”, but rather “that which must have always existed”, or more specifically,

4. Therefore, there must have actually always been "something"

There is a sublime difference between the two.

I’ll come back to this in a minute.

The initial starting condition of the universe? If you mean the concept of the point from which the big bang is hypothesized to have sprung, then I would say that it can not qualify as eternally existing because it no longer exists.

Again, I’ll come back to this - I think I may need to go back to your original argument.

Or do you believe it was “God”, and “God” died or exploded, leaving the visible universe in its wake, which itself will eventually die out also? If you think that, then you probably also believe that all thought processes and even your consciousness is just the result of chemical interactions in matter. But such thinking is folly, and misses something very obvious: that there are also things existing that are not visible nor made of material matter, and do not depend on the human mind to exist.

This whole notion of which you speak could become a thread by itself…

I’m curious what some examples of such things would be - nonmaterial things which do not depend on the human mind for existence.

Agreed. Matter and energy cannot think.

hurst

Why?

 

[EnterTheBowser]

hurst:

…

Now that is a good question.

As you see, I am generally trying to avoid the issue of semantics by discussing what we can naturally know. Any faith has to be based on natural knowledge, as I quoted previously. For us to have a good foundation for faith, we have to have accurate knowledge. As far as I am concerned, it doesn’t matter whether we ever call it “God”. What matters is facing the reality of it. The reality we can naturally know and recognize is what will form the basis from which we build our faith.

It just so happens that the Catholic Church does establish a certain definition for “God”, to an extent, but not exhaustive. And I am not sure if it would be helpful at this point to delve on various definitions until we come to an understanding of what we can naturally know about existence in general.

hurst

You made some interesting points; I’ve snipped them because I’ve realized it would be usueful to go back to your original argument before deciding what exactly it does show. That aside, given that this debate is about a particular argument for the existence of God, it would be a good idea if we knew what you meant when you said “God.” Perhaps asking for an exhaustive definition was a bad idea, but do you have at least some necessary or sufficient conditions for Godhood?

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

I’m curious what some examples of such things would be - nonmaterial things which do not depend on the human mind for existence.

sets, classes, propositions, the number 5, the letter W.

basically, any abstract object.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

hurst:

This is insightful and true, if what you mean by “exists” is “exists of itself”.

For a carpenter can build a chair, but the chair does not exist of itself: it can be disassembled into a pile of wood, which will no longer be a chair.

I would like to share a line of reasoning about existence.

1. Nothing can come from "total nothingness"
2. But there is not “total nothingness” now
3. Therefore, there must have never actually been "total nothingness"

Regarding premise 1, I’m curious about a few things: what is “total nothingness”? Is total nothingness a “possible world”? That aside, what is the support for 1? Is it something we know a priori, or is it something we’ve discovered from observing the world? Is it equivalent to some sort of principle of causality (eg “everything which begins to exist has a cause”)?

And as a corollary,

4. Therefore, there must have actually always been "something"

At this point, we do not know what this “something” is, except that it must have actually always been.

…

I think that you make a slight mistake here. Admitting that you have shown that there must have been something which had no beginning - but you have not shown that it cannot have an end.

Additionally, later on you begin saying “eternal.” Now, eternal can mean, surprisingly enough, more than one thing. It could mean that at every point in time, this thing existed; or it could mean that this thing existed for an unbounded amount of time. Now, if we follow what Maranatha said, the second option is impossible - it would never have gotten to now, since there’s an infinite amount of time behind us. So this thing must have existed for a finite amount of time, as it were.

I think also that there may be something wrong with talking about time in relation to this thing. Since this thing is the ultimate cause of everything, is it right to say that it caused time to exist?

Lastly, is it correct to say that this “something” necessarily exists in the modal sense of the word?

 

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

sets, classes, propositions, the number 5, the letter W.

basically, any abstract object.

And why should we suppose that these things are not products of human minds?

 

[Hitetlen]

hurst:

I am not sure what you are trying to say here. However, one can definitely put an order to events in general.

That is something you have to prove, not merely assert. An example is not enough. Just because for two sepcific events you can find a “prior-later” or “cause-effect” relationship you cannot assume that such a relationship exists either for any arbitrary pair of events, or the universe itself. (Another illustration: every human has a mother, but the summary of all humans - humanity - does not have a mother. In other words, if you wish to posit that the universe must be part of a cause-effect relationship, that must be proven, not asserted.)

The concept of space-time is contingent upon the universe. Just like it is meaningless to ask: “what is to the north from the North Pole?” it is meaningless to ask: “what happened before the Big Bang?”. Since time is contingent upon the density of matter, which cannot be determined at the “time” of the Big Bang, there can be no prior-later pair for the events.

 

[Hitetlen]

Maranatha:

If there were an infinite number of events that preceded the present moment, we would never have reached the present moment, because it would have taken an infinitely long time.

My, oh my… the naive Greek fallacy of “infinity” strikes again.

Achilles and the turtle had a race. Achilles gave the turtle a few yards of advantage. By the time Achilles reaches the point where the turtle was, the turtle has already moved further. By the time Achilles reaches this new point, the turtle has moved further again, and so on… so Achilles can never overtake the turtle.

Just because there are infinitely many “events” on a line (if there are), it does not take infinitely long time to get to the present. For the mathematically inclined: there are convergent and divergent series, with different characteristics. (Calculus 101)

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

And why should we suppose that these things are not products of human minds?

because it makes no sense to say that these things are contingent - they exist whether or not humans exist. the proposition “the first living things formed via abiogenesis” was true or false 2 billion years ago, prior to there being any humans to consider it. there were 5 monkeys in a tree on the prehistoric savannah 10 million years ago, whether or not anything could think about there being 5 things, or any other number of things. and so on.

now, i agree that it makes sense to think of abstract objects as dependent for their existence on being thought by some mind - but if so, and if abstract objects are necessary existents, as they are typically supposed to be, then the thinking mind would also have to be necessarily existent. which is one way of getting to the existence of god…

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

Just like it is meaningless to ask: “what is to the north from the North Pole?” it is meaningless to ask: “what happened before the Big Bang?”. Since time is contingent upon the density of matter, which cannot be determined at the “time” of the Big Bang, there can be no prior-later pair for the events.

perhaps. but even if it is meaningless to ask what is temporally prior to the big bang, it is certainly not meaningless to ask what is causally prior to the big bang.

unless you can prove that temporal priority and causal priority are identical…

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

My, oh my… the naive Greek fallacy of “infinity” strikes again.

Achilles and the turtle had a race. Achilles gave the turtle a few yards of advantage. By the time Achilles reaches the point where the turtle was, the turtle has already moved further. By the time Achilles reaches this new point, the turtle has moved further again, and so on… so Achilles can never overtake the turtle.

my, oh my - the naive fallacy of conflating the possibly divisible with the actually divided.

zeno’s paradox is based on the assumption that for any extended object, that object consists of an actually infinite number of (contiguous) discrete objects. and, as a paradox, it actually functions as a reductio of that particular assumption.

Hitetlen:

Just because there are infinitely many “events” on a line (if there are), it does not take infinitely long time to get to the present. For the mathematically inclined: there are convergent and divergent series, with different characteristics. (Calculus 101)

i’m not sure what this has to do with anything. if the universe has always existed, then, by definition, an infinite amount of time has already passed.

in which case, the series of temporal events is, by definition, divergent.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

perhaps. but even if it is meaningless to ask what is temporally prior to the big bang, it is certainly not meaningless to ask what is causally prior to the big bang.

unless you can prove that temporal priority and causal priority are identical…

Just as a note, one would not need to show that temporal and causal priority are equivalent, just that temporal priority is a necessary condition of causal priority (or conversely that causal priority implies temporal priority). Either one would be sufficient.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

because it makes no sense to say that these things are contingent - they exist whether or not humans exist. the proposition “the first living things formed via abiogenesis” was true or false 2 billion years ago, prior to there being any humans to consider it. there were 5 monkeys in a tree on the prehistoric savannah 10 million years ago, whether or not anything could think about there being 5 things, or any other number of things. and so on.

…

Now, I will admit that the given state of affairs represented by a particular proposition obtains (or does not obtain) regardless of whether or not there are humans. But I also think it’s a mistake to equate propositions with the states of affairs they represent.

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

Just as a note, one would not need to show that temporal and causal priority are equivalent, just that temporal priority is a necessary condition of causal priority (or conversely that causal priority implies temporal priority). Either one would be sufficient.

you’re right, of course - i should have said that an entailment relation would need to be demonstrated.

thanks.

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

Now, I will admit that the given state of affairs represented by a particular proposition obtains (or does not obtain) regardless of whether or not there are humans. But I also think it’s a mistake to equate propositions with the states of affairs they represent.

ok. then what are propositions? are you a nominalist when it comes them? what are the prime bearers of truth? do they enter into entailment relations? can they be thought by different thinkers in different languages at different times? how do you preserve these and other semantic properties of natural language without introducing abstract objects?

if there are no propositions, then how do you avoid the consequence that there are no necessary truths? isn’t 1+1=2 true even in all of the possible worlds not containing human thought?

just wondering.

 

[martino]

PLP:

It is logically impossible for everything that exists (whatever that is) to be caused.

well we actually agree on that statement. but what i am also saying is that this universe and everything in it was caused by something else. there must have been a first cause that started the chain of causes to begin. the first cause must be able to explain itself, having no cause preceeding it, it must be eternal. im saying that God is this necessary being. what example would you give for a being that was not caused by any other?

 

[Ghosty]

PLP: It seems that you aren’t following the logic of martino’s original statement all the way through: if something exists in its own essence, it is an “existing thing” by definition and never a “potentially existing thing”, then it must exist. We can conceive of an “existing thing”, but that conception is not the existing thing because our conception is caused by our minds, which are themselves caused, and so on and so forth.

There is nothing at all dubious in the assertion that something that exists in essence exists by necessity. In fact, it’s pretty much stating the same thing in different words. You seem to be hung up on the question of whether such an existing thing is necessary for us to exist, but you’re putting that issue prior to its proper order in the establishment of the argument. What is being said by “something that exists by its own essence exists by necessity” is merely refering to its own internal definition: it’s impossible for a thing to contradict its own essence, therefore it’s necessary that it follows its own essence.

Before anything more can be said, I think that needed to be cleared up.

Peace and God bless!

 

[EnterTheBowser]

“Nothing can come from total nothingness.”

Hurst: is this logically equivalent to the statement “Everything that begins to exist has a cause”? I’ve got a strong suspicion that it is, but it would be easier if you admitted it than for me to present an argument (which could take a while).

 

[Ghosty]

EntertheBrowser wrote:

I do not see how this follows. For example, let’s say that billiard ball A strikes billiard ball B, causing B to move. Afterwards I destroy B - is it then true that A stops moving?

You’re not following the logic back far enough. Billiard ball A can not strike billiard ball B unless a) it is caused to move (and also caused to exist), or b) it is a moving, existing thing by definition. If it is a), then you have to follow the argument back to a further cause (the person striking billiard A with a pool cue, for example), if it is b), then you can’t destroy it because it is an existing thing by definition, not a “possibly existing thing”.

Peace and God bless!