God's Goodness: A Consequence, or Intrinsic?

[Oreoracle]

For instance, you are suggesting, as skeptics sometimes do, that “great” is a sufficiently vague term as to not be helpful here. But that strikes me as mistaken. For instance, if I refer to a great dinner, or the greatest comedian I have every heard, or a great man, I think you would get the sense of what I mean. You would know that by “great” I mean a dinner, or comedian, or man, of surpassing excellence. You wouldn’t think that I was saying “good grief, that was a terrible dinner/person.” So I think you know perfectly well what “great” means, or at least well enough for our purposes.

I think we have a fundamental disagreement on this point. I concur that being great implies being excellent, but you’ve only shifted the problem to the meaning of “excellent”. When we say that something’s excellent, we are begging the question “Excellent at doing what?” The reason that you say certain foods are excellent is because you have a preconceived notion of food’s purpose; that is, being tasty for humans. The reason that you say a comedian is excellent is because you have a preconceived notion of the purpose of a comedian; that is, making us laugh. The only reason you can make these judgments is because you have a purpose in mind for these objects.

And this is the reason for greatness’s ambiguity. If we say that something is great, we mean it’s excellent, but we know that it is excellent for a certain purpose, and not excellent “in itself”. Without establishing what a thing’s purpose is, “excellent” is a nebulous concept. And so we are not in agreement that great things must possess certain qualities such as moral perfection, because it may not be a thing’s purpose to be moral. For example, the purpose of a liar is to deceive, and so a great liar is excellent at deception. The purpose of a gun is to kill, and so a great gun is excellent at killing. So you see, a person or thing can be described as great even when they aren’t good or it isn’t good.

Such is the problem with deeming God “great”. The action assumes that God is excellent, but it doesn’t answer the question it is begging: Excellent at doing what? So what is your stance on this? What purpose does God excel at serving? If you don’t know what God should be excellent at doing, how can you expect to get away with describing him as excellent anyway?

I must say, though, that I suspect Christianity would deem it heretical to assign a purpose to God. And if you can’t assign a purpose to God, he can’t be excellent, which means he can’t be great, which means he wouldn’t count as the paradigm of anything by the GCB interpretation. Which leads to the conclusion that choosing God as the standard of goodness is no better than choosing something else.

Now here is where the challenge comes in. God is by definition a GCB (at least I would say so).

Which, as I said above, is meaningless without a stated goal for God’s existence. At what does he excel?

By this, I mean that God is a being of surpassing excellence, such that no being with greater excellence can possibly be thought of (if it could, then that being would be God).

What if we considered something to be excellent at not being God? Surely God wouldn’t be better at this task than the thing that isn’t like God, right?

This is why I like to avoid using slippery words like “great” or “best”. My friend might be the best at winning games of golf, but I might also be the best at losing games of golf. We would both be “the best”, but in utterly different respects. There would be a good deal of confusion if people called each of us the best without qualifying what they think we’re the best at doing, because we might be the best at doing different things. And even if God is the best in some respects, he surely can’t be the best in every respect, because he’s not the best at not being God. And so calling God the best boils down to considering him good at doing certain things. What things does God do that would qualify him as “the best”? Since the meaning of God’s excellence is contingent upon these factors, they must be included in the definition of “God”.

 

[danserr]

I think we have a fundamental disagreement on this point. QUOTE]

I’m going to mention this again after i answer your questions, but I have to point out that this is the second time you’ve ignored some highly relevant parts of my post. You seem to have seized on GCB theology as something you can attack that will help you escape my answer, but I’m afraid this doesn’t work.

As to GCB theology (which is not necessary to avoid the Euthyphro dilemma, I just consider it useful and interesting), you seem to be confusing God being the GCB, with our discerning what properties a GCB must poses. And this is two very different things. The fact that we are not wholly sure what properties a GCB would possess does not invalidate the notion of God as a GCB. (reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8363). That being said we have a good idea of what properties a GCB would posses. A being that is morally perfect and omnipotent is more objectively great than a being that rapes and kills little girls. Don’t you agree?

From the same link: “Note that mere disagreement about whether a property is great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter. When we have a disagreement, then we may present arguments why we think it is greater to have some property than to lack it. The fact that some properties (like timelessness) are not clearly great-making does not imply that no properties are great-making or that the concept of a greatest conceivable being is wholly subjective.”

I think this shows that you can’t just hold your head and complain that the concept of greatness is meaningless or wholly subjective. (If that were true, then you could not say that a man who falls on a grenade to save a friend is greater than a pedophile.

You difficulty is that you are playing with different senses of the word “great.” For instance, one can use the word “good” in different ways (see Craig’s debate with Sam Harris, found on the same website). One can say “that is a good football player,” “that was a good throw,” “a good route to NY,” “a good way to get oneself killed.” Here you are using the term good in non-moral senses. Hence why your example of the “great” gun is flawed. In this non-moral usage, then of course, the word is connected to a purpose that may be immoral! (By your logic, I could use your argument to “prove” that real “good” does not exist, the same way real “great” does not exist. On why, see more below).

So, I am not begging the question at all, you are, by assuming that God is only great because he does something. You are using “great” in non-moral and in deliberately subjective terms. You say, you can use “great” to refer to things that aren’t “good.” But you can also use the word “good” to refer to things that aren’t “good” (a good way to commit murder). The fact that you can use the word “good” or “great” in a non-objective or non-moral way is not evidence that one cannot use it in an objective or moral way.

So it seems perfectly coherent to refer to God as a GCB. Now the question before us is, are there objective great-making properties? So far you have not actually disagreed with me on any I have listed, so it seems we agree there are. For instance, it is objectively greater to be morally perfect than not (that is, to be wholly “good” and without moral defect). Don’t you agree? Don’t you agree that an omnipotent being is greater than one who is not?

What if we considered something to be excellent at not being God? Surely God wouldn’t be better at this task than the thing that isn’t like God, right?

 

[danserr]

Since you did not reply to this twice, I will copy it again and ask you to consider a clear choice between the two options I list. Which one do you accept yourself?

So, back to my comparison above. God is to goodness as salt is to saltiness. Just as salt is the paradigm by which we measure saltiness, so God is the paradigm by which we measure goodness.
1). - Hence I say: why is that pizza salty? You reply: because it tastes like salt. I ask: why is salt salty? you reply: salt is the very paradigm of saltiness. I say: why? you say: “it just is, sooner or later you need to reach some stopping point, you can’t keep asking “why” forever.”
2). Hence you say: why is an action or being good? I reply: An action or being is more good in so far as it approaches the character of God, a GCB, and the paradigm of moral goodness.
you say: Why is God good? I could reply: “he just is, the same way salt is salty.” I could add that it is the very nature of God to be good.

Now consider where too much skepticism on this point would lead you.
In the same way, you ask “why is God good?” I could ask, "why is the good good? Why is that good? why is that good? ad infinitum.

As I say above:
We have two choices, 1. either we decide that “good” is completely without meaning. This seems to me to entail various absurd consequences. (For example, if “good” is meaningless, then we cannot say that a man who sacrifices is life for a friend is more good than a man who rapes and kills little children-- not only is this irrational, but it is frankly offensive).
2). Alternately, we agree that in terms of what is “good” we have to reach some stopping point sooner or later. The nature of God, a GCB, is thus the least arbitrary stopping point. As a greatest conceivable being (which I would say God is by definition), God is good by nature. A being that is the paradigm of moral goodness is greater than a being that merely exemplifies it. Thus God’s nature is definitive or moral goodness.

 

[Oreoracle]

I’m going to mention this again after i answer your questions, but I have to point out that this is the second time you’ve ignored some highly relevant parts of my post. You seem to have seized on GCB theology as something you can attack that will help you escape my answer, but I’m afraid this doesn’t work.

I have ignored it because it’s a non-issue. It only becomes an issue if you’re right, and I don’t think you are. This is what we’re disputing.

A being that is morally perfect and omnipotent is more objectively great than a being that rapes and kills little girls. Don’t you agree?

This is an interesting chain of reasoning you have. Okay, tell me if I have all of this straight: God is perfectly good because he’s the moral paradigm. He’s the moral paradigm because he’s the GCB. And he’s the GCB because–you guessed it–he’s perfectly good. This is just a circular argument. You can’t say that we have a moral code because of God and contend that God is God because he registers higher than anyone else on his own moral code. In other words, the claim is that God’s prowess on performing under his own moral code established that moral code.

Which came first: God’s greatness or God’s moral paradigm-ness? They can’t support each other’s existence–one had to come first.

From the same link: “Note that mere disagreement about whether a property is great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter. When we have a disagreement, then we may present arguments why we think it is greater to have some property than to lack it. The fact that some properties (like timelessness) are not clearly great-making does not imply that no properties are great-making or that the concept of a greatest conceivable being is wholly subjective.”

And that’s perfectly fine with me. I agree that it need not be a subjective matter. But it is immediately obvious that it’s only meaningful to call something great if we know what it’s great at doing. What is God great at doing?

You difficulty is that you are playing with different senses of the word “great.”

I’m not using “great” in a moral sense because you say that God is moral on account of his being the GCB. In other words, his goodness is contingent on his greatness. But if we then call God great because of his goodness, we’ve introduced circularity to the argument, rendering it trivial. The argument becomes “God is good because he is great because he is good.”

 

[danserr]

I have ignored it because it’s a non-issue. It only becomes an issue if you’re right, and I don’t think you are. This is what we’re disputing.

This is an interesting chain of reasoning you have. Okay, tell me if I have all of this straight: God is perfectly good because he’s the moral paradigm. He’s the moral paradigm because he’s the GCB. And he’s the GCB because–you guessed it–he’s perfectly good. This is just a circular argument.

What is interesting is your repeated refusal to answer my questions, which is actually very revealing. I have asked a series of questions in my previous posts that you are simply ignoring, using your diffiiculty over GCB as an excuse, but some of those questions stand regardless of whether you accept GCB theology or not. So I have to ask you to actually answer some of those questions.

Your reply in the last post essentially came down then, to a straw man version of my argument by which you attempted to render it circular. No such luck.

• God is by definition a GCB. We may disagree on some of the exact qualities a GCB would possess, but you agree that this does not mean that the words are without meaning.
• To say “why is God a GCB” is essentially saying “why is God, God?” The word God means GCB. Now, as you understand what the words “great,” “conceivable” and “being” are, we go forward. A note, though, to say that God is a GCB is to say that God is the greatest possible being that is conceivable, or a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. This seems to me a useful a concept.
• The next step, then, is to ask what a GCB would be like. I would say that a GCB would be morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscience (the property of knowing only and all truths), and metaphysically necessary. This seems reasonable. As I ask above: A being that is morally perfect and omnipotent is more objectively great than a being that rapes and kills little girls. Don’t you agree?
• What is more, God must also be the paradigm of morality because if he were not, then we could conceive of a greater being, one who is the paradigm of morality, and that being would be God.

There is nothing circular about this. The progression is perfectly linear. You are overly focused on the idea that God must be great or good because of what he does rather than what he is. Now this might (or might not) be true of people because we are not GCB’s and not the paradigm of morality. God, however, as a GCB, is the paradigm of morality. Furthermore, even people are not only good or bad because of the things they do. When we call a person good, we don’t only describe his actions, we describe him. And we call a person good in so far as their character approaches God, the paradigm of moral goodness.

So given this, I think you need to consider some of these questions:
1). Do you agree that it is greater to be morally perfect than to rape and torture little girls?
2). Do you agree that it is greater to be the paradigm of moral goodness rather then to merely exemplify it?
3). Greatness is not wholly subjective, if it were you could not say it is greater to give one’s life for a friend than to blow up a school. Do you agree that the first action is greater than the second?
4). As I say above, if you keep asking, “why is God, good?” why? why? etc, I could do the same about “goodness.” I could ask: “why is goodness, good?” why? why? ad infinitum.
As I say above:
We have two choices, 1. either we decide that “good” is completely without meaning. This seems to me to entail various absurd consequences. (For example, if “good” is meaningless, then we cannot say that a man who sacrifices is life for a friend is more good than a man who rapes and kills little children-- not only is this irrational, but it is frankly offensive).
2). Alternately, we agree that in terms of what is “good” we have to reach some stopping point sooner or later. The nature of God, a GCB, is thus the least arbitrary stopping point. As a greatest conceivable being (which I would say God is by definition), God is good by nature. A being that is the paradigm of moral goodness is greater than a being that merely exemplifies it. Thus God’s nature is definitive or moral goodness.

5). Which of the above 2 choices do you believe to be probably true?

I know you are trying to avoid answering these, but the very fact that you are trying so hard to avoid the implications of your own views should make you uneasy. I think I have given good reasons for showing that GCB theology is quite plausible and that your attempt to claim I was circular was simply a straw man; but many of the above questions remain valid whether or not you accept GCB theology. If you are going to hold a logically consistent worldview, you need to confront them sooner or later. You can’t just ignore them.

 

[Oreoracle]

God is by definition a GCB. We may disagree on some of the exact qualities a GCB would possess, but you agree that this does not mean that the words are without meaning.

If we disagree on what GCB-ness is we actually have no concensus at all as to its meaning. We’re using the same words but giving them completely different meanings. That is only a superficial state of agreement.

• To say “why is God a GCB” is essentially saying “why is God, God?” The word God means GCB.

If you insist that something is the greatest, I don’t find it the least bit unreasonable to ask what you take greatness to mean.

• I would say that a GCB would be morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscience (the property of knowing only and all truths), and metaphysically necessary.

Okay, so just to be absolutely crystal clear, you contend that moral goodness, power, knowledge, and metaphysical necessity are the factors that contribute to greatness?

If that is so, defining God as the greatest conceivable being is the same as defining him as the being who is the most good, has the most power, has the most knowledge, and is necessary. Do you see how much clearer that definition is?

A being that is morally perfect and omnipotent is more objectively great than a being that rapes and kills little girls. Don’t you agree?

I don’t think that morality is objective, no. Listening to various peoples’ conflicting moral codes should make this obvious.

I do agree that not killing and raping little girls is better than doing so, but that’s because my brain is hard-wired to care about what happens to other humans, not because something in reality dictates that that ought to be the case. This genetic bias we have becomes especially obvious whenever we talk about intelligent animals that aren’t humans. For example, humans don’t usually argue that killing cows is wrong. Likewise, wolves don’t really mourn the deaths of humans, either.

• What is more, God must also be the paradigm of morality because if he were not, then we could conceive of a greater being, one who is the paradigm of morality, and that being would be God.

Just out of curiosity: How do you know that the most moral, powerful, and knowledgeable being isn’t a human? (I realize I left the “metaphysically necessary” part out, but it could be the case that the metaphysical necessity isn’t moral, powerful, or knowledgeable.) Our ability to conceive of God in the way you describe doesn’t imply that he exists.

And this is an extremely important point. From what you describe, the GCB concept essentially homes in on the greatest being and makes whomever that is the moral paradigm, and I now see why that isn’t necessarily circular. However, it presents another problem: the greatest conceptual being isn’t necessarily the greatest actual being. How do you know that the greatest conceptual being is equal to the greatest actual being?

You are overly focused on the idea that God must be great or good because of what he does rather than what he is.

That’s because God is the only being who’s treated this way. We hold everyone else to a moral standard; namely, humans have to perform actions to be considered good. And if they don’t perform good deeds, that’s taken as evidence, and possibly even proof, that they aren’t good. Defining God as being good outright doesn’t improve the fact that he’s held to a different standard. I can understand considering God to be perfect because he completely coincides with the standard that applies to us, but to hold him to a different standard entirely seems arbitrary.

And we call a person good in so far as their character approaches God, the paradigm of moral goodness.

So since God is considered good due to infinite qualities, such as omnipotence, wouldn’t a human’s goodness always be negligible compared to his? Our own prowess would be seen as infinitesimal compared to infinite prowess.

I haven’t read much of his work, but I believe Kant said that “ought” implies “can”. If we ought to be identical to God, but we can’t (and this failure is infinitely abysmal in light of God’s infinite capacities), doesn’t that violate this standard?

1). Do you agree that it is greater to be morally perfect than to rape and torture little girls?

I agree that it’s better in the sense of being “more good”. But whether it’s great depends on the goal in mind, as I’ve consistently stated throughout the thread. If you have the same goal in mind as you stated for God, then yes, it’s greater.

2). Do you agree that it is greater to be the paradigm of moral goodness rather then to merely exemplify it?

Again, assuming the same definiton of greatness you mentioned earlier, sure.

3). Greatness is not wholly subjective, if it were you could not say it is greater to give one’s life for a friend than to blow up a school. Do you agree that the first action is greater than the second?

That obviously depends on one’s moral code. I would say it’s greater, yes, but a sociopath might not. The fact that the answer varies based on preference rather than intellect demonstrates that your question does contain a subjective element. Two people who are equally knowledgeable and reasonable would have similar opinions on objective matters, but might have very different opinions on ethics.

5). Which of the above 2 choices do you believe to be probably true?

I agree that we need a stopping point, but I don’t know if it’s the GCB because the GCB might not actually exist. Furthermore, I don’t think the GCB would be the Christian god even if it did exist. Let me put it this way: I can think of humans that are far more moral than the character depicted in the Bible.

 

[danserr]

I think we might be getting closer to making sense of what each other are saying (knock on wood), but now we are starting to get into some new territory, as you ask some new go questions and bring up a couple new points. I’m just going to try to go through them as briefly (I hope) as possible, but you can ask for further clarification.

If we disagree on what GCB-ness is we actually have no concensus at all as to its meaning. We’re using the same words but giving them completely different meanings. That is only a superficial state of agreement.

So we are starting with the concept of God as a GCB. Here, I simply mean objectively great. Not great for whatever purpose I have in mind, but objectively great. This is what the concept means. Now we can debate between us what qualities would make a being objectively great. (what are greatness making qualities/features etc.). I think it fair to say that such a being would be omnipotent (do anything possible), omniscent (know only and all truths), morally perfect, and metaphysically necessary. I think we could agree that such a being would also be the paradigm of moral goodness since you agreed a being that is the paradigm of moral goodness is greater than a being that merely exemplifies it. Such a being may have other qualities as well, of course, and we can present arguments for these. But this seems like plenty to go on. Now if you disagree with any of these qualities, you can present an argument why you think that feature is not a feature or quality a GCB would possess.

Okay, so just to be absolutely crystal clear, you contend that moral goodness, power, knowledge, and metaphysical necessity are the factors that contribute to greatness?

Yes, and you agree later in your post that this sounds reasonable to you. Now I don’t claim that these are the only great-making qualities, and part of the value of the concept of a GCB is to help us judge what qualities such a being (God) would posses. What qualities would make a being objectively great, namely, the greatest conceivable?

From what you describe, the GCB concept essentially homes in on the greatest being and makes whomever that is the moral paradigm

Not at all. Like you say, there is a different between the greatest conceivable being and the greatest actual being. God is a GCB, now if the GCB does exist, then I think we do have a paradigm of moral goodness. But if such a being does not exist, then I would not claim that the greatest being that exists would then be the paradigm of moral goodness. In fact, if God does not exist, then I would deny that there would exist a paradigm of moral goodness and morality would be purely subjective.

Now, you complain that the mere fact that a GCB makes sense as a concept and could be the paradigm of moral goodness does not prove that such a being exists. Actually, this may not be true, but for the present I’ll that. I have actually never tried to claim that anything I said proves that a GCB (God) exists. Remember, we were discussing the euthyphro dilemma, why God supposedly cannot be the basis of an objective morality. I respond by showing that this argument is misguided because the GCB theology helps to show a way that God, as a GCB can be the paradigm or moral goodness after all. This is not necessarily mean He does exist, only that if he does, then He is the paradigm of moral goodness.

I can understand considering God to be perfect because he completely coincides with the standard that applies to us, but to hold him to a different standard entirely seems arbitrary.

He is not held to a different standard, rather, as you see by now, GCB theology is one way of showing that God is the standard.

 

[danserr]

Now you raise some specific question we haven’t touched on yet.
1). You deny that objective morality exists, because different societies thought different things. (But this contradicts with your later statement that it is more good not to rape and torture little girls.
2). You say a GCB may not exist.
3). The GCB may not be the Christian God because the Old Testament God seems like such a jerk.

1). There are a few problems with your thinking. (a) This confuses moral epistemology (the perception/recognition of moral values) with moral ontology (the existence of objective moral values. The fact that some people do not perceive morality as well as other is not evidence that an objective morality does not exist. For instance in the year 1400, intelligent people disagreed on whether the world was round or flat. This does not prove the world did not exist. (b) If this were true, then one could never condemn another society as morally wrong. To criticize Incan human sacrifice, Chinese footbinding of girls, or the Hindu practice of burning wives on their husbands funeral pyres would be a matter of cultural chauvinism.

2). Maybe. I am just saying that if God does exist, then we have an objective basis (since God is a GCB) of moral values of duties. This seems easy enough to show. (A). If God does not exist, as you say, then morality is simply a matter of socio-biological conditioning. It is subjective. (B) On the other hand, it also seems, the case that some things really are objectively wrong no matter what people think. For instance to rape and kill a little girl isn’t just socially taboo (like asking a woman her age), but an objective moral abomination. It is really wrong to torture and kills little girls. And this is really wrong because there is a real right, which would not be if God did not exist.
(C) hence the existence of objective moral values and duties provides evidence that God does exist and is the paradigm of moral goodness.

3). You are right that this doesn’t show the Christian God is necessarily the GCB, but I think He is, partly because of evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, partly for other reasons (from your point that ought implies can, actually). But your reason for denying this, namely that the OT God is so mean is not a reason to doubt the Christian God. Why?
Because it could be possible that the OT writers were mistaken in attributing those commands to God. This would cause a Christian to have to say that the OT is divinely inspired, but not necessarily inerrant. So, what you are really doing is question scriptural inerrancy, but not whether the Christian God exists or is the basis of morality. Now if this interests you, then there are other things to say about the OT. I will mention briefly amazon.com/God-Moral-Monster-Making-Testament/dp/0801072751/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1313200371&sr=8-1 This book by Paul Copan puts those issues in context and explains alot of your questions here, I think.

So even though I had not been trying to argue that a GCB necesarily exists, only that such a being would be able to be the paradigm of moral goodness. I do think there are many reasons to think that such a being does exist and is the paradigm of moral goodness.

sorry if i missed something, it’s late and i need to turn in.

 

[Oreoracle]

I apologize for not addressing your posts directly here, but I feel we may have strayed too far from the topic. To get everything into perspective, let’s have a brief recap and try to address matters one at a time.

1. Firstly, we’ve defined God as the GCB; that is, God’s greatness is optimal. This greatness is caused by qualities such as omnipotence, omniscience, metaphysical necessity, moral perfection, and possibly others. Now, we both agree that these qualities are only vaguely understood, and therefore greatness itself is only vaguely understood. But we’ve more or less decided to ignore that factor until it becomes relevant.
2. You’ve stated that you aren’t sure that the GCB exists. If it does, you think we have a basis for objective morality; if not, you say that morality would be subjective.
3. You believe this concept of GCB addresses the question posed in this thread because God being the GCB implies that he is morally perfect by definition. Thus, the answer is that God’s goodness is intrinsic.

Have I got everything right so far?

Assuming that I have, here are my questions/objections:

1. Since we both admit that peoples’ conceptions of greatness may not completely coincide with one another, there doesn’t seem to be any guarantee that my GCB will be the same as your GCB. Suppose that there are multiple beings in the universe that come close enough to the GCB concept that humans would have difficulty agreeing which ought to be considered the GCB. How do we settle this dispute? What does this disagreement concerning identifying a GCB imply about human conceptions of power, knowledge, morality, and necessity? Do we disagree because those things are subjective, or are some humans just being unreasonable or ignorant?
2. Correct me if I’m wrong, but you seem to be saying that morality is objective if and only if the GCB exists. You say you aren’t sure that a GCB exists, but you seem certain that morality is objective. Since an objective morality would imply a GCB by your reasoning, doesn’t this essentially mean you’ve already decided that a GCB must exist? If that’s not the case, then the biconditional statement does not hold.
3. After giving this more thought, I’m not sure that the GCB concept implies that God’s goodness is intrinsic. I mean, when we define something as possessing certain characteristics, those characteristics aren’t always innate. For instance, a thief is a thief because of what he does, not what he is. Indeed, it is conceivable that someone could accidentally be a thief without having a “thieving” mindset. Defining God as great would not necessarily imply that this greatness is innate (or so it seems). He could just as easily be great because of what he does, and defining him as great doesn’t change this.

What do you think?

 

[danserr]

Getting a recap of the situation is fine with me. I think the stuff I posted was relevant to some of your replies, but if so, it’ll come up again anyway. I think there are still a couple misunderstandings we can make sense of too.

1. Firstly, we’ve defined God as the GCB; that is, God’s greatness is optimal. This greatness is caused by qualities such as omnipotence, omniscience, metaphysical necessity, moral perfection, and possibly others. Now, we both agree that these qualities are only vaguely understood, and therefore greatness itself is only vaguely understood. But we’ve more or less decided to ignore that factor until it becomes relevant.

Mostly true. But, I don’t think these qualities are too vaguely understood. I mean, we do have a fair idea what omnipotence means (ability to do possible states of affairs), omniscience (knowing only and all truths). I agree, though, that there is some room for play (does God know the future or not?); and second, I agree, that these are not necessarily the only great-making properties. Third, I don’t think the term “great” as applied to a GCB is really very vague. I mean, you were able to agree in a previous post that assuming my use of the word great, we could make sense of this.

1. You’ve stated that you aren’t sure that the GCB exists. If it does, you think we have a basis for objective morality; if not, you say that morality would be subjective.

Actually, I do think such a being exists and I can give reasons for thinking so. My point is only that you claimed that the mere concept of a GCB does not prove He exists (actually this may not be true). I just pointed out that so fair, I was not trying to prove such a being exists, only that if such a being exists, then this answers the euthyphro dilemma and gives us an objective basis for moral goodness. In essence, your OP was to defend the euthyphro dilemma as a reason to doubt God as the basis of moral goodness, and I responded that the concept of a GCB helps to solve this problem quite nicely (though probably isn’t necessary to solve the problem).

1. You believe this concept of GCB addresses the question posed in this thread because God being the GCB implies that he is morally perfect by definition. Thus, the answer is that God’s goodness is intrinsic.

Since it is greater to be the paradigm of moral goodness than to merely exemplify it, and God is a GCB, then we can show that God can be the non arbitrary basis of moral goodness.

To your questions:

1). Well, in some respects I doubt the disagreement is so serious as you would suggest, for instance take omnipotence, I think most people could easily agree that omnipotence in some way consists of ability to do possible things. Some might stress God’s raw power more than ability, but I think this is not a huge enough difference to lead to real trouble. And I don’t think that people might disagree either means those things are subjective or that people are stupid. Intelligent people will often disagree. Many great physicists disagree on whether quantum physics is useful, true, or not. But that doesn’t mean either that one side is unreasonable or that physics is subjective.

• But, understand, that by greatest conceivable, I actually do not mean the greatest being that human beings can imagine. I actually mean metaphysical conceivability, which is more like logically possible. This means that such a being and such properties are objective, that is, independent of what humans think. Let me explain. A shape with a billion, billion, billion side is simply not imaginable by human beings. Our minds can’t handle it. But, that doesn’t mean such a shape is subjective. Such a shape is still metaphysically possible.
• Now, I do think we have other guides to a GCB, scripture, for instance, and I think there are good reasons for that. But even if you don’t accept this, we determine great-making properties by making reasonable arguments for what qualities are great- making or not.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but you seem to be saying that morality is objective if and only if the GCB exists.

Essentially correct. This seems reasonable.

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
   -This seems obvious, if God does not exist, morality is purely subjective. It is the result of socio-biological conditioning or personal preference. We might feel that stabbing babies is wrong, but there would be no objective basis this should be true.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist. It is simply the case that it really is wrong to rape and kill a little girl, no matter what society thinks, or what we have evolved to think. Things like kindness, justice, and mercy, really are objectively good.
3. Therefore, God exists.

I think the existence of objective moral values and duties provides a reason for thinking God exists, and that the concept of a GCB helps show why the euthyphro dilemma is flawed.

 

[danserr]

After giving this more thought, I’m not sure that the GCB concept implies that God’s goodness is intrinsic. I mean, when we define something as possessing certain characteristics, those characteristics aren’t always innate. For instance, a thief is a thief because of what he does, not what he is. Indeed, it is conceivable that someone could accidentally be a thief without having a “thieving” mindset. Defining God as great would not necessarily imply that this greatness is innate (or so it seems). He could just as easily be great because of what he does, and defining him as great doesn’t change this.

What do you think?

I think above you switched a couple words. At first you say “defining God as GCB doesn’t imply his goodness is intrinsic,” but later “defining God as great doesn’t mean his greatness is intrinsic.” This is actually a relevant different.
– Understanding God as a GCB does mean that his goodness is intrinsic. Why? As I have said, because God is a greatest conceivable being and a being that is the paradigm of moral goodness is greater than a being that merely exemplifies it.

• In terms of God as a Greatest Conceivable Being. This is what He is by definition, it is what the word God means (or at least I think so, though not all Christians need to accept GCB theology). The question then, is what are great-making properties, what properties would such a being possess? And this just goes back to what I say earlier in this post.

 

[Oreoracle]

Mostly true. But, I don’t think these qualities are too vaguely understood.

Fair enough. But I have another question.

Suppose that we have a hypothetical device I’ll call a “GCB finder”. Here’s how it works: You type in the qualities that you believe constitute greatness, and then the GCB finder will lock on to the greatest being that exists according to those definitive qualities.

Alright, so we begin by typing in the qualities with which we more or less agree, such as power, knowledge, and metaphysical necessity. Lastly, you type in your conception of morality, so the GCB finder understands what you’ll mean by “morally perfect”. You then submit those qualities into the finder, and it locks onto the GCB.

Now here’s my question: How did you “know” what morality to put into the finder? It seems as though it’s necessary to have a conception of morality before one knows what “morally perfect” means (if we didn’t (name removed by moderator)ut a specific morality, the finder might have locked onto a bully, right?). And if one knows what morality is already, why does one need God as a basis for it? I can understand calling the GCB the basis of morality if you found the GCB based on something other than moral perfection, studied him, deemed him the moral paradigm, and followed his example. But you find the GCB based on your conception of morality, so your basis of morality would have been yourself all along. You knew what was moral before God ever entered the equation.

To make my point succinct, it seems like you need to know morality before knowing the GCB, not the other way around. And if that’s the case, the GCB is not the basis of morality.

Actually, I do think such a being exists and I can give reasons for thinking so.

My mistake, then.

• Now, I do think we have other guides to a GCB, scripture, for instance, and I think there are good reasons for that. But even if you don’t accept this, we determine great-making properties by making reasonable arguments for what qualities are great- making or not.

Fair enough.

-This seems obvious, if God does not exist, morality is purely subjective. It is the result of socio-biological conditioning or personal preference.

Whenever you were younger, did you ever feel that something was definitely (objectively) wrong before you had these opinions about God? I don’t see why God is really needed for an objective morality. Then again, I don’t see how anything could make morality objective, but that’s a different discussion.

– Understanding God as a GCB does mean that his goodness is intrinsic. Why? As I have said, because God is a greatest conceivable being and a being that is the paradigm of moral goodness is greater than a being that merely exemplifies it.]

Whenever you say “paradigm” I understand that to mean “prime example”. I don’t see why God being the prime example of morality necessitates that he be good regardless of his actions. Why can he not be the moral role model based on his actions?

 

[FurtherSuntime]

This is getting all mixed up. God is whole. We are not whole in existence, we are part from the whole.
God in opinion does not contain goodness, he is goodness. We can only be partially good as we are only a part of the whole.A God would not have morals. Morality is only a morality relative to items in conflict with a given morality. We don’t need God as a basis for morality, we need God in order to reflect on a second opinion. Man is a mental case and needs a second opinion
which follows an independent progress to reason …the Source of reason itself…the recoursive
and contemplative discovery re fitting morality is honor to God, with our kick at the cat towards progress

These problems arise when people wind up promoting a CEO God.,who plays games with peoples lives. God is acceptance period, its hard to comprehend because we know unconsciously we are only part of a whole and basically see reasons for rejection…its illogical
relative to a God. Goodness is a term for humanity, it requires an assumed counterpart.
God would be Whole, period.

 

[danserr]

Fair enough. But I have another question.

To make my point succinct, it seems like you need to know morality before knowing the GCB, not the other way around. And if that’s the case, the GCB is not the basis of morality.

… If one knows what morality is, why need God as a basis for it?

I think if I could put your question as simply and succinctly as possible, it seems to me to essentially be, "I need to have a conception of morality before I can know what I GCB is, and because of this, the GCB cannot be the basis of morality.

Remember, in terms of GCB theology, we are dealing with concepts. Does the concept of a GCB show a way in which God can be the paradigm(model/standard) of moral goodness?
Now in terms of the GCB, what we need is the concept of objective morality, and then we need to know that a being that is the paradigm of moral goodness is greater than one who is not. (This seems fair enough).
I did not need to know what morality to put into the finder, I did not need to (name removed by moderator)ut a specific series of moral commands at all. All I need is the concept of objective morality since a GCB would be the paradigm of that morality.

Second, having a concept of morality in advance does not mean a GCB can’t be the basis of morality. I could have reasons (and I think there are good ones) for thinking that an objective morality exists. I might then reason that is it improbable that such a morality would exist, unless a GCB also existed as the paradigm of such morality.
The principles of reasoning would be like this:

1. A is probably true.
2. A would not be true unless B were also true.
3. Therefore B is probably true.

Whenever you were younger, did you ever feel that something was definitely (objectively) wrong before you had these opinions about God? I don’t see why God is really needed for an objective morality. Then again, I don’t see how anything could make morality objective, but that’s a different discussion.

Yes, that point you mention at first is an interesting reason for thinking an objective morality might exist, I do think there are other, better reasons though. And the reason God is needed for an objective morality is that without God, our moral feelings are only the result of socio-biological conditioning, but there would be nothing objective about them.

Whenever you say “paradigm” I understand that to mean “prime example”. I don’t see why God being the prime example of morality necessitates that he be good regardless of his actions. Why can he not be the moral role model based on his actions?

By paradigm, I mean the standard or model. He has been a role model based on his actions (the incarnation and cruxifixion), but he did not have to do those things to be good. As a GCB, he was always the standard of morality and always without moral defect.

 

[Oreoracle]

I did not need to know what morality to put into the finder, I did not need to (name removed by moderator)ut a specific series of moral commands at all. All I need is the concept of objective morality since a GCB would be the paradigm of that morality.

I think this is the point at which our views are irreconcilable. I would say we would have to put the details of morality into the finder, because we wouldn’t know which moral code the finder would use otherwise. But if you believe there’s only one kind of morality to begin with (on account of it being objective), then you won’t see that as a problem.

The entire discussion boils down to whether morality is subjective or objective, I think.

And the reason God is needed for an objective morality is that without God, our moral feelings are only the result of socio-biological conditioning, but there would be nothing objective about them.

I think that even if a GCB exists, morality would be subjective, because morality would then be dependent on a subject (the GCB). If you asked the GCB why killing children is wrong, the GCB could only respond, “Because that’s how I feel/how I am.” I don’t see how that’s any more objective than a human talking about how they feel or how they are. You’re still listening to an opinion, it’s just that the opinion is from a supposedly greater being.

 

[danserr]

I think that even if a GCB exists, morality would be subjective, because morality would then be dependent on a subject (the GCB). If you asked the GCB why killing children is wrong, the GCB could only respond, “Because that’s how I feel/how I am.” I don’t see how that’s any more objective than a human talking about how they feel or how they are. You’re still listening to an opinion, it’s just that the opinion is from a supposedly greater being.

Not a greater being, the greatest conceivable being and as the GCB, necessarily the paradigm (standard) or moral goodness.

Yes, though, there is a point where when asking why good is good, you eventually need a stopping point. I have repeated this throughout the thread. When speaking of goodness, we need to reach a stopping point sooner or later, and a GCB is the least arbitrary stopping point (because a being that is the paradigm of goodness is greater than one that is not). This is far different from a human because a human is not a GCB and so not the paradigm of moral goodness.

I think this is the point at which our views are irreconcilable. I would say we would have to put the details of morality into the finder, because we wouldn’t know which moral code the finder would use otherwise. But if you believe there’s only one kind of morality to begin with (on account of it being objective), then you won’t see that as a problem.

The entire discussion boils down to whether morality is subjective or objective, I think.

Well, if so, we have moved past the euthyphro dilemma, which does not show that morality is subjective, but that if morality is objective, then it cannot be based in God. I have shown how the concept of a GCB helps shows why this is mistaken.

Now if you are suggesting that God cannot be the basis of objective morality because morality is subjective that is a separate argument. But we don’t need to know every detail of morality to be able to have a coherent concept of a GCB, which is all we require. As another note, whether moral values are objective or not is another argument, but I think given our moral experience, it would require some very strong evidence to hold that objective moral values do not exist. And I don’t think any skeptic has ever successfully met that burden of proof.

 

[FurtherSuntime]

danserr, theres a big problem here

Whenever you were younger, did you ever feel that something was definitely (objectively) wrong before you had these opinions about God? I don’t see why God is really needed for an objective morality. Then again, I don’t see how anything could make morality objective, but that’s a different discussion.

Yes, that point you mention at first is an interesting reason for thinking an objective morality might exist, I do think there are other, better reasons though. And the reason God is needed for an objective morality is that without God, our moral feelings are only the result of socio-biological conditioning, but there would be nothing objective about them.

…