Free will - what is it?

[R_Daneel]

So many threads spent on questions regarding “free will”, but never has it been rigorously defined. This thread attempts to do that. I am going to present a tentative description, on which we might or might not agree. To have free will, the following conditions must be met:

1. The agent needs at least two possible courses of action.
2. The agent must be aware of these courses.
3. The agent must be (physically) able to carry out either course.
4. The agent has the locus of decision.
5. There is no external entity with would force the agent to select one and only one of these courses.

If all these criteria are met, we say that the agent has free will to carry out either possible course of action.

So far, I expect we can have an agreement. However, there is one more problem, which is never mentioned. The agent has an internal value system, which cannot be disregarded.

Suppose the agent is confronted by a dilemma: “in the grocery store the cashier made a mistake, and offers more money in exchange than she should. The agent is aware of this fact.” The agent has two courses of action, to accept the extra money and walk away, or give the extra money back. Suppose, his internal value system compels him to be honest and give back the money he is not entitled to. He follows his inclination.

The question is: did he exercise his free will, or was he compelled by his upbringing to behave as he did? Was he free to pocket the money? Intuitively we feel that he could have “cheated”, but he chose not to - in other words, he exercised his free will. But is this intuitive feeling correct? How strong is his upbringing? Was he really free to stay quiet and take the money? Are we ever “free” from our value system? Of course not. Our internal value system is what decides how we shall behave in any given situation. Does it “force” us to behave in a certain manner, or does it merely “compel” us? And how do we differentiate between the two?

Suppose that a soldier throws himself onto a grenade which landed among his peers. He did that because the training he received was highly successful, he valued the life of his comrades more than his own life. Is that an act of free will, or the result of the training?

 

[James_S_Saint]

So many threads spent on questions regarding “free will”, but never has it been rigorously defined. This thread attempts to do that. I am going to present a tentative description, on which we might or might not agree. To have free will, the following conditions must be met:

1. The agent needs at least two possible courses of action.
2. The agent must be aware of these courses.
3. The agent must be (physically) able to carry out either course.
4. The agent has the locus of decision.
5. There is no external entity with would force the agent to select one and only one of these courses.

If all these criteria are met, we say that the agent has free will to carry out either possible course of action.

So far, I expect we can have an agreement.

Emm… no. What you described is “Voluntarism”.

The issue of the definition is whether the term “Free-will” refers to an “Uncaused-Will” or a “Caused-Will”.

Free-Will really only means that one is free to exercise his will. It has nothing to do with what caused him to have that will. This is the view referred to as “Compatibilism”.

ALL things are caused (“Determinism”). Freedom of choice (Free-Will) merely means that the will to take an action is not critically impeded.

And no. You are never free from your personal value system (by definition).

 

[NowAgnostic]

So many threads spent on questions regarding “free will”, but never has it been rigorously defined. This thread attempts to do that. I am going to present a tentative description, on which we might or might not agree. To have free will, the following conditions must be met:

1. The agent needs at least two possible courses of action.
2. The agent must be aware of these courses.
3. The agent must be (physically) able to carry out either course.
4. The agent has the locus of decision.
5. There is no external entity with would force the agent to select one and only one of these courses.

If all these criteria are met, we say that the agent has free will to carry out either possible course of action.

So far, I expect we can have an agreement.

Philosophers aren’t going to agree on even this much. In fact, believe it or not, there’s a problem with at least 4 of your criteria. (There’s a reason “free will” isn’t rigorously defined.)

1. What kind of possibility is being referred to? Logical possibility, metaphysical possibility, physical possibility, epistemic possibility? Even if one restricts it to logical possibility there is a problem right away for a theist; this denies God free will, for it is logically impossible for God to perform evil.
2. If someone right in front me has a heart attack and I need to perform CPR to save his life, the possibility of not doing so might not enter my mind. My mind is going to be completely preoccupied with what I need to do to save him. Yet most would say nevertheless I freely chose to save his life.
3. But God and angels are supposed to have free will, yet they are incorporeal and not all their choices are physical in nature.
4. is perhaps OK if all that is meant by it is that a decision is made by the agent, but again perhaps there is an issue here if there is only one possible choice, or only one choice which presents itself to the mind.
5. depends on what “force” means. A related question, of course debated ad nauseam between libertarians and compatibilists, is whether if one’s choice is predetermined by other factors it can still be an act of free will. Libertarians, I suspect, might agree that a choice wouldn’t be free if it were “forced” but the term is rather nebulous.

However, there is one more problem, which is never mentioned. The agent has an internal value system, which cannot be disregarded.

Exactly, and compatibilists say this is exactly what free will is: being free to act in accordance with one’s internal value system. Of course, for libertarians, if one’s value system is so strong as to predetermine one’s choice, then for them the act isn’t free.

But this only sets the question back a step: is one’s internal value system predetermined, or is that a result of a free choice as well?

 

[FightingFat]

Do you understand the concept of freedom for excellence?

 

[James_S_Saint]

Exactly, and compatibilists say this is exactly what free will is: being free to act in accordance with one’s internal value system. Of course, for libertarians, if one’s value system is so strong as to predetermine one’s choice, then for them the act isn’t free.

Although I agree with the rest of what you said, in that one part, you “equivocated” “free to act” with “free from internal cause”.

The issue is ENTIRELY one of defining the intended use of the word “free” when talking about “Free-will”.

Do you mean “uncaused-will” or do you mean “unimpeded-will”?

 

[R_Daneel]

Philosophers aren’t going to agree on even this much. In fact, believe it or not, there’s a problem with at least 4 of your criteria. (There’s a reason “free will” isn’t rigorously defined.)

Isn’t it ironic that people spend a lot of time on arguing about undefined subjects? How can they hope to have a fruitful conversation?

1. What kind of possibility is being referred to? Logical possibility, metaphysical possibility, physical possibility, epistemic possibility? Even if one restricts it to logical possibility there is a problem right away for a theist; this denies God free will, for it is logically impossible for God to perform evil.

Indeed so. But I am mostly interested in actual beings, not mythological ones. We can hypothesize other beings, and talk about them, too, as long as those beings carry some kind of relevance. That might include “robots”. (Besides, only the Catholic concept says that God is unable to commit evil, Protestants assert that God could commit evil, but chooses not to. Precisely for this reason I am not particularly interested in discussing these “beings”.) Also, I am talking about physically be able to carry out the decision. A long time ago I talked to someone on these boards and asked why does God always take the side of the strong one (example was the rapist vs. victim of a rape) and allow the free will of the strong one dominate the free will of the victim. His answer was that the free will of the victim (not to be raped) is not in jeopardy, just because she is unable to act on her “will”. Needless to say, I found this line of argument unacceptable. If one has a “desire” or “will” and is unable to carry it out, it is meaningless to talk about her “free will”. Free will cannot be separated from free action.

1. If someone right in front me has a heart attack and I need to perform CPR to save his life, the possibility of not doing so might not enter my mind. My mind is going to be completely preoccupied with what I need to do to save him. Yet most would say nevertheless I freely chose to save his life.

To be more precise, the deliberation process never entered into the **conscious part **of your mind. However, most of the processes happen in the subconscious, and this can even be verified in an experimental manner. So we cannot exclude this point.

1. But God and angels are supposed to have free will, yet they are incorporeal and not all their choices are physical in nature.

Let’s talk about actual beings before we contemplate mythological ones. The questions like: “how many angels can stand on the point of a needle” are void of meaning and relevance.

1. is perhaps OK if all that is meant by it is that a decision is made by the agent, but again perhaps there is an issue here if there is only one possible choice, or only one choice which presents itself to the mind.

The problem of the subconscious is important here, too.

1. depends on what “force” means. A related question, of course debated ad nauseam between libertarians and compatibilists, is whether if one’s choice is predetermined by other factors it can still be an act of free will. Libertarians, I suspect, might agree that a choice wouldn’t be free if it were “forced” but the term is rather nebulous.

Indeed, this is the most important point. How strong is the “force” there? Le’s take a hypothetical scenario: someone finds a purse with a lot of money and a name+address in it. He is not pressed for time, and the address is easy to find. He can decide to keep it, or look up the person and return it. There is ample time for deliberation - unlike the CPR case. Suppose his personality (inherited and also formed by his upbringing) “nudges” him to return the money. Does he exhibit “free will” if he actually returns the money? Or does he only exhibit free will if he acts agaist his better judgment, and keeps it? This would lead to some very strange results; should we say that a good person can only exhibit free will if acting in an evil manner, or a bad person can only “prove” his free will, if he acts in a moral manner? That would not make a lot of sense, would it?

Exactly, and compatibilists say this is exactly what free will is: being free to act in accordance with one’s internal value system. Of course, for libertarians, if one’s value system is so strong as to predetermine one’s choice, then for them the act isn’t free.

The trouble is that our value system is not monolithic, it is composed of many - mutually contradictory - concepts and needs. For example, on one hand we have the biological urge to survive and propagate our genes, on the other hand we have a social system which puts “brakes” on these natural urges and desires. The balance of these contradictory urges is exhibited in free choices - based upon the 5 criteria I enumerated in the OP.

But this only sets the question back a step: is one’s internal value system predetermined, or is that a result of a free choice as well?

The internal value system is given. It cannot be part of a deliberation process. Otherwise, we would arrive at an infinite regress. I don’t like the term: “predetermined”, I would prefer the phrase: “given”. It is the result of a semi-random process, which is partially based upon the inherited characteristics, and also heavily influenced by the upbringing.

 

[R_Daneel]

A remark. It is fine and dandy to present criticisms in regards of OP. It would be appreciated if along with the criticisms some constructive ideas would be presented. Just what do you consider the proper definition of free will?

 

[James_S_Saint]

Isn’t it ironic that people spend a lot of time on arguing about undefined subjects? How can they hope to have a fruitful conversation?

That isn’t by accident. It is a part of a methodology. “Agree TO disagree”. A method to create division, conflict; to create energy and the heat to steam the waters, to drive the locomotive. Man has the understanding of far more efficient motors like the electric motor so as to get far more momentum from far less suffering. Harmony produces many, many more times the useful energy and it requires so much less to keep it going (it runs on Freed Will with the right bread and wine). He just hasn’t the wisdom to use it.

 

[grannymh]

Free will is the spiritual power or faculty of the soul to choose or not to choose an action. Free will make humans responsible for their actions to the extent that they are voluntary.

Christmas Blessings,
granny

The shepherds sing; and shall I silent be?
“Christmas” by George Herbert

 

[grannymh]

A remark. It is fine and dandy to present criticisms in regards of OP. It would be appreciated if along with the criticisms some constructive ideas would be presented. Just what do you consider the proper definition of free will?

Free will is the spiritual power, faculty, or ability of the soul by which a human is able to choose or not to choose an action. Free will make humans responsible for their actions to the extent that they are voluntary.

Christmas Blessings,
granny

The shepherds sing; and shall I silent be?
from the poem “Christmas” by George Herbert

 

[R_Daneel]

Free will is the spiritual power, faculty, or ability of the soul by which a human is able to choose or not to choose an action.

Apart from the “spiritual” and “soul” kind of mumbo-jumbo I agree with you to a certain extent. To choose or not to choose represents the PaP (principle of alternate possibilities) and the LoCC (locus of causal control) - so your definition is essentially the same as the one spelled out in greater detail in the OP. Though the scope of selection does not have to be just a “to-do-or-not-to-do” type of scenario. Also the lack of irresistable force is a requirement. If a gun is held to your loved one’s head, and you have good reason to believe that the gun will be used if you dare to resist the demand of the gunman, your action will not be considered “free”, even if you could resist - theoretically.

Free will make humans responsible for their actions to the extent that they are voluntary.

Ah, but that is one possible course of analysis, which may prove to be interesting to explore. Is a child responsible for wielding a dangerous weapon, which was left by the parent? Can the parent use the defense: “but I told him to leave that loaded gun alone!”?

 

[Bob_Crowley]

So many threads spent on questions regarding “free will”, but never has it been rigorously defined. This thread attempts to do that. I am going to present a tentative description, on which we might or might not agree. To have free will, the following conditions must be met:

1. The agent needs at least two possible courses of action.
2. The agent must be aware of these courses.
3. The agent must be (physically) able to carry out either course.
4. The agent has the locus of decision.
5. There is no external entity with would force the agent to select one and only one of these courses.

If all these criteria are met, we say that the agent has free will to carry out either possible course of action.

So far, I expect we can have an agreement. However, there is one more problem, which is never mentioned. The agent has an internal value system, which cannot be disregarded.

Suppose the agent is confronted by a dilemma: “in the grocery store the cashier made a mistake, and offers more money in exchange than she should. The agent is aware of this fact.” The agent has two courses of action, to accept the extra money and walk away, or give the extra money back. Suppose, his internal value system compels him to be honest and give back the money he is not entitled to. He follows his inclination.

The question is: did he exercise his free will, or was he compelled by his upbringing to behave as he did? Was he free to pocket the money? Intuitively we feel that he could have “cheated”, but he chose not to - in other words, he exercised his free will. But is this intuitive feeling correct? How strong is his upbringing? Was he really free to stay quiet and take the money? Are we ever “free” from our value system? Of course not. Our internal value system is what decides how we shall behave in any given situation. Does it “force” us to behave in a certain manner, or does it merely “compel” us? And how do we differentiate between the two?

Suppose that a soldier throws himself onto a grenade which landed among his peers. He did that because the training he received was highly successful, he valued the life of his comrades more than his own life. Is that an act of free will, or the result of the training?

 

[Bob_Crowley]

So many threads spent on questions regarding “free will”, but never has it been rigorously defined. This thread attempts to do that. I am going to present a tentative description, on which we might or might not agree. To have free will, the following conditions must be met:

1. The agent needs at least two possible courses of action.
2. The agent must be aware of these courses.
3. The agent must be (physically) able to carry out either course.
4. The agent has the locus of decision.
5. There is no external entity with would force the agent to select one and only one of these courses.

If all these criteria are met, we say that the agent has free will to carry out either possible course of action.

So far, I expect we can have an agreement. However, there is one more problem, which is never mentioned. The agent has an internal value system, which cannot be disregarded.

Suppose the agent is confronted by a dilemma: “in the grocery store the cashier made a mistake, and offers more money in exchange than she should. The agent is aware of this fact.” The agent has two courses of action, to accept the extra money and walk away, or give the extra money back. Suppose, his internal value system compels him to be honest and give back the money he is not entitled to. He follows his inclination.

The question is: did he exercise his free will, or was he compelled by his upbringing to behave as he did? Was he free to pocket the money? Intuitively we feel that he could have “cheated”, but he chose not to - in other words, he exercised his free will. But is this intuitive feeling correct? How strong is his upbringing? Was he really free to stay quiet and take the money? Are we ever “free” from our value system? Of course not. Our internal value system is what decides how we shall behave in any given situation. Does it “force” us to behave in a certain manner, or does it merely “compel” us? And how do we differentiate between the two?

Suppose that a soldier throws himself onto a grenade which landed among his peers. He did that because the training he received was highly successful, he valued the life of his comrades more than his own life. Is that an act of free will, or the result of the training?

The argument about “free will” is inconsequential unless there are repercussions which come from applying that free will.

For example, take the episode of the soldier throwing himself on the grenade. The end result is that he dies and his comrades live a bit longer (they’ll all die eventually). If he hadn’t thrown himself on the grenade, they would have all died or been seriously injured right there and then. He might have escaped perhaps, but he’d have died eventually.

However if that is the end of the story, then so what?

If however his decision is judged, and that judgment has consequences, then the issue becomes of some importance. In his case his value system would have conflicted with his inbuilt desire or reflex to save his own life, which is a very strong impulse.

If there is no judgment, then who cares whether his choice was voluntary or a conditioned reflex? But if his decision has eternal consequences for himself (and by extension, his comrades), then it becomes important.

I suspect for exampe, when the suicide bombers face up to their judgment, one of the first quesions will be “Who gave you the authority to murder all those other people?” On the other hand, heads of state who rush into wars for the wrong reason will be asked similar equally pointed questions.

This will be despite the value system they’ve been indoctrinated with - Jihad fanaticism on the one hand, and political jingoism on the other.

 

[R_Daneel]

The argument about “free will” is inconsequential unless there are repercussions which come from applying that free will.

For example, take the episode of the soldier throwing himself on the grenade. The end result is that he dies and his comrades live a bit longer (they’ll all die eventually). If he hadn’t thrown himself on the grenade, they would have all died or been seriously injured right there and then. He might have escaped perhaps, but he’d have died eventually.

However if that is the end of the story, then so what?

I see it differently. If that is the end of the story, then it is of utmost importance, how he behaves. If any decision made here is only important because of some presumed consequences “afterwards”, and not because of the consequences here and now, then what is the whole point of this existence - in and by itself? None whatsoever. Isn’t that a kind of nihilsim?

 

[grannymh]

Apart from the “spiritual” and “soul” kind of mumbo-jumbo I agree with you to a certain extent. To choose or not to choose represents the PaP (principle of alternate possibilities) and the LoCC (locus of causal control) - so your definition is essentially the same as the one spelled out in greater detail in the OP. Though the scope of selection does not have to be just a “to-do-or-not-to-do” type of scenario. Also the lack of irresistable force is a requirement. If a gun is held to your loved one’s head, and you have good reason to believe that the gun will be used if you dare to resist the demand of the gunman, your action will not be considered “free”, even if you could resist - theoretically.

Ah, but that is one possible course of analysis, which may prove to be interesting to explore. Is a child responsible for wielding a dangerous weapon, which was left by the parent? Can the parent use the defense: “but I told him to leave that loaded gun alone!”?

Let’s explore the idea that in order for a human being to be free enough to choose, there also has to be the power of the intellect. In other words, we think of fully developed humans as having the intellectual tools of reason, self reflection, logical evaluation, and analytical thought.

I am probably not saying this correctly–and I am sure someone down the thread will do a better job. Nonetheless, free will is only half the equation pertaining to actions. Intellect is the other half. But, and this is an important but, intellect and free will are not some separate items floating around. Their powers are part of the corporeal package which is our make-up. In other words, our material body expresses these powers in space and time.

From conception on, we are developing as a unified living being. We are constantly taking in knowledge. This knowledge may be limited by our material body. We may be blind or missing taste buds. Our brains are limited not only physically but by the availability of knowledge. As the body of a child develops so does the use of intellect and will. Thinking and choosing need to be practiced.

A child may want to hold the gun because it looks like a fun toy. A child may choose to do something other than what the parent is saying because two year olds typically test boundaries. But can the child reason out the danger? Does the child understand the consequences of the choice?

I agree that there have been lots of threads spent on questions regarding “free will”. It does need to be rigorously defined.

As for your 5 points in the OP, I would throw out 3. immediately, because in my opinion, it does not belong in the definition. The other points are actually conditions which is why it is so difficult to rigorously define free will. It is far easier to discuss all the hows rather than to determine the simple what.

My answer to your question in post 10 is an example of the how. On the other hand, it, along with your other points, could be reworked into the what.

Christmas Blessings,
granny

The shepherds sing; and shall I silent be?
from the poem “Christmas” by George Herbert

 

[R_Daneel]

Let’s explore the idea that in order for a human being to be free enough to choose, there also has to be the power of the intellect. In other words, we think of fully developed humans as having the intellectual tools of reason, self reflection, logical evaluation, and analytical thought.

I am probably not saying this correctly–and I am sure someone down the thread will do a better job. Nonetheless, free will is only half the equation pertaining to actions. Intellect is the other half. But, and this is an important but, intellect and free will are not some separate items floating around. Their powers are part of the corporeal package which is our make-up. In other words, our material body expresses these powers in space and time.

From conception on, we are developing as a unified living being. We are constantly taking in knowledge. This knowledge may be limited by our material body. We may be blind or missing taste buds. Our brains are limited not only physically but by the availability of knowledge. As the body of a child develops so does the use of intellect and will. Thinking and choosing need to be practiced.

A child may want to hold the gun because it looks like a fun toy. A child may choose to do something other than what the parent is saying because two year olds typically test boundaries. But can the child reason out the danger? Does the child understand the consequences of the choice?

Good points. But unfortunately even underdeveloped humans do have the freedom of acting out some of their desires (not all of them) and that is a very dangerous thing. Indeed, understanding the ramifications of one’s actions is vastly preferable, but the lack of understanding is no impediment to act in a free manner. As a matter of fact, I think that having “free will” is a horrible idea - from a constructor’s point of view. But we can talk about it later, when the free will is defined.

I agree that there have been lots of threads spent on questions regarding “free will”. It does need to be rigorously defined.

Right on the money!

As for your 5 points in the OP, I would throw out 3. immediately, because in my opinion, it does not belong in the definition.

I don’t think you thought this one through. A “will” or “wish” or “desire” to do something is really irrelevant if one is unable to carry it out. A long time ago I had a conversation with someone on this board, and I presented the question (with the intent of whipping up some controversy): “why does God respect (or allow) the free will of a rapist conquer the free will of the visctim? Why is the free will of the strong one more important than the free will of the weak one?”. The answer left me almost (but quite ) speachless. He said that the “free will” of the raped one is not restricted; she is free to “will” not to be raped. Her inability to prevent this act is not important. You say something similar. Are you sure?

A “will” without the ability to act on it is really irrelevant.

 

[onenow1]

The ability to think or consider options to rise above mere instinct

Peace and God Bless
onenow1

 

[Bob_Crowley]

I see it differently. If that is the end of the story, then it is of utmost importance, how he behaves. If any decision made here is only important because of some presumed consequences “afterwards”, and not because of the consequences here and now, then what is the whole point of this existence - in and by itself? None whatsoever. Isn’t that a kind of nihilsim?

It depends on whether you believe in an after-life to begin with. If there is no after-life, then all decisions are equally inconsequential, since the final result is a dead-end so to speak.

However I believe in an after-life. In fact I’m sure of it. And I believe there’s a judgment that goes with it.

So I believe our choices, particularly our ethical choices, have a consequence, for us individually, and for society collectively.

Regardless of our conditioning.

 

[R_Daneel]

It depends on whether you believe in an after-life to begin with. If there is no after-life, then all decisions are equally inconsequential, since the final result is a dead-end so to speak.

However I believe in an after-life. In fact I’m sure of it. And I believe there’s a judgment that goes with it.

So I believe our choices, particularly our ethical choices, have a consequence, for us individually, and for society collectively.

Regardless of our conditioning.

But that is illogical. You could equally assert that all the decisions made up until the age of 20 (for example) are totally irrelevant in and by themselves and they only get relevant because we continue our life beyond that point. To select the point of death is arbitrary. Maybe you think that it is the act of judgment which lends importance to the decisions? But there is a continuous act of judgment happening here and now. It is performed by our peers, family, friends and society.

Furthermore, if this life is all we have, than it is very important how we spend it. It is better to leave a legacy of good nature, rather than a legacy of horror - even if we are not around to enjoy it.

It is interesting that you mentioned “society”. Society only exists here and now. Our choices affect the society, obviously - which has nothing to do with out supposed continued existence. So your stance is logically inconsistent.

 

[Bob_Crowley]

But that is illogical. You could equally assert that all the decisions made up until the age of 20 (for example) are totally irrelevant in and by themselves and they only get relevant because we continue our life beyond that point. To select the point of death is arbitrary. Maybe you think that it is the act of judgment which lends importance to the decisions? But there is a continuous act of judgment happening here and now. It is performed by our peers, family, friends and society.

Furthermore, if this life is all we have, than it is very important how we spend it. It is better to leave a legacy of good nature, rather than a legacy of horror - even if we are not around to enjoy it.

It is interesting that you mentioned “society”. Society only exists here and now. Our choices affect the society, obviously - which has nothing to do with out supposed continued existence. So your stance is logically inconsistent.

It is the *argument *about whether the definition of free will which is inconsequential, if there is no ultimate judgment. In the final analysis, as the universe suffers its final heat death, or collapses, what difference is it going to make as to what the definition of free will is?

You argue that choices have consequences. Correct. Both now (on an individual and social level), and I believe eternally (on an individual basis). But if there is no after-life, what difference is the mere definition of “free will” going to make?