God as Lawgiver

[steph_86]

Greetings to all,

I started this thread on the Moral Theology section, but I have yet to receive an answer, so I decided to pose the same question in this section.

I have been looking for a quote from St. Thomas Aquinas concerning the reality of Evil. It essentially addresses the Eutyphro Dilemma:

“Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?”

St. Thomas’ answer was essentially that: something is Evil because God forbids it, but God forbids it because it is Evil.

I would like to know if someone can help me find the exact quote.

Also, I would like to know if there is a way to move a thread from sub-forum to another.

 

[balto]

Greetings to all,

I started this thread on the Moral Theology section, but I have yet to receive an answer, so I decided to pose the same question in this section.

I have been looking for a quote from St. Thomas Aquinas concerning the reality of Evil. It essentially addresses the Eutyphro Dilemma:

“Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?”

St. Thomas’ answer was essentially that: something is Evil because God forbids it, but God forbids it because it is Evil.

I would like to know if someone can help me find the exact quote.

Also, I would like to know if there is a way to move a thread from sub-forum to another.

I’m not sure what the quote is that you are looking for (I have some books on Aquinas but I have yet to read them). The answer that you mentioned seems to just be an inverse of the Eurypthro dilemma restated in terms of evil, which doesn’t seem to solve the problem. I didn’t think this was St. Thomas’ view although I may be wrong.

The reason the dilemma does not apply to God is because God and Goodness and one and the same. So it’s not the case that God sat down one day and decided on the Ten Commandments or something like that because then all divine law is arbitrary. God would basically be like some sort of tyrant forcing His will on others, only He’s the biggest kid on the block, which doesn’t correspond to the classical understanding of God. On the other hand, if God is merely commanding certain behavior because there’s an external standard above Him that He adheres to, then He’s not really God because the standard of goodness is above Him and His being is dependent on this higher standard.

The solution is that something is good if it conforms to the nature of God, who is Goodness Itself. Evil is seen as a privation of good meaning that what is evil excludes God’s will or final ends to various degrees. I forget the terminology but this whole understanding of God involves something like the “convertibility of the transcendentals.” In other words, God’s being is His Power, is His Knowledge, is His Goodness, is His Will, is His Action, etc. Due to our limited natures we perceive separations between these transcendentals when they are all really one and the same in God. Does this make sense?

 

[hicetnunc]

Greetings to all,

I started this thread on the Moral Theology section, but I have yet to receive an answer, so I decided to pose the same question in this section.

I have been looking for a quote from St. Thomas Aquinas concerning the reality of Evil. It essentially addresses the Eutyphro Dilemma:

“Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?”

St. Thomas’ answer was essentially that: something is Evil because God forbids it, but God forbids it because it is Evil.

I would like to know if someone can help me find the exact quote.

Also, I would like to know if there is a way to move a thread from sub-forum to another.

I’m not sure what you’re thinking of here…perhaps you could elaborate. I have never come across the kind of formulation of evil in St Thomas you seem to be suggesting and St Thomas in fact rejects the kind of bifurcation contained in the Euthyphro dilemma.

Evil is not something for St Thomas; evil is a privation of being and not a kind of being strictly speaking. Natural and divine law forbids evil because it is contrary to the good (ST 1a2ae, q.18) and human will and reason are, by nature, inclined to the good and true respectively. Evil in that sense is forbidden because the proper orientation of all being is the good, and the nature of goodness is found in being. So even when people desire to do something evil, they are in fact desiring under the aspect of the good, because the good is what all people by nature desire. So evil is forbidden primarily by reason and not simply a positive command.

 

[steph_86]

I’m not sure what the quote is that you are looking for (I have some books on Aquinas but I have yet to read them). The answer that you mentioned seems to just be an inverse of the Eurypthro dilemma restated in terms of evil, which doesn’t seem to solve the problem. I didn’t think this was St. Thomas’ view although I may be wrong.

The reason the dilemma does not apply to God is because God and Goodness and one and the same. So it’s not the case that God sat down one day and decided on the Ten Commandments or something like that because then all divine law is arbitrary. God would basically be like some sort of tyrant forcing His will on others, only He’s the biggest kid on the block, which doesn’t correspond to the classical understanding of God. On the other hand, if God is merely commanding certain behavior because there’s an external standard above Him that He adheres to, then He’s not really God because the standard of goodness is above Him and His being is dependent on this higher standard.

The solution is that something is good if it conforms to the nature of God, who is Goodness Itself. Evil is seen as a privation of good meaning that what is evil excludes God’s will or final ends to various degrees. I forget the terminology but this whole understanding of God involves something like the “convertibility of the transcendentals.” In other words, God’s being is His Power, is His Knowledge, is His Goodness, is His Will, is His Action, etc. Due to our limited natures we perceive separations between these transcendentals when they are all really one and the same in God. Does this make sense?

Alright. The fact is, I do remember a quote from St. Thomas Aquinas addressing this specific problem. It is simply that I do not remember what the exact quote was.

But yes, I know that God is Goodness itself, and the measure of all Good. Which means that, to seek goodness and righteousness, is to seek God Himself and that Good and Evil do not exist apart from the Divinity.

But my understanding from the quote of St. Thomas Aquinas’ quote was twofold.

First, because God is the Lawgiver, He commands that which is Evil, and that which is Good, and man is bound to give his assent, and live by God’s commands. But to be more specific, God’s commands can be related to the Divine Law. The Divine Law, in my understanding, essentially refers to the Ten Commandments, which God revealed through Moses to Israel, and then to the nations. Through the Divine Law, God reveals that which is Good and Evil, and binds man to live by His commands. Hence, the first point to be made is, God is Goodness, and for that fact, is the measure of Good and Evil. As such, man can know Good and Evil, because God reveals them.

The second consideration, is to consider Good and Evil under the aspect of the Natural Law. The central notion is to understand that God forbids an act because it is Evil. It is true, as stated above, that God is Goodness, and the measure of Goodness Itself, since He is the Lawgiver, and the dictates of His Reason determine the rightness and the wrongness of human acts. At the same time, however, the sentence God forbids an act because it is Evil can be taken to mean the following. It means that, although God is Goodness and the Author of the Divine Law, it is also possible to discover the rightness or the wrongness of an action apart from the Divine Law. To be more explicit, it means that, human reason apart from the Divine Law, can discover the central truths of Good and Evil. This understanding can more or less be equated with the notion of the Natural Law.

In retrospect, let us summarize the two statements.

“Something is Evil because God commands it”: This means that man comes to know Good and Evil through the Revelation of God as Lawgiver, primarily in the Divine Law. In other words, man comes to the knowledge of Good and Evil, because God commands it.
Or, something is Good or Evil, because Divine Reason judges it to be Good or Evil.

“God commands something because it is Evil”: This means that although God is Goodness Itself, is the measure of Good and Evil, is the Lawgiver, and is the One who reveals Good and Evil, it is possible for human reason to discover the truths of rightness and wrongness apart from Divine Revelation, and primarily in the Natural Law. In other words, the knowledge of Good and Evil, can be discovered by human reason apart from Revelation. Or, something is Good or Evil, because (human) right reason discovers it to be Good or Evil (apart from God’s Revelation).

This, I think is how I would explain the matter.

 

[balto]

This, I think is how I would explain the matter.

I agree with what you have written. I apologize, I didn’t mean to patronize; I just was a little unclear about what you were asking. As for the quote, I’m not sure which one you are looking for so someone else will have to help with that.

“God commands something because it is Evil”: This means that although God is Goodness Itself, is the measure of Good and Evil, is the Lawgiver, and is the One who reveals Good and Evil, it is possible for human reason to discover the truths of rightness and wrongness apart from Divine Revelation, and primarily in the Natural Law. In other words, the knowledge of Good and Evil, can be discovered by human reason apart from Revelation. Or, something is Good or Evil, because (human) right reason discovers it to be Good or Evil (apart from God’s Revelation).

Just to be clear, you’re not speaking of evil as a positive force, but as the absence or deprivation of good right? Hicetnunc provided the view that Aquinas would hold I believe.

I think you are bringing up a good point with natural law though and I know Aquinas was big on natural law. If I remember correctly, something is considered “good” naturally if it perfectly fulfills its form and intended purpose. This could be known through observing final causes in nature and through divine revelation. The reason for the rules is so that humans could perfectly conform with the final end that God gave them. So the laws were not imposed to prevent us from taking too much but for settling for less than the fullness of being that God intended for us.

 

[hicetnunc]

But my understanding from the quote of St. Thomas Aquinas’ quote was twofold.

First, because God is the Lawgiver, He commands that which is Evil, and that which is Good, and man is bound to give his assent, and live by God’s commands.

I can assure you that the first part of your claim is certainly not from St Thomas, who in fact insists that God neither wills nor commands evil (ST 1a, q.19, a.9).

That God commands the good is found in St Thomas in many places (for example, 2a2ae, 104). But not in a way which supports your version of the Euthyphro dilemma.

 

[steph_86]

I can assure you that the first part of your claim is certainly not from St Thomas, who in fact insists that God neither wills nor commands evil (ST 1a, q.19, a.9).

That God commands the good is found in St Thomas in many places (for example, 2a2ae, 104). But not in a way which supports your version of the Euthyphro dilemma.

I am sorry, I must have not expressed my thought clearly. My statement meant that God decides (judges, and reveals) that which is Good and that which is Evil. Which is why I said “commands”. Meaning, man is bound by God’s commands to observe that which is Good and reject that which is Evil. Of course, it cannot simply be stated that God’s commands are arbitrary since they are in accordance with His Reason and His Goodness.

I suppose that this is a more correct way to express it.

As far as the quote itself, however, it might have come from Duns Scotus. I am really not entirely sure, I have searched for the quote for some time, because I do remember reading it, but I have not found it in its entirety.

 

[steph_86]

I agree with what you have written. I apologize, I didn’t mean to patronize; I just was a little unclear about what you were asking. As for the quote, I’m not sure which one you are looking for so someone else will have to help with that.

Everything is fine.

Just to be clear, you’re not speaking of evil as a positive force, but as the absence or deprivation of good right? Hicetnunc provided the view that Aquinas would hold I believe.

I am not entirely clear on this. On the one hand, I understand a bit St. Thomas’ argument that, in reality, all evil is done under the aspect of some good. He even went to further as to state that, in some sense, evil is caused due to ignorance, or due the intellect’s inability to fully understand. I think the best way I understand it, is concerning the liberty of rational creatures. Freedom, in theological terms, is the ability to do the Good, and not simply the ability to choose between Good and Evil. If considered under that aspect, it is then possible to truly understand how Evil is a privation, since only Good perfects freedom.

But it is difficult for me to consider evil only as privation. Maybe it is because when understood in that way, it seems to take away from its reality. In a sense, Evil does exist, whether it is moral or physical. Evil is not just spiritual, or moral, it is tangible. One can intellectualize it as injustice, or count it in the number of Jews that die in the Holocaust.

But, please, explain to me what is meant by Evil being “absence or deprivation of good”.

I think you are bringing up a good point with natural law though and I know Aquinas was big on natural law. If I remember correctly, something is considered “good” naturally if it perfectly fulfills its form and intended purpose. This could be known through observing final causes in nature and through divine revelation. The reason for the rules is so that humans could perfectly conform with the final end that God gave them. So the laws were not imposed to prevent us from taking too much but for settling for less than the fullness of being that God intended for us.

I agree fully. Yes, I understand the goodness of a thing to mean its existence (more precisely its being?), its form or its nature, its purpose, and its ability to fulfill that purpose.

Also, the precepts of morality and the natural ends of human existence can be discovered by reason in the Natural Law. However, God gave humanity the Divine Law, in order to clearly indicate the precepts of morality, and protect from error in the judgment of the morality of human acts.

 

[steph_86]

I’m not sure what you’re thinking of here…perhaps you could elaborate. I have never come across the kind of formulation of evil in St Thomas you seem to be suggesting and St Thomas in fact rejects the kind of bifurcation contained in the Euthyphro dilemma.

Evil is not something for St Thomas; evil is a privation of being and not a kind of being strictly speaking. Natural and divine law forbids evil because it is contrary to the good (ST 1a2ae, q.18) and human will and reason are, by nature, inclined to the good and true respectively. Evil in that sense is forbidden because the proper orientation of all being is the good, and the nature of goodness is found in being. So even when people desire to do something evil, they are in fact desiring under the aspect of the good, because the good is what all people by nature desire. So evil is forbidden primarily by reason and not simply a positive command.

I seem to understand. By stating “evil is a privation of being and not a kind of being strictly speaking”, are you stating that Evil has not being?

However, what about the fate of the damned? They can no longer will the Good, since they are invincibly confirmed in Evil. Does their freedom (even though to be truly exact, they are no longer free, since they are confirmed in Evil) still will Evil under the aspect of some good?

 

[balto]

I am not entirely clear on this. On the one hand, I understand a bit St. Thomas’ argument that, in reality, all evil is done under the aspect of some good. He even went to further as to state that, in some sense, evil is caused due to ignorance, or due the intellect’s inability to fully understand. I think the best way I understand it, is concerning the liberty of rational creatures. Freedom, in theological terms, is the ability to do the Good, and not simply the ability to choose between Good and Evil. If considered under that aspect, it is then possible to truly understand how Evil is a privation, since only Good perfects freedom.

Privation of evil is similar to the way heat works. Considering that it is in the single digits outside my apartment currently, I would say that it is cold outside. But I’m not saying that there’s some positive energy called “coldness” outside. There’s still heat outside just significantly less of it than there would be in July. It’s the same way with good and evil. Evil is just an exclusion of good.

But it is difficult for me to consider evil only as privation. Maybe it is because when understood in that way, it seems to take away from its reality. In a sense, Evil does exist, whether is moral or physical. Evil is not just spiritual, or moral, it is tangible. One can intellectualize it as injustice, or count it in the number of Jews that die in the Holocaust.

Yes, I can understand your reasoning here. But just because evil is a privation doesn’t mean that it doesn’t have any effects. There are definitely negative effects of depriving a situation of good and you noted it perfectly with your example of the Holocaust. Just like there are effects that can be realized from excluding heat from my living room. One thing to consider is the fact that the only reason why anything is as good as it seems is precisely due to the presence of good in the world. God created everything good, but when human actions exclude good from the created order the effect is evil

 

[balto]

As far as the quote itself, however, it might have come from Duns Scotus. I am really not entirely sure, I have searched for the quote for some time, because I do remember reading it, but I have not found it in its entirety.

I was reading a book on Aquinas by Edward Feser earlier today and came across this quote of Aquinas on evil: “it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that evil is neither a being nor a good. For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.” (Summa Theologiae I.48.1) So he definitely takes the privation view of evil. It does seem to correspond with your view on natural goodness:

I agree fully. Yes, I understand the goodness of a thing to mean its existence (more precisely its being?), its form or its nature, its purpose, and its ability to fulfill that purpose.

Maybe it was a quote from Duns Scotus that you were thinking of. I’ve heard that some of Duns Scotus’ theology and philosophy have departures from the classical understanding of these issues, so maybe his view on evil was different than Aquinas’ view.

 

[steph_86]

I was reading a book on Aquinas by Edward Feser earlier today and came across this quote of Aquinas on evil: “it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that evil is neither a being nor a good. For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.” (Summa Theologiae I.48.1) So he definitely takes the privation view of evil. It does seem to correspond with your view on natural goodness:

Since Evil is understood as the absence of Good, and Being is Good, does that mean that Evil implies the absence of Being, or maybe even non-Being?

Maybe it was a quote from Duns Scotus that you were thinking of. I’ve heard that some of Duns Scotus’ theology and philosophy have departures from the classical understanding of these issues, so maybe his view on evil was different than Aquinas’ view.

Yes, I haven’t heard Duns Scotus much, but I came across some commentaries on some of his writings, and I have to say that at first sight, I had a hard time wrapping my mind around his philosophy.

 

[steph_86]

Privation of evil is similar to the way heat works. Considering that it is in the single digits outside my apartment currently, I would say that it is cold outside. But I’m not saying that there’s some positive energy called “coldness” outside. There’s still heat outside just significantly less of it than there would be in July. It’s the same way with good and evil. Evil is just an exclusion of good.

Yes, I can understand your reasoning here. But just because evil is a privation doesn’t mean that it doesn’t have any effects. There are definitely negative effects of depriving a situation of good and you noted it perfectly with your example of the Holocaust. Just like there are effects that can be realized from excluding heat from my living room. One thing to consider is the fact that the only reason why anything is as good as it seems is precisely due to the presence of good in the world. God created everything good, but when human actions exclude good from the created order the effect is evil

I see, but I think that it is not enough to consider Evil as simply an effect. If we consider Goodness as a substance, not only because it is God Himself, but also because its form and its essence are real, perhaps we can posit that Evil can be understood as a lack, an absence of Good, or a privation in said substance (not in God Himself).

Evil has not Being because it is privation, but Evil is real because it inheres in that which already has Being. But it only inheres in said thing, because said thing already has Being. In other words, Evil has no Being or substance of Itself, but only by inhering in that which already has Being or substance.

As such, it is not possible to consider the existence of Evil, without the existence of Good. Meaning, without Good, there would be no Evil.

But I am merely theorizing here, and I am sure there are errors in my thought.

 

[steph_86]

Privation of evil is similar to the way heat works. Considering that it is in the single digits outside my apartment currently, I would say that it is cold outside. But I’m not saying that there’s some positive energy called “coldness” outside. There’s still heat outside just significantly less of it than there would be in July. It’s the same way with good and evil. Evil is just an exclusion of good.

If it were possible then, to expound on my thoughts above, it can then be stated the following.

Good is a substance, and Evil inheres in Good, but only as privation or lack of Good. Heat is good and heat is a substance. Cold is a privation or lack of heat. Therefore, cold inheres in heat, but only as privation or lack of heat. Further, it can be stated, cold is a substance, but only as a privation in substance, that is, in heat.

Is this good understanding of principles and sound reasoning?

 

[steph_86]

I see, but I think that it is not enough to consider Evil as simply an effect. If we consider Goodness as a substance, not only because it is God Himself, but also because its form and its essence are real, perhaps we can posit that Evil can be understood as a lack, an absence of Good, or a privation in said substance (not in God Himself).

Evil has not Being because it is privation, but Evil is real because it inheres in that which already has Being. But it only inheres in said thing, because said thing already has Being. In other words, Evil has no Being or substance of Itself, but only by inhering in that which already has Being or substance.

As such, it is not possible to consider the existence of Evil, without the existence of Good. Meaning, without Good, there would be no Evil.

But I am merely theorizing here, and I am sure there are errors in my thought.

For instance, there is concupiscence.

1. Evil is a privation of Good.
2. Concupiscence is disorder between reason and the animal nature.
3. Disorder is a privation of a good, namely order.
4. Concupiscence is a privation of Good (namely order between reason and the animal nature).
5. Concupiscence is Evil.
6. Concupiscence inheres in Good (substance: reason and the animal nature), but only as privation.
7. Evil inheres in Good (substance), but only as privation.

 

[balto]

For instance, there is concupiscence.

1. Evil is a privation of Good.
2. Concupiscence is disorder between reason and the animal nature.
3. Disorder is a privation of a good, namely order.
4. Concupiscence is a privation of Good (namely order between reason and the animal nature).
5. Concupiscence is Evil.
6. Concupiscence inheres in Good (substance: reason and the animal nature), but only as privation.
7. Evil inheres in Good (substance), but only as privation.

Yes, I think this is right. I’m not as well-versed in formal philosophical reasoning as I should be, but this sounds mostly right to me. The one thing I am unsure of is if evil is considered to be its own substance. I think the form of the object is what determines its goodness and then how well the object actually instantiates its form determines how naturally and/or morally good/evil it is. For instance, with humans our form is that of a rational animal who’s end is being in a loving relationship with God. But due to concupiscence as you said, we have the power to turn from that end such that we are not fulfilling our form as well as we should, leading to moral evil.

It seems that one of the logical ends of Aquinas’ reasoning, which I think you alluded to in an earlier post, is that complete and utter evil would entail non-existence. This seems to contradict with hell because it is never described as a state of non-existence. But I don’t think it’s the case that something becomes 100% evil even in hell, so there’s very limited amounts of good being left due to the fact that the lost soul has completely rejected God eternally which means their nature, which is inherently ordered towards God, is eternally frustrated and suffering due to this rejection. They may still seek what they believe to be goodness but their concept of goodness is irreversibly warped such that they believe very strongly that what is in reality a deprivation of good is good for them.

 

[steph_86]

Yes, I think this is right. I’m not as well-versed in formal philosophical reasoning as I should be, but this sounds mostly right to me. The one thing I am unsure of is if evil is considered to be its own substance. I think the form of the object is what determines its goodness and then how well the object actually instantiates its form determines how naturally and/or morally good/evil it is. For instance, with humans our form is that of a rational animal who’s end is being in a loving relationship with God. But due to concupiscence as you said, we have the power to turn from that end such that we are not fulfilling our form as well as we should, leading to moral evil.

Are you making a distinction between Goodness and natural and/or moral Goodness? Which do you qualify as Goodness: the form or nature of thing, or its being or existence? At the same time, you seem to equate the form of a thing, with the purpose of said thing. For example, the form of man, is that which actualizes his essence which is rational animal. But isn’t however, the purpose or end of man as you have stated, to be “a loving relationship with God”?

It is interesting, because, I have never equated form, essence, or nature with purpose. Meaning, I have never equated form, essence, or nature with purpose as being the same thing. The form of man actualizes his essence which is that of rational animal. His nature is his substance as a thing, which is a compound of a rational nature and of an animal nature. However, man has a twofold end, which are natural and supernatural. The natural end of man is life and virtue within society. The supernatural end of man is Love and Happiness with God.

But does form necessarily equate with “purpose”? I understand the Goodness of a thing to be primarily its existence, and its ability to act according to (or in view of) its purpose, which its nature conditions (or actualizes).

Is nature created in view of purpose, or is purpose specified in view of nature?

Should it not be said that God created nature in view of purpose? For instance, God gave man a human nature, in view of his ultimate end, which is Beatitude with God in Heaven; which in the end, constitutes man’s purpose.

It seems that one of the logical ends of Aquinas’ reasoning, which I think you alluded to in an earlier post, is that complete and utter evil would entail non-existence. This seems to contradict with hell because it is never described as a state of non-existence. But I don’t think it’s the case that something becomes 100% evil even in hell, so there’s very limited amounts of good being left due to the fact that the lost soul has completely rejected God eternally which means their nature, which is inherently ordered towards God, is eternally frustrated and suffering due to this rejection. They may still seek what they believe to be goodness but their concept of goodness is irreversibly warped such that they believe very strongly that what is in reality a deprivation of good is good for them.

It is my position that God wills the existence of the damned according to a twofold good: He sees their existence as a good, and He sees their freedom as a good. At the same time, since they are invincibly Evil, and only Good actualizes Being, and since the natural end of freedom in rational creatures is Good Itself, their existence is a kind of privation of Being. But to comment on what kind of existence is theirs, I do not know.

 

[balto]

Are you making a distinction between Goodness and natural and/or moral Goodness?

I think the distinction between natural and moral evil is that moral evil is a result of human will. For instance, sexuality is oriented or directed towards procreation. Using contraception to deliberately frustrate that end would be a moral evil, whereas natural infertility would be a natural evil because it was not willed by a human agent. Although natural and moral evils can certainly be used to produce a greater good, which is why they are permitted. Moral and natural goodness would be the same thing just that they are fulfilling an end rather than frustrating it.

It is interesting, because, I have never equated form, essence, or nature with purpose. Meaning, I have never equated form, essence, or nature with purpose as being the same thing. The form of man actualizes his essence which is that of rational animal. His nature is his substance as a thing, which is a compound of a rational nature and of an animal nature. However, man has a twofold end, which are natural and supernatural. The natural end of man is life and virtue within society. The supernatural end of man is Love and Happiness with God.

I agree that there is a distinction between form and final cause (both are part of Aristotle’s four causes, the other two being material and efficient causes). In the case of a human for instance, the form of the rational animal gives us the ability to comply with our final end of being in a loving relationship with the Creator. Whether or not we actually do so is on us I guess.

But does form necessarily equate with “purpose”? I understand the Goodness of a thing to be primarily its existence, and its ability to act according to (or in view of) its purpose, which its nature conditions (or actualizes).

I agree, the only difference in the case of humans is that the rationality inherent in our formal cause allows us to comply with our purpose or not (we need to be able to choose to comply because our final end of love necessitates our free choosing, else it wouldn’t be love). Every other material object does not rationally seek a final end although they are directed towards an end nonetheless.

Is nature created in view of purpose, or is purpose specified in view of nature?

Should it not be said that God created nature in view of purpose? For instance, God gave man a human nature, in view of his ultimate end, which is Beatitude with God in Heaven; which in the end, constitutes man’s purpose.

You are bringing up an interesting question about teleology. I definitely think that God created nature in view of His purposes, suggesting that purpose permeates all of nature. Aquinas tries to use this to argue for God’s existence and later His omniscience in the so-called Fifth Way.

The other alternative is to take the materialist route and say that any purpose we observe is an illusion and exists only in our minds. But that contradicts almost the entire way the universe works because every causal relationship we know of is oriented towards a final end. Their confusion seems to stem from assuming that final causation implies a conscious seeking of a goal, which is not strictly needed.