God's omniscience

[Keeler]

Yes, I said that God knows everything. Are things that could exist, but do not actually exist something? You seem to think not, but I think you over look the distinction between act and potency. You, like the pre-Socratics, seem to be saying that “being is, non-being is not.” Which in the history of philosophy at first seemed obvious, but then Aristotle came around and introduced the notion of potency. Just because something does not exist, does not mean that there is no potency for it to exist, and in a sense the thing can have an accidental form even if it lacks a substantial one.

Aristotele was a smart guy, but many of his ideas are outdated and rightfully discarded. (I could never fathom why is he held in such a high regard.) What can you expect from someone who thought that the brain is just an organ to cool the blood? He was a genius of his time, but the general knowledge was very low back then. So he engaged in speculations (nothing wrong with that) but those specularions carry no water today. What is a problem is to hold his ideas still valid when real, actual physics has rendered his metaphysics useless and irrelevant.

Potency is not a form of existence. There are two kinds of existence: physical and conceptual. (Yes, I know that believers assert a third type of existence, but they could never substantiate that such an existence is real, and how can one detect it. However, this is not the topic right now.) Physical is real existence. Concepts do not exist as physical objects do. Concepts are mental images. When one speaks of a “future” book or chair, one speaks of a mental image (which translates into the electro-chemical activity of the brain.

Take a unicorn for instance. Do you know what a unicorn is? Sure you do. Does it exist in reality? Nope, but that doesn’t mean that the idea of unicorn does not exist, because a unicorn is simply a combination of two natural forms, that of horse and horn. So, you are correct in saying that knowledge is knowledge of something, but you are incorrect in asserting that just because something does not exist in substantial form that it is nothing.

The unicorn is a concept. As a concept it certainly exists. When we say that we both “know” what a unicorn is, we say that we have an agreement about this concept.

The concept of knowledge must be separated based upon its subject. When one speaks of knowledge of physical objects, then the object must exist, physically. Just contemplate this question: “what is the title of an imaginary book in the third nonexistent drawer of my desk, which I will buy next week, if I win on the lottery?”. Can God anwser this question? Syntactically it is well-formed sentence, or propostion, but semantically it is sheer nonsense.

Again with the “being is, non-being is not” fallacy.

Not a fallacy.

Something can exist in potency.

You are in serious epistemological trouble here. Suppose for a second that I would accept the “potential existence” as useful and valid category - just for the sake of the argument. Here is the question: “how do you separate those ‘things’ which could exist, but do not, from those which cannot exist at all?” - in other words how do you tell apart the “potential existence” from “non-existence”? Is there any difference?

Until you can resolve this problem the concept of “potential existence” is meaningless and will be treated as such. Just a fair warning, it would not be a good idea to mix God’s alleged “omnipotence” into the “game”. To say that whatever God can actualize has a “potential” existence, but whatever God cannot actualize belongs to “non-existence”. I am sure you see why this would be a bad idea. If “omniscience” cannot be discussed on its own right, then there is no reason to discuss it at all. (Besides, omnipotence is also ill-defined).

There is no logical contradiction in asserting existence or non-existence based on view point. I can offer a practical example. President Nixon had a dog named Checkers. From his perspective in 1976, that dog exists. From my perspective in 2011, it does not. The difference in perspective is one of time, and since things can come into existence or fall out of existence in time, it is possible to have different vantage points on a things existence.

Your example is just a lingustic game. From our 2011 point of wiew that dog existed but does not exist any more. We do not “know” if that dog existed, that is we do not have first hand, physical proof of his existence, but we have overwhelming testimonial evidence of its existence. But that is not the same. Testimonial evidence is never as certain as physical evidence would be.

Existence outside of time is total statis or lack of change. On this we agree. God is immutable, He does not change. We do not agree, however, that any action is change.

An action without a change is an oxymoron. It cannot be separated from “non-action” - so God’s actions (without a change) are non-actions. Don’t you see the contradiction here??

I think you have a slight equivocation on the term action and act. A change is a move from potency to act, but you can have a state of act without a prior potency. Right now, I am in act in regard to existing, yet I never changed in regard to existence. I was never in potency to existence and then actually existing (because prior to my existing, there was no subject with which to be in potency to. This is why Creation is not a change of any kind, either in God or in the thing created.) Anyway, the point is that you are introducing a false premise by trying to equate change with act.

Since you did not define “potential existence”, this little paragraph is discarded.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…There are two kinds of existence: physical and conceptual…Concepts are mental images… (which translates into the electro-chemical activity of the brain.

You argued from 2 types of existence to 1.

 

[Keeler]

You argued from 2 types of existence to 1.

No, I do not. You just don’t understand what I am saying. But I really don’t care if you comprehend it or not. I am not interested in wasting my time to educate you or tony.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

No, I do not.

You stated the following.

There are two kinds of existence: physical and conceptual.

Then you equate conceptual existence with physical existence in this statement

a mental image (which translates into the electro-chemical activity of the brain.

You went from arguing that there is 2 kinds of existence to arguing that they are both physical. Which is it?

 

[Katholish]

Aristotele was a smart guy, but many of his ideas are outdated and rightfully discarded. (I could never fathom why is he held in such a high regard.) What is a problem is to hold his ideas still valid when real, actual physics has rendered his metaphysics useless and irrelevant.

It is an unfortunate, but I suppose understandable reaction that many people have, that because Aristotle was incorrect about most of his statements on the natural sciences, that his entire system was somehow discredited. I think that this was a major contributor in Scholasticism falling out of favor in the 16th Century. However, and not to be impolite, it is a somewaht near-sighted approach. Aristotle literally wrote the book on logic, and because of that, he is still the foundation for Western Thought in many ways. It is also remarkable how untouched his metaphysics were by his errors in the natural sciences. You state that you cannot fathom why he is held in such high regard, and I would suggest that perhaps you haven’t given a close look at this non-natural science writing.

Coming to a philosophy forum on a Catholic website, you have to expect to run into Aristotle because in many ways he is the basis of Catholic philosophical thought. While we sometimes say that the Church doesn’t adopt an official philosophical system, there are certain aspects of Aristotle that have been officially adopted like his view on the distinction between form and matter, and really accidental and substantial forms. Also, St. Thomas Aquinas is the one who vigorously apply Aristotle’s philosophy to the study of theology, and St. Thomas was mandated by papal decree to be used as the basis of all seminary training.

Potency is not a form of existence. There are two kinds of existence: physical and conceptual. Concepts are mental images. When one speaks of a “future” book or chair, one speaks of a mental image (which translates into the electro-chemical activity of the brain.

If you want to call those two forms of existance formal and material, I might be able to agree with you (but I don’t think you mean that). In which case, a real potency would be a real power existing in a thing, and hence have a kind of formal existence. By potency, I am not referring to something that does not exist, but the actual power in an existing thing to bring about a change or to “make” something else. Take for instance, a theoretical status of Barack Obama. It does not exist yet, but I have the actual real ability to make it. Hence, it exists in potency in me. Once I have the idea of the statue and what it would look like, I bring it into formal existence, and even a kind of material existence (because the image in my mind is made from material components in my brain.)

As I think another poster pointed out, your definition of conceptual existence is just as material as you physical existence, it only acknowledges the difference between substantial and accidental forms.

The unicorn is a concept. As a concept it certainly exists. When we say that we both “know” what a unicorn is, we say that we have an agreement about this concept.

How is a concept knowable if the thing that it is a concept of, does not exist?

The concept of knowledge must be separated based upon its subject. When one speaks of knowledge of physical objects, then the object must exist, physically.

Sure, real knowledge is of some thing in reality. I have no problem saying that. I would, however, include immaterial things in the category of what exist in reality, like “justice”, which is not a physical thing, yet really exists.

Not a fallacy.

Ok, if being “is” and non-being is “not”, and you refuse to accept Aristotle’s solution of potency, how do you solve the pre-Socratic problem of change. How can something ever change? Either it is or it is not. How can something which is not come to be or something which is, cease to be?

Here is the question: “how do you separate those ‘things’ which could exist, but do not, from those which cannot exist at all?” - in other words how do you tell apart the “potential existence” from “non-existence”? Is there any difference?

Because I am only talking about actual potencies which exist as a power in some real thing. I am sitting in my office now, but I have a potency to be standing in my home later. Nothing has a potency (or power) to create what is impossible for it. An ant does not have the potency to initiate space travel, because it is not within its natural power (I realize that is a bit redundant, but I am just trying to highlight the definition of potency). Thus, the difference between would could exist and what could not exist is found in the potencies of the existing things which could make them.

 

[Katholish]

Your example is just a lingustic game. From our 2011 point of wiew that dog existed but does not exist any more. We do not “know” if that dog existed, that is we do not have first hand, physical proof of his existence, but we have overwhelming testimonial evidence of its existence.

I do not need first-hand physical proof to know something. I know that Checkers existed even if I never saw or touched him. There is no linguistic game. Frankly, whether I knew the dog ever existed in the past was actually irrelevant for the example. The point was that for Nixon it did exist because he touched it and it was alive, but for me, regardless if it ever existed in the past, it is certain dead now and does not exist.

An action without a change is an oxymoron. It cannot be separated from “non-action” - so God’s actions (without a change) are non-actions. Don’t you see the contradiction here??

You are only looking at one meaning of the term action. Act is in opposition to potency, and refers to a state of completion or perfection. It is when a potency is “actualized”. Right now, I have the act of existing. That act does not change, and is not changing right now. Anything that “actually” exists is in a state of act. “Action” refers the state of being in act, and there is nothing intrinsic to the notion of being in act which requires the presence of change, so there is no contradiction in terms of saying that something actual, in act, or which acts–does not change.

 

[Joel_PF]

God knows what human beings will freely choose. Where is the contradiction?

The proximate cause of someone’s action is not God’s knowledge of it, so God does not coerce the action in any way. The cause is the person’s beliefs, desires and his appraisal of the circumstances. God knows all this, and He knows what choice will be freely made from the many options that present themselves to the individual. The individual could have done otherwise; however, God knew that he wouldn’t.

Plus, from the point of view of God, there is no past or future. He is like a composer looking at the musical score on a sheet. The music itself exists only in time; but the composer can look at it as a whole simultaneously, even making changes to different parts of it at the same time.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

As I think another poster pointed out, your definition of conceptual existence is just as material as you physical existence

 

[Keeler]

It is an unfortunate, but I suppose understandable reaction that many people have, that because Aristotle was incorrect about most of his statements on the natural sciences, that his entire system was somehow discredited.

No, I do not discredit all that he has done, just some of it. If someone’s metaphysics is contradicted by real physics, then the metaphysics must be discarded.

However, and not to be impolite, it is a somewaht near-sighted approach. Aristotle literally wrote the book on logic, and because of that, he is still the foundation for Western Thought in many ways.

Indeed, and rightfully so. Just like Newton’s incredible genius formed the branch of mathematics called calculus, which is “immortal” (like all mathematical systems are), but his concepts of physics (absolute space and time) have been superceeded and now are considered obsolete. It is not derogatory to to say that some concepts of a great thinker are now discarded, while other ones still flourish.

Coming to a philosophy forum on a Catholic website, you have to expect to run into Aristotle because in many ways he is the basis of Catholic philosophical thought. While we sometimes say that the Church doesn’t adopt an official philosophical system, there are certain aspects of Aristotle that have been officially adopted like his view on the distinction between form and matter, and really accidental and substantial forms. Also, St. Thomas Aquinas is the one who vigorously apply Aristotle’s philosophy to the study of theology, and St. Thomas was mandated by papal decree to be used as the basis of all seminary training.

Some Catholics are Molinists, some are Thomists, some follow Aristotele… there is no “standard”. But that is not the main point. Some Catholics subscribe to the “middle knowledge” advocated by Molina.

If you want to call those two forms of existance formal and material, I might be able to agree with you (but I don’t think you mean that).

No, I do not. Physical existence is obvious. It is readily available to our senses, or the extention of our senses. Conceptual existence is also obvious. We make abstractions of the physical reality, and then we can combine abstractions and make new ones, or build up some never-seen-brand-new inventions and ideas. “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu” - all of our ideas and concepts start from experience. The idea that there exists some “abstract” chair and all the physical chairs are just a more-or-less-precise approximations of this “ideal” chair is complete nonsense. The “physical” chair primary, and the “abstract” chair is secondary - NOT the other way round.

In which case, a real potency would be a real power existing in a thing, and hence have a kind of formal existence.

Sorry, I have absolutely no idea what you mean here. It may be my fault, but that senstence is totally meaningless as far as I am concerned. Some “stuff” does not exist today. If that “stuff” has “potential” existence, then it may exist some time in the future. If it cannot exist in the future, then it does not have “potential” existence. **Give me an objective algorithm, how to separate “potential existence” from nonexistence". **

As I think another poster pointed out, your definition of conceptual existence is just as material as you physical existence, it only acknowledges the difference between substantial and accidental forms.

I don’t accept the concepts of “substantial” and “accidental” forms. They are void metaphysical constructs. All of our thoughts (ideas) are based upon the activity of the brain, but the meaning of the thoughts cannot be reduced to the electro-chemical activity. There is a correspondence between them. Take the conversation between an English speaking and a German speaking person. The English speaking says “two” and raises two fingers. The German speaking says “Zwei” and also raises two fingers. The electro-cemical activities of the two brains are totally different, but the “meaning” is the same - and it is established by mutual consent.

How is a concept knowable if the thing that it is a concept of, does not exist?

By mutual consent. There is no such “thing” as a physical “two”. But we know what “two” means, by making the “ultimate” abstraction of discarding all the specifics, and keeping just the “number”.

Sure, real knowledge is of some thing in reality. I have no problem saying that. I would, however, include immaterial things in the category of what exist in reality, like “justice”, which is not a physical thing, yet really exists.

Sure it exists as a concept. Just like “beauty”. Beauty is what we find “pleasing”. Justice occurs when the penalty or reward is commensurate to the deed.

Ok, if being “is” and non-being is “not”, and you refuse to accept Aristotle’s solution of potency, how do you solve the pre-Socratic problem of change. How can something ever change? Either it is or it is not. How can something which is not come to be or something which is, cease to be?

Reality is not static. Change is part of it. The old Greeks thought that reality is “static”. We understand that reality is not static, and “change” presents no problem any more. And all “change” is just an exchange of physical particles.

Because I am only talking about actual potencies which exist as a power in some real thing.

Give me a generic algorithm which can be applied to individual cases. How do you decide that “ants cannot instantiate space travel”?

 

[Keeler]

I do not need first-hand physical proof to know something. I know that Checkers existed even if I never saw or touched him.

No, you do not “know” it, you believe it (though you have good reasons for that belief). But think about 1984 (the novel). It is possible that all our records of the past have been faked.

You are only looking at one meaning of the term action. Act is in opposition to potency, and refers to a state of completion or perfection. It is when a potency is “actualized”. Right now, I have the act of existing. That act does not change, and is not changing right now. Anything that “actually” exists is in a state of act. “Action” refers the state of being in act, and there is nothing intrinsic to the notion of being in act which requires the presence of change, so there is no contradiction in terms of saying that something actual, in act, or which acts–does not change.

Until you can give me an algorithm to separate “potential existence” from “nonexistence” this differentiation is meaningless.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…The meaning of the thoughts cannot be reduced to the electro-chemical activity…

You are admitting that immaterial existence is real.

“meaning” is the same - and it is established by mutual consent.

Here you admit that existence can be established by an act of will.

 

[tdgesq]

Potency is not a form of existence. There are two kinds of existence: physical and conceptual. (Yes, I know that believers assert a third type of existence, but they could never substantiate that such an existence is real, and how can one detect it. However, this is not the topic right now.) Physical is real existence. Concepts do not exist as physical objects do. Concepts are mental images. When one speaks of a “future” book or chair, one speaks of a mental image (which translates into the electro-chemical activity of the brain.

I don’t think you can maintain this definition of “concept” within your own worldview. For example, the concept of “randomness” is not merely a mental image. I might construct a mental image of flipping a coin multiple times, for instance, but that would not be what we would call a concept of randomness. I might abstract a concept of randomness from observing the flipping of a coin, but the concept is useful precisely because it is not an image. The same is true with concepts such as “infinity,” which it is impossible to imagine because I cannot hold a mental image of an endless string of objects or events in my thinking.

As for potential existence, it cannot be required that the reality of it be based upon an algorithm. Take the example of randomness again. Can a series of random events occur in the natural universe? I think you would say it can. Do we have an algorithm that describes randomness? Last time I checked, no such algorithm existed.

Maybe a more illustrative example is the unicorn example mentioned. I can certainly imagine a possible world where unicorns exist. Do I really need to construct an algorithm to posit that such thing can potentially exist? It seems that a possible worlds analysis is superior here.

I think that the your requirements are in need of refining.

 

[Keeler]

I don’t think you can maintain this definition of “concept” within your own worldview. For example, the concept of “randomness” is not merely a mental image. I might construct a mental image of flipping a coin multiple times, for instance, but that would not be what we would call a concept of randomness. I might abstract a concept of randomness from observing the flipping of a coin, but the concept is useful precisely because it is not an image. The same is true with concepts such as “infinity,” which it is impossible to imagine because I cannot hold a mental image of an endless string of objects or events in my thinking.

As for potential existence, it cannot be required that the reality of it be based upon an algorithm. Take the example of randomness again. Can a series of random events occur in the natural universe? I think you would say it can. Do we have an algorithm that describes randomness? Last time I checked, no such algorithm existed.

Maybe a more illustrative example is the unicorn example mentioned. I can certainly imagine a possible world where unicorns exist. Do I really need to construct an algorithm to posit that such thing can potentially exist? It seems that a possible worlds analysis is superior here.

I think that the your requirements are in need of refining.

I cannot agree. “Randomness” is a description of certain physical behavior. There is no question that those physical events exist. “Randomness” as an ontological object does not exist, only as a concept.

“Potential” existence is a very different idea. It means that some physical objects or events do not exist, but they could exist under some different conditions. Presumably there are other imagined objects or events, which not just do not exist, but also cannot exist. If this second set would be an empty set, then clearly “everything” would exist “potentially”, and as such the term would lose its meaningful status. And also “married bachelors” would have “potential” existence. Or coldness of minus one Kelvin would also be potentially possible.

Therefore until one can tell apart the two sets of objects or events, we have an alleged distinction, but cannat decide about a specific object where does it belong to. This is where the problem of a decision method or algorithm comes into the picture. And under such circumstances what is the point of the categorization? None at all.

 

[tonyrey]

No, I do not. You just don’t understand what I am saying. But I really don’t care if you comprehend it or not. I am not interested in wasting my time to educate you or tony.

You are assuming your knowledge and understanding of omniscience are far superior to those you disagree with you in spite of your failure to refute their statements. It would be wiser to confine yourself to the topic and observe the rules rather than making aggressive, irrelevant and insulting remarks which reveal your hostility to religion.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…“Randomness” as an ontological object does not exist, only as a concept.

notExist=existasConcept. This statement is a logical contradiction and therefore false.

“Potential” existence is a very different idea. It means…

That’s not what it means.

po·ten·tial (p-tnshl)
adj.

1. Capable of being but not yet in existence; latent: a potential problem.

You are talking about logical contradictions, which are not capable of existing by definition.

 

[tdgesq]

I cannot agree. “Randomness” is a description of certain physical behavior. There is no question that those physical events exist. “Randomness” as an ontological object does not exist, only as a concept.

I will accept your characterization. The main point I was making is that concepts are not limited to mental images. It would make higher mathematical concepts insanely difficult, if not impossible, to apprehend. The question becomes what is the ontological status of a concept like “randomness”? Neither of us would agree I think that it has material reality, other than perhaps it correlates with certain brain activity that we don’t yet exactly understand. The concept is highly useful in that its application to certain statistical models can be highly predictive of actual events that we observe. What is the ontological description of what we might call a valid concept such as this?

“Potential” existence is a very different idea. It means that some physical objects or events do not exist, but they could exist under some different conditions. Presumably there are other imagined objects or events, which not just do not exist, but also cannot exist. If this second set would be an empty set, then clearly “everything” would exist “potentially”, and as such the term would lose its meaningful status. And also “married bachelors” would have “potential” existence. Or coldness of minus one Kelvin would also be potentially possible.

In a possible worlds analysis the second set is not empty though. Those propositions that are logically impossible cannot exist ie. married bachelors. All such logically impossible propositions belong in the second set. Those things that are materially possible would belong to the first set. The assertion that unicorns could potentially exist would fall in the first set. Thus, there is still a meaningful distinction between the two sets.

The issue I have is with your epistemic standard for potential existence. If an algorithm is required then we would have to say that unicorns could not potentially exist, as there is no descriptive algorithm. I think there is an additional problem with using algorithms as a criteria though beyond the overly restrictive objection.

Algorithms appear to fall within the category of concepts. While they can be reduced to mathematical formulae written on a piece of paper, how can they describe what may potentially exist in reality? It appears you are proposing that concepts are the ultimate justification for potential existence. This seems to make it all the more necessary to assign some ontological description to concepts.

 

[Keeler]

I will accept your characterization. The main point I was making is that concepts are not limited to mental images.

What else would they be? Maybe you subscribe to the concept of “abstract objects”, which are supposed to “exist” apart from our concepts? Abstract objects would be “numbers”, “letters”, the combination of them, etc? We could talk about those entities, if you want to. Some philosophers assert that “abstract objects” are “real”. I do not subscribe to this notion, and have some pretty serious arguments against it.

It would make higher mathematical concepts insanely difficult, if not impossible, to apprehend.

Not really. Numbers are an easy concept, at least the positive integers. We abstract them by looking two apples (for example), get rid of the individual characteristics, and arrive at the concept of “two”. It is remarkable that some animals can do the same. They have a clear concept of “two”. Some even can go a bit higher.

In a possible worlds analysis the second set is not empty though. Those propositions that are logically impossible cannot exist ie. married bachelors. All such logically impossible propositions belong in the second set. Those things that are materially possible would belong to the first set. The assertion that unicorns could potentially exist would fall in the first set. Thus, there is still a meaningful distinction between the two sets.

Agreed, that the two sets are both non-empty. The question is are they meaningful and useful? After all we can come up with infinitely many categorizations and most of them are meaningless or worse. (Just an example: humans are subdivided into “races”, based upon their skin color and some other bodily characteristics. This subdivision is more or less objective. But it has no good use. When I am asked about my “race” I simply respond: “human”.)

The issue I have is with your epistemic standard for potential existence. If an algorithm is required then we would have to say that unicorns could not potentially exist, as there is no descriptive algorithm.

Hypothetically, there might be. Gene-splicing could do the trick. But, of course we are in science fiction now. My problem is not just that “potential existence” cannot be told apart from non-existence. It is that it has no use, it is irrelevant. Actual objects either exist, or existed, of will exist in the future. What existed in the past, does not exist in the present any more. What will exist in the future, does not exist yet.

Let’s not forget that these categories (past, present and future) are actual, physical, meaningful categories. And the whole thread is about “knowledge”. My question was: “what does it mean that God knows the contents of a book, which will never be written, since the author will never be born?”. Hypothetically speaking the author “may” be born, “may” grow into a writer, “may” write a book - under some different circumstances. If he does and when he does, there there will be an actual book, and then God can know the contents of that book. In a simpler format: “can God know how the book Winnie the Pooh would have turned out if A. A. Milne had a serious toothache, when he wrote it?”.

I think there is an additional problem with using algorithms as a criteria though beyond the overly restrictive objection.

Algorithms appear to fall within the category of concepts. While they can be reduced to mathematical formulae written on a piece of paper, how can they describe what may potentially exist in reality? It appears you are proposing that concepts are the ultimate justification for potential existence. This seems to make it all the more necessary to assign some ontological description to concepts.

The word “algorithm” has a lot of mathematical connotations. I mean “method”, in general. If we consider a categorization method to subdivide “stuff” into two categories, but we cannot tell if a specific object belongs to category “A” or category “not-A”, then what is the use such subdivision? The bare minimum would be a way (method, algorithm) to find out where would any object belong to.

I suggest that there are two types of existence: “physical existence” (P-existence) and “conceptual existence” (C-existence). P-existence can be directly experiences by our senses or indirectly by the extension of our senses. As a first approximation, C-existence is the mental abstraction of P-existence. But it does not stop there: concepts can be developed about physical objects, and about other concepts (meta-concepts).

P-existence is active, it changes, it interacts with other physical objects. C-existence is passive, it cannot interact with other concepts. The written symbols (abstractions) of 2 H + O will never get into interaction and form a water molecule (H2O). P-existence is “there”, even if there is no one to experience it. C-existence is contingent upon some beings who are able to conceptualize and create abstractions. If all humans would disappear, then the text of “Hamlet” would still be available in the books, but “Hamlet” - the meaning of the text - as we understand it, would cease to exist.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…P-existence is active, it changes, it interacts with other physical objects. C-existence is passive, it cannot interact with other concepts.

Metaphysics is based in logic, just as mathematics is. You are simply making up ontological objects, and assigning them properties convenient to you, but not based in any logic. For instance here you claim that concepts cannot interact with other concepts. How do you know that? What logic supports that? Second, As we have already demonstrated, your idea of a concept is physical existence itself. That makes any further distinction moot.

The written symbols (abstractions) of 2 H + O will never get into interaction and form a water molecule (H2O)

You just made 2 concepts interact to form a third! The concept of hydrogen and the concept of oxygen and the concept of addition were just combined to create the concept of H2O, water. You just wrote a sentence to deny an idea that you demonstrate in the statement!

P-existence is “there”, even if there is no one to experience it.

How can you know that without someone there to experience that?

C-existence is contingent upon some beings who are able to conceptualize and create abstractions.

You just made the same argument we make using different words. Some beings are contingent on beings that who are able to conceptualize and create abstractions. We call them Contingent and Necessary Beings. Welcome to Catholicism.

If all humans would disappear, then the text of “Hamlet” would still be available in the books, but “Hamlet” - the meaning of the text - as we understand it, would cease to exist.

without anyone there to experience it, how do you know?

 

[tdgesq]

What else would they be? Maybe you subscribe to the concept of “abstract objects”, which are supposed to “exist” apart from our concepts? Abstract objects would be “numbers”, “letters”, the combination of them, etc? We could talk about those entities, if you want to.

Not mental images, even if they exist solely in the mind. If words have meaning then images are just that. I can’t have an image of the square root of -1 in my mind. Neither can I have the image of an infinite series of objects in my mind. I don’t dispute that beings of reason such as these can only exist in the mind. I just want an ontological description of them. It can’t be images like an image of my grandma or an image of a series of objects in my mind.

Agreed, that the two sets are both non-empty. The question is are they meaningful and useful?

If you are asking how the set of the logically possible viz the set logically impossible is useful then pick up any philosophical work that engages in possible worlds analysis, including those written by atheists. In philosophy it is extremely useful to exclude those scenarios that are logically impossible as opposed to those that are not.

Hypothetically, there might be. Gene-splicing could do the trick. But, of course we are in science fiction now. My problem is not just that “potential existence” cannot be told apart from non-existence. It is that it has no use, it is irrelevant. Actual objects either exist, or existed, of will exist in the future. What existed in the past, does not exist in the present any more. What will exist in the future, does not exist yet.

Unless time travel theory is completely useless as well, but we don’t even need to go that far. It is one of the primary uses of science to predict what will occur or exist in the future. Everything from cosmological theories to bridge building are based upon it. Predicting what will exist in the future is a large component of our lives.

Let’s not forget that these categories (past, present and future) are actual, physical, meaningful categories. And the whole thread is about “knowledge”. My question was: “what does it mean that God knows the contents of a book, which will never be written, since the author will never be born?”.

It means that God knows that if a certain author with certain characteristics existed he would write a book, the contents of which God also knows. And? Even human beings with their limited intellect can imagine a person with certain characteristics and what type of book such a person might author. Of course God knows if that person will actually come into existence, unlike human beings.

The word “algorithm” has a lot of mathematical connotations. I mean “method”, in general. If we consider a categorization method to subdivide “stuff” into two categories, but we cannot tell if a specific object belongs to category “A” or category “not-A”, then what is the use such subdivision? The bare minimum would be a way (method, algorithm) to find out where would any object belong to.

While an algorithm may be a method of predicting existence, not all methods of predicting existence are algorithms. So apparently you aren’t requiring an algorithm to justify potential existence, which is good. It appears to me all you are really stating is that some methods of predicting what will actually come into existence are better than others. I don’t disagree with you.

On the other hand, I don’t need any other tools besides my imagination to conceive of the yet to exist author and his book. Is it possible this person could potentially exist? Of course. It is even possible that the person exists today and I just don’t know it. Is it probable? No. Is there a meaningful distinction between events that are only remotely possible and events that are not possible at all? Yes, especially in philosophy.

A certain algorithm may be a superior method of predicting what is likely to exist when compared to my imagination, but it is inferior when it comes to determining the mere possibility that an event could exist. Then again. Both methods are inferior to God’s, who knows with certainty what has existed, what will exist, and what is merely possible.

 

[Keeler]

Not mental images, even if they exist solely in the mind. If words have meaning then images are just that. I can’t have an image of the square root of -1 in my mind. Neither can I have the image of an infinite series of objects in my mind. I don’t dispute that beings of reason such as these can only exist in the mind. I just want an ontological description of them. It can’t be images like an image of my grandma or an image of a series of objects in my mind.

I wonder if you use the word “mental image” in the same manner as I do. I have absolutely no problem with square root of minus one, or working with infinite sets, or n-dimensional vectors and matrices. The square root of minus one is trivial, once you generalize the concept of numbers from the points on a line to the points on a two dimensional plane (where the original numbers are just a special case now). To work with concepts like this it is not necessary to be able to “visualize” them. We cannot visualize a tesseract (a 4-dimensional cube), but we understand its characteristics and can work with it. Let’s put it this way: a “mental image” is not necessarily a “visual image”.

If you are asking how the set of the logically possible viz the set logically impossible is useful then pick up any philosophical work that engages in possible worlds analysis, including those written by atheists. In philosophy it is extremely useful to exclude those scenarios that are logically impossible as opposed to those that are not.

That is not what I am asking at all. The word “logically” was injected by you, not the original poster. He wanted to introduce “possible existence” as a category (next to actual existence). I am quite familiar with the concept of “possible world analysis”. We don’t need to go there, since the “possible existence” does not require it. A temperature of minus one Kelvin or speed faster than light are not logically impossible, they is physically impossible (yes, even for God).

Unless time travel theory is completely useless as well, but we don’t even need to go that far. It is one of the primary uses of science to predict what will occur or exist in the future. Everything from cosmological theories to bridge building are based upon it. Predicting what will exist in the future is a large component of our lives.

Of course we do, we do it all the time. But we usually do not confuse our predictions with knowledge. To say that if we toss a coin into the air, the result will be either heads or tails, or the coin may land on its edge (very unlikely, but not impossible) or it may be snatched in mid air, or it may be destroyed somehow before landing is a nice prediction but it does not constitute knowledge, unless one can predict the actual outcome, too. To be able to enumerate the possible outcomes is not “full” knowledge, unless one can also tell the actual outcome.

And one more point. Such predictions are impossible for a non-deterministic system. See chaos-theory. The old Newtonian world with its classic clockwork, which travels on its path from the past to the future has been abandoned. Of course, as usual, philosophers (and especially theologians) are reluctant to change their outdated metaphysical models, even if they are rendered obsolete by real physics. If actual physics and speculation are at odds, speculation is the loser.

It means that God knows that if a certain author with certain characteristics existed he would write a book, the contents of which God also knows. And? Even human beings with their limited intellect can imagine a person with certain characteristics and what type of book such a person might author. Of course God knows if that person will actually come into existence, unlike human beings.

I did not say “would” at all. It is an important distinction. Refer back to the paragraph above. The enumeration of counterfactuals is not the same as knowing the actual outcome. If there is no outcome, there is no knowledge. Sure, there is “partial” knowledge, but that is no big deal. “Omniscience” is supposed to mean more than just telling the possibilities.

Let’s keep it simple: does it make any sense to say “God knows the color of a ball which does not reside on my desk”. If something does not exist, it cannot have attributes. Linguistically it is the same as saying: “God knows the color of the nonexistent ball which resides on my desk”. The color of a nonexistent ball is an oxymoron. The contents of a nonexistent book are undefined, undefinable and therefore unknowable. Knowledge can only be applied to something that exists, or existed, or what can be extrapolated - which requires a deterministic universe.

It appears to me all you are really stating is that some methods of predicting what will actually come into existence are better than others. I don’t disagree with you…

Sure, but none of those predictions constitute knowledge.

On the other hand, I don’t need any other tools besides my imagination to conceive of the yet to exist author and his book. Is it possible this person could potentially exist? Of course. It is even possible that the person exists today and I just don’t know it. Is it probable? No.

Imagination is not the same as knowledge.

Is there a meaningful distinction between events that are only remotely possible and events that are not possible at all? Yes, especially in philosophy…

If you cannot tell where a specific “something” belongs to, then the distinction is illusiory. If a bullet misses by an inch or by a mile, they both missed.