First Way

[Someone2841]

[Note: Motion is always in the Aristotelian/Thomistic sense; that is, motion is the reduction of potentiality to actuality. The same goes with the verb “to move.”]

I have been trying to wrap my head around the Aquinas’s First Way, but I am stuck on one particular issue. Here is Feser’s summary of the First Way:

As presented in the Summa Theologiae , the proof from motion goes as follows. We know from experience that “some things are in motion” (“motion” in the Aristotelian sense just being change, as we saw in our discussion of Aristotle’s reply to Parmenides). Now motion or change is just the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But “nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by something in a state of actuality” ( ST I.2.3); for instance, fire, which is actually hot, makes wood, which is otherwise only potentially hot, become actually hot. Moreover, nothing can be both potential and actual in the same respect at the same time; what is actually hot, for example, is not at the same time potentially hot, but potentially cold. In that case, though, it is impossible for anything to be at the same time and in the same respect both that which is moved or changed and that which does the moving or changing. Hence, “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another” ( ST I.2.3). By the same token, if that which puts something else in motion is itself moving, there must be yet something further moving it , and so on. But if such a series went on to infinity, then there would be no first mover; and if there were no first mover, there would be no other movers, for “subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand” ( ST I.2.3). It follows that “it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this I.2.3). -Edward Feser Aquinas

I have bolded the part that my question concerns. I agree with the statement, but it seems to leave a loose end in the proof. What if that which puts something else in motion is itself not moving? This is certainly possible, since at least God moves other beings without himself moving. But why not something else? That is, why not a first mover in a casual chain that moves without being moved yet is not God? Feser does address this:

Even if it is granted that the First Way takes us to an unmoved mover, why should we hold (as Aquinas does) that this mover is also unmovable ? As Scott MacDonald suggests, it may be that a first mover of the sort whose existence is established by Aquinas’s first mover, it does not in fact move. In other words, for all Aquinas has shown, a first mover may well have certain potencies which are not in fact being actualized , at least not insofar as it is functioning as the first mover in some series of efficient causes ordered per se. Perhaps its potencies are actualized at some other time, when it is not so functioning; or perhaps they never are. But as long as it has them, it will not be something that can be characterized as “pure act,” and thus, given Aquinas’s own commitments, it will not be identifiable with God. -Ibid.

I’m not sure I completely follow his refutation of this. He goes back to the distinction between causal chains per se and per accidens, which I understand, but I am not convinced that casual chains per se must end with something that is pure act (actus purus). Why is this the case?

Last comment: Feser brings up the problems inertia brings the the “metaphysical table,” as it were, and I think he does an okay job of defending it. However, if an object floating through space at a constant rate (i.e., with no change to its momentum) is actually at rest (i.e., with no reduction of potency to act), then at any point it may collide with another object and change that objects momentum. The initial object received its actuality from something actual, and in turn it eventually realized another objects potential; however, this is definitely a per accidens casual chain. This is obviously just an example, but its metaphysical generalization would be that things that are actual may (via some metaphysical analog to momentum, inertia, and force) be able to move an object without itself being moved at that very instant that thus not be a part of some essential casual chain.

[If on the other hand, the floating object is moving, what is moving it?]

Thanks in advance!

 

[Ignatius]

[Note: Motion is always in the Aristotelian/Thomistic sense; that is, motion is the reduction of potentiality to actuality. The same goes with the verb “to move.”]

I have been trying to wrap my head around the Aquinas’s First Way, but I am stuck on one particular issue. Here is Feser’s summary of the First Way:

I have bolded the part that my question concerns. I agree with the statement, but it seems to leave a loose end in the proof. What if that which puts something else in motion is itself not moving? This is certainly possible, since at least God moves other beings without himself moving. But why not something else? That is, why not a first mover in a casual chain that moves without being moved yet is not God? Feser does address this:

I’m not sure I completely follow his refutation of this. He goes back to the distinction between causal chains per se and per accidens, which I understand, but I am not convinced that casual chains per se must end with something that is pure act (actus purus). Why is this the case?

Last comment: Feser brings up the problems inertia brings the the “metaphysical table,” as it were, and I think he does an okay job of defending it. However, if an object floating through space at a constant rate (i.e., with no change to its momentum) is actually at rest (i.e., with no reduction of potency to act), then at any point it may collide with another object and change that objects momentum. The initial object received its actuality from something actual, and in turn it eventually realized another objects potential; however, this is definitely a per accidens casual chain. This is obviously just an example, but its metaphysical generalization would be that things that are actual may (via some metaphysical analog to momentum, inertia, and force) be able to move an object without itself being moved at that very instant that thus not be a part of some essential casual chain.

[If on the other hand, the floating object is moving, what is moving it?]

Thanks in advance!

Of course it must all start with the the Prime Mover. I.E. at some point there must be
a beginning, an Unmoved Mover.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

[Note: Motion is always in the Aristotelian/Thomistic sense; that is, motion is the reduction of potentiality to actuality. The same goes with the verb “to move.”]

I have been trying to wrap my head around the Aquinas’s First Way, but I am stuck on one particular issue. Here is Feser’s summary of the First Way:

I have bolded the part that my question concerns. I agree with the statement, but it seems to leave a loose end in the proof. What if that which puts something else in motion is itself not moving? This is certainly possible, since at least God moves other beings without himself moving. But why not something else? That is, why not a first mover in a casual chain that moves without being moved yet is not God? Feser does address this:

I’m not sure I completely follow his refutation of this. He goes back to the distinction between causal chains per se and per accidens, which I understand, but I am not convinced that casual chains per se must end with something that is pure act (actus purus). Why is this the case?

Last comment: Feser brings up the problems inertia brings the the “metaphysical table,” as it were, and I think he does an okay job of defending it. However, if an object floating through space at a constant rate (i.e., with no change to its momentum) is actually at rest (i.e., with no reduction of potency to act), then at any point it may collide with another object and change that objects momentum. The initial object received its actuality from something actual, and in turn it eventually realized another objects potential; however, this is definitely a per accidens casual chain. This is obviously just an example, but its metaphysical generalization would be that things that are actual may (via some metaphysical analog to momentum, inertia, and force) be able to move an object without itself being moved at that very instant that thus not be a part of some essential casual chain.

[If on the other hand, the floating object is moving, what is moving it?]

Thanks in advance!

We have a new thread on the First Way already. Why not close this thread and make your comments on the other thread. I could comment here but I think it would show disrespect to the other post to do so.

Linus2nd

 

[Someone2841]

Of course it must all start with the the Prime Mover. I.E. at some point there must be
a beginning, an Unmoved Mover.

This isn’t really a sufficient answer to my question. I understand Aquinas’s conclusion just fine, but do you have anything to say about what I brought up?

We have a new thread on the First Way already. Why not close this thread and make your comments on the other thread. I could comment here but I think it would show disrespect to the other post to do so.

Linus2nd

Are you referring to the thread How Aquinas confuses the First and Second way? I’ll read through it more carefully, but it doesn’t seem to be addressing my particular point.

 

[balto]

I’m not sure I completely follow his refutation of this. He goes back to the distinction between causal chains per se and per accidens, which I understand, but I am not convinced that casual chains per se must end with something that is pure act (actus purus). Why is this the case?

I had this difficulty at one point also. Suppose you have a purely actual being that is still finite, so it does not change. But if it is finite and there are ways in which it could be but is not, then it does not exist by nature. So there is still a distinction between essence and existence in this being, and since it nonetheless does exist, it’s potency for existing is actualized by God, who is “pure act”, whose essence is existence. So this finite pure act is still “moved” in a certain sense, since its potency for existing is being actualized by God. This analysis makes it the case that every causal series per se necessarily gets you to God as pure act full stop. Does that explanation suffice?

Last comment: Feser brings up the problems inertia brings the the “metaphysical table,” as it were, and I think he does an okay job of defending it. However, if an object floating through space at a constant rate (i.e., with no change to its momentum) is actually at rest (i.e., with no reduction of potency to act), then at any point it may collide with another object and change that objects momentum. The initial object received its actuality from something actual, and in turn it eventually realized another objects potential; however, this is definitely a per accidens casual chain. This is obviously just an example, but its metaphysical generalization would be that things that are actual may (via some metaphysical analog to momentum, inertia, and force) be able to move an object without itself being moved at that very instant that thus not be a part of some essential casual chain.

Your momentum example does not get away from the principle that “what is moved is moved by another.” Let’s take your example: there are two bodies with mass m1 and m2. m1 has a constant velocity of v1 and m2 has no velocity. So the momentum of the system is m1v1. Then they collide and become stuck together and since momentum is conserved the velocity of both of them post collision is v3=m1v1/(m1+m2). During the collision, m1 is being moved by m2 such that its velocity is slowed down from v1 to v3 and m2 is being moved by m1 such that it accelerates from 0 to v3. This still involves a causal series per se and gets you to the unmoved Mover.

[If on the other hand, the floating object is moving, what is moving it?]

If a moving object is traveling at a constant velocity, it is not experiencing motion as you defined it in the OP. A change in place is merely a Cambridge change. We only say something changes place because we are saying that the distance between it and some other point is changing, but this does not imply a real change in the objects themselves. Acceleration on the other hand does imply a real change in the object itself. However, the floating object still is being moved in another extremely basic way though, since it’s nature is always being actualized by God’s eternal creative act.

 

[Someone2841]

I had this difficulty at one point also. Suppose you have a purely actual being that is still finite, so it does not change. But if it is finite and there are ways in which it could be but is not, then it does not exist by nature. So there is still a distinction between essence and existence in this being, and since it nonetheless does exist, it’s potency for existing is actualized by God, who is “pure act”, whose essence is existence. So this finite pure act is still “moved” in a certain sense, since its potency for existing is being actualized by God. This analysis makes it the case that every causal series per se necessarily gets you to God as pure act full stop. Does that explanation suffice?

First of all, thanks for taking time to answer my question. I do honestly want to understand this.

But what about a being that is an admixture of potentiality and actuality (call this X). X is not pure act, and moreover has priorly had some potentiality reduced to actuality. Can X not reduce the potentiality of some other being Y without simultaneously having any of its potentialities actualized at that moment? God (pure act) does just this, but can X (a composite)? Why or why not?

Your momentum example does not get away from the principle that “what is moved is moved by another.” Let’s take your example: there are two bodies with mass m1 and m2. m1 has a constant velocity of v1 and m2 has no velocity. So the momentum of the system is m1v1. Then they collide and become stuck together and since momentum is conserved the velocity of both of them post collision is v3=m1v1/(m1+m2). During the collision, m1 is being moved by m2 such that its velocity is slowed down from v1 to v3 and m2 is being moved by m1 such that it accelerates from 0 to v3. This still involves a causal series per se and gets you to the unmoved Mover.

Can you elaborate on this point a bit more? How does the causal series per se go beyond that of the first body?

Thanks!

 

[Shike]

Balto gets very close to the mark when he says that the X in question would actually be reducing from potentiality to actuality, contrary to what was said in the hypothetical scenario. It is really where you put the emphasis in the scenario: another answer (perhaps respecting more the actual scenario you gave) is that if there is no reduction from potentiality to actuality then what you are really dealing with is the Unmoved Mover.

First of all, thanks for taking time to answer my question. I do honestly want to understand this.

But what about a being that is an admixture of potentiality and actuality (call this X). X is not pure act, and moreover has priorly had some potentiality reduced to actuality. Can X not reduce the potentiality of some other being Y without simultaneously having any of its potentialities actualized at that moment? God (pure act) does just this, but can X (a composite)? Why or why not?

Just in case, be careful not to confuse potentiality with potential or power as they are not the same at all: potentiality is a very specific principle as found in scholastic natural philosophy and metaphysics. I see the confusion a lot so I like to mention it just in case.

It may help to imagine the situation better by only taking into account one instant in time or time slice. At this moment in time, what are the sustaining (per se) causes to the effect in question. And if the effect in question has a cause that has the principle of potentiality within its being, then what are the sustaining causes of this cause… and so on.

It is necessary to think in terms of pe se causes as they show the existential nature of the situation. Existence, existence, existence. Think in terms of existence. With existence, it is an either or kind of thing. If you think in terms of existence, you will see that the situation of a being that has the principle of potentiality within itself cannot create something that does not also include the principle of potentiality within it.

You might be right in a sense, that there are other unmoved movers, perhaps in the field of free will and human choices. But when we are talking about potentiality and actuality, we are talking about the existential situation. An extension to human choices would be metaphorical.

 

[balto]

First of all, thanks for taking time to answer my question. I do honestly want to understand this.

No problem. This is actually good for me as well because it helps me to understand these issues better by discussing them with others .

But what about a being that is an admixture of potentiality and actuality (call this X). X is not pure act, and moreover has priorly had some potentiality reduced to actuality. Can X not reduce the potentiality of some other being Y without simultaneously having any of its potentialities actualized at that moment? God (pure act) does just this, but can X (a composite)? Why or why not?

Shike brings up some good points in the preceding post that I agree with, especially the part about how your question is getting pretty deep, probably down to the existential level. Your supposed unmoved mover that is not God is probably something like a human or angelic will, or it might even just be any nature more generally. An active power is considered to be actuality. So I have the active power of speaking even if I am not always speaking. My decision to start speaking might actually be the first in an order of natural causes only. But why is my nature real? My nature is contingent, not necessary, so it may or may not exist. God is who is causing it to be the case that my nature is real and causing it to be the case that I even have the active power of speaking at all. So I am still “existentially moved” although I am “naturally unmoved” but only God is unmoved in both respects. Technically it is not right to say that God causes things, because “causing” things refers to a natural power acting on another thing. God “causing” my nature to be real is really only analogous to what we understand causation to be.

Can you elaborate on this point a bit more? How does the causal series per se go beyond that of the first body?

Well I think you would have to speak to a physicist to get a better answer. It would be something like that when the bodies collide, the first body acts on the second, but that occurs only because the atoms in the first are repelling the atoms in the second, and that only occurs because the atoms are currently held together by atomic forces and quarks, which are only held together because … until you get to the nature of something that simply has the active power of doing whatever it is that it does and then God actualizes that nature.

 

[ynotzap]

[Note: Motion is always in the Aristotelian/Thomistic sense; that is, motion is the reduction of potentiality to actuality. The same goes with the verb “to move.”]

I have been trying to wrap my head around the Aquinas’s First Way, but I am stuck on one particular issue. Here is Feser’s summary of the First Way:

I have bolded the part that my question concerns. I agree with the statement, but it seems to leave a loose end in the proof. What if that which puts something else in motion is itself not moving? This is certainly possible, since at least God moves other beings without himself moving. But why not something else? That is, why not a first mover in a casual chain that moves without being moved yet is not God? Feser does address this

Answer:
Anything in a causal chain is caused, God is the uncaused cause He is apart from the causal chain but the cause of it. Nothing can move of itself, whether spiritual or physical, God is the Prime Mover, and the One who sustains motion in His creation. We in a sense can be secondary movers, but even our wills can not move themselves, it is a power of the soul which is the source of spiritual activity in the human body, and it exists in every part of the body , but the soul can not move itself, it is not it’s own power. The movement (change) from potency to act is caused by God. God is Pure Act, no change, no motion Every thing else changes, dynamic. (end of answer)

I’m not sure I completely follow his refutation of this. He goes back to the distinction between causal chains per se and per accidens, which I understand, but I am not convinced that casual chains per se must end with something that is pure act (actus purus). Why is this the case?

Last comment: Feser brings up the problems inertia brings the the “metaphysical table,” as it were, and I think he does an okay job of defending it. However, if an object floating through space at a constant rate (i.e., with no change to its momentum) is actually at rest (i.e., with no reduction of potency to act), then at any point it may collide with another object and change that objects momentum. The initial object received its actuality from something actual, and in turn it eventually realized another objects potential; however, this is definitely a per accidens casual chain. This is obviously just an example, but its metaphysical generalization would be that things that are actual may (via some metaphysical analog to momentum, inertia, and force) be able to move an object without itself being moved at that very instant that thus not be a part of some essential casual chain.

[If on the other hand, the floating object is moving, what is moving it?]

Thanks in advance!

 

[Vico]

[Note: Motion is always in the Aristotelian/Thomistic sense; that is, motion is the reduction of potentiality to actuality. The same goes with the verb “to move.”]

I have been trying to wrap my head around the Aquinas’s First Way, but I am stuck on one particular issue. Here is Feser’s summary of the First Way:

I have bolded the part that my question concerns. I agree with the statement, but it seems to leave a loose end in the proof. What if that which puts something else in motion is itself not moving? This is certainly possible, since at least God moves other beings without himself moving. But why not something else? That is, why not a first mover in a casual chain that moves without being moved yet is not God? Feser does address this:

I’m not sure I completely follow his refutation of this. He goes back to the distinction between causal chains per se and per accidens, which I understand, but I am not convinced that casual chains per se must end with something that is pure act (actus purus). Why is this the case?

Last comment: Feser brings up the problems inertia brings the the “metaphysical table,” as it were, and I think he does an okay job of defending it. However, if an object floating through space at a constant rate (i.e., with no change to its momentum) is actually at rest (i.e., with no reduction of potency to act), then at any point it may collide with another object and change that objects momentum. The initial object received its actuality from something actual, and in turn it eventually realized another objects potential; however, this is definitely a per accidens casual chain. This is obviously just an example, but its metaphysical generalization would be that things that are actual may (via some metaphysical analog to momentum, inertia, and force) be able to move an object without itself being moved at that very instant that thus not be a part of some essential casual chain.

[If on the other hand, the floating object is moving, what is moving it?]

Thanks in advance!

There are a few things we know about St. Thomas Aquinas in his First Way:

1. It is not a demonstration of the cause of the first beginning in time.
2. It is not temporal succession but simultaneous causes: “per se causes”.
3. Every motion in the world depends on a single initial moving cause.
4. A per se effect, must be caused by another prior, simultaneous cause, in the case of the spheres (where the activity of the cause is itself a change of motion).

 

[Shike]

If you think in terms of existence, you will see that the situation of a being that has the principle of potentiality within itself cannot create something that does not also include the principle of potentiality within it.

Although my post might have a couple helpful points, I have been thinking more on how to best respond to the original post. I still think what I said is true, but perhaps we should focus more on the scenario provided, which is a scenario that is not necessarily composed of per se causes.

So even though per se causes are what we need to focus on if we are going to eventually come to the Unmoved Mover here and now, the original poster wants to know if potentiality is involved in exercising a power. Yes, we know potentiality is involved in any effect, but that is not the question. The question is if potentiality also needs to be found in an agent other than God.

Well yes, because of per se causes, potentiality in some respect must be found in agents other than God. But the question is if in the very exercising of a power, potentiality is involved within the finite agent.

And interestingly enough, the answer to this question is in some way (if not totally) answered by the considerations already mentioned, namely the per se causes. God is responsible for our natures at every instant. And our natures are what specify our causal powers. Therefore in the exercising of any causal power of a finite being, that same potentiality is found that partly allows for the existence of that power.

Anything beyond this, is beyond me and I do not know.

 

[thinkandmull]

Does Fesser realize that Aquinas believed that the eternity of the motion could not be disproved from reason?

“Moreover, nothing can be both potential and actual in the same respect at the same time; what is actually hot, for example, is not at the same time potentially hot, but potentially cold. In that case, though, it is impossible for anything to be at the same time and in the same respect both that which is moved or changed and that which does the moving or changing.”

Something hot can be potentially hotter, but I digress. As Linus2 knows from a previous discussion, Aquinas is ambiguous on whether God is a selfmover or unmoved. Is God not both? Than he is both that which is moved and that which does the moving

There is so much confusion here on Aquinas. He doesn’t believe that per se infinity is possible, but accidental. The distinction really doesn’t exist however in physics. For there to be a “simultaneous causes”, well, does the cause exist before the effect? Is it in motion before the effect? It would have to be. If it moved at the same time of the effect, it would be a person with will, not a machine like nature.

However, there is not way to prove there is a First Mover if there is an eternity of motion

 

[ynotzap]

ynotzap:
Quote Someone: …but I’'m not convinced that causal chain per se must end with something that is pure act.

In a causal chain which ends in act,it is not pure act. To be pure act is to be Pure being. When speaking of a causal chain we are speaking of created being, and created being does not contain Pure being, so instead of being we think “becoming, constant change”, not a static state. So when we think “Potency” we think "the real capacity to become. When we think “Act” we think, the act of “becoming” Created beings will never be Pure Being or Pure Act. This refers to God only so pure act can never be the end in a causal chain