God Delusion is Delusional

[Mystic_Banana]

Let’s be clear - theists have a vested emotional interest in believing the things they do. They think they’re going to heaven, they think their religion gives them ethical superiority over the irreligious, and so on.

Atheists are unencumbered with such bias-inducing baggage.

Give me a break! If ever there is a self delusion, it is surely this one. Atheists have a vested emotional interest in thinking there is no moral authority higher than themselves (whom, in my experience, have a habit of considering far more *righteous *than the majority) in looking down on all about in judgement! Based on a dodgy (but doubtless gratifying) pseudo logic!

If there is no higher than yourself than yourself, then there is no moral authority at all, because there is no reason for morality at all… is that hard for you to understand… hmmmmmm?

unencumbered with such bias-inducing baggage??? Who do you think you’re fooling???

 

[OrdinaryMelkite]

What greater delusion can there be than the notion that the power of reason and the capacity for love are derived from fortuitous combinations of atomic particles, random mutations and blind necessity?!

 

[alongexpected]

Maybe I will get around to responding to your original post in this thread, and it’s many errors, but, for now, I will respond to this.

Proof can only be provided in the realms of the logical and the mathematical. Science does not provide proof. It provides predictions because it depends on inductive logic. This is why a scientific body of knowledge could only ever be said to be likely true, not, in fact, true. The question of God’s existence is not amenable to science, sure, but it is amenable to logic, and, if you recall, logic can provide proofs.

The problem is, and you do not seem to get this, this kind of knowledge is excluded from Dawkins’ scientism. He may be open to “change” or “new ideas,” but not ones that are excluded from his worldview as a valid body of knowledge! So it would not do me any good to reason with him. He is IRRATIONAL.

Windfish…I don’t really know what else to say…if people want to believe in a god(s), and think that that god created everything, and whose ethical code is the only correct one to live by, and whose paradise is the only one that’s possible to attain, then believe in that. But do you reallly think, by an accident of birth, that you were born with a monopoly on those truths? Please start thinking with a less biased and open mind.

 

[tonyrey]

I could have thrown in truth, goodness, freedom, justice and beauty as well but if reason and love aren’t enough nothing will satisfy their demand for “evidence”!

 

[Mystic_Banana]

Windfish…I don’t really know what else to say…if people want to believe in a god(s), and think that that god created everything, and whose ethical code is the only correct one to live by, and whose paradise is the only one that’s possible to attain, then believe in that. But do you reallly think, by an accident of birth, that you were born with a monopoly on those truths? Please start thinking with a less biased and open mind.

…didn’t even particularly say that, did he?..

Maybe you should check and see if that’s what he thinks… maybe then you could start thinking with ‘a less biased and open mind’ (or, even better, perhaps a less biased and more open mind?)

 

[wanstronian]

A proof can fail to convince 1 person, or 100, or 1 billion, and still be reasonable. The number of those not convinced is irrelavent.

No indeed. But this proves nothing, certainly not that the ‘proof’ is reasonable.

This works both ways. I could just as well say atheists have an emotional interest (subconsciously even, just like theists are accused of having a strong subconscious desire for God). This is really a red herring and doesn’t help one side or the other.

True in principle, although I’m not sure what subconscious desire the atheist has for disbelief. It is of no benefit to the atheist if God doesn’t exist.

It’s tempting to throw off the question as “silly,” I know, but it is legitimate to ask how it is your intellect senses your own existence. This is particularly important in the question of epistemology. How do you distinguish yourself from the “other” or “things”?

It depends on what you mean by “how.” Do you mean “by what process?” If so, I don’t know, nor does anybody else. If you mean, “By what criteria do I distinguish myself,” I’m not sure I can explain it. But I think I may be missing the point of your question…

Ah, but you are assuming what’s in question, and what as of yet has not been proven or falsified - the deity’s existence. It is circular to say at this point he doesn’t exist. As of this point in the argument, it is an unknown.

Well, okay, I’m making an assumption on the nature of God - but it’s a common representation.

Again, this is all question begging. The existence of a deity is what is in question at this time, so it is circular to go on about these things.

Again, this is a common belief of what the Christian God is, and does. It’s a spectacular claim.

Is it? I could just as easily say it is common sense to say God exists, but I doubt you would find that reasonable. Why cannot I object to your “common sense” or “intuitive” anti-solipsism?

Well, I find your suggestion that the existence of God is as common sense as the existence of the computer that I can see, touch, predict its behaviour (although it is Windows…) to be puzzling.

It is a good question to answer: why are you not a solipsist? I can say why: because I hold my intellect detects beings outside itself, and, reflecting on its act of knowing, becomes aware that it is not those objects which it knows.

I would say largely the same thing. I just find it irritating when people start trotting out questions like “How do you know that you exist,” as if such a question offers any kind of startling insight into the nature of reality.

This is important, because it establishes the ability for the intellect to grasp other beings – not imaginatively or illusively (as would a solipsist hold) – but truly. From this it follows, that there are actual, real beings – things or objects – outside my own existence. This is a fundamental point of metaphysics which must be grasped in the traditional proofs of God’s existence.

Yes, I believe that there is a universe that exists regardless of whether I exist.

Then you must hold the mind can know that things exist “in themselves.” This admission is fundamental.

Again, this seams reasonable as a statement.

The proof procedes then: all beings receive existence from logically prior beings (not necessarily temporal.) All things in act receive that act from some other being, which indicates that each being which received act, was thenforth in potency in respect to that act, and is now, after having received its act, in potency to what it was. Thus, by reductio ad absurdum, we must posit a being which receives no potency, because we cannot procede to infinity, or no being would ever receive act.

How do we know that all beings receive existence from prior beings? We have axiomatic proof that this is the case for physical objects. Your reference to the reduction ad absurdum equates to the argument from ignorance here - you see an infinite regress as absurd, therefore there must be a backstop. While I agree that this seems instinctive, instinct is not good enough to provide proof.

But even if, for the sake of the argument, I were to concede the existence of such a first cause (I made this concession for WSP also, but he wouldn’t go further until I accepted his argument for a first cause, which was unconvincing). How can we determine the nature of the backstop? And why only one backstop? Why not many simultaneous ‘first’ causes?

Geocentricity may hold more weight than you think. What perspective do we have of the universe, but a geocentric one after all? That is beside the point however.

To take that to the extreme, we each hold a ‘me-centric’ perspective, surely?

It is unfortunate that the first cause proof is not treated of more profoundly in common literature. But if you seriously want a good treatment of it, see Garrigou-Lagrange’s “God: His Existence and Nature” in 2 volumes.

Is it free!!?

I don’t think the Christian God can be proven with the metaphysical certainty of the first cause. What I am going after is simply a “first cause” or “completely actual being” whose “essence is existence.” I don’t think you can deduce the Trinity from this, the virgin birth, etc. (It is odd, however, that a 2,000+ year old text has a “god” telling a man his name is “I AM WHO AM” . )

Thank you for your response.

Okay, well let’s focus just on that then. I think you’ve attempted to prove a first cause, and I’ve rebutted it. How do you respond to my rebuttal?

 

[wanstronian]

Wanstronian - You commit a strawman by saying, if I’m reading you right, that the FSM could fill the requirements of the Necessary Being even if it were proven to exist (though the possibility of it not being God is left open). The problem is it doesn’t, is considered a strawman even by some atheists. You didn’t show how it equated God, or how it filled the requirements, but compared it to God as serving the task as Necessary Being. This, according to my self-teaching in philosophy, is right up the alley of a strawman.

The FSM is obviously a flippant response, but it serves its purpose. I posited a wild and unevidenced first cause, which you can’t prove wrong. It doesn’t equate to God, why should it? I simply replace God with the FSM as the first cause, and explained how it created everything. The hypothesis was not serious, but the point is. One can define any arbitrary start to the universe with little fear of being proved wrong. God is just one example.

Now, for circular reasoning, I confess I may have misread you, but this is based on how I interpreted it. You said theists can’t define God’s personality and properties until his existence is proven. But if this is right, we can never prove God because we don’t know what God is, how he acts, or any other properties he has! By this logic, I can live my entire life being agnostic towards oranges (the fruit).

I think I objected to a poster (can’t remember who) attempting to define God into existence by stating that one of his properties is that he’s necessary, then saying that this proves that if he could possibly exist, he must exist.

If you’re talking about something different, help me out and tell me what post I should be looking at!

 

[Windfish]

Okay, well let’s focus just on that then. I think you’ve attempted to prove a first cause, and I’ve rebutted it. How do you respond to my rebuttal?

Huh? Where did this happen?

 

[awatkins69]

I think I objected to a poster (can’t remember who) attempting to define God into existence by stating that one of his properties is that he’s necessary, then saying that this proves that if he could possibly exist, he must exist.

'Twas I, my friend! And it’s all true. Most people define God in this manner. Let g be God. If it something is g, then it is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfect in all possible worlds. If it does not fit this definition, it is not God. Now, “in all possible worlds” is just another word for “necessary”. They are equivalent terms, logically speaking. That’s just definitions here.

If something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary. This is called the S5 axiom of modal logic. It’s not very controversial. And of course, if it is necessary, then it is actual. That is to say, it is the case in the actual world.

This post is explanatory. What I’d really like to hear what you have to say about, is this:

…help me out and tell me what post I should be looking at!

#140.

 

[Spock]

To make life easy, I’ll do away with the necessary being idea, and just use God. We’ll take God to be a being which is omniscient, omnipotent, all-good, and supreme in every possible world.

1. God is either necessary or impossible.
2. God is not impossible.
3. Therefore, God is necessary.

The argument is valid. Therefore, you must deny some premise. So don’t dodge the question; deny a premise.

This is simply hilarious! The best joke I have seen in a long time.

You define God as being existent in every possible world - which is the definition of a “necessary” being. Then you create a bogus syllogism, which is dependent on this “definition”. And then you triumphantly declare that your syllogism “proved” God’s existence. Why bother with the syllogism, if you already defined God as a being which is “necessary”?

You see, the proper way to go is this:

We conduct a thought experiment based upon the perfectly valid concept of “possible world”. A world is called a “possible world”, if it differs from our existing world in some respect or another. For example, in a different possible world the Andromeda galaxy might be missing, or there might be an extra galaxy between the Milky Way and Andromeda. The first problem is that there are infinitely many possible worlds. Then we must examine all the possible worlds and see if there is an entity, which happens to exist in all of them. The existence of such an entity cannot be “presumed”, of course - unlike you did. It is the end result of this thought experiment - provided that the experiment is successful.

Now, it is impossible to examine all the possible worlds, since there are infinitely many of them, therefore you have an impossible task on your hand. However, it is very simple to show two possible worlds, which have nothing in common, and thus we can disprove the existence of a “necessary” being. The way to do this is simple. The number of enitites in a possible world is unspecified, it can be any number from one to any arbitrarily large number. There is no reason to assume that a possible world “must” contain at least “n” entities. I leave the rest of the argument as homework. Find two worlds, which have absolutely nothing in common. It is very easy.

And, thank you for the best laugh I had in a very long time.

 

[awatkins69]

This is simply hilarious! The best joke I have seen in a long time.

You define God as being existent in every possible world - which is the definition of a “necessary” being. Then you create a bogus syllogism, which is dependent on this “definition”. And then you triumphantly declare that your syllogism “proved” God’s existence. Why bother with the syllogism, if you already defined God as a being which is “necessary”?

You see, the proper way to go is this:

We conduct a thought experiment based upon the perfectly valid concept of “possible world”. A world is called a “possible world”, if it differs from our existing world in some respect or another. For example, in a different possible world the Andromeda galaxy might be missing, or there might be an extra galaxy between the Milky Way and Andromeda. The first problem is that there are infinitely many possible worlds. Then we must examine all the possible worlds and see if there is an entity, which happens to exist in all of them. The existence of such an entity cannot be “presumed”, of course - unlike you did. It is the end result of this thought experiment - provided that the experiment is successful.

Now, it is impossible to examine all the possible worlds, since there are infinitely many of them, therefore you have an impossible task on your hand. However, it is very simple to show two possible worlds, which have nothing in common, and thus we can disprove the existence of a “necessary” being. The way to do this is simple. The number of enitites in a possible world is unspecified, it can be any number from one to any arbitrarily large number. There is no reason to assume that a possible world “must” contain at least “n” entities. I leave the rest of the argument as homework. Find two worlds, which have absolutely nothing in common. It is very easy.

And, thank you for the best laugh I had in a very long time.

Hi. You don’t think **anything **is necessary then? Not even “2+2=4”? Or “something cannot both be and not-be in the same respect”? And I’m hilarious?

I guess I’ll start here. Consider this argument, for the conclusion that necessarily something exists, namely S:

Let S = “Something exists” and N = “nothing exists”. We assume that N is possibly true.

1. If N is possibly true, then S, is only true contingently.
2. There are some possible worlds in which S is false and possible worlds in which S is true. (From 1)
3. In the worlds in which S is true, something exists.
4. In the worlds in which S is false, something exists, viz. S, since something can only have a property (e.g. “falsity”) if it exists.
5. Every proposition is either true, or if not true, then false.
6. Every world has something in it (at least S).
7. Hence, it is not possible that nothing exists.
8. Thus, necessarily, something exists.

You can see how we would say that S exists necessarily, right? The only real objection I can think of is if you hold to a deflationary theory of truth you might reject (4). Then we’re going to get into some real metaphysical work.

 

[Spock]

Hi. You don’t think **anything **is necessary then? Not even “2+2=4”? Or “something cannot both be and not-be in the same respect”? And I’m hilarious?

I guess I’ll start here. Consider this argument, for the conclusion that necessarily something exists, namely S:

Let S = “Something exists” and N = “nothing exists”. We assume that N is possibly true.

1. If N is possibly true, then S, is only true contingently.
2. There are some possible worlds in which S is false and possible worlds in which S is true. (From 1)
3. In the worlds in which S is true, something exists.
4. In the worlds in which S is false, something exists, viz. S, since something can only have a property (e.g. “falsity”) if it exists.
5. Every proposition is either true, or if not true, then false.
6. Every world has something in it (at least S).
7. Hence, it is not possible that nothing exists.
8. Thus, necessarily, something exists.

You can see how we would say that S exists necessarily, right? The only real objection I can think of is if you hold to a deflationary theory of truth you might reject (4). Then we’re going to get into some real metaphysical work.

Lots of objections here. First and foremost you talk about “propositions” and not “objects” or “entities”. Propositions do not exist independently from someone who makes those propositions. In a world where there are no higher level intelligent beings, who can make propositions, the “2 + 2 = 4” is neither true, nor false, it simply does not exist.

Second, I object to your 5). A proposition can be self-refuting, thus neither true nor false, for example: “this sentence is false”. Another kind of proposition which has no true or false value attached to it could be: “at this particular geographic location it will rain tomorrow”. At the moment, when this proposition is uttered, it is impossible to attach a true or false value to it. It is simply undecided.

Now, accepting your line of arguments (despite its problems), your final conclusion is: “something exists”. Hardly a world-shattering observation. Since “nothing” is just a concept, and not an ontological object, we can safely say that the proposition: “nothing exists” is nonsensical.

The real trouble is that the “necessary” existence is supposed to point to some concrete entity (God, mayhaps), and not a vague, undefined “something”.

 

[awatkins69]

Lots of objections here. First and foremost you talk about “propositions” and not “objects” or “entities”. Propositions do not exist independently from someone who makes those propositions. In a world where there are no higher level intelligent beings, who can make propositions, the “2 + 2 = 4” is neither true, nor false, it simply does not exist.

I hope you’re still having a jolly time in laughter.

2+2=4 is neither true nor false? You’re starting to make me laugh! Now, I’m not saying your position is indefensible, but it’s interesting that you don’t think anything is necessary. I can’t think of anybody who thinks that there is no thing that is necessary. Not even tautologies like the law of non-contradiction?

Anyways, you make a very good point in the underlined part. However, I don’t think 2+2=4 can be neither true nor false. It’s necessarily true. And, since as you say a proposition can only exist dependent upon a mind, *pace *Plato, there must be some mind in which necessary propositions exist. Necessarily S implies necessarily M. If you want, I can formalize this argument more clearly. Just ask.

Second, I object to your 5). A proposition can be self-refuting, thus neither true nor false, for example: “this sentence is false”. Another kind of proposition which has no true or false value attached to it could be: “at this particular geographic location it will rain tomorrow”. At the moment, when this proposition is uttered, it is impossible to attach a true or false value to it. It is simply undecided.

The first sentence is not a proposition. Propositions are truthbearers. The second one is a little trickier. One solution is to say that the proposition “it will rain tomorrow” is either true or false. For example, an omniscient God “sees” all events timelessly. That doesn’t mean they weren’t done freely of course. You may object to the idea of an omniscient God. But then you’re going back to my original argument.

Either way, this is sort of irrelevant, because the proposition “something exists” is either true or false. No problem of future contingents or liar paradoxes here. We can change (5) to read “S is either true, or if not true, then false.” The validity is perfectly preserved.

Now, accepting your line of arguments (despite its problems), your final conclusion is: “something exists”. Hardly a world-shattering observation. Since “nothing” is just a concept, and not an ontological object, we can safely say that the proposition: “nothing exists” is nonsensical.

Oh, good. But certainly “there is a possible world which does not contain any entity” is not non-sensical. So at least we’ve disproven that.

The real trouble is that the “necessary” existence is supposed to point to some concrete entity (God, mayhaps), and not a vague, undefined “something”.

Not just some vague “something” (although we have proven that). We’ve proven the abstract object, the proposition “S”, is necessary (contra your implausible hypothesis of nothing being necessary). As you say, abstract objects depend in their conceptual existence upon minds. So if S implies a mind, and necessarily S, then necessarily a mind in which S inheres. Are minds concrete enough for ye? (Maybe not a good conclusion for the materialist, because in those worlds in which no physical being is instantiated, we still have that pesky mind.)

Like I said, you’re going to have to go back and deny (4) somehow. I don’t think these sort of objections, which I’ve already thought of, work. If you really want to deny it you’re going to have to get into some deflationism.

And to get back on thread, I know that Dawkins has **really **thought about this stuff, he just doesn’t want to go too fast for his readers.

 

[awatkins69]

Now, I can’t go on about everything. So if you’re interested in talking about this more, we can do a few things.

1. We can continue to discuss this argument to get to the conclusion that “necessarily, something exists.”
2. We can accept the argument, take the conclusion that “the proposition S exists necessarily” and move on to the conceptual argument for a divine mind which I’ve laid out in passing remark.
3. We can accept the argument’s conclusion that “necessarily, something exists”, and move on to a different argument to a necessary being, and discuss why this is God.
4. We can accept the argument, conclude that there is such a thing as necessity (which the vast majority of people *do *accept), and see what ramifications this has for my *original *argument which you found very funny (though most people take Alvin Plantinga more seriously than you do).
5. We can stop, because everyone has finals this week.

It’s up to you though. Best.

 

[Spock]

Anyways, you make a very good point in the underlined part. However, I don’t think 2+2=4 can be neither true nor false. It’s necessarily true. And, since as you say a proposition can only exist dependent upon a mind, *pace *Plato, there must be some mind in which necessary propositions exist.

Nope, that does not follow. There are some philosophers who argue for the “existence” of “abstract objects”. I deny the validity of such a view, and I have some arguments against it.

Abstract objects are assumed to be numbers, letters, musical notes, thoughts, and the like. Of course also combinations of these entities. Based upon this view, Hamlet, for example is an abstract object, which “exists” independently of us, which has been “discovered” by Shakespeare, rather than created by him. Or Beethoven merely “discovered” the Ninth Symphony, rather than composed it, ex nihilo. Furthermore, if some orchestra would perform the Ninth, and one musician would make one false note, would that mean that he just happened to “discover” a brand new “abstract object”? Or is the German translation of Hamlet constitute a new “abstract object”? If the typesetter made a mistake, did he just dicover a new “abstract object”? I hope that you see the absurdity on this view. Abstract objects are bogus concept, just like “necessary” existence is.

The same applies to to 2 + 2 = 4. It is a valid proposition, provided if there is someone who made this proposition.

The first sentence is not a proposition.

Oh, brother. Why would it not be? Suppose I would utter a sentence in a language you do not speak. For me it would be a perfectly valid proposition, for you it would only be gobbledegook. You wish to “define” propositions as utterances, which you can decide? That is total nonsense. Suppose that a brand new scientific proposition comes along, the validity of which is “still up in the air”. By your definition, it is not a “proposition”, since we do not know yet, if it is true or not.

The second one is a little trickier. One solution is to say that the proposition “it will rain tomorrow” is either true or false. For example, an omniscient God “sees” all events timelessly.

Another “oh, brother” moment. You wish to prove God’s existence somehow. Then you cannot invoke God’s alleged “omniscience” to argue this. This proposition is neither true nor false.

Oh, good. But certainly “there is a possible world which does not contain any entity” is not non-sensical. So at least we’ve disproven that.

It is true in one sense. Such a world cannot exist physically. But as an abstraction it is perfectly valid. Mathematicians routinely deal with “empty sets”, and find them extremely useful.

Not just some vague “something” (although we have proven that). We’ve proven the abstract object, the proposition “S”, is necessary (contra your implausible hypothesis of nothing being necessary). As you say, abstract objects depend in their conceptual existence upon minds. So if S implies a mind, and necessarily S, then necessarily a mind in which S inheres.

First, I deny the concept of “abstract objects”. Second, dependence of the proposition “S” upon a mind does not lead to the existence of a mind. All we can say: “if there would be a mind to conceive it, then the proposition ‘S’ would be true”. And that makes the “necessarily” true proposition only “contingently” true. Curiousier and curiousier - as Alice would say.

 

[The_Exodus]

Thank you for the responses Wanstronian. I hope we can continue dialogue.

But this proves nothing, certainly not that the ‘proof’ is reasonable.

It proves that it may be reasonable, even if it fails to convince, which was my initial point.
wans:

True in principle, although I’m not sure what subconscious desire the atheist has for disbelief. It is of no benefit to the atheist if God doesn’t exist.

I can imagine all sorts of unconcious desires, not only by atheists, but believers, for “wishing” God didn’t exist – particularly judgment, and Christ’s own words: if you deny me, I will also deny you.
wans:

If you mean, “By what criteria do I distinguish myself,” I’m not sure I can explain it. But I think I may be missing the point of your question…

The point of my question is to determine the fact that there are other “beings” or “things” outside yourself, that really exists, whether or not you think they do. I’m trying to steer clear of radical idealism which says “existence is perception” and Schopenhauer’s “world as representation of will” philosophy.

Basically, I’m trying to put forth the philosophy of St. Thomas - Because I exist, therefore I think; instead of Descartes - Because I think, therefore I exist.

If we start off with Descartes, existence, truth, being, etc. all depend on our intellect, instead of our intellect depending on them. Reality as it were is just what we think it is, and we form it or “categorically project” it as Kantians would say. According to St. Thomas and the classical method, we rather apprehend and discover it.
wans:

Well, I find your suggestion that the existence of God is as common sense as the existence of the computer that I can see, touch, predict its behaviour (although it is Windows…) to be puzzling.

Because if solipsism is true, that computer in front of you doesn’t really exist outside your perception of it. Difficult to wrap your head around, I know, but if “existence is perception” (which is the logical conclusion of relativism and idealist existentialism), then, strictly speaking, the computer’s existence depends on your knowing it, instead of your knowing it depending on its existence. In other words, its “being” depends on you.

Yet, if we admit that being is independent of our thought – the computer exists in and of itself, whatever we think about it – we have made a great step in epistemology. Being determines our intellect, and not vice versa.
wans:

I would say largely the same thing. I just find it irritating when people start trotting out questions like “How do you know that you exist,” as if such a question offers any kind of startling insight into the nature of reality.

But the answer to that question offers tremendous insight.
wans:

Yes, I believe that there is a universe that exists regardless of whether I exist.

Then you are, epistemologically speaking, (in general terms) a Thomist or classical Scholastic.
wans:

How do we know that all beings receive existence from prior beings? We have axiomatic proof that this is the case for physical objects. Your reference to the reduction ad absurdum equates to the argument from ignorance here - you see an infinite regress as absurd, therefore there must be a backstop. While I agree that this seems instinctive, instinct is not good enough to provide proof.

Great questions here.

We do not know that “all beings” receive existence from prior beings. (In fact, if this were true the first cause would receive existence from a prior being.) We merely know that all beings which we *sense *do. Now, since an infinite regress in this way is absurd, and since we have both agree that the intellect does not determine reality, but is determined by it, we must admit that there really is some other sort of being (or even beings), which exist in a fundamentally different way than sensible beings. If we say that reductio is not a proper method of argument, we have fallen back into idealism by saying that thought determines reality, since this “absurdum” that I’m thinking (or trying to think) may in fact be true. But the intellect gets its knowledge of being from reality itself. This is where it “learns” reality’s laws – i.e. the law of contradiction, identity, cause/effect. The intellect doesn’t “make up” these things, else we lapse back into idealism and say that the computer doesn’t really exist in front of me, but my perception determines its existence.
wans:

How can we determine the nature of the backstop? And why only one backstop? Why not many simultaneous ‘first’ causes?

Since it is a “backstop” as you nicely put it, it must be first and must precede all other beings. It also cannot be “many simultaneous first causes” (though I admit this is an interesting objection), because there would then be no real “first” cause at all. If ten people picked up the same car at one time, none would be the “first” one to do so.

However, supposing the first cause contained “within itself” more than one “personality” (such as the Trinity), I see no problem with admitting, in this sense, “many simultaneous first causes.” I am not trying to prove many simultaneous first causes, but only to show that, so long as the “many” is applied to the personality, and not the essence or being, it may be possible. This gets into Trinitarian theology however (something I’m not familiar with), which I can by no means readily prove, nor am I trying to show how it is reasonable. Only that it is not impossible.

 

[awatkins69]

The same applies to to 2 + 2 = 4. It is a valid proposition, provided if there is someone who made this proposition.

Don’t worry, I read the rest and I am not ignoring it Now, that’s fair enough. However, given your view of abstract objects (or propositions, or whatever), and that all abstract objects are the qualitatively the same (you say they are all contingent) then it follows that just as Beethoven created Symphony 9 ex nihilo, minds created *the truth value *of 2+2=4 ex nihilo. This is much more absurd than the idea that necessary propositions actually exist to be truthbearers. Consider a possible world where there are only five people. When they are not thinking “2+2=4”, is the proposition still true? Suppose they all get knocked out into a coma for 3 days. Was “2+2=4” neither true nor false for three days?

Moreover, you miss the point that I’m only speaking about necessary truths. And if it seems like there are an infinite number of necessary truths, all the better for the hypothesis of an omniscient mind.

Finally, this idea of truth doesn’t even make sense. How does my thinking 2+2=4 make it true?

Oh, brother. Why would it not be? Suppose I would utter a sentence in a language you do not speak. For me it would be a perfectly valid proposition, for you it would only be gobbledegook. You wish to “define” propositions as utterances, which you can decide? That is total nonsense. Suppose that a brand new scientific proposition comes along, the validity of which is “still up in the air”. By your definition, it is not a “proposition”, since we do not know yet, if it is true or not.

I think you missed the point. I didn’t say it wasn’t a proposition because it’s in a different language or because I don’t understand it. I said it’s not a proposition because it’s not capable of having a truth-maker. It’s not a truthbearer.

Another “oh, brother” moment. You wish to prove God’s existence somehow. Then you cannot invoke God’s alleged “omniscience” to argue this. This proposition is neither true nor false.

I don’t see why not. I’m not proving God’s existence with this argument. If there could be any objective observer and the truth-value of the future contingent could be known, then there is a truth-value to the future contingent. But please, let’s forget all about this.

Like I said, leave the problems of future contingents and liar paradoxes aside. I won’t discuss them anymore, because they are not applicable. Better yet, I’ll give you that there is a third truth-value, “unknown”. Or a fourth one. An nth one. Whatever you want.

Just change the premise (5) to say “S is either true, or false, or unknown, or x^y” The validity stays the same. If “unknown” is a property of the proposition S, S must exist to have the property.

It is true in one sense. Such a world cannot exist physically. But as an abstraction it is perfectly valid. Mathematicians routinely deal with “empty sets”, and find them extremely useful.

What does this mean? It’s physically possible, but abstractly possible? This just doesn’t make sense to me and you’ll have to explain. I’m familiar with empty sets. That doesn’t make them possible in any sense. They are conceivable, if that’s what you mean.

First, I deny the concept of “abstract objects”. Second, dependence of the proposition “S” upon a mind does not lead to the existence of a mind. All we can say: “if there would be a mind to conceive it, then the proposition ‘S’ would be true”. And that makes the “necessarily” true proposition only “contingently” true. Curiousier and curiousier - as Alice would say.

I don’t understand what abstract objects, concepts, etc. are if they don’t exist, as you said above. That’s just unintelligible to me. It’s also unintelligible how conceiving something makes it true. Why is it that when I conceive 2+2=5 that is not true? I really don’t get this. If I conceive 2+2=4, and it is not my conceiving it that makes it true, then there is some truth-maker for that proposition external to me. What could that be?

 

[The_Exodus]

All we can say: “if there would be a mind to conceive it, then the proposition ‘S’ would be true”. And that makes the “necessarily” true proposition only “contingently” true. Curiousier and curiousier - as Alice would say.

I actually agree that all this follows, were it first proven God did not exist. However, on its own (and if God’s existence is unknown) it refutes itself. Or, at least it is an indefensible fideism and has no argumentative weight. Why? Because it turns all propositions into contingent propositions, even the proposition in question - that “God does not exist” (or its opposite.)

Yet, if that is the case, one can simply deny axiomatically whatever proposition you offer, and you cannot say anything. You cannot justify your claim over his, since the truth of your proposition is contingent upon your mind. Hence, if your mind were not thinking – or if another’s mind was thinking the opposite – your proposition would be false and its contrary true.

If we start with Descartes, and if we start with our mind determining truth, and we end in existiential idealism and “propositional relativism” as it were.

 

[awatkins69]

Also, consider this. Maybe it’s simpler.

(1) There is a possible world W where there are no contingent beings.
(2) There is no possible world where no being is instantiated. (we agreed with that, yes?)
(3) Therefore, W must contain a necessary being.

That means:
(4) Possibly, there is a necessary being.
(5) There is a necessary being. (S5)

That means there is at least one thing that is necessary.

 

[awatkins69]

I actually agree that all this follows, were it first proven God did not exist. However, on its own (and if God’s existence is unknown) it refutes itself. Or, at least it is an indefensible fideism and has no argumentative weight. Why? Because it turns all propositions into contingent propositions, even the proposition in question - that “God does not exist” (or its opposite.)

That’s a good point. If all propositions are contingent, by definition, the proposition “God exists” is true in some possible worlds and false in others. But if God is a being Who maximally exemplifies His properties, He exemplifies them in all possible worlds. And thus is necessary. And thus “God exists” is true in all possible worlds.

Huh???

Yet, if that is the case, one can simply deny axiomatically whatever proposition you offer, and you cannot say anything. You cannot justify your claim over his, since the truth of your proposition is contingent upon your mind. Hence, if your mind were not thinking – or if another’s mind was thinking the opposite – your proposition would be false and its contrary true.

If we start with Descartes, and if we start with our mind determining truth, and we end in existiential idealism and “propositional relativism” as it were.

Yes. This is the part that doesn’t make sense to me. I don’t understand how my conceiving “2+2=4” makes it true, but my conceiving “2+2=5” doesn’t, if there is no external and objective truth-maker or “standard”.