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Solution: I answer that it should be said that God is essentially in all things, not nonetheless so that he is mixed together with things as if he were a part of any thing. To make this evident, it is necessary to note three points. First, it is necessary that a mover and a thing moved and an operating agent and a thing made exist simultaneously, as is proven in Book 7 of the Physics. But this occurs in a different way in corporeal things and spiritual things. For, because a body by its essence, which is circumscribed by the boundaries of quantity, is determined to some position, it cannot be that a moving body and a moved body are in the same position. Hence, it is necessary that they exist simultaneously by contact, and in this way, a body causes change by its own power, because by all means it can, up to some point, change another thing which is unchanged that is immediately united to it. However, a spiritual substance—the essence of which is wholly independent of quantity or position and, consequently, a place—is not separated from that which it moves by place or position. But where the thing that is moved is, there is the mover itself. The soul, for instance, is in the body, and the power that moves the heavens is said to be on the right side of the sphere that it moves—motion begins from this point, as is established in Book 8 of the Physics.
Secundum est, quod esse cujuslibet rei et cujuslibet partis ejus est immediate a Deo, eo quod non ponimus, secundum fidem, aliquem creare nisi Deum. Creare autem est dare esse. Tertium est, quod illud quod est causa esse, non potest cessare ab operatione qua esse datur, quin ipsa res etiam esse cesset. Sicut enim dicit Avicenna, lib. I Sufficientiae, cap. XI, haec est differentia inter agens divinum et agens naturale, quod agens naturale est tantum causa motus, et agens divinum est causa esse. Unde, juxta ipsum, qualibet causa efficiente remota, removetur effectus suus; et ideo, remoto aedificatore, non tollitur esse domus, cujus causa est gravitas lapidum quae manet; sed fieri domus cujus causa erat; et similiter, remota causa essendi, tollitur esse. Unde dicit Gregorius, lib. XVI Moral., c. XXXVII, quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret. Unde oportet quod operatio ipsius, qua dat esse, non sit intercisa, sed continua; unde dicitur Joan. V, 17: Pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor. Ex quibus omnibus aperte colligitur quod Deus est unicuique intimus, sicut esse proprium rei est intimum ipsi rei, quae nec incipere nec durare posset, nisi per operationem Dei, per quam suo operi conjungitur ut in eo sit. The second point is that the being of any thing and of any part of it comes immediately from God, because, according to faith, we maintain that only God creates. To create, however, is to give being. The third point is that that which is the cause of being cannot desist from the operation by which being is given without the thing itself also ceasing to be. For, as Avicenna says in Book 1, Chapter 11 of the Physics, the difference between the divine agent and a natural agent is that a natural agent is only a cause of motion, and the divine agent is the cause of being. Hence, according to him, when any efficient cause is withdrawn, its effect is removed, and therefore, when a builder is withdrawn, a house’s being is not destroyed—the being whose cause is the weight of the stones that remains—but the house’s becoming is destroyed—the becoming whose cause was the builder. And similarly, when the cause of being is withdrawn, being is destroyed. For this reason, Gregory says in Book 16, Chapter 37 of Morals that all things would fall into nothingness if the hand of the omnipotent one were not preserving them. Hence, it is necessary that his operation by which he gives being be not intermittent but continuous, and for this reason, it is said in John 5:17, My father is at work until now, and I am at work. From all these points, it is plainly inferred that God is most intimate to every thing just as the being that is proper to a thing is most intimate to the thing itself, which can neither begin nor last except by God’s operation through which he is united to his work so that he is in it.
www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/Sententiae/ISentd37q1a1.html
Linus2nd
Secundum est, quod esse cujuslibet rei et cujuslibet partis ejus est immediate a Deo, eo quod non ponimus, secundum fidem, aliquem creare nisi Deum. Creare autem est dare esse. Tertium est, quod illud quod est causa esse, non potest cessare ab operatione qua esse datur, quin ipsa res etiam esse cesset. Sicut enim dicit Avicenna, lib. I Sufficientiae, cap. XI, haec est differentia inter agens divinum et agens naturale, quod agens naturale est tantum causa motus, et agens divinum est causa esse. Unde, juxta ipsum, qualibet causa efficiente remota, removetur effectus suus; et ideo, remoto aedificatore, non tollitur esse domus, cujus causa est gravitas lapidum quae manet; sed fieri domus cujus causa erat; et similiter, remota causa essendi, tollitur esse. Unde dicit Gregorius, lib. XVI Moral., c. XXXVII, quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret. Unde oportet quod operatio ipsius, qua dat esse, non sit intercisa, sed continua; unde dicitur Joan. V, 17: Pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor. Ex quibus omnibus aperte colligitur quod Deus est unicuique intimus, sicut esse proprium rei est intimum ipsi rei, quae nec incipere nec durare posset, nisi per operationem Dei, per quam suo operi conjungitur ut in eo sit. The second point is that the being of any thing and of any part of it comes immediately from God, because, according to faith, we maintain that only God creates. To create, however, is to give being. The third point is that that which is the cause of being cannot desist from the operation by which being is given without the thing itself also ceasing to be. For, as Avicenna says in Book 1, Chapter 11 of the Physics, the difference between the divine agent and a natural agent is that a natural agent is only a cause of motion, and the divine agent is the cause of being. Hence, according to him, when any efficient cause is withdrawn, its effect is removed, and therefore, when a builder is withdrawn, a house’s being is not destroyed—the being whose cause is the weight of the stones that remains—but the house’s becoming is destroyed—the becoming whose cause was the builder. And similarly, when the cause of being is withdrawn, being is destroyed. For this reason, Gregory says in Book 16, Chapter 37 of Morals that all things would fall into nothingness if the hand of the omnipotent one were not preserving them. Hence, it is necessary that his operation by which he gives being be not intermittent but continuous, and for this reason, it is said in John 5:17, My father is at work until now, and I am at work. From all these points, it is plainly inferred that God is most intimate to every thing just as the being that is proper to a thing is most intimate to the thing itself, which can neither begin nor last except by God’s operation through which he is united to his work so that he is in it.
www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/Sententiae/ISentd37q1a1.html
Linus2nd