God, other minds and the infinite epistemological regress

[Matthias123]

Let large Greek letters be a belief and let small Greek letters be the belief that justifies a belief.

Α → α → β → γ → δ → ζ -->η….]

A belief needs to be justified in order for it to be considered rational. A belief that is justified is justified by a belief other then itself, and this belief is justified by another belief, and this belief needs to be justified by another et cetra. Therefore we will regress into an infinite series justifying beliefs, and never actually finishing the set to justify belief Α.

Now there are several ways of responding to this problem. There is firstly, the position of scepticism. The sceptic claims “the only thing that I know is that I don’t know anything”. This position holds that no beliefs can possibly be justified.

The second is trying to form some sort of a “loop”, but this ultimately begs the question.

The third coherence theory, but this is not compatible with orthodox correspondence theory, which is not satisfactory in the opinion of most people.

The fourth is foundationalism that offers the promise of a solution. This solution postulates the existence of “basic beliefs” that themselves need no justification.

Now such basic beliefs must have criteria in order for them to be classified as “basic”. Although knowing such criteria for certain is not possible because the criteria per se would have to be a basic belief, otherwise the argument would be self refuting. The criteria of basic beliefs are not in themselves basic beliefs therefore we cannot know the criteria for certain.

So given this landscape, what can we say on justifying the belief in God? I believe that the theist can rationally assert that the belief in the existence of God can be an epistemological basic belief.

Take for example a basic belief that we all hold in common, the belief that there are other minds then our own. We see the operation of other material bodies that are similar in appearance, function to ourselves, and share the same fundamental parts. We then infer by our intuition that these beings must have a mind as we do.

Now there is no fundamental logic that can prove to me that there are other minds then my own. It could come to pass that we will know the material brain to an extent where we do not need to postulate an immaterial intellect. I am playing Devil’s advocate here because I don’t believe the mind brain gap can be filled, only bridged. Yet from our knowledge right now, you cannot prove to me that you in fact you actually have a mind as I do. The only reason I know that you have a mind is due to a prior knowledge. This means I know you have a mind by intuition and not from logical reasoning.

In the same way, most theists view the existence of God. I obviously uphold the teaching of Mother Church that we can come to know the existence of God for certain, by the light of natural reason. Yet I do not believe this is necessaryto justify our belief in God. As we come to the knowledge of his existence by a prior reasoning, by viewing the world, acknowledging it’s existence, characteristics, the way it operations, it’s awe and majesty, and we infer by intuition that it is due to a Supreme Mind. Many people who are not religious come to the knowledge of the existence of what they call “a higher power” in this same method.

Now even if we have a complete knowledge of the phenomenon in the universe, we will still be able to hold our basic belief due to the presence of the why question. Asking why something is so, is characteristically human – when a terrorist attack happens and kills thousands of people the first thing we ask is, why? The victims are always asking – why me?

Now there needs to be a distinction between the species of why. I believe there exists two species of “why” questions: Primary why and exclusive why.

An exclusive “why” is an enquiry into a specific isolated phenomenon. The biologist asks “why does the camillian change colour?”, the answer is to hide itself from predators. A primary why would be an enquiry into why something happens to be the way it is. Why was the species “camillian”, in this situation, in a place where it was forced to evolve such camouflage in order to survive? This “why” questions the final end of evolution itself, what purpose is there in the evolution of species?

Then we must ask, why should anything exist at all?

Claiming “it just does” is avoiding the question. One must either demonstrate that it does actually have no purpose otherwise it is open to explanation.

Saying that we should not ask such questions is also avoiding the question, by effectively confessing ignorance.

So unless it is demonstrated for certain that there is no purpose to all that exists, and that there is no potential for this position to be reversed, our basic belief in God is epistemologically justified.

 

[Matthias123]

Objection 1:

It seems that God is not the same as other minds. As a child sometimes when seeing a door being closed by itself due to a change in air pressure attributes this to an “invisible friend” shutting the door, as he does not know about air pressure. When he eventually learns about air pressure he will abandon the notion of an invisible friend as irrational. In the same way the existence of God is in error.

Response to objection 2:

On the contrary, this is non sequtor, as the potential to solve questions of meaning and purpose of the exclusive “why” does not result in the notion of the existence of God as a basic belief being fallacious. Although we can demonstrate that God exists through causality, this is not needed for most people as we can hold the notion that God exists through the lack of explanation of the “primary why”. Until this “primary why” can dismissed, one can hold the belief in God as a basic belief.

Objection 2:

It seems that in stating that God is the same as other minds, one is letting anything come under human knowledge. For if God can be a basic belief, then any other belief which are obviously superstitious may come be claimed as basic beliefs. We know that these superstitious beliefs are false by the light of human reason, then it follows that this epistemology is not satisfactory.

Response to objection 2:

On the contrary, since the criterion of a basic belief is not itself a basic belief, then the notion that one can know the criteria of a basic belief is self-contradictory. Therefore you cannot know that holding God as a basic belief will open “pandora’s box” and cause any belief to be accepted as knowledge.

I answer that the notion of the existence of a Supreme Mind, is the similar to the notion of the existence of humans minds other then your own, due to the existence of the “primary why” inquiry. Can we not explain why the statue of the statue of David exists by the mind of Michelangelo? Can we not explain why abstract art is the way it is by the mind of the artist? For obviously this art is primarily a creation of the intellect of the artist and no other. If one were to ask, why the painting exists in the way it does, we would say the artist made it so. So if we are to take the cosmos, can we not say it is the way it is because the Supreme Artist made it so – who Himself is self-existent and self-explaining due to being existence per se, and truth per se?

 

[Touchstone]

Now such basic beliefs must have criteria in order for them to be classified as “basic”. Although knowing such criteria for certain is not possible because the criteria per se would have to be a basic belief, otherwise the argument would be self refuting. The criteria of basic beliefs are not in themselves basic beliefs therefore we cannot know the criteria for certain.

So given this landscape, what can we say on justifying the belief in God? I believe that the theist can rationally assert that the belief in the existence of God can be an epistemological basic belief.

Well, perhaps it can be – anything’s possible. Asserting that something “can be a rational belief” (or maybe we should say “justified true belief”) isn’t saying anything at all, though. It only becomes interesting if you commit to saying that such a belief is rational, is properly basic.

But you just denied that possibility! You’ve just closed that door to yourself, as such a criteria cannot ‘bootstrap’ itself as properly basic belief in its own right. So all you have is “can”, not “is”, which is nothing more than saying "the winning lottery numbers can be “2, 35, 74, and 16” for the next drawing. Unless you are trying to play games with us and suggesting that what can be a justified true belief under the auspices of being properly basic is such, then you aren’t establishing anything at all with that assertion, any more than I am in randomly plucking out some numbers which can be picked in an upcoming lottery. They may NOT be the picked numbers, yet the may be, I don’t know. But I’m a fool to claim those are the numbers because they can be.

It’s similarly erroneous to assert that a belief in God is properly basic because one supposes it might be. In the case of the lottery numbers picked at random, we are on even better ground, as we do have a clear criterion as to what qualifies as a legitimate possibility. With “properly basic belief” we have no such criterion, and can’t have any such criterion by your own admission. We don’t even have warrant to believe a belief in God can be properly basic, but only suppose by superstition that this is the case.

As for other minds, the denial of other minds fails spectacularly as a model for our surrrounding word in comparison to a model that affirms the presnce of other minds. Other minds are far superior in terms of parsimony and evidence-matching.

Such cannot be said for the intuition of God. By theists’ admission God cannot be reconciled empirically, as other minds can, and it commits the maximal grievance against parsimony possible, the worst offense against explanatory economy one can commit.

-TS

 

[Matthias123]

Well, perhaps it can be – anything’s possible. Asserting that something “can be a rational belief” (or maybe we should say “justified true belief”) isn’t saying anything at all, though. It only becomes interesting if you commit to saying that such a belief is rational, is properly basic.

The criteria for a basic belief cannot be established – although by casting it as the same, as something that is universally accepted as a basic belief we may claim that this also is a properly basic belief. I believe it is unlikely for anyone to deny that other minds exist other then our own.

It’s similarly erroneous to assert that a belief in God is properly basic because one supposes it might be. In the case of the lottery numbers picked at random, we are on even better ground, as we do have a clear criterion as to what qualifies as a legitimate possibility. With “properly basic belief” we have no such criterion, and can’t have any such criterion by your own admission. We don’t even have warrant to believe a belief in God can be properly basic, but only suppose by superstition that this is the case.

Then I must ask you, what is properly basic if we cannot make predictions? We cannot create criteria because it is self-refuting. Therefore we are forced to make predictions; otherwise we fall into an infinite regress and into sceptic nonsense.

As for other minds, the denial of other minds fails spectacularly as a model for our surrrounding word in comparison to a model that affirms the presnce of other minds. Other minds are far superior in terms of parsimony and evidence-matching.

Yet you do not know for certain, which is what I am claiming. You depend on your intuition to come to this knowledge a prior.

Such cannot be said for the intuition of God.

I disagree, as I pointed above with the existance of the “primary why”. I can explain more of the universe with the existance of a Supreme Mind. Therefore why should I not accept his existance on intuition?

By theists’ admission God cannot be reconciled empirically, as other minds can, and it commits the maximal grievance against parsimony possible, the worst offense against explanatory economy one can commit.

I believe it can be reconciled empirically, and I believe that minds can be reconciled empirically, although because this is through a prior knowledge and is a basic belief, the theist does not need to justify his belief – even though the theist can prove it through philosophical argument a posteriori.

 

[Matthias123]

Let’s take for example your belief in the earth being round and call it beleif Α. Now in order for Α to be justified it needs to be justified by another belief – we will represent justifying beliefs by small Greek letters. Now lets say the reason that you believe the earth is round is because you have seen NASA photos – we will call this justifying belief α Now for α to be justified there needs to be a justifying belief for it. For one could ask, why you believe that these photos are trustworthy, and thus you would need to give another belief that would testify to the truth of α. Say you believe that the photos are trust worthy because you believe that the community at NASA is trustworthy – we will call this justifying belief β. Now belief β like all other justifying beliefs will have to have yet another justifying belief. I assert you that this chain of justifying beliefs is going to digress to infinity and therefore never form a set to justify the initial belief Α. Therefore you are going to have to postulate the existence of basic beliefs. Now what is a basic belief? Well to claim to know this is self-refuting, as the knowledge of the criteria of basic beliefs is not it a criteria. Even so, there are beliefs that are universally accepted to be basic beliefs, such as the existence of other minds, or the belief that we are not in a matrix. If the belief in the existence of God is just the belief is another mind, then this can be a properly basic beliefs and it does not need to be justified.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Let large Greek letters be a belief and let small Greek letters be the belief that justifies a belief.

Α → α → β → γ → δ → ζ -->η….]

A belief needs to be justified in order for it to be considered rational.

I’d like a precise definition of justification. Some reason to think it is true? Some reason to think it is more likely true than false?

A belief that is justified is justified by a belief other then itself, and this belief is justified by another belief, and this belief needs to be justified by another et cetra. Therefore we will regress into an infinite series justifying beliefs, and never actually finishing the set to justify belief Α… The fourth is foundationalism that offers the promise of a solution. This solution postulates the existence of “basic beliefs” that themselves need no justification.

Which contradicts the assertion that all beliefs need justification, so how do we distinguish basic beliefs from non-basic beliefs?

Now such basic beliefs must have criteria in order for them to be classified as “basic”. Although knowing such criteria for certain is not possible because the criteria per se would have to be a basic belief, otherwise the argument would be self refuting. The criteria of basic beliefs are not in themselves basic beliefs therefore we cannot know the criteria for certain.

This doesn’t make sense because you’ve got a bit of a dilemma here. Either the criteria need justification or they don’t.

1. The criteria don’t have to be justified, they are themselves basic beliefs. But then where are the criteria for classifying those criteria as basic beliefs, unless they are somehow self-referential.
2. The criteria would have to be justified, not being basic beliefs, and we’re off to the same problem again of avoiding an infinite regress.

So given this landscape, what can we say on justifying the belief in God? I believe that the theist can rationally assert that the belief in the existence of God can be an epistemological basic belief.

You just contradicted yourself, because you just said the epistemological basic beliefs were without rational justification.

Take for example a basic belief that we all hold in common, the belief that there are other minds then our own. We see the operation of other material bodies that are similar in appearance, function to ourselves, and share the same fundamental parts. We then infer by our intuition that these beings must have a mind as we do. Now there is no fundamental logic that can prove to me that there are other minds then my own… Yet from our knowledge right now, you cannot prove to me that you in fact you actually have a mind as I do. The only reason I know that you have a mind is due to a prior knowledge. This means I know you have a mind by intuition and not from logical reasoning.

Something we can infer cannot be a basic belief (that can’t be the criterion). You don’t **know **I have a mind with absolute certainty. You can’t **prove **you aren’t a brain in a vat and I am only an illusion. You can not even infer I have a mind using inductive reasoning, because your sample size is only 1 (your own mind), and even then you would still need a justification for induction.

Therefore, my definition of a properly basic belief is that basic beliefs are **minimal assumptions **necessary for rational argument. These assumptions may be logical (e.g. law of non-contradiction, excluded middle, etc.) or metaphysical (e.g. existence of external reality, other minds, etc.). To argue against them you need to assume them, using what Ayn Rand called the “stolen concept”.

Notice that this avoids the dilemma I posed above. The belief that the criterion for a basic belief is a minimal necessary assumption is itself a minimal necessary assumption.

In the same way, most theists view the existence of God. I obviously uphold the teaching of Mother Church that we can come to know the existence of God for certain, by the light of natural reason. Yet I do not believe this is necessary to justify our belief in God. As we come to the knowledge of his existence by a prior reasoning, by viewing the world, acknowledging it’s existence, characteristics, the way it operations, it’s awe and majesty, and we infer by intuition that it is due to a Supreme Mind. Many people who are not religious come to the knowledge of the existence of what they call “a higher power” in this same method.

Again, where is your justification for upholding the validity of inference as a basic belief?

Then we must ask, why should anything exist at all?

…

So unless it is demonstrated for certain that there is no purpose to all that exists, and that there is no potential for this position to be reversed, our basic belief in God is epistemologically justified.

Well, why should God exist?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Therefore, my definition of a properly basic belief is that basic beliefs are **minimal assumptions **necessary for rational argument. These assumptions may be logical (e.g. law of non-contradiction, excluded middle, etc.) or metaphysical (e.g. existence of external reality, other minds, etc.). To argue against them you need to assume them, using what Ayn Rand called the “stolen concept”.

Why do you need to assume other minds to argue against other minds?

 

[Matthias123]

I’d like a precise definition of justification. Some reason to think it is true? Some reason to think it is more likely true than false?

If A makes a claim, and B then casts doubt on it, A’s next move would normally be to provide justification. It is self-evident.

Which contradicts the assertion that all beliefs need justification, so how do we distinguish basic beliefs from non-basic beliefs?

Only basic beliefs do not need justification – that is what makes them basic.

This doesn’t make sense because you’ve got a bit of a dilemma here. Either the criteria need justification or they don’t.

Basic beliefs have criteria, but we cannot logically know them. It is a foundation that cannot be seen.

You don’t **know **I have a mind with absolute certainty.

Surely there are different degrees of certainty. I know that you have a mind a prior, but I do not have demonstrative knowledge.

You can’t **prove **you aren’t a brain in a vat and I am only an illusion. You can not even infer I have a mind using inductive reasoning, because your sample size is only 1 (your own mind), and even then you would still need a justification for induction.

See above

Therefore, my definition of a properly basic belief is that basic beliefs are **minimal assumptions **necessary for rational argument.

What would be a minimal neccesary assumption?

How is a minimal neccesary assumption itself a minimal neccesary assumption?

Would this minimal neccesary assumption include the belief in other mind?

Again, where is your justification for upholding the validity of inference as a basic belief?

inference was the wrong word --my mistake – the word I should have used was intuition

Well, why should God exist?

Why should I beleive you exist?

 

[Matthias123]

This is not a thomistic position, this is me trying new things.

 

[Matthias123]

Basic beliefs have criteria, but we cannot logically know them. It is a foundation that cannot be seen.

Correction, they are not self-evident and we cannot know them through reason. The above is in error

We could know them by intuition.

 

[MindOverMatter]

This is not a thomistic position, this is me trying new things.

Isn’t this Plantingas defence?

 

[Matthias123]

Isn’t this Plantingas defence?

Yes this is (my above errors are from me not understanding his argument, that is why I come here, to test arguments and learn where I am wrong.) Yet Thomas Aquanis would disagree with Plantinga. I am jumping in on Plantinga’s charge

 

[NowAgnostic]

Why do you need to assume other minds to argue against other minds?

Who are you arguing against? You’re assuming the existence of other minds that can comprehend your arguments.

 

[NowAgnostic]

If A makes a claim, and B then casts doubt on it, A’s next move would normally be to provide justification. It is self-evident.

That’s not a definition of justification. What would qualify the claim as being “justified”? What would A need to say or show?

Only basic beliefs do not need justification – that is what makes them basic.

And why don’t they need justification?

Basic beliefs have criteria, but we cannot logically know them. It is a foundation that cannot be seen.

Then we can never know which beliefs are properly basic. Thus, your argument that belief in God is properly basic fails right there - we could never know it to be basic. An atheist could just as well argue belief in no God as properly basic. That’s why I want you to flesh this out.

Surely there are different degrees of certainty. I know that you have a mind a prior, but I do not have demonstrative knowledge.

No you don’t know. You must assume. Or infer. If you didn’t know about mirages you would think that you “know” that you were seeing an oasis.

What would be a minimal neccesary assumption?

How is a minimal neccesary assumption itself a minimal neccesary assumption?

To get to the nitty-gritty, reason is the only tool we know how to use to argue for and against things. But what guarantees the validity of reason? But it is meaningless to ask the question or to attempt to argue against it, for to do so already assumes the validity of the very tool we must use to do so - reason.

Thus, a minimal necessary assumption is one necessary to make a rational argument - one which cannot be argued against without implicitly accepting it. For instance, the law of non-contradiction. You can’t argue the law of non-contradiction is false, because then it can also be true at the same time. Or that there is an objective reality comprehended by the senses - because otherwise I can’t make an argument against it because you will deny I am really making the argument in reality. From these basic axioms can follow the necessary truths of mathematics, geometry, and so on.

Your second question literally is asking how A is A, a tautology. So I’ll respond to what I think you meant. I’m saying the set of basic beliefs includes those necessary to make a rational argument, and only those. Included among those beliefs is the belief that that is the proper criterion; it is logically necessary. If one doesn’t believe that is the proper criterion, then the set of basic beliefs might not include one of the minimal necessary assumptions like law of non-contradiction, which makes it impossible to argue against the belief without implicitly accepting it. Or the set of basic beliefs could include a superfluous assumption, which I’ll get to next.

Let’s instead say the set of basic beliefs includes whatever we “intuit”. We can’t self-justify the belief that that is the proper criterion in the same way. To say we can “intuit” that belief already assumes the correctness of the criterion. I can question the validity of intuition in a way that I can’t the basic principles of logic.

Would this minimal neccesary assumption include the belief in other mind?

Yes, otherwise who are we arguing with?

inference was the wrong word --my mistake – the word I should have used was intuition

What is intuition if not inference by induction?

Why should I beleive you exist?

You have to assume I do for the purpose of arguing with me.

 

[Matthias123]

I obviously do not know my subject well enough. That is why I come on here, to test arguments.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I obviously do not know my subject well enough. That is why I come on here, to test arguments.

It’s OK; none of us are infallible either. BTW the Church (or at least certainly scholastic philosophers) have not looked favorably on Plantinga’s argument anyway; the idea that we have “intuitive” knowledge of God’s existence is known (for some unknown reason) as “ontologism” (not to be confused with proponents of the ontological argument).

I think this would help: defining an epistemologically basic belief as a proposition that we cannot prove (or at least aren’t going to try to) but must assume for the purposes of X, “intuition” as recognition of that belief, and see where that goes.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Who are you arguing against? You’re assuming the existence of other minds that can comprehend your arguments.

You laid down your own standard of basic beliefs, which I quoted and inquired about.

Therefore, my definition of a properly basic belief is that basic beliefs are minimal assumptions necessary for rational argument. These assumptions may be logical (e.g. law of non-contradiction, excluded middle, etc.) or metaphysical (e.g. existence of external reality, other minds, etc.). To argue against them you need to assume them, using what Ayn Rand called the “stolen concept”.

Why is the bolded text true of other minds? Why is that a basic belief?