Free will and love... love? WHICH love?

[Trurl]

One of the arguments to “support” and “endorse” the evils due to human actions is the assertion that “free will” is necessary for “love” to exist. (I am constantly amazed that believers sort of “vote for” the existence of evil acts and not for eliminating evil from the world.) It is said that “love” is useless, unless “freely given”. The problem is that the kind of love which requires “free will” is never specified, it is just a “generic love”. But there are at least four kinds of love, “eros” (romance, sex), “philia” (friendship), “storge” (affection) and “agape” (selfless love). The real question is, which one of these loses its meaning or value, if not volitional? The answer is simple. “Eros” is based on chemistry and emotions - and none of those are volitionally based. “Philia” and “storge” are based on family and friendship relations, so there is no volitional action there either. You are either attracted to someone or not. It cannot be forced by volition. The only candidate for volitional actions is “agape”, which means to act on behalf of someone else, and actions are clearly volitional.

So the question is what does the volitional aspect add (if anything at all) to the action which epitomizes “agape”? Let’s consider a simple scenario: “there is a traffic accident and a passer-by stops to help”. That is clearly a volitional act on behalf of someone else, so it qualifies as an act of “agape”. Now, who cares if that was a volitional act, or a “pre-programmed” one? The person who suffered the accident is happy for the help in either case. He would not care if the helper was “programmed” to help, or if he could have just walked on. The act of helping is what is important, and the “why” is completely irrelevant. If the person stopped from the goodness of his “heart”, or he stopped because he wanted to feel good about himself, or he secretly hoped (but never asked) for a reward, it makes no difference. So it turns out that “free will” is not important when it comes to “agape” either, and it does not play a role in the other kinds of “love” either.

There are some more “kinds” of love, when one “loves” certain foods, and does not love others, or loves certain kinds of music, but none of those are volitional choices. They are there or they are not there, and it does not matter either way.

Conclusion: the so called “free will” defense (free will is necessary, because otherwise love would be meaningless) is just a bunch of baloney just like all the other defenses pertaining to the problem of evil. If we all were “programmed” to be kind and helpful toward each other, if the thought of volitionally harming others would never cross our mind, we would not lose anything; all the different kinds of love would be present. Emotions, attractions would be there. People would be attached and attracted to others just fine. People would be compelled to help, but that does not matter to the ones who are being helped. The end result is the same. So I suggest to drop this argument, because it is simply false. (Of course it will not be dropped completely, but maybe some people will realize how ridiculous it is and will not use it. One can only hope… even if that “hope” is hopeless… )

 

[Peter_Plato]

So the question is what does the volitional aspect add (if anything at all) to the action which epitomizes “agape”? Let’s consider a simple scenario: “there is a traffic accident and a passer-by stops to help”. That is clearly a volitional act on behalf of someone else, so it qualifies as an act of “agape”. Now, who cares if that was a volitional act, or a “pre-programmed” one? The person who suffered the accident is happy for the help in either case. He would not care if the helper was “programmed” to help, or if he could have just walked on. The act of helping is what is important, and the “why” is completely irrelevant. If the person stopped from the goodness of his “heart”, or he stopped because he wanted to feel good about himself, or he secretly hoped (but never asked) for a reward, it makes no difference. So it turns out that “free will” is not important when it comes to “agape” either, and it does not play a role in the other kinds of “love” either.

There are some more “kinds” of love, when one “loves” certain foods, and does not love others, or loves certain kinds of music, but none of those are volitional choices. They are there or they are not there, and it does not matter either way.

Conclusion: the so called “free will” defense (free will is necessary, because otherwise love would be meaningless) is just a bunch of baloney just like all the other defenses pertaining to the problem of evil. If we all were “programmed” to be kind and helpful toward each other, if the thought of volitionally harming others would never cross our mind, we would not lose anything; all the different kinds of love would be present. Emotions, attractions would be there. People would be attached and attracted to others just fine. People would be compelled to help, but that does not matter to the ones who are being helped. The end result is the same. So I suggest to drop this argument, because it is simply false. (Of course it will not be dropped completely, but maybe some people will realize how ridiculous it is and will not use it. One can only hope… even if that “hope” is hopeless… )

The problem with this analysis is that you do not include “free will” at all. You are assuming a kind of programmable universe that would merely be functionally “good.” There would be no difference between this and a well-oiled machine because you have removed the power of “agency” that free will brings into the picture. Where your argument goes wrong is in the statement that “…the act of helping is what is important, and the “why” is completely irrelevant…” That is assuming a functional, materialistic purpose to the universe and to morality as an aspect of that universe. In your understanding it is just the “good” functioning of the universe that is important not the how by which that is achieved.

The thrust of most theodicies is that the why is crucially important. It may not matter to you, as beneficiary of the good, if it was “a volitional act, or a “pre-programmed” one” but it makes all the difference in the world to the agent doing the act if they freely and consciously choose to do it or are merely programmed, unconscious machines inevitably and unconsciously following lines of a programmed code.

The free will defense is based upon the implicit value of free moral agency. To merely consider the effects of moral activity as all that should count is unfair to the free will argument.

Furthermore, it could be demonstrated that it “should” make a difference to you as the recipient whether the act was done by a pre-programmed machine or a free moral agent.

Your claim amounts to saying it doesn’t matter whether we live as cogs in a well-run machine or within a universe of free beings who have the dignity and responsibility of free causal agency. If God, and therefore Personhood, is ultimately the ground of existence then free conscious moral activity is ultimately valuable because a moral agent responded and accomplished a “good” deed. The fact that someone did the good deed is vitally important in the ultimate scheme of things.

In a materialistic universe, you are right, it wouldn’t matter why some act occurred, but, on the other hand, in that same larger scheme of things, any effect would be equally desirable, good or bad, because no qualitative value would exist. There could me no ultimate good or bad, just what is.

 

[Tee_See]

Truri, free will is God’s great gift to us without which we would simply be “programmed” to act a certain way, much like the machines we turn on and use every day. The freedom of will means we have the capacity to choose to do right or to do wrong or to do nothing.

Yes, love comes in many ways (we’re not talking about food, clothes, programs, etc. as that is not really love at all), and all love comes from God because God is love. Whether love is romantic (the love that is between couples/spouses), friendship or familial, or agape (true, Christ-centered love), if it is truly love, it is from the heart where the person loving puts the beloved first before his/her own wants, needs, or desires. Chemical attraction between two people is just that: chemical attraction. It can certainly become true love but in this first flush of attraction, it is not love.

We were all given this great gift of freedom of will. We can choose to love, or not. Love is never forced. If it is, it’s not love at all but something else.

 

[Viewscreen]

Free will beckons me less and less with its supposed vaunted import…

I can readily understand, however, how the doctrine of our utter and complete irresponsibility might seem mischievous in people’s eyes.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Free will beckons me less and less with its supposed vaunted import…

Could the reason be that you are recognizing more and more that free will entails allowing another Being into the closed system of your will in order to be a truly dynamically free will?
That being a solitary isolated will necessarily means being determined by the current conditions existing in one’s self.

Just a thought.

By the way, the idea that a truly free will is a dynamic interaction between each of us and God corresponds very nicely with the idea that God ultimately is Love and that we are called to love, to enter into the dynamic communion between ourselves and God.

 

[Viewscreen]

Could the reason be that you are recognizing more and more that free will entails allowing another Being into the closed system of your will in order to be a truly dynamically free will?

I am not sure quite what that means, could you explain it more broadly?

That being a solitary isolated will necessarily means being determined by the current conditions existing in one’s self.

Just a thought.

Occasionally I like to think of myself as being only a part of a larger, moving universal will or current… You might call that ‘humanity’ or a pantheistic oneness. Not saying I believe any of this, just that I find it appealing.

By the way, the idea that a truly free will is a dynamic interaction between each of us and God corresponds very nicely with the idea that God ultimately is Love and that we are called to love, to enter into the dynamic communion between ourselves and God.

Do you even need free will for Love? How do you define ‘Love?’

To me it seems like no one is ever really ‘called’ to love. People just love because they have no other choice. Love, in that sense, is choiceless…

 

[Trurl]

Peter Plato:

The problem with this analysis is that you do not include “free will” at all.

Of course I did. The assertion is that “love is meaningless, unless freely given”. And the “type” of love is never included in this assertion. I did exactly that, according to C.S. Lewis’s differentiation. Neither eros, nor philia nor storge can be volitionally “brought forth”. Volition can only be associated with agape.
Peter Plato:

You are assuming a kind of programmable universe that would merely be functionally “good.”

What else is there than “functionally good”? If something is “functionally bad”, in what respect can it be “good”?
Peter Plato:

There would be no difference between this and a well-oiled machine because you have removed the power of “agency” that free will brings into the picture.

This is the very question I asked all along. WHAT is that difference, and why is it “valuable”. Please explain. I have never seen a coherent explanation, it was only stated as a brute fact.
Peter Plato:

Where your argument goes wrong is in the statement that “…the act of helping is what is important, and the “why” is completely irrelevant…” That is assuming a functional, materialistic purpose to the universe and to morality as an aspect of that universe. In your understanding it is just the “good” functioning of the universe that is important not the how by which that is achieved.

Obviously. Actually, I would prefer that “good functioning” to be without negative aspects, which cannot be guaranteed by the “free will”. What is even worse, those negative aspects sometime can far outweigh the positive ones.
Peter Plato:

The thrust of most theodicies is that the why is crucially important. It may not matter to you, as beneficiary of the good, if it was “a volitional act, or a “pre-programmed” one” but it makes all the difference in the world to the agent doing the act if they freely and consciously choose to do it or are merely programmed, unconscious machines inevitably and unconsciously following lines of a programmed code.

The point is: “WHY” does it matter how that functional good was achieved? To WHOM does it matter? Please get into the details, because that is the crux of the problem.

Also you seem to disregard the tremendous amount of “programming” we are all exposed to in our formative years (to be programmed and to be conscious about it are not mutually exclusive). For example, just a few days ago I went to the local farmers’ market and the vendor gave me back more money as she should have (she was very busy with several customers). Now, theoretically I could have walked away with the extra money. In a sense I was “free” to do so, since there was no external force to compel me. But there was the internal, psychological factor of my upbringing (programming, if you will) which made it impossible. So programming does not invalidate “free will”.
Peter Plato:

The free will defense is based upon the implicit value of free moral agency.

Again: “value to WHOM?”. There is no “abstract value” apart from some “valuer”. I am a “valuer” and to me it does not matter. I would suggest that if you asked a million people if they would care if the doctor (for example) helps them out of the goodness of their heart, or because he expects to be rewarded (paid) for his efforts, or feels compelled according to the Hippocratic oath (which is the declaration of giving up the “free will” by making a wow to help even one’s worst enemies) no one would care one iota for the reason (or maybe a few people would).
Peter Plato:

Furthermore, it could be demonstrated that it “should” make a difference to you as the recipient whether the act was done by a pre-programmed machine or a free moral agent.

Please, I beg you, do demonstrate it! I can hardly wait!
Peter Plato:

In a materialistic universe, you are right, it wouldn’t matter why some act occurred, but, on the other hand, in that same larger scheme of things, any effect would be equally desirable, good or bad, because no qualitative value would exist. There could me no ultimate good or bad, just what is.

Absolutely. And since all we can see, hear, touch, taste, experience is a materialistic universe, the assumption of some “ultimate good” is just an unproven and unsubstantiated hypothesis. Of course the lack of “ultimate” good or bad does not invalidate the “current or local” good or bad. But you said that you can demonstrate that it “should” matter to me, why someone exhibited an agape-type behavior volitionally. Please show me why it should matter.

A few more remarks. The “free will” type of argument suffers from at least two major deficiencies. One, it never specifies what they mean by “free will”. Some people say that “free will” includes the ability of acting upon that “will”, that is “free will is inseparable from freedom of action”, while other ones assert that as long as one is free to “wish, want, will, desire” something freely, it does not matter if that “wish, want, will, desire” can be carried out or not. (Naturally the second one is ridiculous, but some people still assert it.) And second, there is no cost-benefit analysis included; the proponents simply assert that “free will is so valuable, that any and all atrocities committed in the name of ‘free will’ are ‘worth’ having”. Which is, of course, sheer nonsense. The sufferers of those atrocities do not “value” the torturers’ “free will”. But the point is that the proponents of “free will” always do a “sloppy job” establishing their claim. I hope you can do better.

 

[fhansen]

One of the arguments to “support” and “endorse” the evils due to human actions is the assertion that “free will” is necessary for “love” to exist. (I am constantly amazed that believers sort of “vote for” the existence of evil acts and not for eliminating evil from the world.) It is said that “love” is useless, unless “freely given”. The problem is that the kind of love which requires “free will” is never specified, it is just a “generic love”. But there are at least four kinds of love, “eros” (romance, sex), “philia” (friendship), “storge” (affection) and “agape” (selfless love). The real question is, which one of these loses its meaning or value, if not volitional? The answer is simple. “Eros” is based on chemistry and emotions - and none of those are volitionally based. “Philia” and “storge” are based on family and friendship relations, so there is no volitional action there either. You are either attracted to someone or not. It cannot be forced by volition. The only candidate for volitional actions is “agape”, which means to act on behalf of someone else, and actions are clearly volitional.

So the question is what does the volitional aspect add (if anything at all) to the action which epitomizes “agape”? Let’s consider a simple scenario: “there is a traffic accident and a passer-by stops to help”. That is clearly a volitional act on behalf of someone else, so it qualifies as an act of “agape”. Now, who cares if that was a volitional act, or a “pre-programmed” one? The person who suffered the accident is happy for the help in either case. He would not care if the helper was “programmed” to help, or if he could have just walked on. The act of helping is what is important, and the “why” is completely irrelevant. If the person stopped from the goodness of his “heart”, or he stopped because he wanted to feel good about himself, or he secretly hoped (but never asked) for a reward, it makes no difference. So it turns out that “free will” is not important when it comes to “agape” either, and it does not play a role in the other kinds of “love” either.

There are some more “kinds” of love, when one “loves” certain foods, and does not love others, or loves certain kinds of music, but none of those are volitional choices. They are there or they are not there, and it does not matter either way.

Conclusion: the so called “free will” defense (free will is necessary, because otherwise love would be meaningless) is just a bunch of baloney just like all the other defenses pertaining to the problem of evil. If we all were “programmed” to be kind and helpful toward each other, if the thought of volitionally harming others would never cross our mind, we would not lose anything; all the different kinds of love would be present. Emotions, attractions would be there. People would be attached and attracted to others just fine. People would be compelled to help, but that does not matter to the ones who are being helped. The end result is the same. So I suggest to drop this argument, because it is simply false. (Of course it will not be dropped completely, but maybe some people will realize how ridiculous it is and will not use it. One can only hope… even if that “hope” is hopeless… )

I think you’re sort of missing the forest for the trees. In the Christian viewpoint evil exists only because we fail to love as we should. And the fact that we don’t know that kind of love is all the more proof that there’s something missing in humankind, something that causes many to will the harm of others rather than the good.

 

[Peter_Plato]

The point is: “WHY” does it matter how that functional good was achieved? To WHOM does it matter? Please get into the details, because that is the crux of the problem.

Crux of the problem, it seems to me, is “Why is a mechanistic universe where good ‘just happens’ any worse morally speaking than a universe where free moral agents have a responsibility for carrying out good actions.”

An important consideration in order to address the answer is the role of conscious awareness in a moral universe.

I would hold that in a purely mechanistic universe, conscious awareness would not exist. A causal order where effects simply occur from prior causes would not have consciousness.

The fact of consciousness implies a possibility of extracting from the serial causal order in order to “see it” from a position outside of itself. Consciousness in and of itself is not sufficient for free will because conscious beings could be benign observers with no ability to originate alternative causal (name removed by moderator)uts into the existing order, but I think consciousness is a necessary precondition for free will. Given consciousness, free will can take effect to (name removed by moderator)ut novelty into the causal chain and therefore extract the agent from being determined by the physical causal chain.

The important point is that consciousness and free will together are important facets of personhood and moral agency. We could only hold someone responsible for their actions if they do, in fact, have some measure of control and choice in what they do. Consciousness over time and the potency to effect change in the causal order is precisely what gives each of us a sense of identity, because a distinct identity within a causal order is demarcated by an awareness of the power to cause novel effects, I.e., consciousness of the power to will free from causal constraints. This sense of distinct identity or personhood is key to the crucial question you are asking.

A second point is that the cosmological argument that moves from the entire chain of physical causation (our universe) to an explanation for that chain because the chain does not explain itself to the necessity of a self-existent First Cause implies that the chain is malleable because it is not necessary. If it can be brought into being, whatever power brought it into being has sufficient power to alter it.

Combine these two points together.

1. There is a power (aka God) that has the resources to effect change in the causal order.
2. Consciousness provides a perspective of the causal chain that separates the conscious agent from the causal order.
3. Free will, if it is any sense free, must mean being free from the causal order in order to have the power to add novel courses of activity into it.
4. Moral agency, in order to be meaningful in any sense, must mean having the power to take alternative courses of action in any given situation. Moral agents must have free will.
5. In order to be valuable in and of themselves, persons (moral agents) must be more than the mere inevitable artifacts of causal events, I.e., in order to be valuable, persons must subsist as identifiable entities.

In your imagined world where good “just happens” there would be no need for moral free agents and therefore no need for personal identity. The “good” would just happen, i.e., good effects would merely be programmed into the system.

My point is that such a system would simply be valueless. Without persons to be aware of the “good” there would in fact be no “good.”

Think of your case of being in a traffic accident and a passerby stops to help you. The fact that you were there to experience the help of the passerby is precisely what made the act good. If you were not a conscious being then it wouldn’t matter if anyone stopped because qualitatively a car accident would be no different than a collision of two rocks careening down a mountain. There is no good attributable to one rock blocking another from crashing down the side of a mountain precisely because a rock is not a conscious being that is aware of its fate. In the traffic accident, the reason the act of a passerby is good is precisely because you as a conscious being are there to witness and benefit from the act.

Continued…

 

[Peter_Plato]

… From previous post

Now imagine your situation where you say it doesn’t matter what the motives of the person doing the good act are as long as you are the beneficiary of the good. The act would still be good no matter who or what did it even if it was a robot.

That claim is tantamount to saying, it doesn’t matter if all other humans on the earth have personhood, self-awareness, or free will because it only matters that the recipient is benefitted by the good done. In other words, your claim is quite consistent with you being the only self-aware being in the world because it is the “receiving” of the good done and not the actual motives or source of the good. From your perspective it is only the good received that is important, not who or why it is done and since you are the only perceiver of good, it is only your benefit that counts.

My point is that it does matter to others whether they are persons or not because there is a huge difference between between being a self-aware conscious person and being a rock. The benefit to the receiver is NOT all that matters. However, the only way to become aware of that is to project your sense of self into others. We call that empathy.

Does it matter to you whether you do good to others for the right reasons? Then it should matter to you if others do the same to you.

I believe this is the point of love rather than just doing the right thing. Love assumes an acknowledgement of others as persons. Others exist as self-aware beings and that is a very valuable thing to be. In other words, we love others for WHO they are, not merely for the good they do for us or for what they are. Their identity as persons is of key value here.

By the way, one of the things that convinces me about Christianity is that God describes Himself as I Am Who Am to Moses and that Jesus made a similar claim, “Before Abraham ever was I AM.” The primacy of identity as “person” is fully endorsed in both those statements.

Personhood is the key feature of a truly moral system and the achieving of full personhood is the most important aspect of such a system. You cannot program personhood, each person attains that individually through free choices made possible by conscious awareness. We make ourselves as persons by our choices. That process is precisely why free will is important. We could not become more complete persons because that is only possible through the free choices we make each day. Our identity and therefore our personhood is only possible by choices free from the determined causal order.

In fact, this discussion could move into why you feel help after a traffic accident is a “good” thing. Was it merely to keep you alive? For what? Does that not have something to do with who you are as a person? The question then moves back to what makes you a person? Is it not consciousness and free choice?

Jesus words: “…what does it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose his very self?” (Mark 8:36)

 

[Trurl]

Peter Plato:

I would hold that in a purely mechanistic universe, conscious awareness would not exist. A causal order where effects simply occur from prior causes would not have consciousness.

That is just an opinion, which I do not share. Consciousness is simply the thought process where one is aware of the “world” around “it”. Self-consciousness would be the ability to differentiate between oneself and the environment. Higher animals have consciousness, and some amount of self-consciousness, too.

But it seems to me that we are still on different wavelengths. The only difference I propose is that the agents in the world would be compelled by their internal status to do the “right thing”. They might very well be aware of the alternatives, but they would not choose those alternatives. Let me put it differently: the agents would all be very good human beings, who do not wish to hurt others, rather would want to help others. We are looking at a very fine line here: the agents I propose would never even “dream of” torturing someone. The thought would never cross their mind. And if they would think about it, they would be nauseated by the act, and would not want to carry it out. Do they have free will? Absolutely. Are they compelled to be “kind, helpful, decent, etc…”? Yes. Do they have a choice in the matter to be “kind and helpful”? No. But, of course they would have plenty of choices in all the other matters. So, why is this world “inferior” (in your eyes) to the one where there are such kind of people and there are also the opposites, who enjoy doing harm to others. In a nutshell: what do the “sociopaths and psychopaths” ADD to the world, which is worth to have?

Your premise that without the ability to do harm to others the agents would be reduced to “robots” is manifestly false. There are extremely good people “out there” who are always altruistic, who always put the needs of others in front of their own benefit - are these people “robots”?

Let me give another example. As I said before, I am aware of the different opportunities in morally significant decisions. I always choose the one which I find morally correct (my choice might not be the correct one in your eyes, but that cannot be helped we have a different base value system). As I said, I know about the alternatives, but do not wish to choose them. That is certainly “freedom”. However where I do not have freedom at all, is to “override” my sense of “what is right and what is wrong”. I have no freedom to change my conscience - NO ONE has that freedom. Now, does that make me a robot? Of course not. Every one has a base set of values (conscience) which is NOT subject to volitional control. This is their “base programming”. A “real robot” would also have freedom within certain limits, and would be unable to override the “three laws of robotics” (as Asimov described them) which would be their “base value system”. We are equally unable to override our “base programming”. So what is the difference?

Please concentrate on the highlighted (underlined) question.

 

[Peter_Plato]

That is just an opinion, which I do not share. Consciousness is simply the thought process where one is aware of the “world” around “it”. Self-consciousness would be the ability to differentiate between oneself and the environment. Higher animals have consciousness, and some amount of self-consciousness, too.

I am not clear that consciousness is very different from self-consciousness. To be aware of the world around oneself would seem to imply an awareness of oneself within that world if any such awareness is happening.

It is also not clear to me that animals have that kind of awareness. I brought up the example of blindsightedness where in some cases of blindness in humans, the person so afflicted can maneuver around a room without a conscious awareness of the room at all. The visual perceptions are not available to the conscious person, but their nervous system unconsciously reacts to the visual stimulus. It could very well be that animals respond to their environment in very complex ways without a conscious awareness of doing so.

Secondly, it is unclear to me why some kind of benign consciousness would even be the case without the concomitant ability to effect change on the causal order apart from it. In other words, if all the physiological functioning of the body is simply necessary chemical or biological processes, no matter how complex, why would there need to be an awareness of what is happening? The awareness would just be superfluous. Better to simply respond without the superfluous programming code used to create awareness. That would just seem to be an extraneous add-on because this kind of simple awareness would add no functionally beneficial capacity. Consider elite athletes who practice movements repeatedly in order that the motions become “natural” in the sense of removing the movement from the conscious process. It seems to me that animals would be better off simply making the moves without being conscious of them for efficiency sake, as in the case of these elite athletes.

Consciousness would seem to only be beneficial if it actually added the functional capability of inserting into the causal order alternative effects as free will entails. The evidence of free will, and, therefore, consciousness, at work in the natural environment would seem to be in observable creativity. Humans, for example, create novelty in the environment as is evidenced in say the vast variety of kinds of homes, tools, art, literature, food preparation, etc. that are developed by human creativity, free of the causally determined natural order of things. No animal, no matter how seemingly intelligent! creates in the vast number of ways that humans do. I suggest that human creativity is proof of human free will because free will entails creative (name removed by moderator)ut into the causal order, which animals do not show any evidence of so doing. If I am correct that conscious awareness is a necessary correlative of free will, then the lack of creative advancement among animals is demonstrable proof of lack of consciousness and lack of free will.

But it seems to me that we are still on different wavelengths. The only difference I propose is that the agents in the world would be compelled by their internal status to do the “right thing”. They might very well be aware of the alternatives, but they would not choose those alternatives. Let me put it differently: the agents would all be very good human beings, who do not wish to hurt others, rather would want to help others. We are looking at a very fine line here: the agents I propose would never even “dream of” torturing someone. The thought would never cross their mind. And if they would think about it, they would be nauseated by the act, and would not want to carry it out. Do they have free will? Absolutely. Are they compelled to be “kind, helpful, decent, etc…”? Yes. Do they have a choice in the matter to be “kind and helpful”? No. But, of course they would have plenty of choices in all the other matters. So, why is this world “inferior” (in your eyes) to the one where there are such kind of people and there are also the opposites, who enjoy doing harm to others. In a nutshell: what do the “sociopaths and psychopaths” ADD to the world, which is worth to have?

It may in fact be that free will is a kind of all or nothing capacity. That to be self-aware and a free agent means that necessarily there is the possibility of sociopathic or psychopathic disorder. The difficulty is that just because we have consciousness and free will does not mean we understand the “mechanism” by which the faculty is actualized.

As to your “limited” free will scenario even though you are able to conceive of its possibility may not necessarily mean it is functionally possible. The columns in the image below can be pictured in 2 dimensions, but that does not entail that they are possible in the real world.

I understand that I cannot prove this to be true, but by the same token you do not have convincing evidence that your scenario proves that God could in fact limit free will to only good effects.



Continued…

 

[Peter_Plato]

… From previous

Your premise that without the ability to do harm to others the agents would be reduced to “robots” is manifestly false. There are extremely good people “out there” who are always altruistic, who always put the needs of others in front of their own benefit - are these people “robots”?

No it does not prove they are robots, but it may be that they are constantly in inner tension to act in this way. At least, their choices may always require conscious and deliberate exercise of free will, it may not be as natural as you think.

Let me give another example. As I said before, I am aware of the different opportunities in morally significant decisions. I always choose the one which I find morally correct (my choice might not be the correct one in your eyes, but that cannot be helped we have a different base value system). As I said, I know about the alternatives, but do not wish to choose them. That is certainly “freedom”. However where I do not have freedom at all, is to “override” my sense of “what is right and what is wrong”. I have no freedom to change my conscience - NO ONE has that freedom. Now, does that make me a robot? Of course not. Every one has a base set of values (conscience) which is NOT subject to volitional control. This is their “base programming”. A “real robot” would also have freedom within certain limits, and would be unable to override the “three laws of robotics” (as Asimov described them) which would be their “base value system”. We are equally unable to override our “base programming”. So what is the difference?

Please concentrate on the highlighted (underlined) question.

I am not convinced by your argument because it entails that your conscience could not be formed consciously or that you could not change a malformed conscience. There are scrupulous people who have a very inflexible and overbearing conscience who can change it over time. Although, not severely scrupulous, I can attest that conscience can be changed by a sincere analysis of one’s concept of right and wrong.

Our continued search for truth is an example of overriding our “base programming.” what we thought we knew is continually being updated and revised, including our “base value system.” If that were not true, we could not question deeply held beliefs and would be simply mired in our belief system. I don’t find that to be true in the least.

 

[Sair]

Could the reason be that you are recognizing more and more that free will entails allowing another Being into the closed system of your will in order to be a truly dynamically free will?
That being a solitary isolated will necessarily means being determined by the current conditions existing in one’s self.

Just a thought.

There’s a big difference between being an isolated will and then only being a “free” will if you consciously invite a supernatural being in to guide your decisions!

By the way, the idea that a truly free will is a dynamic interaction between each of us and God corresponds very nicely with the idea that God ultimately is Love and that we are called to love, to enter into the dynamic communion between ourselves and God.

We have to interact with our environment, and that means every other sentient being in that environment, including other humans. Seems to me that there’s plenty to be going on with, to provide the dynamic interaction, even in the absence of any supposition of God/gods. What if we are not “called” to love by a conscious, personal entity but simply impelled to seek and experience love by our evolved biochemical makeup? Would that, in any objective or even appreciable sense, diminish our experience and exercise of love?

 

[MPat]

One of the arguments to “support” and “endorse” the evils due to human actions is the assertion that “free will” is necessary for “love” to exist. (I am constantly amazed that believers sort of “vote for” the existence of evil acts and not for eliminating evil from the world.) It is said that “love” is useless, unless “freely given”. The problem is that the kind of love which requires “free will” is never specified, it is just a “generic love”. But there are at least four kinds of love, “eros” (romance, sex), “philia” (friendship), “storge” (affection) and “agape” (selfless love). The real question is, which one of these loses its meaning or value, if not volitional? The answer is simple. “Eros” is based on chemistry and emotions - and none of those are volitionally based. “Philia” and “storge” are based on family and friendship relations, so there is no volitional action there either. You are either attracted to someone or not. It cannot be forced by volition. The only candidate for volitional actions is “agape”, which means to act on behalf of someone else, and actions are clearly volitional.

So the question is what does the volitional aspect add (if anything at all) to the action which epitomizes “agape”? Let’s consider a simple scenario: “there is a traffic accident and a passer-by stops to help”. That is clearly a volitional act on behalf of someone else, so it qualifies as an act of “agape”. Now, who cares if that was a volitional act, or a “pre-programmed” one? The person who suffered the accident is happy for the help in either case. He would not care if the helper was “programmed” to help, or if he could have just walked on. The act of helping is what is important, and the “why” is completely irrelevant. If the person stopped from the goodness of his “heart”, or he stopped because he wanted to feel good about himself, or he secretly hoped (but never asked) for a reward, it makes no difference. So it turns out that “free will” is not important when it comes to “agape” either, and it does not play a role in the other kinds of “love” either.

There are some more “kinds” of love, when one “loves” certain foods, and does not love others, or loves certain kinds of music, but none of those are volitional choices. They are there or they are not there, and it does not matter either way.

Conclusion: the so called “free will” defense (free will is necessary, because otherwise love would be meaningless) is just a bunch of baloney just like all the other defenses pertaining to the problem of evil. If we all were “programmed” to be kind and helpful toward each other, if the thought of volitionally harming others would never cross our mind, we would not lose anything; all the different kinds of love would be present. Emotions, attractions would be there. People would be attached and attracted to others just fine. People would be compelled to help, but that does not matter to the ones who are being helped. The end result is the same. So I suggest to drop this argument, because it is simply false. (Of course it will not be dropped completely, but maybe some people will realize how ridiculous it is and will not use it. One can only hope… even if that “hope” is hopeless… )

Yes, if you start from the assumption that “It’s just the result that counts.”, you shouldn’t expect anything different. But this assumption is not universally accepted.

Second, you assert that will has nothing to do with “non-agape love”. However, you have yet to demonstrate that no “will based component” can ever have anything to do with them…

Third, I am afraid that “It is said that ‘love’ is useless, unless ‘freely given’.” might be too strong. It would be enough (for the argument in question) that love that is freely given is just more valuable, even if the “non-free” love might still have some value too.

Finally, I’ll try to give an example. As we know, many people have cats. There is a somewhat common “utilitarian” reason for that (problems with mice), but there are enough cases when cats are held without such reason. However, there is an alternative: Teddy bears. They are also soft and fluffy. They can also be petted. They can also be played with. They can also be talked with (and are going to understand about as much). And if we would look further, we can find many advantages of Teddy bears: they need no food nor drink, they can be left alone for long periods, they are not going to scratch their master…

Now, after listing all those advantages, one might ask why anyone would even consider having a cat when such an alternative exists. And yet, there are many people who do have cats. There must be at least some way in which cats are better. And, well, if we assume that love (or “love lite”) is more valuable when it is more freely given, that would give us an explanation: cats are closer to having free will than Teddy bears are. In a sense, the possibility to refuse to love makes the love more valuable when it actually “happens”.

Now, can you find a different explanation…?

 

[Trurl]

Peter Plato:

I am not clear that consciousness is very different from self-consciousness.

The difference would be that self-awareness needs a level of abstraction, which most animals do not seem to have. But this is not what I had in mind. I think we are still on different wavelengths. The word “conscience” has several meanings, and I specifically mean the one which describes one’s “internal scale of right or wrong” or “internal sense of good and bad” - which some people call “natrual moral law”.
Peter Plato:

Secondly, it is unclear to me why some kind of benign consciousness would even be the case without the concomitant ability to effect change on the causal order apart from it.

Very good observation. The solution would be a matter of complexity in the underlying code. Bugs (for example) come with a detailed “programming”, but it comes with a huge price, they are unable to learn when the circumstances change (of course, since they lack the cerebellum). Awareness also comes with the price: “a long learning process”. Humans have very few instinctual behavorial patters (like blinking when an insect approaches the eye), but we are extremely flexible due to our learning process. However, no one has ever stated that the “balancing” between the instinct and learning is at an “optimal level” right now. To move certain behaviors from the volitional into the instinctual arena could have benefits, and I think that being kind and caring could be moved into that “camp”.
Peter Plato:

Consciousness would seem to only be beneficial if it actually added the functional capability of inserting into the causal order alternative effects as free will entails.

I don’t disagree at all. But I want to point to idea that our “freedom” is not unlimited, and some higher animals exhibit some very creative “talents”. The difference between humans and animals is huge, but not that huge.
Peter Plato:

It may in fact be that free will is a kind of all or nothing capacity. That to be self-aware and a free agent means that necessarily there is the possibility of sociopathic or psychopathic disorder. The difficulty is that just because we have consciousness and free will does not mean we understand the “mechanism” by which the faculty is actualized.

This is simply speculation (of course there is nothing wrong with speculation ). The point is that there is no evidence that “free will” is a binary function, on the very contrary, the actual existence of “extremely good people” (saints???) is evidence that being “inclined” to do evil is not necessary for having “freedom to choose”.
Peter Plato:

I understand that I cannot prove this to be true, but by the same token you do not have convincing evidence that your scenario proves that God could in fact limit free will to only good effects.

This is a very important point we reached here. According to classical theism, God is only unable to instantiate logically contradictory states of affairs. And the lack of ability to perform evil acts is not a logical contradcition, so God should be able to actualize it. Indeed, it is one of the major defects in Plantinga’s reasoning that he states: “it is POSSIBLE that there are some logically consistent states of affairs, that God is unable to actualize”. Now here he cut off God’s so-called omnipotence at the “knees” - he asserts that MAYBE God is unable to create a logically possible world. In a sense he threw off the baby with the bathwater. Not to mention that “maybe” and “possibly” is not an argument (but this is a different problem).
Peter Plato:

No it does not prove they are robots, but it may be that they are constantly in inner tension to act in this way. At least, their choices may always require conscious and deliberate exercise of free will, it may not be as natural as you think.

There is no evidence for that. And my point is that to remove these dilemmas from the need to consciously contemplate and act in an instinctive manner would also remove the “frustration” (which is just speculation).
Peter Plato:

I am not convinced by your argument because it entails that your conscience could not be formed consciously or that you could not change a malformed conscience.

Again, it may be that we are talking about two different things. I agree that one is able to act against the internal “moral compass”. It is also true that this “compass” includes a plethora of possible dilemmas, not all being equally important. However, I am only speaking of the most important, underlying ones, which are not amenable to volitional modification. For example I consider the “torturing of humans or animals for sheer pleasure as horrifyingly evil” one of the basic tenets of my moral compass. I doubt very seriously that I could “brainwash” myself into a new state of mind, where I would find “torturing for pleasure” a good morally upright behavior. Of course I read 1984, where Winston Smith finally “loved” Big Brother (after intolerable physical and psychological torture), but I cannot believe that such a change is possible. And if it is, it was definitely NOT volitional, it was due to unbearable torture.

Now, I think that our conversation has changed very significantly. You seemed to stop to say that “non-volitional” good behavior is somehow inferior, rather you switched into contemplating if it is possible to actualize. A very interesting change in my eyes.

 

[Trurl]

MPat:

Yes, if you start from the assumption that “It’s just the result that counts.”, you shouldn’t expect anything different. But this assumption is not universally accepted.

True, but just because you can find dissenters to ANY point of view, it is not true that ALL points of view are incorrect. I am specifically asking for the “value” of volition in the “agape” type love (kindness, helpfulness, caring, etc…) There is an opposite side to this question: “if making people to be naturally good-hearted, kind and helpful would lessen the value of such behavior, then the current ‘arrangement’ of having pedophiles, child-molesters, torturers, rapists, murderers is somehow ‘more valuable’ than the lack of such people”. And for the life of mine, I am unable to find any good reason why to “value” the sociopaths and psychopaths. Who would shed a tear if all the afore-mentioned people would disappear, or would be cured of their sick behavior? Personally, I would not. And even if someone could bring up a really good reason that getting rid of such people would have some negative outcome in this world, I would ask for a cost-benefit analysis, and ask the propoponent to show that the existence of “this nebulous benefit coming from human evil would be worth to have compared to the somewhat idillic scenario of not having psychopaths”. You see, no one has ever presented an actual cost-benefit analysis (to my knowledge). It is always a bare assertion, which does not have the justification or the proper analysis.

MPat:

Second, you assert that will has nothing to do with “non-agape love”. However, you have yet to demonstrate that no “will based component” can ever have anything to do with them…

Emotions cannot be forcefully created, they are instinctual and emotion based. One is either attracted to someone or is not. If you find someone physically repulsive, you cannot “force” yourself to be attracted to that person, even though you can “pretend” to be attracted.

MPat:

Third, I am afraid that “It is said that ‘love’ is useless, unless ‘freely given’.” might be too strong.

I did not invent it. Please don’t shoot the messenger.

MPat:

Finally, I’ll try to give an example. As we know, many people have cats. There is a somewhat common “utilitarian” reason for that (problems with mice), but there are enough cases when cats are held without such reason. However, there is an alternative: Teddy bears. They are also soft and fluffy. They can also be petted. They can also be played with. They can also be talked with (and are going to understand about as much). And if we would look further, we can find many advantages of Teddy bears: they need no food nor drink, they can be left alone for long periods, they are not going to scratch their master…

Now, after listing all those advantages, one might ask why anyone would even consider having a cat when such an alternative exists. And yet, there are many people who do have cats. There must be at least some way in which cats are better. And, well, if we assume that love (or “love lite”) is more valuable when it is more freely given, that would give us an explanation: cats are closer to having free will than Teddy bears are. In a sense, the possibility to refuse to love makes the love more valuable when it actually “happens”.

Now, can you find a different explanation…?

I think that your example proves my point really nicely. The cat’s “love” is an instinctive affection, it has nothing to do with “volition”. (You can’t even teach cats, they are still undomesticated, wild creatures.) The cats certainly give “feedback”, while the teddy bear does not, and people appreciate that feedback. I would suggest that it is the feedback which makes people to prefer cats to Teddy-bears, not the very real and nasty scratch they get from the cat, when the “owners” step over the line and their caresses are not welcome by the cat any more.

 

[MPat]

True, but just because you can find dissenters to ANY point of view, it is not true that ALL points of view are incorrect. I am specifically asking for the “value” of volition in the “agape” type love (kindness, helpfulness, caring, etc…) There is an opposite side to this question: “if making people to be naturally good-hearted, kind and helpful would lessen the value of such behavior, then the current ‘arrangement’ of having pedophiles, child-molesters, torturers, rapists, murderers is somehow ‘more valuable’ than the lack of such people”. And for the life of mine, I am unable to find any good reason why to “value” the sociopaths and psychopaths. Who would shed a tear if all the afore-mentioned people would disappear, or would be cured of their sick behavior? Personally, I would not. And even if someone could bring up a really good reason that getting rid of such people would have some negative outcome in this world, I would ask for a cost-benefit analysis, and ask the propoponent to show that the existence of “this nebulous benefit coming from human evil would be worth to have compared to the somewhat idillic scenario of not having psychopaths”. You see, no one has ever presented an actual cost-benefit analysis (to my knowledge). It is always a bare assertion, which does not have the justification or the proper analysis.

Well, it is true that the assertions do not become false if they are not universally accepted, but that was not what I meant. I meant that, unless you start with assertions that your opponent accepts, you will not make a persuasive argument.

Emotions cannot be forcefully created, they are instinctual and emotion based. One is either attracted to someone or is not. If you find someone physically repulsive, you cannot “force” yourself to be attracted to that person, even though you can “pretend” to be attracted.

“Emotions …] are …] emotion based.”…?

Anyway, while it is true that we do not have a complete control of our emotions, we do have partial control. For example, a conscious choice to listen to “Smile Song” (from “My Little Pony: Friendship is Magic” episode “A Friend in Deed” - mlp.wikia.com/wiki/Smile_Song ) can be expected to improve one’s mood. And I don’t see why one cannot try to manipulate one’s emotions do generate some sort of emotional love for another person.

I did not invent it. Please don’t shoot the messenger.

Well, it means that your “victory” against that assertion wouldn’t invalidate their argument.

I think that your example proves my point really nicely. The cat’s “love” is an instinctive affection, it has nothing to do with “volition”. (You can’t even teach cats, they are still undomesticated, wild creatures.) The cats certainly give “feedback”, while the teddy bear does not, and people appreciate that feedback. I would suggest that it is the feedback which makes people to prefer cats to Teddy-bears, not the very real and nasty scratch they get from the cat, when the “owners” step over the line and their caresses are not welcome by the cat any more.

“The cats certainly give ‘feedback’, while the teddy bear does not, and people appreciate that feedback.”? Well, Teddy bears do give “feedback” - they can “pet” humans, “give hugs”… However, those actions are not initiated by the Teddy bears, but by humans. On the other hand, the actions of a cat are initiated by cat itself. That’s a difference of “free will lite” (no, it is not real free will, but it is somewhat similar).

Also, “You can’t even teach cats, they are still undomesticated, wild creatures.” doesn’t look right. For example, if that was so, no cat could be used in a circus.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Again, it may be that we are talking about two different things. I agree that one is able to act against the internal “moral compass”. It is also true that this “compass” includes a plethora of possible dilemmas, not all being equally important. However, I am only speaking of the most important, underlying ones, which are not amenable to volitional modification. For example I consider the “torturing of humans or animals for sheer pleasure as horrifyingly evil” one of the basic tenets of my moral compass. I doubt very seriously that I could “brainwash” myself into a new state of mind, where I would find “torturing for pleasure” a good morally upright behavior. Of course I read 1984, where Winston Smith finally “loved” Big Brother (after intolerable physical and psychological torture), but I cannot believe that such a change is possible. And if it is, it was definitely NOT volitional, it was due to unbearable torture.

Now, I think that our conversation has changed very significantly. You seemed to stop to say that “non-volitional” good behavior is somehow inferior, rather you switched into contemplating if it is possible to actualize. A very interesting change in my eyes.

Don’t get too carried away with your glee, there has been no change. If you start defining “good” ambiguously as pleasing to the recipient or practically good for the recipient or some such, then you might detect a perceived change, but it is you subtly playing with the word “good” that is causing the misperception. If we are talking about morally good, then it seems to me that sort of act must be inherently volitional.

If a horse runs across the road just in time to stop a car from running me over, I might see in that act a good effect - my life was saved - but that would be a far cry from claiming that the horse acted in a morally good way. If the horse merely happened to cross the road at the instant the car came by, no moral good could be assigned to the act. It was fortunate for me, perhaps, but not moral in any sense of the word. Unless the horse actually had the capacity to choose the morally laudable act of attempting to save my life given other choices available to it, then the act has no claim to being morally good. I would even venture to say that the extent, and only to that extent, to which the act is the result of some capacity of choice free from constraints, is the quality that would make it appreciably moral.

In case you missed it on retelling, my point is that non-volitional morally good behaviour (with emphasis on morally) is not only inferior to the extent it is constrained but also not even moral behaviour to the extent it is non-volitional.

An apparent quandary might appear from this. If evil behaviour (sin) involves a loss of freedom because of the addictive nature of sinfulness, then evil must in some sense be non-volitional. My point to counter this seeming difficulty is that grace (being (name removed by moderator)ut by God) is always available to us to provide the counter force necessary to overcome slavery to sin. We can “get out” of the addiction or slavery to sin by the grace of God.

*To the Jews who had believed him, Jesus said, “If you hold to my teaching, you are really my disciples. Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.”

They answered him, “We are Abraham’s descendants and have never been slaves of anyone. How can you say that we shall be set free?”

Jesus replied, “I tell you the truth, everyone who sins is a slave to sin. Now a slave has no permanent place in the family, but a son belongs to it forever. So if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed." (John 8:31-38)*

 

[Trurl]

Peter Plato:

Don’t get too carried away with your glee, there has been no change. If you start defining “good” ambiguously as pleasing to the recipient or practically good for the recipient or some such, then you might detect a perceived change, but it is you subtly playing with the word “good” that is causing the misperception. If we are talking about morally good, then it seems to me that sort of act must be inherently volitional.

I was not “gleeing”, I was simply happy (mistakenly though) that our positions seemed to get closer. I thought that it is obvious that I was asking about the stipulated benefit of morally good behavior, as opposed to the “merely” functionally good one. And you did not realize this until now? No matter, it is not too late to get to the problem.
Peter Plato:

In case you missed it on retelling, my point is that non-volitional morally good behaviour (with emphasis on morally) is not only inferior to the extent it is constrained but also not even moral behaviour to the extent it is non-volitional.

Again, this is trivial. I do not dispute it at all. What I am still asking, WHY is the “morally good” behavior preferred compared to the “functionally good” one. It is not obvious at all.

Your horse example shows that you still don’t get my point. I am not talking about lucky accidents, I am talking about pre-programmed beneficial behavior. Here comes a real life (not hypothetical) example to show what I am talking about. The US Army developed a mine-sniffing and destroying “gadget”, or “robot”, if you prefer. The robot finds the mines and detonates them, and sometimes gets destroyed in the process, sometimes “only” gets seriously damaged. When they get damaged, they are sent back for repair and then they return to “active duty”. Nothing is really special until now, just another useful device to protect the soldiers. Its function is not morally good, “merely” fuctionally good.

The nice part is that the soldiers get “attached” to these devices, they give them names, and they weep for them and they make “funerals” for them when repair is not possible any more. In other words, they value the machines, they personify them. For them they are much more than just another throw-away contraption. It is a “buddy”, and they could not care less that its behavior is predetermined, it has no option, but “sacrifice” itself. So for them the WHY is irrelevant, the action is relevant.

Following your posts I ask you: would you prefer that a real soldier would throw himself onto the mines to save the lives of his mates? After all, that would be a “morally good” action. The machine is only functionally good. Is it really true that you would prefer the actual sacrifice of actual people, rather than having a machine be destroyed in the event? Or, maybe you have second thoughts? (Would be nice, but I don’t hold my breath.) Those soldiers definitely reject your assertion that “morally good” actions are better than the merely functionally good ones. They actually value the lives of their comrades.

There is another aspect of this problem. The possibility for morally good actions does not come cheap. It presupposes the existence of morally bad actions. Posters around here keep on asserting that this “price” is “worth it”. Of course they never present an actual cost-benefit analysis, they just say it, without any substantiative argument and in-depth analysis. If there would be no possibility of having morally good actions, there would be no possibility for morally bad actions either - and as such the overall “goodness-level” of the world would be much higher. There still would be natural calamities, accidents, bad decisions and all sorts of needs to help the victims. But there would be no Holocaust, no concentration camps, no genocides, no rapes, no tortures, no wars… and YET, quite a few on your side of fence vehemently reject that such a world would be better. (As a matter of fact, I have not met any catholic who did NOT opt for not having morally evil act.) Quite frequently they scorn the concept as “idillic and utopian”. I cannot comprehend that “good, christian, catholic” people actually prefer rapes, tortures and wars. Goes way over my head.