God's free will and yet immutable

[Gwlstimler]

How does God will us to be created in a free way from all eternity and yet not change His will if He were truly free to not to? The SUMMA’s reasoning behind absolute necessity versus necessary by supposition does not make sense to me. I run into a sense of contradiction here, but then again what do I know of eternity and God’s divine nature (or any of us know, as we are bound by time and space whereas God is not). If God created necessarily, then there is no free will and there should be no time and space, no imperfection in our limitations, no evil/lack of good or order or knowing or sense of purpose. Everything should work flawlessly… but it does not (obviously!). Any help here would be appreciated.

 

[Gorgias]

How does God will us to be created in a free way from all eternity and yet not change His will if He were truly free to not to?

I think you’re asking “does God’s immutable will imply that He doesn’t have freedom?”…?

Let me ask it this way: when you make a choice and stick with it, does that imply that you don’t have the freedom to not stick with it? No, of course it doesn’t.

Albeit that this is an imperfect reality, it shows the flaw in reasoning: staying on a particular course doesn’t mean that no other courses might have been chosen.

If God created necessarily

Could God have not created? If so, then creation is contingent and not necessary.

Would God have chosen a less perfect approach (i.e., the approach of deferring to create)? No, since it was less perfect.

However, the fact that He willed what He willed doesn’t imply that His ‘necessary’, as such, but merely ‘fitting.’

Everything should work flawlessly

OK… this is a different question. You’re asking “since it was God who created, and God is perfection, then shouldn’t God’s creation necessarily be perfect in all ways?”

That doesn’t hold up. God’s creation perfectly instantiates His will, but it doesn’t follow that God’s will must be “a creation that’s perfect.”

For example: let’s suppose that an artist paints a picture which is aesthetically unpleasant for you. You would look at it and say “ugh! imperfect!”. And yet, if that were the artist’s intent, and he intended the painting he created, then we would say that it’s a perfect instantiation of his will.

See the distinction?

 

[quaestio45]

Could God have not created? If so, then creation is contingent and not necessary.

It seems as if creation must be necessary, however…

Would God have chosen a less perfect approach (i.e., the approach of deferring to create)? No, since it was less perfect.

…and this is exactly the reason. For you see, a being of pure actuality has a number of necessary traits as a result of completion in being, one of that being that you are ultimately and eternally in a perfect state due to your very own completion and not due to any externality. As such, God by himself is already maximally perfect, we may agree out of necessity.

Now, if we claim that the universe is unnecessary, then its creation was voluntary, but were it voluntary we may conceive of a world in which the act did occur and did not occur. If we do this, we would have two different effects stemming from the same cause. Now, I think we both agree that if a cause is the same but the effect is different we can find the explanation for such through either one of three things:
a) The cause changed in quality, thus explaining the change in effect
b) The surrounding conditions changed in quality, thus explaining the change in effect
c) The principle of sufficient reason is wrong, and thus the effect was merely random

Now, the first one cannot be the case, for God’s essence is pure actuality, to which fully explains his existence of pure actuality. Because of that, to conceive of a universe where God is different in quality (even if voluntarily being in that quality state) to make way for a different effect requires we imagine God as having an altered existence (even if slightly). But that would only happen if his essence is different as well, but the essence of God, like all essence, must always remain constant across all conceptions in order to accurately be a description of an entity (for what makes a man in this universe must be what makes a man in all universes). As such, the essence of God must be different, to which it cannot be. As such, the reason for difference in effect cannot be found in God.

The second cannot be the explanation either, for nothing can hinder the absolute will and plan and intentions of God except for what is definitionally impossible. Further, because the all entities are ontologically subsequent to God, there can be no “surrounding conditions” which are there to change the outcome of the results.

That leads to the final explantion, which has been proposed in an attempt to fix modal collapse by apologist Christopher Tomaszewski, to which is also unsatisfactory, for it does not remedy the problem presented which is the absolute inability for a pure act entity to choose whether or not to create a universe. Instead its a philosophical slight of hand, taking the presented problem and masquerading it as a problem of result rather than cause.

 

[quaestio45]

Given all this, there is a secondary solution to which may be given; that is that God acted to create the universe because it was a “more perfect act” then to not create. The problem, however, is that once you say that perfection itself, in itself, is not the most perfect, and that it can be more perfect if it was in another state of being (like creation) you commit a glaring contradiction to the term “perfect being”. Unless, of course, you were to say that to be perfect one must act in a state of creation, however, once the theist exclaims this he surrenders the idea of the perfect entity being noncontingent, as his ultimate perfection becomes ultimately contingent on his act of creation and therefore creation itself. As such, not even of necessity could a pure act God create the universe without contradiction. As such, it pains me to say it, but there cannot be a God of actus purus given that none of my points be refuted. (In the days to come, when my school work is lower, I will open a thread on this topic against God. Hopefully I may receive a sufficient answer then).

 

[Gorgias]

It seems as if creation must be necessary, however…

Gorgias:

Would God have chosen a less perfect approach (i.e., the approach of deferring to create)? No, since it was less perfect.

…and this is exactly the reason.

That doesn’t make it necessary, as such, in a philosophical sense, I don’t think. It’s fitting, to be sure. It’s in line with God’s nature. But, when we act according to our nature, do we act from necessity, as such?

Now, if we claim that the universe is unnecessary, then its creation was voluntary, but were it voluntary we may conceive of a world in which the act did occur and did not occur.

God’s will could have been otherwise, though, don’t you think? We don’t claim that the world is maximally perfect – if we did, then I think your argument might have a leg to stand on. Since it’s not, then I don’t think we can point to the universe and say “necessary!”

If we do this, we would have two different effects stemming from the same cause.

Two different possible events. Only one occurs. Therefore, your three cases don’t apply, do they?

 

[quaestio45]

That doesn’t make it necessary , as such, in a philosophical sense, I don’t think. It’s fitting , to be sure. It’s in line with God’s nature. But, when we act according to our nature, do we act from necessity , as such?

Its best I clarify that when I say that creation is necessary I don’t mean it to say that its noncontingent or anything like that, but rather that the universe must be created if its the result of a pure act God as he can only act of necessity on the basis of his nature and not of voluntary option. So no, reality or creation is not necessary in and of itself.

God’s will could have been otherwise, though, don’t you think?

I really wish I could think that. But it doesn’t as if God could work our of voluntude but only by necessity, as I’ve attempted to show above.

We don’t claim that the world is maximally perfect – if we did, then I think your argument might have a leg to stand on. Since it’s not, then I don’t think we can point to the universe and say “necessary!”

Yes, but I think your mistaking my use of the term necessary. I don’t mean to say that the universe is a necessary being, but that if God created it, it can only be because he had too.

.

Two different possible events. Only one occurs. Therefore, your three cases don’t apply, do they?

I’m attempting to get to the answer of whether or not there was a possibility to not create in the first place. The only way we can do that, I think, is if we evaluate the results of each possibility and compare them to see if they’re compatible with definitions and logical laws. Its on this basis that I am forced to sadly declare that there cannot have been voluntude in God.

 

[Gorgias]

So no, reality or creation is not necessary in and of itself.

Right. I agree.

I really wish I could think that. But it doesn’t as if God could work our of voluntude but only by necessity, as I’ve attempted to show above.

God works freely, out of His nature. If you want to assert that He’s constrained in some way, it would be necessary to assert who (or what) constrains Him. That’s a problematic assertion, it would seem.

I don’t mean to say that the universe is a necessary being, but that if God created it, it can only be because he had too.

Again: who or what constrains God to do something?

I’m attempting to get to the answer of whether or not there was a possibility to not create in the first place. The only way we can do that, I think, is if we evaluate the results of each possibility

Only one event happens. Therefore, in the results, P1 = 1 and P2 = 0.

So, if you’re considering “results of possibilities”, you only have one to consider. That doesn’t thwart the freedom of the will of God. It merely says that we know what His will is.

 

[quaestio45]

God works freely, out of His nature. If you want to assert that He’s constrained in some way, it would be necessary to assert who (or what) constrains Him. That’s a problematic assertion, it would seem.

So what I’m thinking is that if we agree that an entity doesn’t have to commit act x of necessity, then it must be of option/voluntude. Of course, if this be so then we can understand that the entity has the possibility of being in state of being A which allowed for result A to occur, or state of being B which did not allow for result A. Now, I think we both agree that these two states of being cannot be the exact same without contridicting the law of sufficient reason, as such we have a distinction here.

Okay, so this is the crux right here: if all acts of voluntude require that an entity be in at least one of two distinct states of being (commit to act or don’t act) then it doesn’t seem as if God can act of voluntude ever. This is because it sets up the idea of God being possibly different in his being in a conceptual universe where God didn’t create (which we musy be able to imagine to some degree, as possibilities are of such nature). But such is an absurdity, because God can never in any possibility be different then how he is now, otherwise there would be a difference in existence, which requires a difference essence, which is impossible as an essence of a being is always constant across all plains of possibility (think of a circle, for example. It must always be the same no matter the possibility). As such, it would contrict God. That which is the factor of contridiction must be eliminated; as such, God cannot act of voluntude but of necessity instead.

Again: who or what constrains God to do something?

I suppose the constraint would be his essence, perhaps?

So, if you’re considering “results of possibilities”, you only have one to consider. That doesn’t thwart the freedom of the will of God. It merely says that we know what His will is.

Well we can at least consider the consequences of saying something is possible at all, yes? For thats really all I’m using to make this argument: the consideration of whether possibility could lead to contridiction in relation to God.

 

[Gorgias]

So what I’m thinking is that if we agree that an entity doesn’t have to commit act x of necessity, then it must be of option/voluntude.

Ahh… but God doesn’t have to act of necessity – He does it from His will (that is, His volition)!

(Edited to add: looks like you’ve pulled your post; I’ll wait to see what your edits are!)

 

[quaestio45]

Ahh… but God doesn’t have to act of necessity – He does it from His will (that is, His volition )!

(Edited to add: looks like you’ve pulled your post; I’ll wait to see what your edits are!)

I moved it to a different thread (argument against God) because I thought the ultimate conclusion being proposed here was more in line with the subject matter there. But, for convenience sake I’ll undelete it here if you wish to respond in this same thread.

 

[Gorgias]

No worries. I’ll look there!