A
Areopagite
Guest
Your ongoing ambiguity is how you relate the concept of what a person wants to what is actually good for a person. Sometimes, you seem to say they are different, and sometimes you seem to say they always go together. Or something.
Sometimes, you seem to say that what is good for a person is based on what he wants, other times you say that a person can want what is not good for him, and then sometimes you say that the idea of “what is good for a person” is meaningless, because you seem to deny the idea of ontological goodness. You do distinguish harm from “going against consent,” but I am still unclear what you mean by harm if you deny ontological goodness. What is harm? I guess I now need a clear definition to understand what you are saying (b/c technically you never gave one … just examples). Once again, I think harm is linked to the concept of privation, and denying that … I cannot see how “harm” could possibly be defined.
But really, according to your thinking, understanding what is good for a person really doesn’t matter. It’s really all about consent, right? Why should consent only be important for people who have understanding? Consent is consent. It is the determining factor of morality, you have said. Why are the rules modified with people who aren’t perfectly informed? Thus, your ongoing statement of: evil is harm done to another without the person’s consent, suffers from grave exceptions. Can you modify the definition a bit to make it more airtight? It just doesn’t seem to apply in many cases.
Your idea of retroactive consent is … well, quite silly. I mean, conceivably I could do all sorts of really horrible stuff to people if later I somehow manage to convince them that it was okay. Someone could really physically abuse and rape people without their consent, but if the people later on say that it’s okay … then … it’s okay. Those rapes were never bad to begin with, according to the doctrine of retroactive consent (which undoes initial dissent apparently). Really, all kinds of evils could potentially evolve into never having been evils at all if the victims just change their minds about it down the road.
What if a kid never retroactively consents to having been forced to go to school? By your definition, those parents did wrong. What if the kid dies before he gives consent? The parents would still be wrongdoers since the future consent never came. Does this make any sense?
One brief mention though: artificial things gain their meaning and defining purposes from their human designers. Natural things, do not. Plants, animals, and even humans cannot be redefined by humans. We are able to define the meaning of artificial things only.
Thus, I would say that the objective standard of humans, since they are not artificial, do not have wavering standards of being. We are able to say what is good for a human and what is bad for a human, because human nature is not changeable. Anyway, I talk more on this if necessary …
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Sometimes, you seem to say that what is good for a person is based on what he wants, other times you say that a person can want what is not good for him, and then sometimes you say that the idea of “what is good for a person” is meaningless, because you seem to deny the idea of ontological goodness. You do distinguish harm from “going against consent,” but I am still unclear what you mean by harm if you deny ontological goodness. What is harm? I guess I now need a clear definition to understand what you are saying (b/c technically you never gave one … just examples). Once again, I think harm is linked to the concept of privation, and denying that … I cannot see how “harm” could possibly be defined.
Now, what makes you call this “misguided helpfulness” rather than “evil” … what is the criteria with which you label this act in this way? You have not explicated this. You said that evil is causing harm to another against that person’s consent. If the old man was uncomfortable (which you said is a kind of harm) during this venture, then technically it is evil, right (going by your definition)? This is a very important point. Is the act’s wrongness reduced because it causes very little harm? If so, I will ask you, again, what is the definition of harm? Much of your arguments hinge on this.If he did not give his consent, then the kids used force to make the old man to do something that he did not want. Whether we call that “evil”, or “misguided helpfulness”, is just a minor point. I would not call it downright “evil”, of course. It does not merit such a strong condemnation. But it is something that the kids should not have done.
Okay, here you talk about “benefit” which I assume is equivalent to “what is good for the child” … in other words, I would say, ontological goodness. Right?The adults (hopefully) possess more knowledge, more wisdom, and can see the benefit on the child’s behalf, which the child does not see. We must presume that the parents have more understanding, and if the child would be in the position to make a valid assessment of the facts, he would agree.
But really, according to your thinking, understanding what is good for a person really doesn’t matter. It’s really all about consent, right? Why should consent only be important for people who have understanding? Consent is consent. It is the determining factor of morality, you have said. Why are the rules modified with people who aren’t perfectly informed? Thus, your ongoing statement of: evil is harm done to another without the person’s consent, suffers from grave exceptions. Can you modify the definition a bit to make it more airtight? It just doesn’t seem to apply in many cases.
Your idea of retroactive consent is … well, quite silly. I mean, conceivably I could do all sorts of really horrible stuff to people if later I somehow manage to convince them that it was okay. Someone could really physically abuse and rape people without their consent, but if the people later on say that it’s okay … then … it’s okay. Those rapes were never bad to begin with, according to the doctrine of retroactive consent (which undoes initial dissent apparently). Really, all kinds of evils could potentially evolve into never having been evils at all if the victims just change their minds about it down the road.
What if a kid never retroactively consents to having been forced to go to school? By your definition, those parents did wrong. What if the kid dies before he gives consent? The parents would still be wrongdoers since the future consent never came. Does this make any sense?
Well, I profusely apologize, but this is getting very philosophical and thus I must stoop down to very philosophical concepts. I would say, as Aristotle would, that the glass and the water are separate substances. “A glass of water” is not a single substance, but two with a relation to each other. Thus, I believe, you can’t talk about “a glass of water” as having a privation but you can talk of privations in the glass and in the water. I may be wrong, but I’m fairly certain. If I’m wrong, there’s this question to ask: “What is a glass of water for?” Look at the purposes of things to determine whether or not it is achieving ontological perfection. Indeed, what is a glass of water for? If it’s slightly empty, does it start to perform it’s function badly? Well, as Aristotle would say, artificial objects get their purposes from their designers. Thus, I ask, why was this particular glass made? What was its purpose intended to be? If it’s job was intended to “hold any amount of water” then you could say it would fulfill its job no matter how much water it had. If you are employing it to be a full glass of water, then you could say it’s not up to snuff, because it’s only 90% full. Human-made things vary in goodness depending on what they are used for by humans.I was not talking about the “glass” itself, I was talking about the “glass of water”, which may only be 90% full. Is there a privation there?
I don’t see what point you’re making here. By saying that goodness is relative … are you in effect saying it’s meaningless? What exactly are you saying?Goodness and fulfillment is a relative term - pertaining to something. Someone might be severly handicapped, but can function perfectly well in a virtual environment, like this discussion board.
One brief mention though: artificial things gain their meaning and defining purposes from their human designers. Natural things, do not. Plants, animals, and even humans cannot be redefined by humans. We are able to define the meaning of artificial things only.
Thus, I would say that the objective standard of humans, since they are not artificial, do not have wavering standards of being. We are able to say what is good for a human and what is bad for a human, because human nature is not changeable. Anyway, I talk more on this if necessary …
Here again, some of your words seem to be at odds with others. ** What do you mean by “dire need of help” … help with what? Help with making him do what he wants or help with getting him to be a better person?No, I don’t disagree. It is absolutely acceptable to try to help, where you perceive that the person is in dire need of help. What is not acceptable is to attempt to help, and when the person tells you that your help is unwelcome, then turn around and do it anyway.
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