First Cause Arguments for the Existence of God

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

if god exists necessarily, then he exists in every possible world, and it is impossible that there be a world that contains nothing. in other words, if the proposition “god exists” is necessarily true, then the proposition “nothing exists” is necessarily false.

I am well aware of what the proposition “God is a necessary being” means. On the other hand, I asked where the logical contradiction is in a possible world where there is no God (and perhaps nothing else either, but that’s really besides the point). Frankly, to show such a contradiction one would need to rely on an ontological argument - and we all know how much fun they are.

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

I am well aware of what the proposition “God is a necessary being” means. On the other hand, I asked where the logical contradiction is in a possible world where there is no God (and perhaps nothing else either, but that’s really besides the point). Frankly, to show such a contradiction one would need to rely on an ontological argument - and we all know how much fun they are.

in order to demonstrate that the proposition “there is a possible world with nothing” is necessarily false, one needs simply to demonstrate the truth of the proposition “there is at least one necessary being”.

but a necessary being is either impossible or necessary; it will be impossible only if it is logically contradictory. but there is nothing (obviously) logically contradictory about the concept “a being which exists in all possible worlds”.

therefore there exists at least one necessary being.

therefore the proposition “there is a possible world with nothing” is necessarily false.

it doesn’t prove god, but it’s a step in the right direction…

 

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

in order to demonstrate that the proposition “there is a possible world with nothing” is necessarily false, one needs simply to demonstrate the truth of the proposition “there is at least one necessary being”.

but a necessary being is either impossible or necessary; it will be impossible only if it is logically contradictory. but there is nothing (obviously) logically contradictory about the concept “a being which exists in all possible worlds”.

therefore there exists at least one necessary being.

therefore the proposition “there is a possible world with nothing” is necessarily false.

it doesn’t prove god, but it’s a step in the right direction…

I think that there’s something fairly wrong with your argumentation. In actuality, I think you just made Plantinga’s ontological argument, or at least something very closely related.

The problem, as I see it, is that modal statements take definite truth values, not modal truth values. For a statement X, it does not make sense to say that it is possibly (in the modal sense) necessarily true. It might be possible in the epistemic sense (ie we can’t rule it out based on our current knowledge) but the modal sense is a little different.

What would a statement like “X is possibly necessarly true” mean? If we unpack it, as it were, we get something like “There is some possible world where X is true in every possible world.” The “possible” part is, well, silly.

Or we can examine the following argument: it is logically possible that I am standing on a necessarily existent (perfect) island. Therefore, I am actually standing on an island. Now, it might appear to me that I’m not, but I am, but this does not establish that it is in some way impossible that I’m not - my senses might be, and apparently are, mistaken.

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

I think that there’s something fairly wrong with your argumentation. In actuality, I think you just made Plantinga’s ontological argument, or at least something very closely related.

The problem, as I see it, is that modal statements take definite truth values, not modal truth values. For a statement X, it does not make sense to say that it is possibly (in the modal sense) necessarily true. It might be possible in the epistemic sense (ie we can’t rule it out based on our current knowledge) but the modal sense is a little different.

What would a statement like “X is possibly necessarly true” mean? If we unpack it, as it were, we get something like “There is some possible world where X is true in every possible world.” The “possible” part is, well, silly.

if you buy into modal logic, then there’s nothing wrong with it at all. and it’s “ontological” only in the sense that it is possible to conclude to the existence of something from the concept of it.

“it is possible that P is necessarily true” is equivalent to “P is necessarily true”, at least in S5 modal logic.

for the formalism:

◊(□P) → □P

i’m not sure what you think is (substantively) wrong with it.

EnterTheBowser:

Or we can examine the following argument: it is logically possible that I am standing on a necessarily existent (perfect) island. Therefore, I am actually standing on an island.

that’s not the same argument at all…

here’s what you’ve said:

possibly (i am standing on an island) & necessarily (the island exists).

apart from not getting the modal relations correct, the concept of a necessarily existent island is logically contradictory, since all material things are essentially contingent.

 

[PLP]

john doran:

sigh. no - this thread is about how all first cause arguments allegedly fail by making the informal fallacy of composition.

Well, to be finicky, this thread shows that a class of arguments for the existence of God do in fact include (at best) the argumentative fallacy of composition and therefore fail. At worst they simply beg the question (by simply asserting that the Material Universe was caused) or are incoherent (by denying there is any such thing as the Material Universe).

I think I have at least adequately demonstrated that I find these arguments rationally unpersuasive for reasons which are not trivial or superficial.

There are undoubtedly additional arguments which do not depend on this fallacy. Modal ontological arguments, which you and EtB seem to be discussing, have their own issues. If there seems to be wide curiousity regarding the rather abstruse class of ontological arguments, I’ll probably start another thread.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

if you buy into modal logic, then there’s nothing wrong with it at all. and it’s “ontological” only in the sense that it is possible to conclude to the existence of something from the concept of it.

“it is possible that P is necessarily true” is equivalent to “P is necessarily true”, at least in S5 modal logic.

for the formalism:

◊(□P) → □P

i’m not sure what you think is (substantively) wrong with it.

…

Indeed; I think I was unclear. To tell the truth, I think that as it stands, I should not have disagreed with you: assuming that there are necessary truths (which I do), it is possible that there are necessary truths. Sorry for being argumentative.

 

[john_doran]

PLP:

Well, to be finicky, this thread shows that a class of arguments for the existence of God do in fact include (at best) the argumentative fallacy of composition and therefore fail. At worst they simply beg the question (by simply asserting that the Material Universe was caused) or are incoherent (by denying there is any such thing as the Material Universe).

well, to be finicky in return, the KCA doesn’t simply assert that the universe has a cause - it stipulates that it has a beginning, an assertion in turn supported by ancillary argumentation.

PLP:

I think I have at least adequately demonstrated that I find these arguments rationally unpersuasive for reasons which are not trivial or superficial.

and i believe that i have at least adequately demonstrated that the class of arguments subject to your criticisms is somewhat smaller than you initially believed.

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

Indeed; I think I was unclear. To tell the truth, I think that as it stands, I should not have disagreed with you: assuming that there are necessary truths (which I do), it is possible that there are necessary truths. Sorry for being argumentative.

nothing to be sorry about - i didn’t think you were being argumentative.

 

[hurst]

PLP:

If there are things other than the Material Universe, can we have any knowledge at all about them?

Sure. A past moment in time is no longer in the universe, but we have knowledge about it.

PLP:

Is belief in things other than the Material Universe rationally justifiable?

Let’s set aside the term “Material Universe” and use a more basic term. How about using “universe” to mean the stars, planets, and space containing them, within the range of human visibility, at one particular moment.

• Perhaps it is overly obvious, but “tomorrow” is not part of the universe today, and yet it is rationally justifiable to believe in.
• A newly married couple have no children, but it is rationally justifiable that in a few years they may have some.
• Chemical reactions unite elements into new compounds that were previously not part of the universe.

In other words, some things not part of the universe come into being somehow. Therefore, we cannot limit ourselves to believing that what currently exists in the universe is all that exists.

So in considering the universe in the context of “existence”, one must be careful not to project into it what one anticipates will soon be there, as if it were already there. (Don’t count your chickens before they’re hatched). Since we do not now see those new things, and nothing is moving towards producing them, then they are not actually part of the universe, and may never be.

But through the agency of people, new children arrive, and new chemical compounds are formed. And through the agency of something else, a new day arrives, and the next moment of time is given to all.

PLP:

If you deny that the Material Universe and Everything that Exists are not good ontological descriptions, the First Cause arguments simply collapse into incoherence.

I don’t see how. The “First Cause” argument is not a “One-Time Cause” argument.

It is or should be “there exists a first cause for everything that did not always exist”, meaning it can be somehow traced back to that which has always been. To do this requires actual instances.

For example, anything that is composed of something else is clearly something that did not always exist. This can be shown by an actual instance: a water molecule is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom; a hydrogen atom is composed of proton and electron; and a proton is composed of three quarks. So while the water molecule did not exist before the proton, neither could the proton exist before the quark. And the quark is itself subject to further analysis (I haven’t read up on it lately).

So we can safely say that water did not always exist, because it is composed of something else. And we can even say protons did not always exist, for the same reason.

This and related logic can be applied and correlated to other things to gain insight about “existence” in general.

PLP:

hurst:

For example, would you say “humanity” is the composition of all humans?

Sure, why not?

Perhaps you misunderstood me. By composition I meant the collection or set of actual humans.

But it isn’t the actual collection of them, but only a reference to them collectively.

But perhaps other example will show what I mean.

Would you say sharpness is the collection of all sharp objects?

PLP:

Well, if we define the entity that is me personally as a four-dimensional entity with some invariant or meta-invariant essential properties, then it’s not quite so problematic.

But is it realistic? You do not understand or know your future self.

Does inserting “t” into 4D mathematical formulas equate to reality? (despite that it can be used to simulate inanimate things fairly well)

PLP:

Still and all, pointing to imprecision, vagueness, and ambiguity in ontological speech simply strengthens the conclusion that First Cause arguments, by employing such vague speech, do not constitute a reason to disbelieve Scientific Materialism. If we can’t talk about the Material Universe as an entity at all, we cannot find it lacking in critical properties.

Do we really need to consider the entire universe as a whole all at once?

Doesn’t it suffice to consider a single molecule, or the birth of a single person, or the consideration of the change in moments of time? I find it enlightening to see these in contrast to “total nothingness”.

hurst

 

[PLP]

hurst:

Let’s set aside the term “Material Universe” and use a more basic term. How about using “universe” to mean the stars, planets, and space containing them, within the range of human visibility, at one particular moment.

We could do that, but why? Ontological speech routinely takes time into account, and our ontological commitment to past events is the same as our commitment to present reality. It is definitely the case that Scientific Materialism entails an ontological commitment to the reality of past events. The future is a little dodgier, but that’s an epistemological problem; our problem is not whether to commit to the existence of future events, but our lack of knowledge which would enable us to commit to any particular set of future events, except in limited circumstances.

In other words, some things not part of the universe come into being somehow. Therefore, we cannot limit ourselves to believing that what currently exists in the universe is all that exists.

You’re artificially limiting “existence” and then proving that your limitation is artificial. I’m just not sure where you’re going here.

It is or should be “there exists a first cause for everything that did not always exist”…

There might or might not be a First Cause. The First Cause argument, though, is an argument that the First Cause not only exists, but that it is not material.

meaning it can be somehow traced back to that which has always been. To do this requires actual instances.

When we are considering a four-dimensional (or 11 dimensional, if the String Theorists are to be believed) material universe, “always” becomes an equivocal term.

It’s just as unjustified to consider time as independent of and extrinsic to the material universe as it is to consider latitude as extrinsic to the Earth. You could, I suppose, presume it’s independent and extrinsic, but on what grounds? To presume time is independent of the material universe is just begging the question.

For example, anything that is composed of something else is clearly something that did not always exist…

This is the case only when the composite thing is defined as a particular arrangement its parts. And it is not an analytical conclusion, but an empirical one. An abstract entity defined simply as a collection of parts without regard to their arrangement is co-equal to the existence of its parts. And under certain specifications of arrangement, we might find still find that the abstract entity was still co-equal with the existence of the parts, or with particular parts.

I don’t think we can say anything in particular about all composite entities other than they are composite.

And the quark is itself subject to further analysis (I haven’t read up on it lately).

AFAIK, Quarks are still considered fundamental.

So we can safely say that water did not always exist, because it is composed of something else. And we can even say protons did not always exist, for the same reason.

Given that “always” refers to extension in time, these are well-supported empirical scientific truths about water molecules and protons. They are not, however, analytical statements about collections. And they are truths about arranged collections, and very specific arranged collections at that.

Would you say sharpness is the collection of all sharp objects?

Of course not. “Sharpness” is the essential property which defines the class of all sharp objects. I understand now your use of “humanity” (i.e. the essential property which defines the class of all humans), but I still don’t get where you’re going with this point. The Material Universe is the collection of all material things, and “material” is the essential property which defines the collection. It is my contention as a Scientific Materialist that “material” is coequal with existant: Everything that exists has the property of being material or is composed of material things.

 

[PLP]

Well, if we define the entity that is me personally as a four-dimensional entity with some invariant or meta-invariant essential properties, then it’s not quite so problematic.

But is it realistic? You do not understand or know your future self.

I can speak, at least speculatively, about the existence of things I don’t know. I might not be able to specify non-essential details about my future self, but if I specify invariant essential properties, then I can analytically conclude that my future self has those essential properties, since my future self is defined in terms of those properties.

Again, I’m just not getting where you’re going with this line of argumentation.

Does inserting “t” into 4D mathematical formulas equate to reality? (despite that it can be used to simulate inanimate things fairly well)

If we define “reality” in a manner which includes time, then discussing the extension in time of things is, by definition, realistic. It seems that it is only the denial of the realism of the time dimension that causes philosophical paradoxes. Include it, and many paradoxes disappear, and no others take its place.

Do we really need to consider the entire universe as a whole all at once?

I don’t see how we’re going to discuss a non-material cause of the entire material universe unless we do discuss the material universe as a whole. If we simply refuse to discuss the universe as a whole, what are we arguing was caused?

Doesn’t it suffice to consider a single molecule, or the birth of a single person, or the consideration of the change in moments of time? I find it enlightening to see these in contrast to “total nothingness”.

Sure, if we want to have scientific knowledge about how individual material things are extended in time, and their timelike relationships. But extending these relationships between material things to the material universe as a whole is a fallacy of composition. Especially since everything we know about time and causality we know by virtue of the relationship of some material things to other material things; if we are going to extend the concept to the Material Universe, this particular component of our analysis, which seems important to me, has to simply be chopped off.

 

[john_doran]

PLP:

AFAIK, Quarks are still considered fundamental.

in the standard model (along with leptons). but the model is by no means static.

string theorists say strings, and loop quantum gravity theorists say loops (or spin foam networks).

we’ll see what happens when the large hadron collider comes on line next year.

 

[hurst]

PLP:

We could do that, but why?

Just to make it easier to consider initially. I could also limit the consideration to “our world” on earth.

PLP:

It is definitely the case that Scientific Materialism entails an ontological commitment to the reality of past events. The future is a little dodgier, but that’s an epistemological problem; our problem is not whether to commit to the existence of future events, but our lack of knowledge which would enable us to commit to any particular set of future events, except in limited circumstances.

I think there is some presumption here that the future will even come to pass… How can we talk about it as lack of knowledge only. Don’t you think it is also a matter of lack of power on our part? I for one do not give myself the next moment in time.

PLP:

You’re artificially limiting “existence” and then proving that your limitation is artificial. I’m just not sure where you’re going here.

I mainly limited the region of consideration.

I then restricted it to a single moment in time, but I should have specified the current moment. After all, that is the only actual manifestation existing.

But that you think I limited “existence” by restricting it to a single moment in time is telling. Are you “a priori” considering everything from the point of view of someone’s mathematical mapping?

I am trying to use reasoning and senses, along with logic, to understand the nature of existence. This requires trying to break things down for analysis, not combine it all into a big pot.

PLP:

There might or might not be a First Cause. The First Cause argument, though, is an argument that the First Cause not only exists, but that it is not material.

But that is part of the conclusion, not the premise. And if some use that as the premise, it can only be as in the manner of checking the conclusion by reverse analysis.

(continued)

 

[hurst]

PLP:

hurst:

meaning it can be somehow traced back to that which has always been. To do this requires actual instances.

When we are considering a four-dimensional (or 11 dimensional, if the String Theorists are to be believed) material universe, “always” becomes an equivocal term.

Why depend on mathematical theories trying to simulate nature, when this discussion is about higher considerations?

As I pointed out before, acting as if we were in control of eternity is presumptuous somehow.

Don’t those theorists merely conjecture, hypothesize, and assert things for the purpose of testing them out? That they have put forth models to factor out the time variable, as it were, does not make it obligatory for us to do likewise. Nor is it wise to do so. For time is something that both constrains us and empowers us, and in each moment of time is where choices are made and movements occur.

PLP:

It’s just as unjustified to consider time as independent of and extrinsic to the material universe as it is to consider latitude as extrinsic to the Earth. You could, I suppose, presume it’s independent and extrinsic, but on what grounds? To presume time is independent of the material universe is just begging the question.

I suppose we have run into the problem of knowing what “time” means. Especially if you retain the use of “Material Universe”, when that term is too broad and ambiguous right now. This is why I think it would be useful to restrict our consideration to part of the universe we can actually recognize ourselves without any scientists telling us what it is. After all, a savage in the jungle has to consider these issues also.

And what we can recognize is that the contents of the visible universe changes over time, but only during the current moment of time. The past can’t be changed. It is no longer part of the experienced universe except insofar as some of it is remembered.

It is like a lit fuse, which burns quickly to its end; the past is burned up and cannot be burned again, the future is yet to be burned, and the current moment is the only thing aglow. To say the whole fuse “exists”, even with 4D math, is incomplete. The math cannot take into account the glowing part changing the state of the fuse, but only make a collection of all states over time and call it the entire entity. There is no continuity between instances. (Incidentally, this brings to mind the Math Community’s factions regarding the “continuum”).

The same can be said of trying to explain how a particle moves through space. How does it cover all points in between in a finite amount of time, or does it? If not, then how did it traverse the gap? The fact is, a 4D time-inclusive model does not explain how it moved, but only maps the trajectory as it were, of movement over time.

Again, to call these models of things over time as consituting their “existence” is glossing over and ignoring the very make up of that thing. It seems to me that it is “a priori” pushing out the possibility of considering the reality of that thing’s dependence through time. It even appears to be a sort of oppression against life, which exists in each moment of time.

(continued)

 

[hurst]

PLP:

hurst:

For example, anything that is composed of something else is clearly something that did not always exist…

This is the case only when the composite thing is defined as a particular arrangement its parts. And it is not an analytical conclusion, but an empirical one. An abstract entity defined simply as a collection of parts without regard to their arrangement is co-equal to the existence of its parts.
And under certain specifications of arrangement, we might find still find that the abstract entity was still co-equal with the existence of the parts, or with particular parts.

I am not talking about a collection or a mere arrangement.

Perhaps “composite” is too vague if you think it a collection or set.

Having a couple hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom together is not water. But when they are formed together into a unity through valence bonds, then they become a molecule. This itself now exibits traits particular to itself that the individual atoms did not have. It is a new thing, and is “composed” of already-existing atoms. It is not merely an arrangement or collection of those atoms and bonds. It now has a fixed structure of sorts and maintains that structure.

Certainly, of itself it is not a molecule, but atoms and bonds. And the same can be said of the atoms vs. protons and electrons. These are not merely arrangements of protons and electrons, nor even of quarks. There are fixed structures that form and define a new behavior not found individually in the quarks or protons or atoms, but which are nonetheless dependenton them.

PLP:

I don’t think we can say anything in particular about all composite entities other than they are composite.

We can say a lot. Mainly, that they could not be formed until that from they are made were formed first.

PLP:

AFAIK, Quarks are still considered fundamental.

What about the gluon? Again, it’s been awhile.

PLP:

hurst:

So we can safely say that water did not always exist, because it is composed of something else. And we can even say protons did not always exist, for the same reason.

Given that “always” refers to extension in time, these are well-supported empirical scientific truths about water molecules and protons. They are not, however, analytical statements about collections.

Not quite.

Based on the empirical (experimental) findings about water molecules, we can apply the results of analytical thought (independent of experiment) to recognize that the water molecule could not have always existed, because its existence consists in other atoms being joined together, which required time for distances to be traversed by particles and energy.

A water molecule is not a collection.

Perhaps you would better understand that a boiled egg could not have always existed, because it takes time to boil one. And it is not a rearrangement of particles, because the process is irreversible by simple rearrangement.

PLP:

And they are truths about arranged collections, and very specific arranged collections at that.

I suppose you are trying to focus on the arrangement of quarks and energy. But there is more than quarks and energy floating around. The very arrangement of them in a fixed manner forms new entities, even if only in a virtual sense.

For just as all the words of our language are formed by 26 letters and could be said to be arranged collections of letters, nevertheless they represent more than that, and not until they are combined in a certain permutation will they represent something in particular. It i ot ea onb t xp c th s meo co d k w w at th s se ten e eans.* See what I mean? You need it all together before it can serve its purpose.

*“It is not reasonable to expect that someone could know what this sentence means.”]

hurst

 

[hurst]

PLP:

Of course not. “Sharpness” is the essential property which defines the class of all sharp objects. I understand now your use of “humanity” (i.e. the essential property which defines the class of all humans), but I still don’t get where you’re going with this point.

That it makes no sense to use the essential property to define a set of things when we are trying to understand something about those things. Would make sense to

PLP:

The Material Universe is the collection of all material things, and “material” is the essential property which defines the collection.

I think you are using “Material Universe” like a mathematical specification of a set “Let P be the set of all triangles”. It is a set that does not actually exist except as a concept, even though there may be many triangles already existing that fulfill that condition. In like manner, your set is just a conceptual definition meant to cover all possibilities of material existence.

Such a definition is useless for the discovery of the nature of existence, because you are defining its bounds in advance! It is as if you built a beautiful city with walls around it and lived within its confines without ever allowing anyone to leave, as if outside the city was nonexistent, since by definition only the city limits were valid. But we must be like the child who is ignorant of the city rules and fines, and look at the sky and intuitively know that there is more beyond the city walls, despite what the grown ups have settled on.

PLP:

It is my contention as a Scientific Materialist that “material” is coequal with existant: Everything that exists has the property of being material or is composed of material things.

And such a definition is useless when discussing the existence of the particular things in the actual universe in order to discover something about them, because your definition incorporates conclusions within itself already.

It occurs to me that “Scientific Materialism” is just a hypothesis or assertion that someone defined and is held by people in the manner of trying it out to see how long they can live within its bounds.

hurst

 

[hurst]

PLP:

I can speak, at least speculatively, about the existence of things I don’t know.

You mean of things you don’t know will exist?

What you are avoiding saying is why you don’t know. Isn’t it because you have accepted the concept that the future is already there even if you aren’t? Doesn’t that only hold in the Model of Reality you have accepted (Scientific Materialism)?

In order to avoid talking past you, I am going to have to ask you to take a look at your model by considering whether you actually know that the future has already happened in such manner that it already exists. For that matter, how can you actually know that the past still exists? It doesn’t exist in time anymore, because it can never be changed.

PLP:

I might not be able to specify non-essential details about my future self, but if I specify invariant essential properties, then I can analytically conclude that my future self has those essential properties, since my future self is defined in terms of those properties.

Sure, properties you can expect to have if things continue as they are. Meaning we don’t have certain knowledge of it.

PLP:

Again, I’m just not getting where you’re going with this line of argumentation.

To establish that the future state of the universe is not part of the present state of the universe, and that they do not exist simultaneously.

And also, that being able to conceptualize it in 4D does not actually resolve the issue. That is to project ourselves into a conceptual region as if we were really there and knew the state of things. Actually, we are not there. Where does 4D exist? We exist in a sequence of moments, one at a time, and none all at once. We are only conscious of one moment, and we cannot go back, nor can we prevent ourselves from moving forward in time.

PLP:

If we define “reality” in a manner which includes time, then discussing the extension in time of things is, by definition, realistic.

How are you going to discover actuality if you keep hemming yourself in with such definitions? You seem content with a mathematical model of the observable universe.

PLP:

I don’t see how we’re going to discuss a non-material cause of the entire material universe unless we do discuss the material universe as a whole. If we simply refuse to discuss the universe as a whole, what are we arguing was caused?

An atom should suffice, as would a chair. But perhaps the best example is a hole in the ground. Dirt is is moved, and a new “thing” comes into “existence”. We have a name for it, refer to it as something, and yet it is not anything of itself…

In any case, it should suffice to find a single actual instance of something that did not always exist. The change of water to ice suffices.

But I think the crux of this is going to be your recognition that the arrangement of particles into new entities exibiting new properties in their virtual existence are in fact a kind of existence. Comments?

PLP:

Sure, if we want to have scientific knowledge about how individual material things are extended in time, and their timelike relationships.

You keep saying “extended in time”. Please define that.

It suffices to discover kinds of existences that are made of and caused to be made by other things. We can’t move forward until we do that.

PLP:

But extending these relationships between material things to the material universe as a whole is a fallacy of composition.

I am not saying that, am I?

PLP:

Especially since everything we know about time and causality we know by virtue of the relationship of some material things to other material things;

Yes, I’d like to focus on this relationship as a particular aspect. I think you are missing something regarding it.

PLP:

if we are going to extend the concept to the Material Universe, this particular component of our analysis, which seems important to me, has to simply be chopped off.

I don’t consider the “Material Universe” as you defined it as anything other than a conceptual definition, and I don’t forsee ever needing to refer to it the way that you understand it. I see no use for that term except in sentences needing to refer to anything material in an abstract sense.

hurst

 

[PLP]

hurst:

You mean of things you don’t know will exist?

What you are avoiding saying is why you don’t know. Isn’t it because you have accepted the concept that the future is already there even if you aren’t? Doesn’t that only hold in the Model of Reality you have accepted (Scientific Materialism)?

In order to avoid talking past you…

I think we are indeed talking past each other. I’m sincerely completely in the dark as to how the ontology of future events relates to the First Cause argument for the existence of God. The more you complicated the ontology of the Material Universe, the harder it becomes to rigorously apply any conclusion to the whole ball of wax, whatever that is, to determine an immaterial “God-like” First Cause.

The ontology of the future and the ontology of relation in time in general are fascinating philosophical issues with many unsolved puzzles. But regardless of however we address these issues, they are issues about the relationship between individual material things with other individual material things.

Even if we relegate the past and future to the category of “immaterial”, we’re getting no closer to the traditional idea of a God; the idea of God has to be “doubly immaterial”, as existing not just outside the present, but also somehow outside the “immaterial” past or future.

 

[PLP]

I’ve been thinking seriously about some of the counter-arguments to my rebuttal of first cause arguments, especially hurst’s. Here’s my first approximation at trying to understand them.

Let’s throw out the whole idea of the composite entity I’ve been calling “the Material Universe”, which has no small few ontological problems. Let’s just talk about the ordinary universe as it appears right now. The present universe is the result of causal physical laws from the previous “state” of the universe; even handwaving aside differences between quantization and continuousness, we can say that there is a causal relationship between the way the universe is right now, and the way the universe was one arbitrarily defined “moment” ago.

Of course, the way the universe was one moment ago is causally dependent on the way the universe was two moments ago. And that on the state of the universe three moments ago. And so forth.

Now it is either the case that these previous moments go on infinitely, or there was some “first moment”. These alternatives are exaustive; either one or the other must be true.

If there was, in fact, a “first moment”, it too deserves causal explanation. But because it is the first moment, there are no previous moments to cause it. Therefore there must be some cause of this first moment (i.e. God) which is not itself a “momenent”.

Do I understand the thrust of your arguments correctly?

(Although the argument for the impossibility of an infinite series of moments from the Kalam Cosmological Argument are, in my opinion, deeply flawed, I think that’s a side issue; especially since I’m not prepared to defend a material universe with infinite extension in time. For the moment, at least, I’m willing to stipulate a finite (but not necessarily bounded) extension in time for at least the ordinary observable universe.)