Then the event was caused well before the origin of the universe, and so can have had no impact on the universe. It was finished well before the universe started. You cannot insert an event into a universe that does not exist.It is an event caused by God, but it is not a change in God.
This is question-begging. I am claiming that a cause can originate outside time, and the sentence above denies that without giving a reason.Then the event was caused well before the origin of the universe, and so can have had no impact on the universe.
Why not? I’m talking about timeless causation. You’re the one who is importing the foreign notion that these causes are “before” events in our timeline. If anything, they are simultaneous with all events on our timeline – though that characterization is inaccurate too.You cannot insert an event into a universe that does not exist.
For one thing, all of the gears could be necessarily moving. Fatalism is a completely consistent philosophy that denies the unmoved mover argument without being capable of disproof.Okay, explain to me what is wrong with the unmoved mover argument.
Because an infinite series of contingent beings do not have within its series the cause of the existence of that series. A contingent being may actualize the potential of another being but only in an intermediary sense since existence does not belong to it intrinsically and thus neither its power because it too was only potentially real to begin with. Existence is something given to every single one of them. None of them are the actual source of that which makes the series actual in the first place. Thus without a source, an existential cuase, an unmoved mover, a necessary being, none of them would exist.Why can’t we have contingent causes ad infinitum?
Only if you think a thing can be arbitrarily true, like a brute fact. And thing necessarily changing is still a mixture of potency and act and therefore is not necessarily actual.Fatalism is a completely consistent philosophy that denies the unmoved mover argument without being capable of disproof.
Even the theist must say that “God is a necessary being” is a brute fact. Or how else do you explain it?Only if you think a thing can be arbitrarily true, like a brute fact.
That’s the first i have heard of it. A thing exists either because of its nature or because of the nature of something else.Even the theist must say that “God is a necessary being” is a brute fact. Or how else do you explain it?
Then why does THIS fact exist?That’s the first i have heard of it. A thing exists either because of its nature or because of the nature of something else.
What is the explanation for the thing’s nature? In cases of contingent things, you needn’t explain the natures of things, because those natures aren’t necessarily instantiated. But a necessary thing is necessarily instantiated, thus there must either be an explanation for its nature OR its nature must be a brute fact. I think you realize this, and you just don’t know what the best way to answer is. That’s OK. We don’t always have an answer for everything. I think God’s being necessary is a brute fact, but I’m open to arguments.A thing existing because of its nature is not a brute fact because the reason for its existence resides in its nature regardless of whether or not we are capable of understand what that is.
This is good philosophy. But one can accept this claim without claiming that anything necessary exists. We could just have an infinite number of contingent series, each caused by another contingent series.Because an infinite series of contingent beings do not have within its series the cause of the existence of that series.
Precisely. Thus you can suggest that there is a reason God must be necessary, but you cannot say what the reason is. From your perspective, it might as well be brute. But sure, I agree it needn’t be brute in itself.I can only comprehend God’s act of existence in a very general sense. God exists because of his nature, something about his nature means that he is necessary or cannot not exist.
But this is the point we started with. I said that you are assuming that the only grounding for contingent things could be a necessary thing. You have not argued for that assumption. You appear to think it is self-evident. I do not. It is not self-evident to me that there must BE an answer for why there is something rather than nothing. Mind you, I think that most likely there is such an answer, and thus I think that probabilistically these arguments accomplish something. But it is not proof that they accomplish.It’s irrelevant how many series there are, none of them exist in their own right. You are trying to remove the need to explain the contingency of somethings nature by adding more contingent things, but that in itself fails miserably in giving an explanation for existence of that which is not necessary. It is not the explanation for why there is something rather than nothing.
It’s irrational. If all beings are contingent then none of them exist because of their nature but rather they exist for no reason at all, which is just as bad as saying something popped out of nothing.In just the same way, someone might claim that all beings are necessarily contingent
OK, so what is the reason that the universe couldn’t be a brute fact? That you find such a universe aesthetically displeasing? So do I. But that’s not proof.It’s irrational. If all beings are contingent then none of them exist because of their nature but rather they exist for no reason at all, which is just as bad as saying something popped out of nothing.
You have to begin with being to explain the potential existence of other beings. If the being you begin with is a nature which is the product of potential or is contingent on something else for its being ad infinitum, what you have is no explanation for the existence of things.I do not. It is not self-evident to me that there must BE an answer for why there is something rather than nothing. Mind you, I think that most likely there is such an answer, and thus I think that probabilistically these arguments accomplish something. But it is not proof that they accomplish.
But the point I’m making is that there is no necessity to explain an infinite past of contingent events. That is an available response to these arguments.If the being you begin with is a nature which is the product of potential or is contingent on something else for its being ad infinitum, what you have is no explanation for the existence of things.