Free will needs clarification

[Spock]

There are two concepts, which are frequently confused: “free will” and “freedom to act on that will”. Of these two, only the second one matters, the first one does not. Whatever anyone can “wish / want / will” is of no consequence if one is unable to act on that “wish / want / will”. To me this sounds obvious, and would hardly merit a thread, if we would all agree on it. But I have seen opposing opinons, not frequently, but still.

One example of dissent was when I asked why does God always respect the “free will” of the stronger party? I brought up the case of a rape, where the strong rapist’s will prevail over the will of the weak victim. The conversation partner answered that the “free will” of the victim is in no way impaired, just because she is unable to carry out her will (namely not to be raped). Needless to say I was speechless. Since then I saw the same reasoning a few times, so I am asking:

"Is free will separate from freedom to act?".

 

[davidv]

There are two concepts, which are frequently confused: “free will” and “freedom to act on that will”. Of these two, only the second one matters, the first one does not. Whatever anyone can “wish / want / will” is of no consequence if one is unable to act on that “wish / want / will”. To me this sounds obvious, and would hardly merit a thread, if we would all agree on it. But I have seen opposing opinons, not frequently, but still.

One example of dissent was when I asked why does God always respect the “free will” of the stronger party? I brought up the case of a rape, where the strong rapist’s will prevail over the will of the weak victim. The conversation partner answered that the “free will” of the victim is in no way impaired, just because she is unable to carry out her will (namely not to be raped). Needless to say I was speechless. Since then I saw the same reasoning a few times, so I am asking:

"Is free will separate from freedom to act?".

I didn’t vote, as I couldn’t agree with either statement.

Your first premise “Of these these two, only the second one matters” is demonstably false as is evidenced by the US legel system. The great difference between first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter is based exclusively on the freedom of will, not the freedom to act. In each of these cases a person is dead (freedom to act was not impeded), yet the perpetrator is treated quite differently because intent (free will) was different.

So free will is separate from freedom to act.

 

[st_felicity]

"Is free will separate from freedom to act?".

This question is different than the one in the poll–so I did not answer the poll.

As for this quoted question, yes–the will is separate from action.

I think Paul’s comments in Romans 7 reflects this distinction–though on a personal level and a personal struggle.

[15] I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate.
[16] Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good.
[17] So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.
[18] For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it.
[19] For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do.
[20] Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.
[21] So I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand.
[22] For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self,
[23] but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members.
[24] Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?
[25] Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I of myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin.

 

[Pieman333272]

First of all, ignore my vote because I misunderstood the question in the poll.

But to answer your question at the end of your post, as others have pointed out, they are separate. Lets say I can choose between driving a minivan and a sports car out of a parking garage. Free will allows me to choose. If I, out of my free will, choose the sports car and am told that I would be arrested for that as it is not my car, that is an example of freedom to act, or really lack of thereof. I still have the freedom to act to drive the minivan or walk home from the garage, but they aren’t with the consent of my free will.

 

[Spock]

I didn’t vote, as I couldn’t agree with either statement.

Your first premise “Of these these two, only the second one matters” is demonstably false as is evidenced by the US legel system. The great difference between first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter is based exclusively on the freedom of will, not the freedom to act. In each of these cases a person is dead (freedom to act was not impeded), yet the perpetrator is treated quite differently because intent (free will) was different.

So free will is separate from freedom to act.

I explicitly stated in the first sentence: “free will” and “freedom to act on that will” - not just “freedom to act”. Obviously I meant the same thing in the final question.

So your example is not valid, though what you say is true. A murder and an accident are not the same, and the difference is the intent - as you correctly pointed it out. But it has nothing to do with my question.

I explicitly question the relevance of an “impotent” free will (a free will, which cannot be carried out). Who cares about what anyone wishes to do, if that person is unable to carry out his intent?

 

[mdrummer5]

First of all, ignore my vote because I misunderstood the question in the poll.

But to answer your question at the end of your post, as others have pointed out, they are separate. Lets say I can choose between driving a minivan and a sports car out of a parking garage. Free will allows me to choose. If I, out of my free will, choose the sports car and am told that I would be arrested for that as it is not my car, that is an example of freedom to act, or really lack of thereof. I still have the freedom to act to drive the minivan or walk home from the garage, but they aren’t with the consent of my free will.

While I agree that they are separate I do not agree with your example. However, it shows a great amount of morality in you.

You being told you would be arrested for taking the sports car does not remove the freedom to act… it merely puts a consequence in the way. You COULD still take the car… but would suffer consequences. Consequences do not impair action… they act as a deterrent.

Now… let’s say both cars belong to you and your spouse and the sports car is a manual transmission but you only know how to drive automatic. That removes your ability to act… unless of course you want to try it and destroy the transmission in the process so even in that case… you still could choose that action but would have the consequence of a car repair.

 

[st_felicity]

I explicitly question the relevance of an “impotent” free will (a free will, which cannot be carried out). Who cares about what anyone wishes to do, if that person is unable to carry out his intent?

Then you have already made up your mind, and you don’t really HAVE a question. You begin with the premise that a free will is dependent upon the freedom to act upon that free will choice. Where is your evidence for that? There isn’t any evidence for that because will and** action** are two distinct things.

plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
Philosophers who distinguish freedom of action and freedom of will do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or “willings.”

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_action
Freedom of action in philosophy has been distinguished from freedom of the will at least since the work of Thomas Hobbes[1] and David Hume,[2] who claimed that human freedom was the lack of external coercion (sometimes called negative freedom) and not the supposed “free will,” which they took to be a will that could act (impossibly at random) independently of the circumstances just prior to a decision.

As for your “who cares?” question–Obviously God does (for those who have faith in Him). God cares that your will is in accord with His Divine Will–not so much that you are able to carry out His Divine Will–only that you strive toward it with intention.

 

[MarcoPolo]

Since it’s God will that we not sin then is God’s will compromised when we sin? No, He still wills that we not sin—that fact remains inviolate.

 

[The_Exodus]

There are two concepts, which are frequently confused: “free will” and “freedom to act on that will”. Of these two, only the second one matters, the first one does not. Whatever anyone can “wish / want / will” is of no consequence if one is unable to act on that “wish / want / will”. To me this sounds obvious, and would hardly merit a thread, if we would all agree on it. But I have seen opposing opinons, not frequently, but still.

This is a good point. Oftentimes the word “will” is used to imply “choice” when it ought to imply “desire” or “wish.”

spock:

One example of dissent was when I asked why does God always respect the “free will” of the stronger party? I brought up the case of a rape, where the strong rapist’s will prevail over the will of the weak victim. The conversation partner answered that the “free will” of the victim is in no way impaired, just because she is unable to carry out her will (namely not to be raped). Needless to say I was speechless. Since then I saw the same reasoning a few times, so I am asking:

"Is free will separate from freedom to act?".

These are good questions Spock. You have a better understanding of freedom than many Christians.

But what you need is a more metaphysical grounding of the concept.

Freedom is typically defined as the ability to act or not act, to choose or not choose. It is when a rational soul is in potency to more than one act. Hence, if sitting, I may get up to eat, or get the mail, or do the laundry, etc. Most people believe that “free will” is a misinterpretation of both Aquinas and Augustine, who used words more closely meaning “freedom of choice.”

Now, the will is typically defined as that which tends towards goodness. It is the part of the rational soul that wants. Since we are not united to God – who is goodness itself, and desirable under every aspect – we are drawn towards finite and changeable goods. Pizza, for instance, is good under one aspect (taste), but bad under another (it is unhealthy.) Also, to obey God is good under one aspect (obedience to a higher rule), but, under another aspect, it is undesirable (repressing our urge to be our own rule.) It is possible to choose these different things – the will is in potency towards them – because the will’s object is infinite good which cannot be attained in this life. And so, as a consequence, it seeks temporary or changeable goods to fill that infinite longing.

God, however, can gently and infallibly hold the will in goodness, or direct it to a good, by presenting to it a good which it naturally desires. This is what happens when unbelievers begin to believe. Faith itself is a gift of God which causes the “hard heart” to melt and turn into a “heart of flesh.”

If you are more interested, you ought to read chapter 9 of this link.

books.google.com/books?id=vSbb6siLONoC&pg=PA146&lpg=PA146&dq=john+of+st.+thomas+reprobation&source=bl&ots=gOH0rr7eUt&sig=Ms6kfAz8CT78TBt2wDyLzkgsKmM&hl=en&ei=Dw0aTaHDJ4H-8AaVvpSrDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&sqi=2&ved=0CDEQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

[Spock]

Then you have already made up your mind, and you don’t really HAVE a question.

I am interested in your opinion. In the OP I gave an example of a differing opinion. By the way, the conversation lasted a little bit longer. When the other person made his remark, that it does not matter if the woman can carry out her wish (not to be raped), because her will is still “free”, I had another question. I said: “if it does not matter if she can carry out her will, then why did God not take her side, and prevent the rapist from carrying out his wish?”. If her free will is safe and sound, even if she is unable to act on it, then - by the same token - the rapist’s free will would also be unimpeded, if he could not carry out his wish. Guess what, the person never answered, and disappeared rather fast. It looks like that some people are not happy if someone points out their illogical stance.

You begin with the premise that a free will is dependent upon the freedom to act upon that free will choice. Where is your evidence for that?

The evidence is obvious. If you need explanation, just say so.

There isn’t any evidence for that because will and** action** are two distinct things.

I emphasised that I am not talking about some generic “action” (which could also be an involuntary reflex - like blinking when an object comes too close to the eye) but the volitional action to carry out what the person wishes / wants / desires. No one denies that action is different from the will to perform the action. (Maybe Jesus does who says that “anyone who looks at a woman with lust, has already committed adultery in his heart” - thus pre-empting George Orwell’s thought-crime by about 2000 years). But I asked something else. What is the relevance of a will, which cannot be carried out?

 

[Spock]

This is a good point. Oftentimes the word “will” is used to imply “choice” when it ought to imply “desire” or “wish.”

My sentiment exactly.

Freedom is typically defined as the ability to act or not act, to choose or not choose. It is when a rational soul is in potency to more than one act. Hence, if sitting, I may get up to eat, or get the mail, or do the laundry, etc. Most people believe that “free will” is a misinterpretation of both Aquinas and Augustine, who used words more closely meaning “freedom of choice.”

Freedom of choice is a very good way to put it.

Now, the will is typically defined as that which tends towards goodness.

I cannot agree with that. Some people are just sociopaths, who want to hurt others. This is not a “will towards goodness”. Do you wish to introduce a new word which will describe a desire toward “badness”? There is no reason for that. A “will” is a “will” (or desire or wish) toward something.

 

[st_felicity]

I am interested in your opinion. In the OP I gave an example of a differing opinion. You asked it as a question, not for opinions, but regardless…

It is not a matter of opinion whether two things–namely the will, and the ability to act upon the will-- are different from one another. By nature of the fact they are TWO–it makes them different.

By the way, the conversation lasted a little bit longer. When the other person made his remark, that it does not matter if the woman can carry out her wish (not to be raped), because her will is still “free”, I had another question. I said: “if it does not matter if she can carry out her will, then why did God not take her side, and prevent the rapist from carrying out his wish?”. If her free will is safe and sound, even if she is unable to act on it, then - by the same token - the rapist’s free will would also be unimpeded, if he could not carry out his wish. Guess what, the person never answered, and disappeared rather fast. It looks like that some people are not happy if someone points out their illogical stance.

Are you asking for opinions concerning the freedom of a rapists will? Your question is unclear. All people have free will, and how they use that free will is of interest to God, but it is not God’s duty to conform mankind’s free will to justice. If God interfered with our will, it wouldn’t be free, would it.

Perhaps I’m not understanding you.

The evidence is obvious. If you need explanation, just say so.

Please. Supply evidence that the will (in order to be free) is dependent upon the ability to carryout the preferred action.

What is the relevance of a will, which cannot be carried out?

And I answered: It matters to God. Likewise–ever hear the cliche “it’s the thought that counts”–that’s used when one’s will is to carry out some good but is unable to do so.

 

[The_Exodus]

I cannot agree with that. Some people are just sociopaths, who want to hurt others. This is not a “will towards goodness”. Do you wish to introduce a new word which will describe a desire toward “badness”? There is no reason for that. A “will” is a “will” (or desire or wish) toward something.

It is impossible to wish for something that has no goodness, or badness as such. No one can will to be unhappy, because even in the willing, there is necessarily a tendency towards something perceived as good. The sociopath hurts others for some inner pleasure it gives him (a good, under a certain aspect). Hence, to a murderer, there is some desirability in his act (perhaps a morbid “getting off” element, some aspect of revenge, etc.)

 

[st_felicity]

It is impossible to wish for something that has no goodness, or badness as such. No one can will to be unhappy, because even in the willing, there is necessarily a tendency towards something perceived as good. The sociopath hurts others for some inner pleasure it gives him (a good, under a certain aspect). Hence, to a murderer, there is some desirability in his act (perhaps a morbid “getting off” element, some aspect of revenge, etc.)

If I’m understanding you correctly, that is a relativist view of “good” that is contrary to Catholic teaching. Good is in accord with the Divine Good–anything other than that is some degree short of “good.” Often sin, and the human nature warped by sin, desire that which is out of accord with the Divine Good. The desire does not make it good, desire is the experience of a will expressing preference or the anticipation of a perceived outcome that may or may not be in accord with the will of God. That’s what makes it “free.”

 

[The_Exodus]

If I’m understanding you correctly, that is a relativist view of “good” that is contrary to Catholic teaching. Good is in accord with the Divine Good–anything other than that is some degree short of “good.” Often sin, and the human nature warped by sin, desire that which is out of accord with the Divine Good. The desire does not make it good, desire is the experience of a will expressing preference or the anticipation of a perceived outcome that may or may not be in accord with the will of God. That’s what makes it “free.”

Thank you for your observation. I assure you, however, what I am saying is in full accord with Catholic teaching, and is found rooted in St. Augustine, fleshed out by St. Thomas, and has been held down the centuries by popes (particularly JP II), bishops, and theologians.

It is incorrect to suppose that the desire for an apparent good justifies the desire, nor makes it good, or that this follows from what I said. I simply said that, since sin is obviously desired in some aspect, it is done so because an object presented to the intellect is in some sense desirable. Sin occurs when that object is desired and acted upon in a way out of accord with the divine rule. In other words, the will is defectible or corruptible, since it cannot, of its own powers, continue to follow the divine rule perfectly (else there would be no distinction between it and God). Hence all beings are naturally defectible and tend towards nothingness. The sin occurs when the will, not considering the divine rule, goes on and makes an act anyway, which is sin.

St. Thomas says all this in De Malo (particularly question 3). You can read about what I said here, if interested: books.google.com/books?id=pUQyEOTKZosC&pg=PA178&lpg=PA178&dq=de+malo+q.+3&source=bl&ots=4wH1Q4qyO-&sig=zbK_JL8CZqZruJ6KS2nHeupD8h0&hl=en&ei=SAYdTam-GcH88Aaik9j_DQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=482&f=false

Thank you for your comments.

 

[st_felicity]

Thank you for your observation. I assure you, however, what I am saying is in full accord with Catholic teaching, and is found rooted in St. Augustine, fleshed out by St. Thomas, and has been held down the centuries by popes (particularly JP II), bishops, and theologians.

It is incorrect to suppose that the desire for an apparent good justifies the desire, nor makes it good, or that this follows from what I said. I simply said that, since sin is obviously desired in some aspect, it is done so because an object presented to the intellect is in some sense desirable. Sin occurs when that object is desired and acted upon in a way out of accord with the divine rule. In other words, the will is defectible or corruptible, since it cannot, of its own powers, continue to follow the divine rule perfectly (else there would be no distinction between it and God). Hence all beings are naturally defectible and tend towards nothingness. The sin occurs when the will, not considering the divine rule, goes on and makes an act anyway, which is sin.

St. Thomas says all this in De Malo (particularly question 3). You can read about what I said here, if interested: books.google.com/books?id=pUQyEOTKZosC&pg=PA178&lpg=PA178&dq=de+malo+q.+3&source=bl&ots=4wH1Q4qyO-&sig=zbK_JL8CZqZruJ6KS2nHeupD8h0&hl=en&ei=SAYdTam-GcH88Aaik9j_DQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=482&f=false

Thank you for your comments.

So how were you using “good” in the post I commented on? Did you add “or badness” after you first posted it? Perhaps there is where I found it confusing. I’ll check out your link.

I do have a question about what you wrote in your clarification above.

You said,

The sin occurs when the will, not considering the divine rule, goes on and makes an act anyway, which is sin.

Are you suggesting that an act is sinful if one fails to consider “the divine rule?” --Even if the act may be one of charity, but without conscious “consideration” that it is an act of charity?

I

 

[st_felicity]

St. Thomas says all this in De Malo (particularly question 3). You can read about what I said here, if interested: books.google.com/books?id=pUQyEOTKZosC&pg=PA178&lpg=PA178&dq=de+malo+q.+3&source=bl&ots=4wH1Q4qyO-&sig=zbK_JL8CZqZruJ6KS2nHeupD8h0&hl=en&ei=SAYdTam-GcH88Aaik9j_DQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=482&f=false

Thank you for your comments.

Very dense reading!

So, if I get it correctly, we’re essentially saying the same thing. I said, *“Good is in accord with the Divine Good–anything other than that is some degree short of ‘good.’” * which is pretty much the same idea of your comment, “Hence all beings are naturally defectible and tend towards nothingness. The sin occurs when the will, not considering the divine rule, goes on and makes an act anyway, which is sin.” --And I assume your comment meant the will that chooses opposition to the Divine “rule” for whatever reason.

Or–said another way:

radicalacademy.com/philaugustine2.htm
The cause of moral evil is not God, who is infinite holiness, nor is it matter, as the Platonists would have it, for matter is a creature of God and hence good. Neither is the will as a faculty of the soul evil, for it too has been created by God. The cause of moral evil is the faculty of free will, by which man is able to deviate from the right order, to oppose himself to the will of God. Such opposition gives moral evil reality – negative, metaphysical reality in the sense of decadence of the order established by God, and hence decadence of being or descent toward non-being.

 

[The_Exodus]

So how were you using “good” in the post I commented on? Did you add “or badness” after you first posted it? Perhaps there is where I found it confusing. I’ll check out your link.

I did add “or badness” after I first posted it. My point was that, metaphysically speaking, there is always some appearance or aspect of an object that seems good, even to sinners. No one can wish or will his own unhappiness, for instance, for in wishing we necessarily are wanting what makes us happy. The reason that there is sin is because there is a defective will on the part of the creature. In other words, the creature, being defective, “fails” to will as it should, which is in conformity to the divine rule (one could call this conscience.) When this happens, since we cannot will a “nothing,” our wills are bent toward whatever object in consideration which has been the occasion for our failure or defectiveness. Hence, when Eve is first asked about the fruit, she says that she is prohibited from eating it (at this point, she is following the divine rule.) But, when she is further tempted, she begins to desire it – sees it is pleasing to the eyes, desirable to make one wise, etc. Now, this desiring of the fruit follows her defective will. Since her will was, so to speak, tending toward nothing or non-being, it, being unable to actually grasp onto a physical nothing, latched onto a lesser good. This is because sin is always a result from a defective will, and never “ignorance” or defective intelligence. Ignorance - or considering a lesser good inordinately or against the divine rule - always follows after defectiveness in the will.
st.felicity:

Are you suggesting that an act is sinful if one fails to consider “the divine rule?” --Even if the act may be one of charity, but without conscious “consideration” that it is an act of charity?

I

Hopefully this is more clear after what has been said above.

 

[st_felicity]

I did add “or badness” after I first posted it. My point was that, metaphysically speaking, there is always some appearance or aspect of an object that seems good, even to sinners. No one can wish or will his own unhappiness, for instance, for in wishing we necessarily are wanting what makes us happy. The reason that there is sin is because there is a defective will on the part of the creature. In other words, the creature, being defective, “fails” to will as it should, which is in conformity to the divine rule (one could call this conscience.) When this happens, since we cannot will a “nothing,” our wills are bent toward whatever object in consideration which has been the occasion for our failure or defectiveness. Hence, when Eve is first asked about the fruit, she says that she is prohibited from eating it (at this point, she is following the divine rule.) But, when she is further tempted, she begins to desire it – sees it is pleasing to the eyes, desirable to make one wise, etc. Now, this desiring of the fruit follows her defective will. Since her will was, so to speak, tending toward nothing or non-being, it, being unable to actually grasp onto a physical nothing, latched onto a lesser good. This is because sin is always a result from a defective will, and never “ignorance” or defective intelligence. Ignorance - or considering a lesser good inordinately or against the divine rule - always follows after defectiveness in the will.

Hopefully this is more clear after what has been said above.

Thanks

That’s how I understand it as well. Thanks for the effort in clearing it up.

 

[Spock]

It is not a matter of opinion whether two things–namely the will, and the ability to act upon the will-- are different from one another. By nature of the fact they are TWO–it makes them different.

I am asking: “which one matters?” Now, the funny part is that I described the dilemma in a crystal clear fashion in the poll part of the OP, and you immediately disregarded it.

Are you asking for opinions concerning the freedom of a rapists will? Your question is unclear. All people have free will, and how they use that free will is of interest to God, but it is not God’s duty to conform mankind’s free will to justice. If God interfered with our will, it wouldn’t be free, would it.

Ok, let’s clarify. There are two contrasting “wills” present in a rape case, one is rapist’s “will” to perform the act, the other is the victim’s “will” to avoid it. By not interfering, God allows the rapist’s will to prevail, which means that God “values” the will of the rapist’s will higher. There is no other conclusion. If there is a human agent present, who had the power to intefere and who does not interfere, he will be held responsible for his inaction. Just like driving by an accident scene and not providing assintance is considered criminal.

Please. Supply evidence that the will (in order to be free) is dependent upon the ability to carryout the preferred action.

It really should be obvious. What you ask for sounds like this: “I am saying that a triangle has exactly 3 sides, and you are demanding evidence for that”. But, what the heck. The “evidence” (if you want to call it that) is the woman’s inability to carry out her intention in the rape case. To say that her “free will” is not affected by her inability to carry out her intention is sheer nonsense. But I can do even better.

Let’s accept your opposing view, and let’s say that the “thought is what matters”, and the ability to carry out is not important. If this were the case, then God really could interfere in each and every case, without violating that “free will”, since there is no interference with the “will”, only the ability to carry out. This stance robs you of all “free-will-defense”. God would have no more excuse for his “non-interference” policy.

And I answered: It matters to God. Likewise–ever hear the cliche “it’s the thought that counts”–that’s used when one’s will is to carry out some good but is unable to do so.

This phrase is only used if there was a chance that the attempt could have been successful. If there is no possibility of success, what does it matter what the intents were? If there is an accident, which traps miners underground, then the intent to rescue them does matter, as long as there is a chance of success. If there is no chance of that, the intent does not matter any more.