For Greater Glory?

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I can tell you that the Church says that we have an obligation to self-defend, up to but not in excess of the force used, or to be used against us.
Can you please provide a reference for this? I have looked in both the Summa and the Catechism and I do not find it. I do not believe it is at all correct.
 
Providing. Providing they are defending the common good of the citizenry they serve.
Well, there is the rub! I think people are not thinking seriously about this essential point.

The Mexican goverment was acting lawfully and in accordance with their constitution and the due process of Mexican law when they passed and enforced the ani-clerical laws. And the atheist president had his own “good” reasons for opposing the Church, which was “corrupting” Mexican citizens.

Now, obviously, Catholics were of a different opinion on at least some of this. But does this invalidate the authority of the Mexican government? Is that official Church teaching? (“Rome” never supported the Cristero rebellion.)

I have always wondered about this and for the most part my impression was that the Church was silent on this, preferring martyrdom to conflict of whatever form. Whenever I have asked Catholics I respect about the “right of revolution” I have been told that is not the Catholic way.

Recently, though, I did hear or read (I can’t remember the source, but it was Catholic, maybe someone on EWTN) that there is no obligation to abide by an unjust law. That is a significant step in the direction of “sedition” but I have yet to find any authoritative source for that.
No. I intended to use it that way. I have additional questions to ask that revolve around “obligation.” 🙂
Well, then, I stand by my previous answers. In answer to your simpler question, there is no obligation to self-defend. If someone comes at me with a knife and I choose not to resist him for what I judge to be good reasons I am not committing a sin. It is a prudential decision whether or not to exercise the right of self-defense and both options of using or not using violence to repel violence are defensible depending on the circumstances. Choosing not to self-defend is not the same as suicide which is a sin.
But such a “right” may well be in conflict with the Church. So, it’s not “right” that I am winding down to. “Rights,” to my way of thinking, are those things that we accord to others, or possess, precisely because they are accorded to us, or by us. I have a right to quench my thirst in your stream, but you have a right to no trespass. Now, one right seems that it should trump the other, correct?
Well, now that we’ve eliminated the possibility that you were misusing the term “obligation” we are back to our substantive disagreement on it. There is a whole discussion that can be had on how rights claims are resolved and traditionally this has been mostly left as a matter for secular governments and courts to decide within certain general paramaters. (But, again, we have to deal with the question of what to do when secular and Church law conflict.)
“Obligation,” OTOH, involves what we ought and must do, if we are able, to conserve the priorities of “life.” Such as, for example, shooting a person who you see as someone about to shoot another. That is the self-defense of another, which is “self-defense” taken wider.
This is a similar but sufficiently different question as to entail a different answer. Let us suppose, for example, that a priest witnesses one person about to kill another. Would he be obligated to intervene with violence? I think that you can make quite an argument in the affirmative, even if the priest is a gentle soul without the least competence in martial arts.

This brings us closer to the Cristero war and the question at hand since, of course, unjust laws are harmful to many, not just to some. Even so, as many have pointed out here, there is a very legitimate place for martyrdom in any such conflict. It may be that the proper role for priests is to hold public mass and get killed for it.
 
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JDaniel:
Obligation," OTOH, involves what we ought and must do, if we are able, to conserve the priorities of “life.” Such as, for example, shooting a person who you see as someone about to shoot another. That is the self-defense of another, which is “self-defense” taken wider.
This is can be an obligation. When we are responsible for the safety of others, at that point we are obligated to do so. This is legitimate defense, but not properly speaking self-defense.

From the Catechism
2265 Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for one who is responsible for the lives of others. The defense of the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm. For this reason, those who legitimately hold authority also have the right to use arms to repel aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their responsibility.
So my point is: I am obligated for defending my family, but I only have the right to defend myself. If only I am at risk of injury or death, it is a perfectly moral choice to not use violence.

It is an interesting question about defending someone we are not responsible for. Do we become responsible for the lives of others when we see them at harm and are able to stop it?
 
Bubba Switzler:
This brings us closer to the Cristero war and the question at hand since, of course, unjust laws are harmful to many, not just to some. Even so, as many have pointed out here, there is a very legitimate place for martyrdom in any such conflict. It may be that the proper role for priests is to hold public mass and get killed for it.
At least with respect to a just war, clerics are never allowed to fight. So if one looks at the Cristero war as just (as I do, despite the Church’s stance at the time), the priests who were actively involved in the fighting were wrong.

From the summa newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm#article2
Reply to Objection 4. Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
 
At least with respect to a just war, clerics are never allowed to fight. So if one looks at the Cristero war as just (as I do, despite the Church’s stance at the time), the priests who were actively involved in the fighting were wrong.
That seems entirely plausible (at the risk of understating something offered by TA). But consider the example I posed: a preist witnesses one person about to kill another. Is he prohibited from using violence to prevent the murder? My guess is, no. The argument that you (and TA) are offering is one of role, not right or duty as the marriage example implies. Priests take a vow of chastity in order to serve a different role in society and presumably that role does not include fighting in wars. But that presumes that there are others who can figtht and that the priest can serve in other ways, e.g. by being a military chaplin. In the example above, there is no possibility of someone else intervening. The opportunity to use violence to prevent murder falls on the priest alone.

Interestingly, this mirrors an argument that I see all the time about marriage. Is chastity a higher calling than marriage and marriage for those who are not up to chastity? Or are they simply different but equal roles in society and some suited to one or the other?

(Incidentally, one of the main characters of the film is a general/priest. Although he has an argument early with a priest who chooses not to fight, the one I mentioned earlier who chooses not even to hide and is executed, there is no criticism of general priest by the martyr priest. Perhaps that is mere artistic license.)
 
That seems entirely plausible (at the risk of understating something offered by TA). But consider the example I posed: a preist witnesses one person about to kill another. Is he prohibited from using violence to prevent the murder? My guess is, no. The argument that you (and TA) are offering is one of role, not right or duty as the marriage example implies. Priests take a vow of chastity in order to serve a different role in society and presumably that role does not include fighting in wars. But that presumes that there are others who can figtht and that the priest can serve in other ways, e.g. by being a military chaplin. In the example above, there is no possibility of someone else intervening. The opportunity to use violence to prevent murder falls on the priest alone.

(Incidentally, one of the main characters of the film is a general/priest. Although he has an argument early with a priest who chooses not to fight, the one I mentioned earlier who chooses not even to hide and is executed, there is no criticism of general priest by the martyr priest. Perhaps that is mere artistic license.)
Your analysis of the general question of a priest’s right to violence as opposed to right to participate in a just war is correct. They are two different questions. To my knowledge the Church has not said the priest does not have a right to self-defense, or the right to the defense of others; so I would answer that they do.

The film was great, but it was not historically accurate in all things. There were two priests who were generals in the Cristeros war; lets just say you will never see either one of them canonized or beatified by the Church. The entire depiction of the Fathers Reyes Vega could be described as artistic license.
 
Your analysis of the general question of a priest’s right to violence as opposed to right to participate in a just war is correct. They are two different questions. To my knowledge the Church has not said the priest does not have a right to self-defense, or the right to the defense of others; so I would answer that they do.
Good to know, makes sense to me.
The film was great, but it was not historically accurate in all things. There were two priests who were generals in the Cristeros war; lets just say you will never see either one of them canonized or beatified by the Church. The entire depiction of the Fathers Reyes Vega could be described as artistic license.
LOL! (Emphasis mine.)
 
Here is TA on “sedition” which pretty clearly is his term for rebellion as we have discussed here. His language is fairly general and I think we can use it to discuss a wider range of choices than taking up arms and killing people. In particular, he is focused on “discord” which is certainly a very general and potentially amiable term. It was certainly an act of discord to hold a public mass in Mexico during the time of the Cristeros. TA seems to be distinguishing just discord from sedition which is always unjust.

newadvent.org/summa/3042.htm#article2
 
Well, then, I stand by my previous answers. In answer to your simpler question, there is no obligation to self-defend. If someone comes at me with a knife and I choose not to resist him for what I judge to be good reasons I am not committing a sin. It is a prudential decision whether or not to exercise the right of self-defense and both options of using or not using violence to repel violence are defensible depending on the circumstances. Choosing not to self-defend is not the same as suicide which is a sin.
Bubba:

Fair enough. Now, let’s up the ante just a little. Let’s say you are a husband and a father of three small children. With your demise, the remaining family will no doubt suffer gravely, especially in a 3rd-world country. Do you still not have an obligation?
This brings us closer to the Cristero war and the question at hand since, of course, unjust laws are harmful to many, not just to some. Even so, as many have pointed out here, there is a very legitimate place for martyrdom in any such conflict. It may be that the proper role for priests is to hold public mass and get killed for it.
Let’s quantify that: how many Priests, or general population, may be slain for martyrdom’s sake? Is there a number that might denote reasonableness?

God bless,
jd
 
This is can be an obligation. When we are responsible for the safety of others, at that point we are obligated to do so. This is legitimate defense, but not properly speaking self-defense.
Tafan:

Yes, I know that, that’s why I modified it with the inclusion of, “in a much wider sense.” Now, is there a number which may represent a tipping point to our dilemma? How many may we directly involve in the act of “martyrdom” before we are obliged to stop an aggressor?
So my point is: I am obligated for defending my family, but I only have the right to defend myself. If only I am at risk of injury or death, it is a perfectly moral choice to not use violence.
Is this situation ethics? In America life may not be so hard for a surviving mother and three small children. In another country, it might be near fatal. Is there a tipping point here, as well?
It is an interesting question about defending someone we are not responsible for. Do we become responsible for the lives of others when we see them at harm and are able to stop it?
I believe I just read that it is, in the post above this one.

God bless,
jd
 
Is this situation ethics? In America life may not be so hard for a surviving mother and three small children. In another country, it might be near fatal. Is there a tipping point here, as well?

God bless,
jd
Well, I am not for sure what “situational ethics” is in a moral theology discussion. So I cannot answer the first question. I understand you point though. I am trying to say that there is no obligation to defend one-self in the objective sense. As in, it is objectively sinful to not defend oneself. I overstated when I implied one would always be free to not defend oneself.

BTW, I would still like a reference document to your previous claim that the Church teaches one has an obligation to defend oneself.

Have a good night.
 
Fair enough. Now, let’s up the ante just a little. Let’s say you are a husband and a father of three small children. With your demise, the remaining family will no doubt suffer gravely, especially in a 3rd-world country. Do you still not have an obligation?
Right! What I said before was for the general case. There is no general obligation to self-defend. Now, however, you have introduced more specific facts and these facts, in my opinion, lead in the direction of the application of violence. This is rather like the example I gave previously of the priest who is witness to an intent to murder. Now I might invent situations where martyrdom would still be appropriate but they would be unusual. For example, I might entrust my children to the care of another or I might buy time for them to escape by my martyrdom. Life is full of complicating facts and what I’m saying is that we are dealing now with a level of questions that are a matter of cicumstantial prudence without absolute answers.
Let’s quantify that: how many Priests, or general population, may be slain for martyrdom’s sake? Is there a number that might denote reasonableness?
I really have no idea how one would even approach such a calculus but we could speculate on the parameters. Among them: is this a Christian society or a society that has a tradition of empthay in it’s culture? The more so, the more likely that martyrdom will influence public opinion. I don’t endorse the idea of martyrdom for the sake of martyrdom. The traditional definition of Christian martyrdom entails witness, i.e. spreading the Gospel in the face of danger or demonstrating a higher purpose than life. It is not sanctified suicide. So the key question in our calculus is how does each marginal death influence the overall advance of social justice as compared to other choices. In the case of the Cristado rebellion, there were a range of choices from open defiance to armed rebellion and, in between, secret Mass, aiding the rebellion materially, caring for the sick and wounded, etc. I would dare say that a priest might properly go armed while holding secret Mass not, then, as a soldier or general but merely as a security guard.
 
Is this situation ethics?
Now that brings back some memories of Catholic school arguments. I finally gave up on the whole matter as it seemed more semantic than substantive. One’s man’s situation ethics is another man’s circumstantial prudence. You say potato, I say potato.
 
Well, I am not for sure what “situational ethics” is in a moral theology discussion. So I cannot answer the first question. I understand you point though. I am trying to say that there is no obligation to defend one-self in the objective sense. As in, it is objectively sinful to not defend oneself. I overstated when I implied one would always be free to not defend oneself.

BTW, I would still like a reference document to your previous claim that the Church teaches one has an obligation to defend oneself.

Have a good night.
Tafan:

I have not forgotten. I very recently moved to another place and left some of my resources in a warehouse. Is it OK to get it tomorrow and tell you then? Now that I’ve had a bit more time to think about it, I may be incorrect. But, I won’t know for sure until tomorrow.

God bless, and good night to you , Sir,
jd
 
And what about subversive acts like holding mass in secret? In China, for example, it is against the law to catechise to minors.
If holding Mass is a subversive act, then I pray wherever that might be the case (in places like China, etc) that Masses would be offered on a daily basis. Holding Mass is illegal in China if you are not sanctioned by the state approved National Catholic Patriotic Association. China is unique in that it is the only country which tries to ordain its own Bishops and priests through its own institution (and not through the normative Vatican approved channels as happens everywhere else in the world).

Christianity does not hinge on the state, it hinges on Jesus Christ. If you are a priest with a parish, you offer Masses every day. If the state wants to throw you in prison for that, or kill you for that, then they’re going to have to do so.

In the Roman Empire, Roman officials were puzzled by the Christians. All the Christians had to do was “fake” like they were giving offerings to pagan gods, or “fake” their loyalty to the Emperor as a god. Tons of other Roman cults already did that without believing in either Roman gods or the divine status of the Emperor.

But not the Christians. The Christians died by their thousands because they refused to do two seemingly simple acts in the eyes of the Romans. One Roman governor, Pliny, wrote a letter to the Emperor Trajan asking if this was the right thing to do or not. That letter, and Trajan’s response are the third document in the book, “Documents of the Christian Church”. The response, was that if the Christians failed to worship Roman gods or the Roman Emperor, then the death penalty was justified to punish disobedience.

The Romans thought that eventually the Christians would come round, and at least ‘offer lip service’ or pretend to do these things. The Romans thought that over time they wouldn’t have to kill as many Christians. What happened, of course, is that so many Romans became Christians that the persecution officially stopped under Emperor Constantine.​

As for the Just War theory, I would more readily take up arms if a Bishop called for the faithful to do so. But, I wouldn’t rule out doing so out of necessity.

I’ve placed the majority of my words in defense of the reverence of the Holy Mass. The philosophical justification of warfare is of far lesser importance than is the place of the Holy Mass.

Having Mass is a non-negotiable part of the Catholic faith. Whether a Mass is “subversive” or not is neither here nor there.
 
There were two priests who were generals in the Cristeros war; lets just say you will never see either one of them canonized or beatified by the Church. The entire depiction of the Fathers Reyes Vega could be described as artistic license.
If you are claiming that they would not be beatified because they fought in a war this would be a highly suspect proposition on your part. Saint Joan of Arc, Saint Louis (IX) among others, argue against that claim. The fact that they were priests may or may not make a difference. I am open to correction.
 
If you are claiming that they would not be beatified because they fought in a war this would be a highly suspect proposition on your part. Saint Joan of Arc, Saint Louis (IX) among others, argue against that claim. The fact that they were priests may or may not make a difference. I am open to correction.
No, my main claim had to do with the priest, Reyes Vega , who had quite a questionable reputation. But, I would say that in this case, they will not be beautified because they fought also. They were ordered not to do so by their Bishops. It must be noted that the Holy See did not support the Cristeros war. For the most part, the Bishops in Mexico fell into line and did not approve of the war. Two Bishops who actively encouraged the war and provided direct assistance were removed from their sees by the Vatican.

I would also point out the obvious that none of your examples are clerics.
 
If holding Mass is a subversive act, then I pray wherever that might be the case (in places like China, etc) that Masses would be offered on a daily basis. Holding Mass is illegal in China if you are not sanctioned by the state approved National Catholic Patriotic Association. China is unique in that it is the only country which tries to ordain its own Bishops and priests through its own institution (and not through the normative Vatican approved channels as happens everywhere else in the world).

Christianity does not hinge on the state, it hinges on Jesus Christ. If you are a priest with a parish, you offer Masses every day. If the state wants to throw you in prison for that, or kill you for that, then they’re going to have to do so.

In the Roman Empire, Roman officials were puzzled by the Christians. All the Christians had to do was “fake” like they were giving offerings to pagan gods, or “fake” their loyalty to the Emperor as a god. Tons of other Roman cults already did that without believing in either Roman gods or the divine status of the Emperor.

But not the Christians. The Christians died by their thousands because they refused to do two seemingly simple acts in the eyes of the Romans. One Roman governor, Pliny, wrote a letter to the Emperor Trajan asking if this was the right thing to do or not. That letter, and Trajan’s response are the third document in the book, “Documents of the Christian Church”. The response, was that if the Christians failed to worship Roman gods or the Roman Emperor, then the death penalty was justified to punish disobedience.

The Romans thought that eventually the Christians would come round, and at least ‘offer lip service’ or pretend to do these things. The Romans thought that over time they wouldn’t have to kill as many Christians. What happened, of course, is that so many Romans became Christians that the persecution officially stopped under Emperor Constantine.​

As for the Just War theory, I would more readily take up arms if a Bishop called for the faithful to do so. But, I wouldn’t rule out doing so out of necessity.

I’ve placed the majority of my words in defense of the reverence of the Holy Mass. The philosophical justification of warfare is of far lesser importance than is the place of the Holy Mass.

Having Mass is a non-negotiable part of the Catholic faith. Whether a Mass is “subversive” or not is neither here nor there.
A good dose of history, there, but an example does not a make a general theory, neither that of the early Christians nor the Christeros.

Still, going back to the original point of the thread, the ever-present tension and sometimes outright conflict between Catholic faith and secular society, it is interesting where people draw the line, what they regard as “non-negotiable”. For you it is the Mass (and I am not criticizing just observing). If you were living in Mexico during the time of the anti-clerical laws, what would you do?
 
I don’t want this to become a thread about tyranicide, but this is interesting:
Most political theorists are familiar with Augustine’s story of Alexander asking a captured pirate where he got the right to steal from other ships, and receiving the answer that he got it from the same place Alexander got the right to conquer other countries. Most will recognize Augustine’s famous summation of the point of the story: "Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale? What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms? [1] However, few are aware of the story’s first appearance in the work of a major pre-Christian political philosopher, the idea that much earlier philosopher intended to express with it, Augustine’s original purpose for quoting the story and embracing the idea, the role that idea plays in Augustine’s larger concept of politics, or the significance that Augustine’s embrace of that idea would have for the history of Christian political theory.
To measure the damage this ignorance does to our broader understanding of the whole field of political philosophy, consider the following quotations:
  1. Code:
    "Someone who kills a tyrant in order to liberate his country is to be praised and rewarded.
  2. Code:
    "Tyrannical government is unjust . . . . Therefore the overthrow of this kind of government does not have the character of sedition. . . . Rather it is the tyrant who is guilty of sedition.
  3. Code:
    "No one is obliged to obey someone whom it is legitimate and even praiseworthy to kill . . . . Therefore no one is obliged to obey a tyrant.
  4. Code:
    "Whoever seizes power by violence does not become a true ruler and lord, and therefore it is permissible when the possibility exists for someone to reject that rulership.
Now suppose you were to ask the average professor of political theory: What is the earliest century in which these revolutionary statements might have been considered mainstream and even accepted conventional wisdom? My guess is the most common answers you would get would be the 17th and 18th centuries, on grounds that rebellion against tyrants was rejected by mainstream political thought until John Locke in the late 17th century the only difficulty being to decide at what point Locke’s radical idea of a right to rebellion could be considered "mainstream and "accepted conventional wisdom.
In fact, all four quotations come from Thomas Aquinas writing in the 13th century. [2] And in writing to exult tyrannicide as an act worthy of praise and reward, Aquinas was only expressing the conventional wisdom of his time. In fact, in medieval political thought Aquinas represents the conservative end of the spectrum on the subject of resistance to abusive government. As the "Thomist school of thought coalesced around Aquinas’s writings, a rival school of thought that was even more sympathetic to resistance against abuses of power coalesced around the ideas of William of Ockham.
lsu.edu/artsci/groups/voegelin/society/2008%20Papers/Greg%20Forster.shtml
 
And here is another article on the Catholic tradition, again from a non-Catholic source:
At the beginning of the second millennium, there was no separation of church and state, and kings ruled the church. Tyrannicide was considered sinful. By the end of the thirteenth century, however, everything had changed. The “Little Renaissance” that began in the eleventh century led to a revolution in political and moral philosophy, so that using force to overthrow a tyrannical government became a positive moral duty. The intellectual revolution was an essential step in the evolution of Western political philosophy that eventually led to the American Revolution.
davekopel.org/Religion/Catholic-Second.htm
 
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