Gadamer's work Truth and Method

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Has any here read Hans Georg-Gadamer’s Truth and Method?

Nothing is perfect but, by and large, it is an absolutely remarkable work—many great insights.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

many great insights.

Such as?

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Such as?

Where to start . . .

(1) A text is actualized in being read as a play is actualized in being performed and a musical score in being played.

(2) When a text is read and understood it is pure mind speaking to us as if in the present and what is presented in a text achieves full/total presence—regardless if the origin is remote.

(3) Human understanding takes place in the medium of language. We understand something because someone explained it to us (in language) or when we can explain it in our own words (again in language).

(4) All understanding of language involves interpretation, but interpreation is usually not noticed until understanding the language/text is problematic. Then interpretation becomes more conscious and is used methodically.

(5) “Language is so uncannily near our thinking, and when it functions it is so little an object, that it seems to conceal its own being from us.” (378) The Greek word logos means both language and thought. “Thus the hermeneutical phenomenon proves to be a special case of the general relationship between thinking and speaking, whose enigmatic intimacy conceals the role of language in thought.” (389)

(6) Hermeneutics is involved in all human understanding. And hermeneutics can study the role of language in human thought.

(7) The traditional three moments of the hermeneutic process (especially re Scripture) are interpretation, understanding, and application. But application isn’t just last. Something like it is involved in all hermeneutics: a text is meangless if we see no relation to our life and to understand it is to connect it to what we know.

(8) “Hermeneutical experience is concerned with tradition. This is what is to be experienced. But tradition is not simply a process that experience teaches us to know and govern; it is language—i.e., it expresses itself like a Thou. A Thou is not an object; it relates itself to us.” (358)

(9) “Hermeneutics must start from the position that a person seeking to understand something has a bond to the subject matter that comes into language through the traditionary text and has, or acquires, a connection with the tradition from which the text speaks.” (295)

(10) “History does not belong to us; we belong to it.” (276)

(11) Tradition – implications for hermeneutics
as historical beings we are always situated within a tradition. (282)
“. . . understanding in the human sciences shares one fundamental condition with the life of tradition: it lets itself be addressed by tradition.” (282) So, “we have to recognize the element of tradition in historical research and enquire into its hermeneutic productivity.” (283) We let ourselves be addressed by tradition. (282) “one of the conditions of understanding in the human sciences is belonging to tradition.” (328) “belonging to a tradition is a condition of hermeneutics.” (291)

Great Quote:
The mode of being of a text has something unique and incomparable about it. It presents a specific problem of translation to the understanding. Nothing is so strange, and at the same time so demanding, as the written word. The written word and what partakes of it–literature–is the intelligibility of mind transferred to the most alien medium. Nothing is so purely the trace of the mind as writing, but nothing is so dependent on the understanding mind either. In deciphering and interpreting it, a miracle takes place: the transformation of something alien and dead into total contemporaneity and familiarity. This is like nothing else that comes down to us from the past. Then remnants of past life–what is left of buildings, tools, the contents of graves–are weather-beaten by the storms of time that have swept over them, whereas a written tradition, once deciphered and read, is to such an extent pure mind that it speaks to us as if in the present. That is why the capacity to read, to understand what is written, is like a secret art, even a magic that frees and binds us. In it time and space seem to be superseded. People who can read what has been handed down in writing produce and achieve the sheer presence of the past. (163)

There’s much more. Great application to scripture and tradition in biblical hermeneutics.

 

[levinas12]

Has any here read Hans Georg-Gadamer’s Truth and Method?

Nothing is perfect but, by and large, it is an absolutely remarkable work—many great insights.

For Gadamer, along with Heidegger, the meaning of a text can change even if the “signifiers” don’t change. For example, Homer’s Illiad has a different meaning for us today because we don’t believe in the Homeric gods anymore … but Homer’s text hasn’t change, the Greek is the “same”.

That’s why interpretation becomes problematic. It will vary with the historical horizon of the one who is doing the interpretation.

Is this relativism? Heidegger says no - because the horizon is not a cultural product made by humans - rather, the horizon comes from outside humanity, from a non-human “place”, from Seyn or Sein crossed out, which “sends” the horizon to us. It’s not clear why this happens.

Sounds like God but Heidegger insists that it isn’t … at least, not God understood ontically as an entity, as a being.

Can one be a Heideggerian and a Catholic?

Not sure. At least, not without some modifications.

God has to be a Person Who cares about us.

But, again, Christians have made accommodations for other philosophers who did not subscribe to a God who created us out of love and continues to preserve us, e.g., Aristotle.

But the real difficulty with Gadamer/Heidegger is whether the meaning of Being can change from the “outside”. This position diverges from the traditional understanding of metaphysics.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I certainly share your metaphysical and epistemological concerns about existential phenomenology =EP]. And as I said nothing is perfect and there are some real problems of each in it. It’s important to remember that much of EP’s apparent lack of objectivity results from a reaction to the supposed objectivity of scientism in the early 20th c. Science alone gave us the really real objective world: the really real table is the one with more space (between the atoms) than matter, not the one in this order of magnitude that you perceive.

Gadamer is not as relativistic as you may think. Some texts. What do you think?

“the interpretative activity considers itself wholly bound by the meaning of the text. Neither the jurist nor the theologian regards the work of application as making free with the text.” (332)

“Because the important thing is communicating the the text’s true meaning, interpreting is always subject to the norm of the subject matter.” (394)

“Coming to an understand . . . is always coming to an understanding about something. Understanding each other is always understanding each other with respect to something. From language we learn that the subject matter is not merely an arbitrary object of discussion, independent of the process of mutual understanding, but rather is the path and goal of mutual understanding itself.” (180)

“When we try to examine the hermeneutical phenomena through the model of conversation between two persons, the chief thing that these apparently so different situations–understanding a text and reaching an understanding in a conversation–have in common is that they both are concerned with a subject matter that is placed before them. Just as each interlocuter is trying to reach agreement on some subject with his partner, so also the interpreter is trying to understand what the text is saying. . . . This understanding of the subject matter must take the form of language. . . . in a succesful conversation they both come under the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community.” (378-9)

“Thus the hermeneutic problem concerns . . . coming to a proper understanding about the subject matter, which takes place in the medium of language.” (385)

So “the prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at his free disposal. He cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding from the prejudices that hinder it and lead to misunderstandings. Rather this separation must take place in the process of understanding itself, hence hermeneutics must ask how that happens.” (295-6)

One intends to understand the text itself. But this means that the interpreter’s own thoughts too have gone into re-awakening the text’s meaning. In this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or inforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says.” (388)

No one can doubt that the world can exist without man and perhaps will do so. . . . In every worldview the existence of the world-in-itself is intended.” (447)

RE concept formation “. . . the general concept meant by the word is enriched by any given perception of a thing, so that what emerges is a new, more specific word formation which does more justice to the particularity of that act of perception. (429)

 

[levinas12]

" …In this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or inforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says.” (388)

I hoped I haven’t lost you … apologize for the delay in responding …

Thank you for your list of quotes … I’ve included one from your list to establish a context for our conversation (in the spirit of Gadamer) …

G says that the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive … but not as a personal standpoint … this is what we need to explore … to use a Heideggerian example, the Greek temple discloses a historical world to us … this world is not our world … but the meaning of the Greek world (for us) is only understood from within the horizon of our world …

… granted: our own horizon is not ‘personal’ in the sense of arbitary individualistic whim, but is shared with others …

Gadamer is very clear that we cannot reactivate the ‘authorial’ meaning … our understanding of the Greek world, and of the Greek temple, is different from that of a 5th century Athenian …

so what is meant by the normative meaning of the text, of the artwork? What ‘space’ does it inhabit?

I guess what I’m asking about is Gadamer’s notion of a fusion of horizons (the Greek world and our contemporary world). On the one hand, according to G, we cannot break free of certain ‘prejudices’ (i.e, our world, our horizon) … but then G talks about fusion … so where or what is our freedom here (from relativism) … Heidegger says that we are stuck in our facticity (at least in one sense) … yet G seems to suggest that there is a way out …

please clarify

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I hoped I haven’t lost you … apologize for the delay in responding …

Thank you for your list of quotes … I’ve included one from your list to establish a context for our conversation (in the spirit of Gadamer) …

G says that the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive … but not as a personal standpoint … this is what we need to explore … to use a Heideggerian example, the Greek temple discloses a historical world to us … this world is not our world … but the meaning of the Greek world (for us) is only understood from within the horizon of our world …

… granted: our own horizon is not ‘personal’ in the sense of arbitary individualistic whim, but is shared with others …

Gadamer is very clear that we cannot reactivate the ‘authorial’ meaning … our understanding of the Greek world, and of the Greek temple, is different from that of a 5th century Athenian …

so what is meant by the normative meaning of the text, of the artwork? What ‘space’ does it inhabit?

I guess what I’m asking about is Gadamer’s notion of a fusion of horizons (the Greek world and our contemporary world). On the one hand, according to G, we cannot break free of certain ‘prejudices’ (i.e, our world, our horizon) … but then G talks about fusion … so where or what is our freedom here (from relativism) … Heidegger says that we are stuck in our facticity (at least in one sense) … yet G seems to suggest that there is a way out …

please clarify

Yes, according to G the is a way out–as far as one can and should want a way out of his historical situation–in the process of interpreting a text.

(1) “history does not belong to us; we belong to it.” (276) “one of the conditions of understanding in the human sciences is belonging to tradition.” (328) “Consciousness of being [historically] conditioned does not supersede our conditionedness.” (448)

(2) But this is not a disadvantage. “belonging to a tradition is a condition of hermeneutics.” (291)

Why?

(3) If we don’t approach the text with some given understanding (fore-understanding, “prejudices”) of the subject matter brought to us in our historical situation by tradition, we have no way to relate the subject matter of the text to our lives and relate our lives to it. It would be alien gibberish and we would never understand it at all. If we have no experience of love and relationships Romeo and Juliet would be impossible to understand.

But . . .

(4) If the reader merely seeks to know the historical situation of the text, where it is coming from, then he can never see himself in it, he has abandoned its claim to say something true and valid for himself, and has stopped trying to reach an agreement. (303) see also (335, 337)
Rather the reader must transpose himself into the other situation of the text, see himself in it, and thus achieve a “fusion of horizons.” Then the truth claims of the text can be heard. (305-6) see also 378 and 388.
IOW, our own fore-understanding and horizon is the avenue to enter the world of the text because it is about the human world which both the text and we share in. Then the text can speak for itself. Don’t forget G is speaking about the method of the human sciences.

Nonetheless, don’t forget–

(5) So “the prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at his free disposal. He cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding from the prejudices that hinder it and lead to misunderstandings. Rather this separation must take place in the process of understanding itself,” (295-6)

One intends to understand the text itself. But this means that the interpreter’s own thoughts too have gone into re-awakening the text’s meaning. In this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says.” (388)

This and the other quotes should help to address the issue of relativism.

Is this helpful? G is not Derrida.

“The mode of being of a text has something unique and incomparable about it. It presents a specific problem of translation to the understanding. Nothing is so strange, and at the same time so demanding, as the written word. The written word and what partakes of it–literature–is the intelligibility of mind transferred to the most alien medium. Nothing is so purely the trace of the mind as writing, but nothing is so dependent on the understanding mind either. In deciphering and interpreting it, a miracle takes place: the transformation of something alien and dead into total contemporaneity and familiarity. This is like nothing else that comes down to us from the past. Then remnants of past life–what is left of buildings, tools, the contents of graves–are weather-beaten by the storms of time that have swept over them, whereas a written tradition, once deciphered and read, is to such an extent pure mind that it speaks to us as if in the present. That is why the capacity to read, to understand what is written, is like a secret art, even a magic that frees and binds us. In it time and space seem to be superseded. People who can read what has been handed down in writing produce and achieve the sheer presence of the past.” (163)

 

[levinas12]

G is not Derrida.

But how close is G to the Heidegger who wants to “destroy” metaphysics … by showing that time (and history) is the horizon of being … and showing this in such a way that it has always and already been “presupposed” but “covered over” in our tradition …

Heidegger returns to the Pre-Socratics, and to Plato and Aristotle, to “uncover” the hidden temporality at work in their texts … his hermeneutics does not “repeat” but “cuts open” the tradition … where does G stand with regard to all of this

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

But how close is G to the Heidegger who wants to “destroy” metaphysics … by showing that time (and history) is the horizon of being … and showing this in such a way that it has always and already been “presupposed” but “covered over” in our tradition …

Heidegger returns to the Pre-Socratics, and to Plato and Aristotle, to “uncover” the hidden temporality at work in their texts … his hermeneutics does not “repeat” but “cuts open” the tradition … where does G stand with regard to all of this

I think we may need to look at who is saying what where.

(1) (a) H and G are engaged in two different enterprises: H is investigating the Being of beings largely through the human being, Dasein; G is investigating the nature of hermeneutics (of texts largely) as involved in the methodology of the human sciences. G is not directly studying the question of Being.
(b) I would say the characteristic texts from G which I gave you show that he doesn’t deny the objectivity of being.

(2) (a) I am only familiar with H’s discussion re destroying the history of ontology in Being and Time, Intro, II, 6. He says his aim is not to “shake off’ the metaphysical tradition or engage in a “vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints” or “ bury the past in nullity.” He wants to “stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition” and he wants to “demonstrate the origin of our basic ontological concepts by an investigation in which their ‘birth certificate’ is displayed.”
(b) As regards temporality and being H notes that beings are encountered as “presence” and so time enters in since we are speaking then about the present.
The word “present” is significant. It is from Latin praeesse - to be before one. This in turn is from prae, (before) pre- + esse, to be. Etymologically it means first “to be before”, “being in view.” It also means on a deeper level “to be (comes) before (anything else it does)”: only the existing thing can stand before anything else. In standing before me as an object of my awareness a relationship is established between the thing and me in which the thing is present in thought. Knowledge is relational and the real is re-presented (present again in a mental way) in the knower.
(c) H is an atheist and so the absoluteness and timelessness of God’s being do not enter (explicitly) into his thought. So, given that he is speaking the encounter with being on this plane only, I think he has some good points to consider.

(3) Re (2)(a) above, I believe JPII gets across a similar insight in Fides at Ratio #4:
“Yet often enough in history this has brought with it the temptation to identify one single stream with the whole of philosophy. In such cases, we are clearly dealing with a “philosophical pride” which seeks to present its own partial and imperfect view as the complete reading of all reality. In effect, every philosophical system, while it should always be respected in its wholeness, without any instrumentalization, must still recognize the primacy of philosophical enquiry, from which it stems and which it ought loyally to serve.” Bold added.

JPII seems to reflect G and H in speaking about recovering the tradition of philosophizing in #85.
“I believe that those philosophers who wish to respond today to the demands which the word of God makes on human thinking should develop their thought on the basis of these postulates and in organic continuity with the great tradition which, beginning with the ancients, passes through the Fathers of the Church and the masters of Scholasticism and includes the fundamental achievements of modern and contemporary thought. If philosophers can take their place within this tradition and draw their inspiration from it, they will certainly not fail to respect philosophy’s demand for autonomy.
In the present situation, therefore, it is most significant that some philosophers are promoting a recovery of the determining role of this tradition for a right approach to knowledge. The appeal to tradition is not a mere remembrance of the past; it involves rather the recognition of a cultural heritage which belongs to all of humanity. Indeed it may be said that it is we who belong to the tradition and that it is not ours to dispose of at will. Precisely by being rooted in the tradition will we be able today to develop for the future an original, new and constructive mode of thinking."

 

[levinas12]

… He says his aim is not to “shake off’ the metaphysical tradition or engage in a “vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints” or “ bury the past in nullity.” He wants to “stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition” and he wants to “demonstrate the origin of our basic ontological concepts by an investigation in which their ‘birth certificate’ is displayed.”

Heidegger stakes out the positive possibilities of metaphysics by exposing what he considers to be the great “omission”, the “forgetting” of Being. This is not just forgetting of Dasein’s being; this is forgetting of the Being (the “to be”) of the world and everything in it. And what is forgotten? That there is no eternal structure, no full presence, always presence mixed with absence, always ineluctable Time. Hence no metaphysics. Aristotle and Plato had gone off course. But we need to “read” them in order to realize what happened. So Heidegger does “return” to the tradition. But his way of doing hermeneutics is explosive (like Nietzsche or Marx or Freud).

I’m not sure whether Gadamer has broken free of this. I think he would agree that we can’t simply bring back the past thinking as it was originally (this is what Dilthey, Schleiermacher, tried to do). No, fusion of horizons prevents that from happening.

And, because the horizons are historical, there will be future fusions.

How does G keep Heraclitus at bay?

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Heidegger stakes out the positive possibilities of metaphysics by exposing what he considers to be the great “omission”, the “forgetting” of Being. This is not just forgetting of Dasein’s being; this is forgetting of the Being (the “to be”) of the world and everything in it. And what is forgotten? That there is no eternal structure, no full presence, always presence mixed with absence, always ineluctable Time. Hence no metaphysics. Aristotle and Plato had gone off course. But we need to “read” them in order to realize what happened. So Heidegger does “return” to the tradition. But his way of doing hermeneutics is explosive (like Nietzsche or Marx or Freud).

Yes, I certainly don’t see in Heidegger a full-blown and theistic metaphysical system as Aristotle and Thomas present. And I regard that system as providing a core of truth that is indisputable.

But I do think it is important to understand exactly what Heidegger is saying, and where. Although I’m not an expert I have read a significant number of his works and I don’t see him defining the forgetfulness of Being as you do. It is the “forgetting of the Being (the “to be”) of the world and everything in it.” But this is it. The rest of what you express is not something he or commentators explicating his thought say regarding this theme. Where does he develop the theme in the way you outline?

By his own admission he is seeking to get behind the formation of systems of related assertions beginning with Plato to “letting lie before us and taking to heart the Being of beings.” (What is Called Thinking?, Lecture X) This quote which he explores comes from Parmenides not Heraclitus. This is the point of his “destruction” as he reiterates in What is Philosophy? He also speaks about “presence” in detail in What is Called Thinking?, Lecture XI. And the present is a moment of time.

Heidegger comes down on the side of Parmenides not Heraclitus.

His effort, as I and commentators read him, is to get back to the primacy of philosophical enquiry rooted in wonder at the Being of beings which in his mind must precede and yet continually pervade all metaphysical efforts at system building.

I’m not sure whether Gadamer has broken free of this. I think he would agree that we can’t simply bring back the past thinking as it was originally (this is what Dilthey, Schleiermacher, tried to do). No, fusion of horizons prevents that from happening.

And, because the horizons are historical, there will be future fusions.

How does G keep Heraclitus at bay?

If Gadamer develops the theme of the fusion of horizons as I explicated it, where is the problem? A person reading Shakespeare 100 yrs in the future will read him from his life in his point in time. But this is an avenue—the only avenue for him—to understand and come to an agreement with subject matter of the play, to reach the verbum interius (inner word) of Shakespeare from the uttered word in a particular work.

Again Gadamer explores the human sciences and hermeneutics not so much Being in itself.

As for Heraclitus, I would get T.M. Robinson, Heraclitus: A Text and Translation with a Commentary. There’s a lot more of value in Heraclitus than one may suspect; e.g., foundations for natural law theory.

I think we have to distinguish between Heraclitus and “Heraclitusism,” if you will. Have you read, Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers? Chapter 5, “Existence and Being” shows that the actual existence of composite beings is always a becoming. “Far from being incompatible with becoming, essence is both the final cause of becoming and the formal condition of its possibility.” (180) “No form engaged in matter can simply and solely be. For it ‘to be’ is to become, and its ‘being’ is ‘becoming.’ (181) This insight is not “Heraclitusism”–nothing but unintelligible flux.

What is this apparent terror of history?

 

[levinas12]

What is this apparent terror of history?

The answer to your question is: someone like Bultmann.

What I mean is that the fusion of horizons could produce a Bultmann, an exegete who seriously “disturbs” the meaning of scripture. But Bultmann’s “fusion” is well-intentioned … it’s all done to make scripture accessible to modern man.

Some fusion indeed.

I wonder what G thought of Bultmann’s interpretation of the New Testament.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

The answer to your question is: someone like Bultmann.

What I mean is that the fusion of horizons could produce a Bultmann, an exegete who seriously “disturbs” the meaning of scripture. But Bultmann’s “fusion” is well-intentioned … it’s all done to make scripture accessible to modern man.

Some fusion indeed.

I wonder what G thought of Bultmann’s interpretation of the New Testament.

Gadamer mentions Bultmann a few times, but only regarding standard hermeneutic issues. He does not advert to Bultmann’s program of demythologization.

RE fusion of horizons: what you describe as a fusion of horizons in Bultmann [his attempt to demythologize the NT] is the exact opposite of Gadamer’s understanding of the hermeneutic process. This is clear in the relevant texts and the description I made of it.

Bultmann in his efforts to demythologize the NT is anti-historical. We maintain that the events and miracles of Christ’s life were historical events and that the Gospels teach us historical truth about Christ.

Gadamer on biblical hermeneutics . . and hermeneutics in general:
“It [fore-understanding] refers to the openness of the horizon of inquiry within which alone understanding is possible, but** it does not mean that one’s own fore-understanding should not be corrected by the encounter with the word of God (or, indeed, with any other word)**. On the contrary, the purpose of this concept is to display the movement of understanding as precisely this process of correction. It must be noted that this ‘corrective’ process is, in the case of the call to faith, a specific one that is of hermeneutic universality only in its formal structure.” (524)

 

[levinas12]

Gadamer mentions Bultmann a few times, but only regarding standard hermeneutic issues. He does not advert to Bultmann’s program of demythologization.

Did G believe in a bodily resurrection of Jesus?

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Did G believe in a bodily resurrection of Jesus?

Gadamer doesn’t comment on this topic. I’ve heard it said that he wasn’t particularly religious. But from his hermeneutics I would surmise that if he did pursue a life of faith more vigorously he would accept the historical claims of the NT books as what the authors intended to assert.

 

[levinas12]

Gadamer doesn’t comment on this topic. I’ve heard it said that he wasn’t particularly religious. But from his hermeneutics I would surmise that if he did pursue a life of faith more vigorously he would accept the historical claims of the NT books as what the authors intended to assert.

I’m not sure.

G’s entire project is to get away from the author’s original meaning. The text has a “history” of its own (independent of the author).

That’s why fusion of horizons is so problematic.

Try to formulate specific examples of fusion.

E.g., a pro-lifer is conversing with a pro-abort. What would a “fusion” look like in this instance?

Or take G’s interpretation of scripture. What happens to the meaning of scripture in the wake of G’s “fusion”? Remember G’s horizon may not be that of a believer - and G’s interpretation is not a reduplication of the author’s original meaning - it is a “fusion” of two historical horizons.

With G, it is important to see how “fusion” operates in concrete situations.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I’m not sure.

G’s entire project is to get away from the author’s original meaning. The text has a “history” of its own (independent of the author).

First of all, I guess I should ask have you read Truth and Method itself? It sounds like you’re relying on someone’s surmise of what he means.

Second, the quotes I gave you belie this project on his part of geting away from the author’s original meaning. It souunds like you’re confusing him with Derrida.

That’s why fusion of horizons is so problematic.

Try to formulate specific examples of fusion.

E.g., a pro-lifer is conversing with a pro-abort. What would a “fusion” look like in this instance?

Or take G’s interpretation of scripture. What happens to the meaning of scripture in the wake of G’s “fusion”? Remember G’s horizon may not be that of a believer - and G’s interpretation is not a reduplication of the author’s original meaning - it is a “fusion” of two historical horizons.

With G, it is important to see how “fusion” operates in concrete situations.

As I mentioned above “A person reading Shakespeare 100 yrs in the future will read him from his life in his point in time. But this is an avenue—the only avenue for him—to understand and come to an agreement with subject matter of the play, to reach the verbum interius (inner word) of Shakespeare from the uttered word in a particular work.”

As far as Scripture goes I gave you a quote which I believe speaks for itself.

The fusion of horizons means that my world of experience (including commonly held ideas of today, preconceptions about the subject matter, prior experiences with the subject matter) is the path to relate to the subject matter of the text arising from the horizon of the author and expressing the inner word of the author. The whole goal of interpretation is to reach the inner word of the author, a word which can challenge and correct what we believe today and modify our own horizon. I may choose to agree or disagree once I understand what the author intended to say. When asked in what the universal claim of hermeneutics consists Gadamer responded “In the verbum interius.” (Jean Grodin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, p. xiii-xiv.)

“We start by saying that a hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices we bring with us. They constitute the horizon of a particular present, for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see. . . . in fact the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed because we are continually having to test all our prejudices. An important art of this testing occurs in encountering the past and in understanding the tradition from which we come. Hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. . . understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves.” (306)

Gadamer is primarily talking about traditionary texts. But in a conversation between two contemporaries, one a pro-lifer and the other a pro-abort, Gadamer would observe that through the uttered word of one the other will reach the inner word. He may or may not agree, but the goal is to understand what he is saying.

 

[levinas12]

… I should ask have you read Truth and Method itself?

I have read Truth and Method ™ … well maybe not in its entirety … but substantial parts of it … I’m a little pressed for time right now … but I would like to discuss with you especially the two Supplements to TM (Hermeneutics and Historicism, To what extent does language preform thought)

 

[levinas12]

But in a conversation between two contemporaries, one a pro-lifer and the other a pro-abort, Gadamer would observe that through the uttered word of one the other will reach the inner word. He may or may not agree, but the goal is to understand what he is saying.

But that’s not fusion of horizons …

It is not simply a question of understanding the propositional meaning of what the other has said … although this is important …

Husserl (early) talks about the idealization of meaning … e.g., the Pythagorean Theorem (PT) is the same whether today or 2500 years ago … our understanding of the PT is identifical with the ancient Greek understanding …

But I don’t think this is not what G means by fusion of horizons - fusion does not mean achieving the same idealized meaning …

Fusion does allow for a sharing of sorts, for us having something in common … the earlier question or issue can seize hold of us - but the historical context is different - so there is a shift from the earlier original meaning

It’s interesting to note that Husserl himself came to emphasize history in his later work (e.g., the Crisis).

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I have read Truth and Method ™ … well maybe not in its entirety … but substantial parts of it … I’m a little pressed for time right now … but I would like to discuss with you especially the two Supplements to TM (Hermeneutics and Historicism, To what extent does language preform thought)

NP. Sounds like a good discussion.