Free will stems from unconsciousness

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glowingembers

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Free will stems from unconsciousness because in unconsciousness there is nothing that can influence our choice, while consciousness consists of things we are conscious of, and these things influence our choice. There’s a whole spectrum of things that influence us, varying in their degree of definiteness - feelings, emotions, thoughts, concepts, words, material things. All of these things attract our attention and evoke reactions in our bodies and thus influence our decision making.

If we were only consciousness we would only be reacting to things we are conscious of. We would have no free will because our choices would be determined by these things. On the other hand, if we were only unconsciousness we would have free will influenced by nothing, but we would also be conscious of nothing. By being both consciousness and unconsciousness we have free will and we are conscious of things we choose. We can also allow things to influence our choices but we still have that spark of free will that is independent of all things and enables us to do something that is not a consequence of other things, for example to create something inherently unpredictable or to choose to what degree we will allow this or that thing to influence us. We are engaged in the world but we are not of it - we are rooted in the unconsciousness that transcends all things, in the nothingness that initiates all things, in the first cause, the prime mover, one with God.

There seems to be a danger though: the things that influence us can start to control us, if we forget about our free will. By misusing our free will we can become attached to things, caught up in deterministic interactions and inertia governed by the law, and forget that we can actually choose. We can turn into puppets on strings pulled by mental, emotional and physical things. Even though we may believe that we choose our actions, we just react to stimuli and follow conditioned patterns of behavior. This may be what happened during the Fall: our eyes opened as our consciousness dawned, but we lost contact with God.
 
Undoubtedly your thesis is very intriguing. Nevertheless I’ve got to inquiries to make the comprehensive answer to which would maybe clarify and strengthen your ideas.
There’s a whole spectrum of things that influence us, varying in their degree of definiteness - feelings, emotions, thoughts, concepts, words, material things. All of these things attract our attention and evoke reactions in our bodies and thus influence our decision making.
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This seems to be, after all, the compatibilist critique of free agent causation. However, though all the things you mention might influence us, this influence perhaps only amounts to a statistic probability that we will act so and so but does not enact a causal relationship.
What reasons are against such a model of influences generating a statistic probability, even a strong one, but nothing more conclusive than this?
On the other hand, if we were only unconsciousness we would have free will influenced by nothing
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Well, this would be free, but it would hardly be willed anymore. Such a random event rather approaches some sort of quantum fluctuation. Instead of the determinism of causal relationships, you inaugurate the determinism of chance - so to say.
 
TheWhim said:
This seems to be, after all, the compatibilist critique of free agent causation. However, though all the things you mention might influence us, this influence perhaps only amounts to a statistic probability that we will act so and so but does not enact a causal relationship.
What reasons are against such a model of influences generating a statistic probability, even a strong one, but nothing more conclusive than this?
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I imagine that things influence us in a causal way like in physics, that there are forces that pull our attention and our bodies, even when they are exerted by non-physical things like thoughts or feelings. However, in addition to these influences there also seems to be an element of unpredictability in our decision making, which means that our decisions don’t follow with 100% certainty from influences of things. Things that influence us can raise the probability of a decision but can’t guarantee it. The unpredictable element is our free will, although it may have been crippled in the Fall.

Anyway, causality is probabilistic also in physics, on the fundamental level of matter.
TheWhim said:
Well, this would be free, but it would hardly be willed anymore. Such a random event rather approaches some sort of quantum fluctuation. Instead of the determinism of causal relationships, you inaugurate the determinism of chance - so to say.
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I agree that free will without consciousness has no meaning. In unconsciousness there are no limitations, so in this sense it is free (unconditioned), but in order for will or choice to be realized there must also be limitations of consciousness - conceptual or physical boundaries of things that differentiate each thing from what it is not and thus enable existence of things and our awareness of them.

The other hypothetical option I mentioned - consciousness without unconsciousness - seems meaningless too, because things that make up consciousness become differentiated from the state of undifferentiated oneness, which is unconsciousness. And in order to perpetuate their existence they must continue to differentiate themselves from what they are not, they must continue to reach out beyond their boundaries, towards the oneness from which they emerged.

So, free will seems to exist only in combination of unconsciousness (nothingness) and consciousness (thingness). Unconsciousness provides the freedom and consciousness provides the will or the realization of this freedom, but consciousness issues from unconsciousness.
 
So, free will seems to exist only in combination of unconsciousness (nothingness) and consciousness (thingness). Unconsciousness provides the freedom and consciousness provides the will or the realization of this freedom, but consciousness issues from unconsciousness.
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In your theory, is it the process whereby unconsciousness is differentiated into conscious objects(that is, a specific sort of consciousness, genuine to each individual and even to each situation) under the charge of free-will? If so, according to which principles is this free-will to act if not according to the conscious principles of an individual? There’s apparently a contradiction here.
However, if the differentiation from unconsciousness to consciousness isn’t effected by a free personal(that is, conscious) agent, we’re thrown back to unconscious randomness and have abandoned free-will altogether(what neither of us would accept). Therefore, consciousness was never preceded by a state of mere unconsciousness(‘oneness’).
And in order to perpetuate their existence they[things that make up consciousness] must continue to differentiate themselves from what they are not, they must continue to reach out beyond their boundaries, towards the oneness from which they emerged.
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I cannot make out what this sentence is all about. How can consciousness ever farther differentiating itself somehow fall back into undifferentiated unconsciousness? And in what manner is this side-remark related to your theory of free-will?
 
TheWhim said:
In your theory, is it the process whereby unconsciousness is differentiated into conscious objects(that is, a specific sort of consciousness, genuine to each individual and even to each situation) under the charge of free-will? If so, according to which principles is this free-will to act if not according to the conscious principles of an individual? There’s apparently a contradiction here.
However, if the differentiation from unconsciousness to consciousness isn’t effected by a free personal(that is, conscious) agent, we’re thrown back to unconscious randomness and have abandoned free-will altogether(what neither of us would accept). Therefore, consciousness was never preceded by a state of mere unconsciousness(‘oneness’).
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At the beginning, the individual is unconscious (so he doesn’t even exist yet, actually). So the very first act of his differentiation is totally unconditioned and unconscious, influenced by no thing. But with the first act of differentiation also arises the first thing that can influence the individual and thus arises what we may call consciousness: the ability to allow things to influence us, the ability to take things into consideration when making a choice, basically the ability to choose from among things. Further differentiation can therefore build on what has been differentiated earlier, and so, even though the element of unpredictability/randomness of freedom remains, the actions of the individual can become influenced by the growing number of things that make up the structure of his consciousness, his mental, emotional and physical body. And if the individual is to survive, he actually has to consider the things in this consciousness so that he can keep them integrated, otherwise the randomness breaks his consciousness apart.
TheWhim said:
[And in order to perpetuate their existence they[things that make up consciousness] must continue to differentiate themselves from what they are not, they must continue to reach out beyond their boundaries, towards the oneness from which they emerged.]

I cannot make out what this sentence is all about. How can consciousness ever farther differentiating itself somehow fall back into undifferentiated unconsciousness? And in what manner is this side-remark related to your theory of free-will?
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I wanted to say that consciousness remains dependent on unconsciousness and therefore the hypothetical scenario of consciousness existing without unconsciousness (“non-free will”) is impossible. Consciousness must continue to differentiate itself, because when the differentiation stops, things merge back into undifferentiated oneness. They are either being differentiated or not. But, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, in order to remain differentiated from the oneness (and not fall back into it) things must keep in touch with it - so that they can differentiate themselves from it. They must maintain their physical or conceptual boundaries that enable their existence as differentiated things, and this maintenance requires oscillating between a thing and its context/environment, an openness towards (but not melting into) the oneness.
 
Now here’s some implications and suggestions:
  1. Since there’s an element of unconsciousness or unconditionality in a free choice, a free choice cannot be completely explained or derived from reasons. Although there may be reasons that support the choice, these reasons can explain the choice only partially. Free will is not determined by any reason, by any thing. If we have free will we can never know fully why we made the decision we made, or how or why we will decide in the future.
  2. Free will is our union with the first cause - God, and we can damage this union by forsaking free will and getting stuck in influences of things. It seems that this state of entrapment in influences restricts realization of our potential and fulfillment. We need to allow freedom into our life by relaxing our attachment to (mental, emotional or physical) things.
  3. We should not detach from things too much either because then we may lose valuable parts of our consciousness, which again would restrict realization of our potential and fulfillment. We need to find a balance between detachment from things and attachment. That doesn’t mean that we should experience things in some lukewarm, half-hearted manner. Sometimes it may indeed be better to quiet ourselves down and disengage from the world, but our interactions with the world can also be filled with passion that is based on a caring love that wishes the world would fulfill its potential, respects the world’s freedom and acknowledges that there is a wisdom we are not - and cannot be - conscious of.
 
Further differentiation can therefore build on what has been differentiated earlier, and so, even though the element of unpredictability/randomness of freedom remains, the actions of the individual can become influenced by the growing number of things that make up the structure of his consciousness, his mental, emotional and physical body.
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What appears to me to be troublesome in your theory is that you explicitely relate the freedom the individual still posesses despite all the exterior influences to the utter randomness of unconsciousness. This would utterly destroy free agent causation because either the agent is drawn by the statistic probability of exterior influences inciting him to act so to act so and so, or his random, out-of-control unconsciousness interposes, setting the statistic probability aside and making him act in a completely unforeseen manner - unforeseen even to himself, so to say.

I propose we should drop the unconscious and integrate freedom into consciousness. This can be done by stopping to equate consciousness with exterior influences. Rather, we should think of consciousness as of what it apparently is: the awareness both of ourselves and of the world.
Freedom is constantly assailed. Circumstances and influences buil up a statistical probability that I will act so and so but self-awareness can make me set aside those reasons and incitements and freely choose to act according to a reason or an impulse whose influence and appeal would ordinarily have been superseded by stronger ones. This, of course, isn’t probable – but it is possible. And that’s what we call free agent causation.
 
  1. Since there’s an element of unconsciousness or unconditionality in a free choice, a free choice cannot be completely explained or derived from reasons. Although there may be reasons that support the choice, these reasons can explain the choice only partially. Free will is not determined by any reason, by any thing. If we have free will we can never know fully why we made the decision we made, or how or why we will decide in the future.
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I disagree, for the reasons mentioned in the previous post. Free choice is not randomness. It can be explained. Perhaps often we’ll have a hard time explaining it. If the human person were just a biological machine we always would act according to those appeals and attractions(everything included here, also reasons) that have sufficient strength to trigger a reaction. Appeals lesser in strength always would be superseded by those greater in strength. Well, that’s the most practical way to act and the way we act most of the time, making us appear like animals, though often dreadfully clever animals(there’s no judgement involved here –often it’s a token of illness to reject the great inclinations, like an anorectic rejecting food and slowly treading the road to starvation). –
But, however, if we focus, if we strive to become more self-aware, we are able to choose among a great variety of appeals present to us(all capable of explaining in some sort or other our future action) and able even to choose those that would never have achieved sufficient strength to actuate a reaction if we were but biological machines. Thus, the anorectic may ignore the great inclination of hunger and choose the lesser appeal of getting attention by her parents and her general environment by arousing frightful worries and most tenderly care in everyone who sets an eye on her emaciated figure.
 
TheWhim said:
What appears to me to be troublesome in your theory is that you explicitely relate the freedom the individual still posesses despite all the exterior influences to the utter randomness of unconsciousness. This would utterly destroy free agent causation because either the agent is drawn by the statistic probability of exterior influences inciting him to act so to act so and so, or his random, out-of-control unconsciousness interposes, setting the statistic probability aside and making him act in a completely unforeseen manner - unforeseen even to himself, so to say.
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Why would it have to be either-or? I say that the agent acts under both deterministic influences of things and uncaused randomness of unconsciousness. Thus his actions are neither completely deterministic nor completely random. For example, there may be a great probability that when it rains heavily the agent will use the umbrella he has in his suitcase, and a low probability that he won’t. So he is quite predictable in this, although not 100%, because he can still decide not to use the umbrella even though he’s getting soaking wet.
TheWhim said:
Freedom is constantly assailed. Circumstances and influences buil up a statistical probability that I will act so and so but self-awareness can make me set aside those reasons and incitements and freely choose to act according to a reason or an impulse whose influence and appeal would ordinarily have been superseded by stronger ones. This, of course, isn’t probable – but it is possible. And that’s what we call free agent causation.
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What is this self-awareness? Is it another reason that determines that I act according to certain reasons?
 
Why would it have to be either-or? I say that the agent acts under both deterministic influences of things and uncaused randomness of unconsciousness. Thus his actions are neither completely deterministic nor completely random. For example, there may be a great probability that when it rains heavily the agent will use the umbrella he has in his suitcase, and a low probability that he won’t. So he is quite predictable in this, although not 100%, because he can still decide not to use the umbrella even though he’s getting soaking wet.
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The either-or-clause doesn’t matter here.
However, your example given is a good illustration of what I mean and where I see the utterly deterministic turn in your assessment of human action. Because either your guy acts in the common-way predictable manner taking the umbrella(acting under “deterministic influences of things”) or he, ignoring all common sense, prefers to get soaked wet just for the pleasure of it(acting under “the uncaused randomness of unconsciousness”). In either way, it’s not genuinely he who chooses because if unconsciousness is mere randomness a decision made under the influence of the unconscious is mere out-of-control random determinism.

If he should act both under the aegis of consciousness and unconsciousness, well, than all the worse for it, because he’s assailed and inextricably bound now both by old materialistic determinism(consciousness) and the new determinism of uninfluenceable randomess(unconsciousness). He’s incapable of acting on his own accord as understood by the theory of free-agent causation.
Certainly my point lies not on the either-or-clause. But it seems quite plain to me that you reject free agent causation, as explained by me. So why don’t you say so? Why don’t you set things straight on this matter instead of flirting with ambiguous terms like “the unconscious”?
What is this self-awareness? Is it another reason that determines that I act according to certain reasons?
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Oh, nevermind! I just introduced this term to make sure I convey the meaning of my ideas correctly. That is, when we act against statistic probability, we are not at the mercy of the random force of the unconscious, but truly act on our own accord by choosing a lesser likely reason as incitement for action.

The essence of your philosophy on human action, glowingmembers, is the destruction of a free agent, the destruction of the “we” or the “I”. That’s my whole contention.
 
TheWhim, I admit that the agent in my theory looks like a semi-random machine whose actions are the result of predictable influences and unpredictable randomness. An analogy that comes to mind is an engine where a blind, indiscriminate outburst of energy (unconsciousness) is channeled through the structure of the engine (consciousness), which results in a relatively predictable action, an oriented flow of energy that can be used to the fulfillment of a particular aim.

The difference between my concept of an agent and yours seems to be that your agent acts only under the influence of things (reasons), while my agent acts under the influence of things (reasons) and also contains an element of randomness. Yours is a non-random, fully predictable machine and mine is a semi-random, partially predictable machine.

You may object that your agent doesn’t act just like a machine because he may choose “weaker” impulses over “stronger” ones, but this choosing is fully determined by some other impulse(s).
 
You may object that your agent doesn’t act just like a machine because he may choose “weaker” impulses over “stronger” ones, but this choosing is fully determined by some other impulse(s).
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I think we’ve greatly succeeded in clarifying our respective positions. - However, free agent causation implies that the choosing of weaker impulses is not in itself controlled by impulses but is a free decision of the individual. - If we have to engage in such an attempted regress ad infinitum of impulses(and I don’t see at all why we should be compelled to do so), it must be remarked that such an attempt stops short at the very moment when a weaker impuls is chosen - in other words, the attempt stops short right at the beginning. The decision, you say, has been determined by weaker impulses. But the core fact that the decision initially has been taken against stronger impulses proves that is is not determined by impulses at all though it undoubtedly will be explainable by such weaker impulses. If it would have been determined by impulses the stronger impuls would inevitably have succeeded in claiming its priority over the weaker one.
 
TheWhim said:
I think we’ve greatly succeeded in clarifying our respective positions.
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I have also clarified my own idea somewhat to myself 🙂
TheWhim said:
  • However, free agent causation implies that the choosing of weaker impulses is not in itself controlled by impulses but is a free decision of the individual.
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Well, and I imagine that the individual consists of consciousness and unconsciusness, so the individual’s choice is controlled by consciousness (things) and unconsciousness (the unconditioned, random nothingness - first cause - which is the source of things). Or could there be something more that an individual consists of?

I thought that a free will choice was one that was not influenced by anything (or could be made despite all things) and at the same time was influenced by a reason, which now seems like a contradiction that I don’t know how to resolve.
TheWhim said:
The decision, you say, has been determined by weaker impulses. But the core fact that the decision initially has been taken against stronger impulses proves that is is not determined by impulses at all though it undoubtedly will be explainable by such weaker impulses. If it would have been determined by impulses the stronger impuls would inevitably have succeeded in claiming its priority over the weaker one.
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What I meant to say was not that the decision was determined by the weaker impulse but rather that behind the weaker and the stronger impulse there is another impulse which happens to be in line with the weaker impulse, and the combination of this third impulse and the weaker impulse is stronger than the “stronger” impulse.
So, when you choose to resist a strong temptation and abstain, it’s because you are driven by a thing whose influence on you is even greater than the temptation, for example a strong moral belief, fear, love or health awareness.
 
glowingembers said:
Well, and I imagine that the individual consists of consciousness and unconsciusness, so the individual’s choice is controlled by consciousness (things) and unconsciousness (the unconditioned, random nothingness - first cause - which is the source of things).
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:ehh:
Unconsciousness is a privation of consciousness.
 
I thought that a free will choice was one that was not influenced by anything (or could be made despite all things) and at the same time was influenced by a reason, which now seems like a contradiction that I don’t know how to resolve.
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Since we are not irrational, there’re always influences(that is, reasons) that make our actions explainable. This I meant when saying that even though our decisions appear to be uninfluenced, they are influenced at least so far that they are made explainable by an impuls(that is, reason), even though it may be a very weak one, according to which we choose to act - influenced, not determined. - Well, either one agrees with this concept or one rejects it but I’ve come to believe that you concur it’s sound, anyway.
What I meant to say was not that the decision was determined by the weaker impulse but rather that behind the weaker and the stronger impulse there is another impulse which happens to be in line with the weaker impulse, and the combination of this third impulse and the weaker impulse is stronger than the “stronger” impulse.
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Well, but this is not free-agent causation(as you, of course, are well aware of). I happen to understand that you cannot disentangle consciousness and determinism. I disagree, as explained. - Apparently we both think that our respective views are sound, though we won’t agree. I think there’s no farther we can get and we should leave it at that. We’re just thinking differently where everything appears quite open to doubt. - It has been worthwhile clarifying our positions, though.
 
TheWhim said:
Since we are not irrational, there’re always influences(that is, reasons) that make our actions explainable. This I meant when saying that even though our decisions appear to be uninfluenced, they are influenced at least so far that they are made explainable by an impuls(that is, reason), even though it may be a very weak one, according to which we choose to act - influenced, not determined. - Well, either one agrees with this concept or one rejects it but I’ve come to believe that you concur it’s sound, anyway.

Well, but this is not free-agent causation(as you, of course, are well aware of). I happen to understand that you cannot disentangle consciousness and determinism. I disagree, as explained. - Apparently we both think that our respective views are sound, though we won’t agree. I think there’s no farther we can get and we should leave it at that. We’re just thinking differently where everything appears quite open to doubt. - It has been worthwhile clarifying our positions, though.
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But I am intrigued by the idea of free agent causation though I don’t know how it could work beyond what I described. You say that a free will choice is always influenced by a reason but you also introduce an element of unpredictability into the decision making, thus combining consciousness with indeterminism. With that element of unpredictability it appears to be similar to my concept of a semi-random machine: we are influenced by reasons but are also subject to randomness, spontaneity (I say that the unpredictability is due to the presence of unconsciousness and you say that the unpredictability is embedded in indeterministic influences of things, which may be the same after all.)

What implications does it have for individual responsibility? Can we be responsible for the reasons that influence us or for the element of unpredictablity?
 
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