But you implicitly extended this to the actual building blocks of our body, and that is not substantiated. Neither a-priori nor a-posteriori.
Why is this extention unjustified? I do not see the difference between matter’s nature, which you are trying to draw. I do not see the
size of matter changing the fact that all change requires a cause.
spock said:
]
You are talking about a billiard ball bumping into another one and thus causing it to move. I am talking about the Brownian motion of the molecules, or the movement of electrons around the nucleus (crude picture, not to be taken literally). You cannot reduce those to “outside” causative agents.
Are you saying that “molecules” have a sort of inherit “motion-ness” to them? Are they, by nature, in movement? (If so, this is the notion of Heraclitus which, I believe, Aristotle refuted.)
It seems to me that invoking the term “Brownian” does little to solve the problem, since the theory dissolves into being coming from non-being, or constant creation ex nihilo (if motion and movement have no cause). Perhaps you could better explain to me what you mean by “Brownian,” and how it is different from the material causation that I am putting forward a posteriori. You’ve yet to say
how it is different. You’ve only *stated *that it is.
spock:
It is very relevant. Your line of arguments is that the universe is one huge, uninterrupted causal chain, which then you assume to have a “first” event. The existence of free decisions (which are assumed) contradicts that picture.
But Spock, I’ve never once maintained that the human person is entirely physical or material. I’m moving from observable, physical reality, to posit an immaterial cause. That is all.
Furthermore, I’ve said nothing of “free decisions.” Even if it were true (which I do not maintain) that free choice is an illusion, it would not invalidate my argument.
spock:
Right. I prefer the word “entity”, because the word “being” has overtones. We usually talk about living beings and that is what I wish to avoid.
You say tomato, I say tomato. We can use “entity” if you like, but the implication is the same, as is the thrust of my argument.
spock:
Or you stop somewhere and say that this particular entity needs no explanation - thus contradicting the PSR. And here is your reductio ad absurdum. Presumably this final entity for you is God. If God is exempt from the PSR, then the PSR is universally applicable. If there is one exception, there can be others, and indeed our free decisions are such examples. (And that is why I bring them up).
The argument is a posteriori. I’m not sure we are in agreement on this point. We find, empirically, that the things we sense have certain kinds of causes. But, if this is the case for
everything we sense, then the universe would be absurd. We are not justified in making the same claims about God – an entity we have no experience of. But we have empirical reasons to make such claims about the nature of the material world.
spock:
I said before that formally, the materialistic and theistic worldviews are identical. They both stop the PSR at a certain point. The materialists stop at STEM, the theists stop at God. Do you see the formal equivalence?
Not at all, since there is observable motion and change. If there was no change, then there would be equivalence, and God would be an unnecessary hypothesis. As it stands, change requires an explanation. That explanation itself cannot be a previous change (either temporal or causal), and so on ad infinitum, because that view is self refuting. An infinite amount of idiots do not make one smart man. Neither does an infinitely long paintbrush give you an artist.
spock:
Instead of postulating STEM, which is observable, you posit God, which is not observable.
I never claimed God was observable, only that the effects of such a being are.
spock:
of the natural laws which are the inherent properties on STEM, you posit a very strange picture, in which there is an immaterial entity, which can nevertheless “somehow” influence matter (thus contradicting the preservation laws).
The phrase “natural laws are inherent properties on STEM” is particularly vague. Do you mean these laws “come from” STEM? “Natural law” is a term, so far as I can tell, entirely devoid of meaning from a materialist standpoint - a sort of natural deity that gives explanation to the order and motion in the universe.
What do you mean by “natural laws are inherent properties on STEM,” and how would you substantiate that assertion?
spock:
Also, the positing of this “faceless” God can only be used as an “explanation” for having the Universe in the first place. From that it does not follow that this God still exists, nor can you reach the other attributes you claim the “real” God has.
I never said anything about explaining God’s “face” nor his other attributes, so this is more or less a straw man.
Further, since the very proofs themselves require an ever present, immovable, changeless cause, they do indeed establish the existence of such a cause as “still” existing. (Your use of the temporal word “still” indicates you’re fundamentally misunderstanding the argument. It is not trying to show that the universe cannot be eternally old, or eternally in time.)
spock:
In your picture would there is no place for “faith” either - which is a principle tenet of theism.
This is a generalization. For one, many theists have no recourse to faith (take, for example, the deists of the Enlightenment.) Secondly, I’ve made no claims to God’s “revelation” – i.e. the Trinity, the virgin birth, the resurrection, etc. In other words, one could posit the first cause and still reject all faith claims about “Jesus of Nazareth.”