Free will and love... love? WHICH love?

[Peter_Plato]

Following your posts I ask you: would you prefer that a real soldier would throw himself onto the mines to save the lives of his mates? After all, that would be a “morally good” action.

This is ambiguous. You are comparing the quality of quite different actions.

To see this the question might be asked, Would you prefer that a real soldier throw himself onto a mine to save the lives of his comrades or would you prefer that he opt to save his own life and let them die?

Is there nothing of inherent value in the act of courage itself? It seems to me that in a world where the possibility of risk, of real possible injury and pain, is removed, then the possibility of real personal heroic virtue is likewise removed. There is a bland and benign character to a world where there exist only beneficiaries of good, where all possibility of “doing good” is left to robots and machines.

Similarly, there is something lacking in a world where all “art” is manufactured in factories. There is something about the opportunity for creative expression that allows the human soul to thrive through art that is “life promoting” in a larger sense. In a similar sense, the opportunity for human beings to act out of love, even when probable risk is high, is preferable to a world where all good “just happens” and we are mere passive beneficiaries of it, where no opportunity for active participation ever presents itself.

The machine is only functionally good. Is it really true that you would prefer the actual sacrifice of actual people, rather than having a machine be destroyed in the event? Or, maybe you have second thoughts? (Would be nice, but I don’t hold my breath.) Those soldiers definitely reject your assertion that “morally good” actions are better than the merely functionally good ones. They actually value the lives of their comrades.

What is preferred is that actual people would care so much for others that they would choose to sacrifice their lives for them. That state is certainly preferable to one where actual people would not lift a finger to help others because they never had to. Speaking for myself, I would prefer to live in a world where I could be an active moral agent than one where I was merely a passive recipient of good and could not actually do anything of moral worth because I would never be placed into the position of needing to be virtuous.

In your robot bomb sniffer example, would that mean you would be fine being with comrades who would never put their own lives on the line because all that nasty stuff would be taken care of by the robots? Or would you prefer to know that those buddies would put themselves in harm’s way for each other and for you? There is something preferable about a world where that kind of loyalty and caring is present among actual people to one where it is unnecessary because the robots take care of it.

It seems to me that your proposed world has a one sided view that receiving good is all that counts and actually doing good is of no value.

 

[Peter_Plato]

There is another aspect of this problem. The possibility for morally good actions does not come cheap. It presupposes the existence of morally bad actions. Posters around here keep on asserting that this “price” is “worth it”. Of course they never present an actual cost-benefit analysis, they just say it, without any substantiative argument and in-depth analysis. If there would be no possibility of having morally good actions, there would be no possibility for morally bad actions either - and as such the overall “goodness-level” of the world would be much higher.

I think your moral calculus is flawed. If there is no possibility for good actions or bad actions, then the “goodness level” is not higher, it basically flat-lines or becomes nil (i.e., morally neutral). Moral goodness does not flourish in such a case, it becomes non-existent. You are again confusing moral goodness with practical benefits or expediency.

There still would be natural calamities, accidents, bad decisions and all sorts of needs to help the victims. But there would be no Holocaust, no concentration camps, no genocides, no rapes, no tortures, no wars… and YET, quite a few on your side of fence vehemently reject that such a world would be better. (As a matter of fact, I have not met any catholic who did NOT opt for not having morally evil act.) Quite frequently they scorn the concept as “idillic and utopian”. I cannot comprehend that “good, christian, catholic” people actually prefer rapes, tortures and wars. Goes way over my head.

This is a non sequitur. It is not that rapes, tortures, etc. are preferred; these are seen as necessary evils in a world where real volitional free will is preferred to automatons merely doing what they were programmed to do. To return to my horse example, a horse accidentally getting in front of a moving vehicle is not more or less morally laudable than a machine programmed to do the same thing because there is no intent on the part of the machine, just as there is no intent on the part of the horse.

The moral value lies in the action of the developer of the machine who created it, ostensibly, to save lives of those in potential danger. However, the development of such a machine is consistent with individuals who out of cowardice or fear never wish to face problematic situations. It seems to me that a willingness to face potentially dangerous situations for the sake of “the good” is a desireable moral quality, which your programmed good scenario denies. Aristotle’s emphasis on happiness as being a fulfillment of potential virtues and not mere passive state (Nichomachean Ethics) would support this view.

The real value in volitional free will lies in the extent that it outweighs the possibility of a certain level of evil. However, it may well be that God (who has a better purview of this) will intervene whenever, in the balance, this is no longer true. There are past precedents (Sodom and Gomorrah, the flood, Exodus, etc.)

 

[Trurl]

Peter Plato:

I think your moral calculus is flawed. If there is no possibility for good actions or bad actions, then the “goodness level” is not higher, it basically flat-lines or becomes nil (i.e., morally neutral). Moral goodness does not flourish in such a case, it becomes non-existent. You are again confusing moral goodness with practical benefits or expediency.

I don’t care about the “moral calculus”. It is true (and I agree again!) that in such a world the “moral value” would be zero, however, the OVERALL “goodness calculus” would be incomparably higher (no moral atrocities in that world). I do not “confuse” anything. You, however seem to discount the actual lack of suffering as irrelevant. I am very keenly aware of the stipulated “moral goodness”, I am STILL waiting for some argument as to “why” is it relevant. I would appreciate if you could present a rational argument as to what is the benefit of a “morally good action” compared to the “functionally good action”. Looks like that you are the only one who is willing invest time and effort (I am amazed that others are simply sit on the sideline), but you still do not attack the problem head on. Nevertheless, I appreciate your efforts.
Peter Plato:

This is a non sequitur. It is not that rapes, tortures, etc. are preferred; these are seen as necessary evils in a world where real volitional free will is preferred to automatons merely doing what they were programmed to do.

Several problems with this line of thought. One is that it is a mere assertion, which you keep repeating, without any justification for it. Why is “volitional free will” preferred? And by WHOM? And yes, the atrocities seem to be definitely preferred “in the greater scheme of things” since they could be avoided. According to catholic teaching there is no “necessary evil”. It is an official teaching that “no good” can come out of evil", and it is also an official dogma that the “end does NOT justify the means”. So the existence of moral evil cannot be “justified” by these means. And still the apologists keep on “valuing” the moral atrocites in the name of some unspecified benefit coming from “free will”. Mind you, it is never the actual sufferers who express such views (they usually do not even survive the experience); it is the “armchair apologists”, who are willing to endure the suffering of others…
Peter Plato:

To return to my horse example, a horse accidentally getting in front of a moving vehicle is not more or less morally laudable than a machine programmed to do the same thing because there is no intent on the part of the machine, just as there is no intent on the part of the horse.

True, but again this is not the point. The soldiers put a value on the “machine”. They are the ones who don’t care “why” the machine intervenes, they are simply glad for the interference, and they mourn the loss of that “soulless” contraption. The machine’s interference is not simply an accident (unlike the horse!), it was programmed by the developers.
Peter Plato:

The moral value lies in the action of the developer of the machine who created it, ostensibly, to save lives of those in potential danger.

Obviously, but again the soldiers could not care less.
Peter Plato:

However, the development of such a machine is consistent with individuals who out of cowardice or fear never wish to face problematic situations.

Uh-oh… Would you dare to repeat this assertion to a squadron of combat veterans, who feel affection for that “machine”? The result might be detrimental to your health.
Peter Plato:

It seems to me that a willingness to face potentially dangerous situations for the sake of “the good” is a desireable moral quality, which your programmed good scenario denies.

Just another baseless assertion without any justification.
Peter Plato:

The real value in volitional free will lies in the extent that it outweighs the possibility of a certain level of evil.

Well, at last something specific. But let’s get down to the details: “just what was the morally good outcome of the holocaust, which outweighed the suffering of those many millions of people, who perished in the camps, and their relatives who lost their loved ones?”. In the stipulated world I suggest there would be no NEED outweigh any evil, since there would be no moral evil.
Peter Plato:

However, it may well be that God (who has a better purview of this) will intervene whenever, in the balance, this is no longer true. There are past precedents (Sodom and Gomorrah, the flood, Exodus, etc.)

Oh, brother. The flood, eh? The indiscriminate slaughter of all humans and animals, perpetrated by God with his own hands? No a very convincing line of thought. Also you forget that “may well be” is not an argument.

 

[MPat]

I don’t care about the “moral calculus”.

We will see about that…

I am very keenly aware of the stipulated “moral goodness”, I am STILL waiting for some argument as to “why” is it relevant. I would appreciate if you could present a rational argument as to what is the benefit of a “morally good action” compared to the “functionally good action”.

Sorry, but that seems to have relatively little to do with the stated subject of this thread (“Free will and love… love? WHICH love???”)… If you want to ask a question “Why is ‘moral goodness’ and not just ‘functional goodness’ worth caring about?”, perhaps it would be better to create a new thread and ask there (and, perhaps, add a link to it here). Oh, and making a case why “functional goodness” is worth caring about would be nice too…

Looks like that you are the only one who is willing invest time and effort (I am amazed that others are simply sit on the sideline), but you still do not attack the problem head on. Nevertheless, I appreciate your efforts.

First, in the subject of the thread you ask: “Free will and love… love? WHICH love???”. You shouldn’t expect an answer to a completely different question here.

Second, well, are you sure you apply your philosophy consistently? “Nevertheless, I appreciate your efforts.” (and some other statements) seems to say that you do see some value in putting some effort to answering the question (“moral good”), and not just to the answer (“result”, “functional good”). So, do you really think that it is just the result that counts…?

Your horse example shows that you still don’t get my point. I am not talking about lucky accidents, I am talking about pre-programmed beneficial behavior. Here comes a real life (not hypothetical) example to show what I am talking about. The US Army developed a mine-sniffing and destroying “gadget”, or “robot”, if you prefer. The robot finds the mines and detonates them, and sometimes gets destroyed in the process, sometimes “only” gets seriously damaged. When they get damaged, they are sent back for repair and then they return to “active duty”. Nothing is really special until now, just another useful device to protect the soldiers. Its function is not morally good, “merely” fuctionally good.

It is pointless to address your example. You assert: “It is always just the result that counts.”, “The love that is freely given is always worth as much as the love that is not given freely”. Even if you will manage to find a hundred examples where it is just the result that counts, you will not be able to get close to demonstrating that your assertion is true. You would only show that in those specific examples only result mattered. A single counterexample would still be enough to disprove your assertion. And you cannot afford to weaken it: if the reasons for action matter in at least one case, your whole argument collapses.

If you want to make an argument in favour of your assertion, you should either give some general reasoning, or to answer the counterexamples that are offered. In this case you have been offered a couple (“Cat and Teddy bear” and “Horse and car”). I don’t think you have dealt with them satisfactorily yet… And that is what you should try to do, if you want a serious discussion.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Why is “volitional free will” preferred? And by WHOM?

I suggest that it would be preferred by any moral being for the simple reason that an actual agent would be behind the moral act rather than a non-person.

In your scenario it would seem that to you as the recipient of good from another it would not matter if that being we’re capable of intention or not as long as you received the good in question from them.

My point is that in any loving relationship the personhood and intent of the other is crucially important because the intentional will behind the acts of the other is precisely the person who is in the loving relationship to you. Without the other’s personhood (volitional free will and consciousness) there would be no relationship, no person there to love. In a sense, the acts are secondary in real loving relationships, but in your scenario the acts are primary and the relationship is secondary, if even required at all.

My point has been that personhood requires consciousness and volitional free will. Without these there is no person to be relationship with. Without volitional free will (and the risk of morally evil choices that come with it) there can be no person to be in relationship with.

In your view, it seems, that would not matter as long as practical good obtained all the time. That is like saying, it wouldn’t matter if I was married to a real person or a robot as long as the benefits (to me) outweighed the risk of any possible problems that being married to a real person would, of necessity, bring.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

One of the arguments to “support” and “endorse” the evils due to human actions is the assertion that “free will” is necessary for “love” to exist. (I am constantly amazed that believers sort of “vote for” the existence of evil acts and not for eliminating evil from the world.) It is said that “love” is useless, unless “freely given”. The problem is that the kind of love which requires “free will” is never specified, it is just a “generic love”. But there are at least four kinds of love, “eros” (romance, sex), “philia” (friendship), “storge” (affection) and “agape” (selfless love). The real question is, which one of these loses its meaning or value, if not volitional? The answer is simple. “Eros” is based on chemistry and emotions - and none of those are volitionally based. “Philia” and “storge” are based on family and friendship relations, so there is no volitional action there either. You are either attracted to someone or not. It cannot be forced by volition. The only candidate for volitional actions is “agape”, which means to act on behalf of someone else, and actions are clearly volitional.

So the question is what does the volitional aspect add (if anything at all) to the action which epitomizes “agape”? Let’s consider a simple scenario: “there is a traffic accident and a passer-by stops to help”. That is clearly a volitional act on behalf of someone else, so it qualifies as an act of “agape”. Now, who cares if that was a volitional act, or a “pre-programmed” one? The person who suffered the accident is happy for the help in either case. He would not care if the helper was “programmed” to help, or if he could have just walked on. The act of helping is what is important, and the “why” is completely irrelevant. If the person stopped from the goodness of his “heart”, or he stopped because he wanted to feel good about himself, or he secretly hoped (but never asked) for a reward, it makes no difference. So it turns out that “free will” is not important when it comes to “agape” either, and it does not play a role in the other kinds of “love” either.

There are some more “kinds” of love, when one “loves” certain foods, and does not love others, or loves certain kinds of music, but none of those are volitional choices. They are there or they are not there, and it does not matter either way.

Conclusion: the so called “free will” defense (free will is necessary, because otherwise love would be meaningless) is just a bunch of baloney just like all the other defenses pertaining to the problem of evil. If we all were “programmed” to be kind and helpful toward each other, if the thought of volitionally harming others would never cross our mind, we would not lose anything; all the different kinds of love would be present. Emotions, attractions would be there. People would be attached and attracted to others just fine. People would be compelled to help, but that does not matter to the ones who are being helped. The end result is the same. So I suggest to drop this argument, because it is simply false. (Of course it will not be dropped completely, but maybe some people will realize how ridiculous it is and will not use it. One can only hope… even if that “hope” is hopeless… )

Free Will newadvent.org/cathen/06259a.htm

Of course Catholic Doctrine teaches that we do indeed have a free will.
Catechism of the Catholic Church vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM

 

[Sair]

Conclusion: the so called “free will” defense (free will is necessary, because otherwise love would be meaningless) is just a bunch of baloney just like all the other defenses pertaining to the problem of evil.

Through no free will of my own, I love your argument

 

[Sair]

Your claim amounts to saying it doesn’t matter whether we live as cogs in a well-run machine or within a universe of free beings who have the dignity and responsibility of free causal agency. If God, and therefore Personhood, is ultimately the ground of existence then free conscious moral activity is ultimately valuable because a moral agent responded and accomplished a “good” deed. The fact that someone did the good deed is vitally important in the ultimate scheme of things.

In a materialistic universe, you are right, it wouldn’t matter why some act occurred, but, on the other hand, in that same larger scheme of things, any effect would be equally desirable, good or bad, because no qualitative value would exist. There could me no ultimate good or bad, just what is.

If you’re looking at actual outcomes, then it doesn’t matter if we are ‘cogs’ in a machine or free beings. What, exactly, does the dignity of free causal agency gain for us if, through that free causal agency, we then fail to act?

And there are quite a lot of 'if’s in your argument - obviously we have no particular reason to think that personhood and therefore the theistic god are the “ground of being”, whatever that actually means. And I’m not sure, either, why any action has to be ultimately valuable - why isn’t temporal value, in a consequentialist sense, equally (if not more) desirable?

This is what seems to me to be the problem with imagining that all our actions, as humans, must have an ‘objective’ value. Clearly our actions have objective consequences, because we are material beings within a material universe, and thus part of the web of cause and effect; but speaking of ‘objective value’ seems deeply problematic to me, at least, since as far as I can tell, value is a subjective phenomenon - it requires a being who may feel a value for some state of affairs over another. If this valuing being is God, all well and good - but that doesn’t make value itself an objective, independent reality.

 

[Peter_Plato]

… as far as I can tell, value is a subjective phenomenon - it requires a being who may feel a value for some state of affairs over another. If this valuing being is God, all well and good - but that doesn’t make value itself an objective, independent reality.

Actually, it does if God is the ground of all existence. If existence Itself is Subjective and all “things” exist because of God, then everything is imbued with value, as a matter of fact. So yes it does make value an objective, independent reality. A Thomist might say the Being and Good are transferable, much like matter and energy are in the physical realm.

 

[Trurl]

Peter Plato:

I suggest that it would be preferred by any moral being for the simple reason that an actual agent would be behind the moral act rather than a non-person.

I am one moral being who disagrees. And those soldiers also disagree. When help comes your way, you do not ask first about the motives, you grab the helping hand. By the way, the other entity is not necessarily a “non-person”, it can be a very good person. You (and many others) keep making this error, I don’t know if on purpose, or out of ignorance. Just because someone is unable to perform a moral atrocity, it does NOT make them a non-person.
Peter Plato:

In your scenario it would seem that to you as the recipient of good from another it would not matter if that being we’re capable of intention or not as long as you received the good in question from them.

I already said this several times.
Peter Plato:

My point is that in any loving relationship the personhood and intent of the other is crucially important because the intentional will behind the acts of the other is precisely the person who is in the loving relationship to you.

But I am not talking about a generic “loving relationship”, and have expressed this in the OP. I am ONLY talking about the “agape” - extending a helping hand to someone in need.
Peter Plato:

Without the other’s personhood (volitional free will and consciousness) there would be no relationship, no person there to love. In a sense, the acts are secondary in real loving relationships, but in your scenario the acts are primary and the relationship is secondary, if even required at all.

Precisely. I do not care to develop a “loving relationship” with my heart doctor. I only expect to have a “professional relationship”, and thus I expect him to fix my problem. And as long as he does it, I could not care less about his motives. But this is again, old news. We went through this many times.
Peter Plato:

My point has been that personhood requires consciousness and volitional free will. Without these there is no person to be relationship with. Without volitional free will (and the risk of morally evil choices that come with it) there can be no person to be in relationship with.

This is simply not true. People develop deep, emotionally based relationships with pets, “who” are definitely not persons. But again, this has nothing to do with agape. By the way, the “free will” of NOT to love someone does not have to extend to the ability of cutting their throat, or putting poison into their drink. One can exercise her free will by stipulating that the loving relationship is over. There is no need for the “freedom” of committing “evil” and violent acts.
Peter Plato:

In your view, it seems, that would not matter as long as practical good obtained all the time. That is like saying, it wouldn’t matter if I was married to a real person or a robot as long as the benefits (to me) outweighed the risk of any possible problems that being married to a real person would, of necessity, bring.

And the “dance” continues. I am not talking about marriage, and you are changing the goalposts again. Enough already. If you can address the actual question, I will be happy to see it. You could start by enumerating the “fruits of the free will” that culminated in the ghettos for the Jews, in the gas chambers where they were forced to die. Those victims did not appreciate the “freedom” of their torturers, just like you would not, if you happened to be involved in a similar situation. (I know I am expected to add the caveat that I hope you will never get that experience… so I did. . Yet, I think that it would do a world of good to those who advocate the “free will” of the psychopaths to gain a little personal insight into the ramifications of what they preach.)

However, do not keep on repeating the same thing, since it is very boring by now. Of course, you are in an illustrious company of failing apologists. Not even the brightest and smartest theologians and philosophers could address this problem in a satisfactory manner. So don’t despair, you are not alone.

 

[Sair]

Actually, it does if God is the ground of all existence. If existence Itself is Subjective and all “things” exist because of God, then everything is imbued with value, as a matter of fact. So yes it does make value an objective, independent reality. A Thomist might say the Being and Good are transferable, much like matter and energy are in the physical realm.

But if ‘being’ is equated with ‘good’, then surely any form of destruction of being is bad - that would include a huge amount of normal human behaviour, and the behaviour of other animals as well - every time we eat anything, for example. To paper over this problem, there must, in the context of real life, be some distinction in value between certain types of being - humans don’t retain any physical being after death, at least not in any recognisably human form…unless you assume we have a spiritual soul - again, whatever that might actually be - that somehow is the seat of “intrinsic” value for the human person. Why would God create a physical world with a separate kind of being? Why not just stick to spirits, if spirits are more valuable than matter?

This supposition of a value that comes from beyond our material existence leads to all kinds of confusion and strangeness - the most obvious, of course, is the hierarchy of being established by most religions, with God at the top, human males next, and human females and other animals a distant third, then plants scarcely worth a mention over rocks (unless they’re precious stones, of course) at the bottom. Value judgements - most of them quite arbitrary, if seriously examined - are implicit in this hierarchy.

You still need to explain what “the ground of being” means, both in general (for a supernaturalist - for a naturalist, matter and energy are the “ground” or the basis of any and all beings, and this implies no value judgement whatsoever) and in the context of naming your God as the “ground” of being. What does that mean, exactly? I’m no Thomist, so a plain-speaking, layperson’s explanation will do just fine here. What are you actually talking about when you say that “God is the ground of being”? How would we know if it was so, or otherwise?

 

[Peter_Plato]

But if ‘being’ is equated with ‘good’, then surely any form of destruction of being is bad - that would include a huge amount of normal human behaviour, and the behaviour of other animals as well - every time we eat anything, for example.

I cannot spend much time on this during the next couple of days due to schedule, however, I can answer this initial quandary. If Being is subjective and has intent then it does not automatically follow that any “destruction” of any contingent existent is necessarily evil because that change may be part of the willed purpose of Being. The fact the Being is subjective would mean the intent and purpose of this Being would be ultimately important. So the good would be what is in line with the intent and purpose of Being in whatever way that is made known, i.e., natural law, revelation, natural order, etc.

 

[Sair]

I cannot spend much time on this during the next couple of days due to schedule, however, I can answer this initial quandary. If Being is subjective and has intent then it does not automatically follow that any “destruction” of any contingent existent is necessarily evil because that change may be part of the willed purpose of Being. The fact the Being is subjective would mean the intent and purpose of this Being would be ultimately important. So the good would be what is in line with the intent and purpose of Being in whatever way that is made known, i.e., natural law, revelation, natural order, etc.

Which demonstrates a complete disregard for the individuality of subjectivity, and still ignores the underlying question - what does it mean to say that “God is the ground of being”?

 

[Peter_Plato]

Which demonstrates a complete disregard for the individuality of subjectivity,

No it doesn’t. It shows the source of each individual subjectivity is embedded in the ultimate reality of Being. Unlike materialism that holds subjectivity to be an epiphenomenon (a shadow cast off) of biochemical processes. That to me shows disregard for individual subjectivity.

 

[atheistgirl]

Through no free will of my own, I love your argument

Me too.

Subscribed.

Interested to see where this goes.

Sarah x

 

[Trurl]

atheistgirl:

Interested to see where this goes.

Sure looks like the thread is at least half-dead and also off on an unrelated topic. There was not one worthwile challenge to the OP, because the “horse-analogy” is simply pathetic. Though I know many people would proclaim that it was a special miracle and give praise to God for a lucky coincidence.

One could bring up the example of Newfoundland dogs. Those dogs were bred to become lifeguards, but the behavior of the dogs is not volitional, and it is still very much valued by those who are on the receiving end of such help (unless they do not want to be helped… ). An even more interesting thought would have been the behavior of dolphins, “who” help out drowning people by pushing them onto the surface. Of course their behavior is completely based on instinct (the newborn dolphins need this help) and not voliton. But I have never heard of someone who would have rejected the helping “snout” of a dolphin and hope that a life-guard might come by to help him. Naturally! Real people in real distress don’t give a “dayum” about the volitonal aspect of agape, only the armchair apologists do. And they are still unable to give any good reason why is the volition so “great”.

 

[Sair]

No it doesn’t. It shows the source of each individual subjectivity is embedded in the ultimate reality of Being.

But naturalists consider subjectivity to be embedded in the ultimate reality of being as well - it’s just that we have an entirely different notion of the ultimate reality of being.

Unlike materialism that holds subjectivity to be an epiphenomenon (a shadow cast off) of biochemical processes. That to me shows disregard for individual subjectivity.

Individual subjectivity gains its individuality through being based in the unique biochemical processes of each subjective being. If they are ultimately based upon the preferences of the same God, for example, whence individuality? Did your God create each individual with particular quirks, or make just a slightly different recipe each time, and then watch how it turned out?

 

[MPat]

But I am not talking about a generic “loving relationship”, and have expressed this in the OP. I am ONLY talking about the “agape” - extending a helping hand to someone in need.

First, you haven’t fully demonstrated that nothing else should be considered yet. Second, I am not sure your definition of “agape” is completely accurate…

Precisely. I do not care to develop a “loving relationship” with my heart doctor. I only expect to have a “professional relationship”, and thus I expect him to fix my problem. And as long as he does it, I could not care less about his motives. But this is again, old news. We went through this many times.

Well, if you are not interested in anything, but that, then you are not interested in “agape” there either. That’s just a business transaction, where “love of money” seems to be far more relevant than any kind of love you mentioned…

And, by the way, I don’t think such way of thinking is very common in the case you chose… Many people are happy to keep a friendly relationship with their doctor.

And the “dance” continues. I am not talking about marriage, and you are changing the goalposts again. Enough already. If you can address the actual question, I will be happy to see it. You could start by enumerating the “fruits of the free will” that culminated in the ghettos for the Jews, in the gas chambers where they were forced to die. Those victims did not appreciate the “freedom” of their torturers, just like you would not, if you happened to be involved in a similar situation. (I know I am expected to add the caveat that I hope you will never get that experience… so I did. . Yet, I think that it would do a world of good to those who advocate the “free will” of the psychopaths to gain a little personal insight into the ramifications of what they preach.)

Well, actually, there are many who ended up in concentration camps and didn’t lose their faith. For example, St. Maximilian Kolbe - and many other Catholics, Protestants, Jews and others. Are you completely sure that “Those victims did not appreciate the ‘freedom’ of their torturers”…?

 

[Peter_Plato]

Individual subjectivity gains its individuality through being based in the unique biochemical processes of each subjective being.

You see this is precisely what does not convince me that materialism can explain subjective being. I can imagine a world where those unique objective biochemical processes can bring about other apparently “subjective” beings that appear objective to me, but that need not imply that those same processes will bring about “me” as a subjective being. What do you suppose is unique about the biological process that brought about “me” as opposed to the processes that brought about the “other” beings whose subjectivity I can have no part of? Why can’t those biological processes just bring about other apparently “subjective” processes that I have no way of knowing are subjective or otherwise? In which case “I” as a subjective process need never exist, so why should I find compelling some merely biological theory of subjective origin when I would never even be aware of those other subjective beings, if I didn’t exist?

Your “unique biological processes” theory need never have brought into being the first person “I,” the subjective being that I am acutely aware of, when there are billions of third party apparently subjective beings that I have no similar awareness of. What makes my awareness of me different from my awareness of them? Or why did those same biological processes not bring about my subjective awareness at every locus where those processes occur? (Why am I not aware of me in every human being? Appeal to biological processes to explain subjective awareness as a kind of “third party” explanation, I.e., why “they” are all the same, leaves out the fact that I am not they and therefore my awareness of myself is unique in a way that an explanation of their subjectivity will never cover.

Biological explanations are objective in the same way as third party subjectivity is objective, but objective explanations do not even come close to explaining the subjective awareness I have of me.

If they are ultimately based upon the preferences of the same God, for example, whence individuality? Did your God create each individual with particular quirks, or make just a slightly different recipe each time, and then watch how it turned out?

God is ultimate subject, uniquely subjective, uniquely who he is (I Am Who Am) so our subjectivity or subjective uniqueness can be based upon the subjective uniqueness of God. However, biological or third party explanations can only be ultimately objective. Subjective awareness can come from ultimate subjective awareness, but subjective awareness is quite a different bird than objective, non-subjective objects that are “out there,” that have absolutely nothing to do with subjectivity. Similar to the proposition that an ought can never be derived from an is, subjectivity can never be derived from objectivity, no matter how complex, unless of course everything is ultimately subjective to begin with.

 

[MPat]

Sure looks like the thread is at least half-dead and also off on an unrelated topic. There was not one worthwile challenge to the OP, because the “horse-analogy” is simply pathetic. Though I know many people would proclaim that it was a special miracle and give praise to God for a lucky coincidence.

And how would you describe my “challenge”…? It would be nice to know a word that would mean “worse than pathetic”…

Though, of course, I don’t see “the ‘horse-analogy’” as “pathetic”… For example, I don’t think you have fully explained what, in your opinion, would be the difference between values of “pre-programed” and “accidental” occurrences…

One could bring up the example of Newfoundland dogs. Those dogs were bred to become lifeguards, but the behavior of the dogs is not volitional, and it is still very much valued by those who are on the receiving end of such help (unless they do not want to be helped… ). An even more interesting thought would have been the behavior of dolphins, “who” help out drowning people by pushing them onto the surface. Of course their behavior is completely based on instinct (the newborn dolphins need this help) and not voliton. But I have never heard of someone who would have rejected the helping “snout” of a dolphin and hope that a life-guard might come by to help him. Naturally! Real people in real distress don’t give a “dayum” about the volitonal aspect of agape, only the armchair apologists do. And they are still unable to give any good reason why is the volition so “great”.

OK, that simply shows that “to value”, “to prefer” and other verbs like that can be used in more than one way. For a clearer illustration, let’s take the military commanders. On one hand, they prefer that their soldiers would deal with the enemy from complete safety. On the other hand, they tend give medals to the soldiers that get in danger and not to the ones that stay in a safe places.

It is also true in atheistic armies. For example, in the Second World War there were many soldiers who must have covered the machine guns in enemy pillboxes with something like sand bags. But it was the one (Matrosov) who covered it with his own chest (as it was claimed), that was declared a Hero of the Soviet Union. Soviet propaganda did see that such deed is going to be more valuable than the safer one, even if the expected result was actually worse. Even they saw that result is not everything that counts.

And, of course, “less valuable” doesn’t mean “worthless”. In both cases you considered here you essentially take the evidence that A is preferred to nothing and conclude that it is not less valuable than B. Non sequitur…?