Free will and existence

[Binary]

Do the following ideas conflict?

-Existence is a good in which all extant things participate, since existence is impossible without the will of God, and God’s will is always good.

-We are free to accept or reject God’s will. In the afterlife, we are said to follow God’s will perfectly in heaven, or be totally severed from God by rejecting his will altogether.

-By continuing to exist in hell, souls there still participate in God’s will (insomuch as he wills them to exist). In terms of existence, God’s will is imposed on all souls without exception, and so can’t be altogether rejected.

A possible objection: it could be that it is unintelligible to say that any being with a will could will itself to not exist, even if granted the freedom to by God. I don’t know if this is the case, just throwing it out there.

 

[Aelred_Minor]

Free will means that the movement of our will is free from creaturely determination. That doesn’t mean we are able to will absolutely anything. We cannot will evil for its own sake, for example, or an ancient Roman could not will to drop a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima because he had no knowledge of either nuclear bombs or Hiroshima.

Likewise there are severe limitations placed on our ability to actualize something we may decide we want. I can use my free will to desire to grow wings and fly into the air, but I lack the power to do this.

The issue of desiring annihilation would fall under the second category I think. A person might freely decide to desire annihilation, but as far as their soul is concerned they lack the power to bring this about. God alone has authority over our existence or non-existence. We are free to set our wills against God’s decision that we should exist or to unite our wills to that decision, but in neither case can or should we be able to usurp God’s authority and power and extinguish our existence.

 

[Binary]

Your second category is analogous in the sense that in both we lack the power to do something, but the situation differs because it is only in my example that we are forced to do something in a positive sense. To this extent, God’s will has no regard for our own. For this reason I say that “free will” is a misnomer. We have mostly free will, sure, but not a will entirely free from compulsion. I reject your definition that “free will” refers only to creaturely influences. Nobody would call a creature whose every decision was determined by God to be free.

 

[fred_conty]

I don’t know of anything that God wills into non-existence. Even material
things do not get annihilated but are so to speak recycled into something
else because matter has commonality. It is ony the soul that is individual
and distinct as a person from every other soul. And as such cannot be recycled.
And also since being a soul is spirit, in itself, is not destructable.
Since God brings everything into existence as good, then there would be
no reason to annihlate it. And the soul of a bad spirit is bad not by its
existence, but only by its condition. Therefore there would be no reason
for the destruction of something good whch gives glory to God.

 

[Aelred_Minor]

Your second category is analogous in the sense that in both we lack the power to do something, but the situation differs because it is only in my example that we are forced to do something in a positive sense. To this extent, God’s will has no regard for our own. For this reason I say that “free will” is a misnomer. We have mostly free will, sure, but not a will entirely free from compulsion. I reject your definition that “free will” refers only to creaturely influences. Nobody would call a creature whose every decision was determined by God to be free.

Once you get into the relationship between God and free will things get very difficult, which is why I left it at creaturely determination. I assume you don’t want another Thomism-Molinism-Other debate on this thread.

The point is that God in continuing to give a person existence is not forcing them to choose existence or choose to do anything to preserve their existence, so it does not violate free will. To use another analogy, a person’s medical condition does not, generally, result from any choice of that medical condition on the person’s part. Also we do not choose whether to be born in Original Sin, and Mary did not choose whether to be preserved from it. Or consider things like natural hair color or skin color- those are positive attributes which were not chosen and were outside of the person’s control. Today the person might die their hair or bleach their skin, but they still lack the ability to change its natural color. Our existence or non-existence in heaven or hell similarly is something we will have independent of whether we will it or not.

 

[Curious_Seed]

Do the following ideas conflict?

Existence is a good in which all that exists participates.
Existence is impossible without the will of God.
God’s will is always good.
We are free to accept or reject God’s will.
In the afterlife, we are to follow God’s will.
In the afterlife, failure to serve God’s will is to be severed.
Souls in hell participate in God’s will.
God’s will is imposed, without exception.

The way the question is prefaced has spoiled any chance of a reasonable answer.

Far too many premises.

 

[rom422]

Do the following ideas conflict?

-Existence is a good in which all extant things participate, since existence is impossible without the will of God, and God’s will is always good.

-We are free to accept or reject God’s will. In the afterlife, we are said to follow God’s will perfectly in heaven, or be totally severed from God by rejecting his will altogether.

-By continuing to exist in hell, souls there still participate in God’s will (insomuch as he wills them to exist). In terms of existence, God’s will is imposed on all souls without exception, and so can’t be altogether rejected.

A possible objection: it could be that it is unintelligible to say that any being with a will could will itself to not exist, even if granted the freedom to by God. I don’t know if this is the case, just throwing it out there.

Let me clarify what we call “free will” by first speaking of free choice.

Suppose you want to buy a used car. So, you go to a used car dealer and find four cars in the parking lot. Call them A, B, C, and D for simplicity. You certainly have free choice because you are free to choose one of these cars. But the problem is, you are limited by the number of choices available. If you are not satisfied, you may choose not to buy any of these cars and go to another car dealer. But your choices will still be limited. Now, just think of it. You are limited in your choices, but there is no denying that you still are free to make your choice. You are also free NOT to choose yet, and decide to buy your car another day.

Now choice is an act of the will, and this act is free. Saying that it is free does not mean that a limitation does not exist, and the existence of a limitation does not mean that freedom is thereby destroyed.

Now, let me bring another concept. This time I will talk about volition. Volition is also an act of the will. But volition is an act of the will with regard to its natural end, while choice is the act of the will with regard to the means. Now, the end of an appetite is that to which the appetite naturally tends. In the case of the will, the end is the good, for the will tends naturally to that which the intellect perceives as good. When the will desires the good, then it is engaged in the act of volition, and this act is NOT free. The will cannot but desire the good, for it is its natural object. But, you ask, don’t we sometimes desire what is evil? Yes, we do, but only when it is presented to the will by the intellect under the semblance of good!

Therefore, when we speak of “free will”, we really mean “free choice.” The will is not free in its act of volition, or in desiring what the intellect perceives as good, because the will tends to it as its natural end. However, the will has freedom of choice as regards the means toward the attainment of its end.

Now let me go back to the original post. It is not unintelligible for a person in hell to desire its non-existence when it perceives its non-existence as a good compared to its suffering in hell. That this person is thereby not annihilated means that his will, unlike God’s will, is not efficacious, for it has no power to bring about or destroy existence. In a sense, it is true to say that his existence is imposed on him by the almighty God. However, this person, because he has a will, retains his fundamental freedom of choice. The problem is, by being in hell, his choices are now severely limited. For one thing, heaven is not available to him anymore. He wants to go to heaven, but he is stuck to being in hell. He is in the same position as a person who wanted to buy a Cadillac, but the Cadillac he likes is already sold to someone else.

 

[Aelred_Minor]

Let me clarify what we call “free will” by first speaking of free choice.

Suppose you want to buy a used car. So, you go to a used car dealer and find four cars in the parking lot. Call them A, B, C, and D for simplicity. You certainly have free choice because you are free to choose one of these cars. But the problem is, you are limited by the number of choices available. If you are not satisfied, you may choose not to buy any of these cars and go to another car dealer. But your choices will still be limited. Now, just think of it. You are limited in your choices, but there is no denying that you still are free to make your choice. You are also free NOT to choose yet, and decide to buy your car another day.

Now choice is an act of the will, and this act is free. Saying that it is free does not mean that a limitation does not exist, and the existence of a limitation does not mean that freedom is thereby destroyed.

Now, let me bring another concept. This time I will talk about volition. Volition is also an act of the will. But volition is an act of the will with regard to its natural end, while choice is the act of the will with regard to the means. Now, the end of an appetite is that to which the appetite naturally tends. In the case of the will, the end is the good, for the will tends naturally to that which the intellect perceives as good. When the will desires the good, then it is engaged in the act of volition, and this act is NOT free. The will cannot but desire the good, for it is its natural object. But, you ask, don’t we sometimes desire what is evil? Yes, we do, but only when it is presented to the will by the intellect under the semblance of good!

Therefore, when we speak of “free will”, we really mean “free choice.” The will is not free in its act of volition, or in desiring what the intellect perceives as good, because the will tends to it as its natural end. However, the will has freedom of choice as regards the means toward the attainment of its end.

Now let me go back to the original post. It is not unintelligible for a person in hell to desire its non-existence when it perceives its non-existence as a good compared to its suffering in hell. That this person is thereby not annihilated means that his will, unlike God’s will, is not efficacious, for it has no power to bring about or destroy existence. In a sense, it is true to say that his existence is imposed on him by the almighty God. However, this person, because he has a will, retains his fundamental freedom of choice. The problem is, by being in hell, his choices are now severely limited. For one thing, heaven is not available to him anymore. He wants to go to heaven, but he is stuck to being in hell. He is in the same position as a person who wanted to buy a Cadillac, but the Cadillac he likes is already sold to someone else.