God's free will and immutability

[quaestio45]

I think you’re mixing modes here, and (intuitively), I think it hurts your analysis. Moving from “a thing that’s voluntary” to a personal “you must have the ability” to the notion of a certain state-ful-ness , is just too much handwaving for it to function as a premise.

No, I don’t think I would call it hand waving but instead the absolute criteria. If something is necessary, we agree it cannot be in any other state than the state its in (for example, if it was necessary that the sun rise tomorrow, it cannot not rise. All other possibilities are reduced to the one absolute). That must mean, then, that for something to be optional or voluntary that it therefore must not follow the same definition as what is necessary. That be so, we fall into saying that what is voluntary is precisely what doesn’t need to happen, and thus there is an opennes to other states of being (as my example highlights, a boy has the voluntary choice between eating a candy bar or not. To commit to eating the candy bar is of course a different state of existence then not to eat the candy bar, and because there is no necessity in this equation, it must be that he is able to either be in a commited state of being or uncommited state of being).

God does not “achieve a teleological end.” The rest of the assertion, therefore – the “if creation does end up being necessary…” part – falls apart.

Okay, so if God has no final cause then therefore nothing can possibly constrain God into acting by necessity. But if theres modal collapse then he does act by necessity. Therefore theres a contridiction still.

 

[Gorgias]

But if theres modal collapse then he does act by necessity. Therefore theres a contridiction still.

If there’s modal collapse. I don’t buy that particular argument, though.

 

[quaestio45]

If there’s modal collapse. I don’t buy that particular argument, though.

Fair enough. This all falls on the premise of modal collapse. Though I’ve come to the point of near absolute certainty of that point.

 

[Gorgias]

This all falls on the premise of modal collapse. Though I’ve come to the point of near absolute certainty of that point.

Have you read Tomaszewski’s paper “Collapsing the Modal Collapse Argument: On an Invalid Argument Against Divine Simplicity”? I’m working my way through it. On the face of it, the article seems to be making good points. I’d be interested in your reaction to his argument that:

To use Quine’s own well-known example, while it is necessarily true that 8 is greater than 7, and it is true that the number of planets = 8, it is false that the number of planets is necessarily greater than 7. So this argument is invalid:
4. |- (8 > 7)
5. Number of the planets = 8
6. Therefore, |- (Number of the planets > 7)
But note that this is precisely the same inference as that in the argument from modal collapse!

 

[quaestio45]

Have you read Tomaszewski’s paper “Collapsing the Modal Collapse Argument: On an Invalid Argument Against Divine Simplicity”? I’m working my way through it. On the face of it, the article seems to be making good points. I’d be interested in your reaction to his argument that:

I actually have read his papers, and to be frank, I found them convincing at first glace as well. but after further consideration of its “solution” and deeper researching into his critics, I have come to reject Tomaszewki’s thoughts. There are two main reasons for this, the first being that his parallel argument fails to accurately reproduce the elements of a modal collapse argument (in his argument, for example, he uses planets as the subject of his parallel argument, however, the problem with this is that in a modal collapse argument all the premises are a priori conceptuals, but in Tomaszewki’s argument, he has an a posteriori and anyltical/experimental premise involved. Thus, they are not parallel arguments). If you would like a further explanation as to why that is so, I recommend you read Shannon Byrd’s article on Tomaszewki’s argument here:

The Collapse of the Anti-Modal Collapse Objections | Free Thinking Ministries

Abstract: The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) has come under fire in recent years and shows no sign of cooling. Currently, one of the most interesting arguments against this doctrine is what has…

freethinkingministries.com

The second reason I reject Mr. Tomaszewki’s arguement is because of the conlusion to which he admits it entails the elimination of the law of sufficient reason (he states this in an interview at http://www.classicaltheism.com/modalcollapse/ at 40 minutes to 46 minutes). For, he advocates very clearly for the idea that a cause need not be any different (nor the surrounding conditions) in order for the effect to be different, to which I see as nothing short of patently false, for one, and two, it doesn’t actually assist in his goal of showing God need not create the universe. For, there simply has to be a difference in intention (which is a conscious attribute) in order for God to have planed creation or not; to say not so would be to deny that either God has a conscious, or that God is not omnipotent, both of which are incompatible with divine simplicity. As such, I cannot agree with Mr.Tomaszewki’s in his solution to the modal problem, unfortunately.

 

[ThomasMT]

If I’m understanding your dilemma correctly, you are wondering how God’s will is free if He’s committed to the unchanging will that He has set. It comes down to the temporal pondering on the eternal. The answer, I would speculate, is that his eternity is a mear instant beyond which there is not much else. The unfolding timeline that we experience… that creation is subject to, revolves around that eternal instant, like Saturn’s ring around its’ planet.

 

[quaestio45]

@Gorgias, I just wrote a possible solution to the modal collapse problem and I’d like to see what you think of it (in terms of whether or not I made a logical error or it contradicts something very important). Here was my post:

Okay, so I’ve been doing some thinking and some reading and some consideration, and I think I have a solution to the problem that I think none of the Thomists will like.

P1) There are incompatible perfections to God (state of creation and state of passivity)
P2) These must be resolved by taking in one and rejecting the other
P3) With no final cause or essence to operate by in scenarios of incompatible perfection (as God’s essence is simply perfection), this requires the freest will to choose by voluntude
C1) Thus, God can and must act of voluntude

The reason I think the Thomist will disagree with me is because this necessarily means God is open to different state of beings, to which challenges to some extent total immutability. But allow me to make a defense for my proposal; God is by definition actuality and perfection itself. If that be so, whatever God is, actuality is, and whatever God isn’t, actuality isn’t. As such, what we conceive as actuality is simply a reflection of God’s current, eternal state of being. This is further supported when we consider how creation makes God no more perfect, yet nonetheless it is seen as a higher mode of existence when we do meaningfully create (relationships, families, lasting legacies) then when we don’t or do the opposite. As such, the actuality of a state of constant creation must be found in God too, who is actuality. Yet this creation, I say oncemore, does not add to God’s perfection, for it was equally perfect for him to never create, for oncemore I say that the state of God determines actuality and perfection.

Thus, it may not be a contradiction to call God pure actuality and simultaneously say he may have been in a different mode of existence then he currently is. It also isn’t a contradiction to say that God is immutable after his eternal choice yet ontoligically, oncemore, may have chosen differenlty then how he chose. Thus, God may be both voluntarily choosing and pure act all at once.

 

[Wesrock]

Yes, I understand that, and thats where we hit the contradiction. For if we delve deep enough into the being of God we see a modal collapse (as I’ve shown) to where all acts are not just possible but necessary for God to do. If a supposed entity leads inevitably to contradiction, then its safe to say they don’t exist.

It’s precisely this alleged contradiction that I don’t believe follows. It is necessary for God to do what he wills to do. But, as I’ve discussed, the only way to make sense of the will is that it self-determines. It makes no sense (given the points I’ve made) to consider God to be pre-determined. And if God self-determines, and wills things that are not necessary to his own perfection, that just is what it is to have free choice. And that point I think is more fundamental than asking if the essence of God could be different.

God does not “achieve a teleological end.” The rest of the assertion, therefore – the “if creation does end up being necessary…” part – falls apart.

I may have been sloppy by speaking of “achieving” and “teleology”, but God has an end, and that end is his own goodness, and that is what he necessarily wills.

 

[quaestio45]

I’ve discussed, the only way to make sense of the will is that it self-determines . It makes no sense (given the points I’ve made) to consider God to be pre-determined . And if God self-determines, and wills things that are not necessary to his own perfection, that just is what it is to have free choice. And that point I think is more fundamental than asking if the essence of God could be different.

I think, actually, we may be saying the same thing, to be frank Wesrock. Have you seen my argument for God’s voluntude? It goes as follows:

P1) There are incompatible perfections to God (state of creation and state of passivity)
P2) These must be resolved by taking in one and rejecting the other
P3) With no final cause or essence to operate by in scenarios of incompatible perfection (as God’s essence is simply perfection), this requires the freest will to choose by voluntude
C1) Thus, God can and must act of voluntude

This argument basically implies that God chose his perfection when he could’ve choosen to be perfect in another way, as there might be multiple routes to perfection to God. Now God is not pre-determined, as you’ve said, but rather self-determined in how he is. I think thats exactly right. God determined himself how he would be perfect. This of course means he could’ve determined himself differently, I’ll admit, but I don’t believe this would be a problem to God as the rules don’t constrain him, for he is the rules, in a sense (pure actuality is determined by his state, not the other way around). What do you think?