God's omniscience

[tdgesq]

Let’s put it this way: a “mental image” is not necessarily a “visual image”.

That’s fair. Although it still leaves uncertain what type of image this really is from an ontological standpoint.

That is not what I am asking at all. The word “logically” was injected by you, not the original poster. He wanted to introduce “possible existence” as a category (next to actual existence). I am quite familiar with the concept of “possible world analysis”. We don’t need to go there, since the “possible existence” does not require it. A temperature of minus one Kelvin or speed faster than light are not logically impossible, they is physically impossible (yes, even for God).

Be that as it may, we have been discussing for the last several posts what qualifies as “possible existence.” You proffered that something only possibly exists if it can be described by an algorithm, later broadened to some type of methodology. My response was that this test is too restrictive on what would qualify as possible existence. I offered a possible worlds analysis as an alternative test, which is useful insofar as it excludes logically impossible events from the set of “possible existence.” So I guess I disagree that we’ve been doing all this time is trying to differentiate between “possible existence” and “actual existence.”

It seems that what you want to focus on is the difference between events that are “physically possible” as opposed to events that are “physically impossible.” To do this though we are only going to be able to talk about this universe in which we live. It necessarily restricts any discussion of other possible universes that could logically operate outside of the physical laws we observe in our own. If that is what you want to discuss then that is fine with me.

However, you haven’t yet given an example of something that is physically impossible to occur in this universe. Zero degrees kelvin is defined as the null point on the kelvin scale. By definition there is no “lower” temperature than zero degrees kelvin, at least within that scale. What you propose then is logically impossible. Also, there is a question as to whether we will ever observe absolute zero in our universe. I don’t believe we have ever achieved it. Whether or not this is a physical impossibility is unclear.

As for the speed of light, there are theories that utilize special relativity to theorize faster than light particles. They have never been observed, but may potentially exist in our universe.

Of course we do, we do it all the time. But we usually do not confuse our predictions with knowledge.

Hopefully I’m not being accused of this since I don’t believe I have committed this error. I agree with you that some predictions do not constitute knowledge, while others do. The degree of knowledge or the degree of certainty we have varies when it comes to predictions, but it does not mean that predictions are mutually exclusive from knowledge.

And one more point. Such predictions are impossible for a non-deterministic system. See chaos-theory. :

This is an interesting assertion. I have debated with chaos theorists who vehemently deny what you are stating. I suspect though that whether such predictions are impossible depends on if a system is truly non-deterministic. I was just discussing atom decay with another poster here who asserted something similar, until I pointed out that decay of like particles on a mass scale can be predicted to a certain degree.

The enumeration of counterfactuals is not the same as knowing the actual outcome. If there is no outcome, there is no knowledge.

There is certainly no knowledge of an actual outcome since we are talking about a counterfactual, which by definition means that it isn’t the actual outcome. But this is an example of actual existence, not potential existence. You seem to be requiring that there is only knowledge of potential existence if it does in fact actually exist at some point in the future, and then only if it exists at the precise moment in time that our assertion of potential existence says it will. But then this destroys knowledge of potential existence in your own worldview. Let me explain.

The truth of a prediction about the material universe can only be known, according to you, once it has occurred ie. once it is in actual existence. In your view, there would be no such thing at all as “knowledge of potential existence,” because the only way it could be known is once it actually exists. We may have 99.99% confidence (and more) that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow because of prior observation and cosmological calculation, but it isn’t a potentially existing event because it may not occur (the earth may be knocked out of orbit by a cosmic event). The truth of the prediction is only known once it occurs, but then it isn’t potential existence anymore; it is actual existence. I will show you below how to escape from the quandary you’ve created. (continued below).

 

[tdgesq]

Let’s keep it simple: does it make any sense to say “God knows the color of a ball which does not reside on my desk”. If something does not exist, it cannot have attributes.

I agree that is a nonsense sentence the way you intend it, but it is nonsense because it conflates actual existence with potential existence. The phrase “a ball” entails that the ball actually exists. The language “not reside” implies that the ball does not exist. However, a ball cannot exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense. What you propose is a logical contradiction, and not even God can know that a ball exists and doesn’t exist. On the other hand, if we interpret the sentence to mean “God knows that a ball of a certain color could exist on your desk if certain counterfactual conditions are met,” then there is no contradiction. It isn’t knowledge of what actually exists, but it is knowledge of what could exist if conditions were different. And this is what saves the category of “potential existence,” even for non-theists.

Scientists can conduct a simple experiment with a battery and a light filament and make predictions. The prediction may be that the light will turn on once the leads to the filament are connected to the posts of the battery. The connection is made, but the light doesn’t turn on. As it turns out, the battery is completely discharged and cannot provide power for the light. The scientist is justified in making the statement, “if the battery had been charged then the light would have turned on.” The scientist is not making an assertion about actual existence, but an assertion about potential existence. The object of knowledge is about what could or would exist, not about what does exist. So unless you want to claim that the scientist’s statement is also nonsense and does not constitute knowledge, you need to revise your definition of knowledge of potential existence.

Knowledge can only be applied to something that exists, or existed, or what can be extrapolated - which requires a deterministic universe.

Two things here: (1) according to you knowledge cannot be acquired by extrapolation into the future because until the event actually occurs it is not known, and (2) it is clear that the universe is not completely deterministic, so the prerequisite for knowledge by extrapolation does not exist. Under your view there can’t be knowledge by extrapolation.

Sure, but none of those predictions constitute knowledge.

Knowledge of what? They constitute knowledge of what is logically possible. I haven’t asserted that possible worlds propositions give us knowledge other than that.

Imagination is not the same as knowledge.

You continue to confuse categories. It is knowledge of what logically could exist, but it isn’t knowledge of what does exist. I believe you will have to agree unless you want to throw out all predictions of science about what would occur if certain conditions held. In fact, you will need to throw out all “if, then” propositions (including all logically conditional statements) as having no truth value.

 

[Keeler]

Be that as it may, we have been discussing for the last several posts what qualifies as “possible existence.” You proffered that something only possibly exists if it can be described by an algorithm, later broadened to some type of methodology.

I think we still have some miscommunication. So let me start afresh.

I do not consider the concept of “possible existence” a meaningful concept, especially since there is no objective way (or method) to find out if a non-existent “object” can possibly exist, or not. As a matter of fact, I find the proposed subdivision of non-existent objects into sub-categories of “possibly existing” and “not even possibly existing” totally void of usefulness and void of meaning, too. To be more precise I find any categorization of “non-existent” objects meaningless.

If something does not exist, it has no attributes. In my view one cannot even meaningful to say that here is a “nonexistent book”, right next to a “nonexistent ball”. How can one differentiate between two objects neither of which exists? Please consider this. In my view it is a cruical point.

Sure we can speak of a book I am about to write, but have not started yet, and we can talk about the possible contents of that book. But until the book is actually written we cannot talk about its contents, only of its possible, planned, intended contents. Does this make sense? Now, in this thread we are concerned with the question of omniscience, and we can contemplate the question: “can God know the contents of the book which is not written yet?”.

To make things more problematic, we can switch to the past. Suppose I contemplated writing a book, thought about it, planned what it was to be about, etc… but never got around to write it. Finally I abandoned the whole project, and dropped the idea of writing that book. So, what about God’s omniscience? Can God “know” the contents of the book that I planned, but never wrote? Sure enough, he could know my plans but my plans are not the same as the actual finished product.

As far as I am concerned, the answer to both questions is “no”. I define knowledge as information about something. The old phrase “justified true belief” is really outdated now. When it was concocted, there was no information theory.

So what is the set of objects we can have information about? Anything that exists. No problem there. Anything that existed, if one was around in the time when it existed. God obviously qualifies. God was around when the object existed, so he could obtain the information about the object, and having prefect recollection, he would retain that knowledge.

The problem is the future. In one sense using the definition of “knowledge = information” the answer should be no. If something does not exist, one cannot obtain information about it. But this seems to contradict the usual assumption that something, which is about to happen, which will happen very soon, which is unavoidable - can be known before it happens. If we use “knowledge” in a slightly weaker form, then we can say that we know something that did not happen yet, but what will happen unavoidably. It is my opinion that it is ill-advised to weaken the meaning of knowledge. It would be much more precise to call this assessment a “justified belief” or “educated guess”.

As far as I am concerned a proposition of “there will be rain tomorrow at 4pm at the coordinates x and y” cannot be assigned a “true” or “false” value until 4pm tomorrow. Then and only then can we find out if the there is rain at those coordinates.

 

[tdgesq]

I do not consider the concept of “possible existence” a meaningful concept, especially since there is no objective way (or method) to find out if a non-existent “object” can possibly exist, or not. As a matter of fact, I find the proposed subdivision of non-existent objects into sub-categories of “possibly existing” and “not even possibly existing” totally void of usefulness and void of meaning, too. To be more precise I find any categorization of “non-existent” objects meaningless.

Then you are being inconsistent - in your own words:

“‘Potential’ existence is a very different idea. It means that some physical objects or events do not exist, but they could exist under some different conditions.”

I agree with this definition by the way. If it is meaningless then why did you express it? Perhaps you have changed your mind. If so, you need to let me know.

As far as I am concerned a proposition of “there will be rain tomorrow at 4pm at the coordinates x and y” cannot be assigned a “true” or “false” value until 4pm tomorrow. Then and only then can we find out if the there is rain at those coordinates.

Then the following propositions are also meaningless and do not constitute knowledge: penguins will be birds tomorrow; the Earth will be round tomorrow; the universe will ultimately experience heat death; the laws of logic will hold tomorrow; the scientific method will operate tomorrow as it has in the past; the laws of mathematics will hold tomorrow. Please affirm or deny that the foregoing propositions are meaningless and do not constitute knowledge.

You need to take a closer look at the correspondence theory of truth. There are solutions to the problem of tense (time dependent) propositions. If the theory of truth to which you hold is as inflexible as this then there are few if any that will agree with you. Best of luck in your studies.

 

[Keeler]

Then you are being inconsistent - in your own words:

I agree with this definition by the way. If it is meaningless then why did you express it? Perhaps you have changed your mind. If so, you need to let me know.

There is no inconsistency here. In everyday vernacular we talk quite sloppily about certain things, since there is no need or reason to be overly precise. When we talk about some “red balls” which will be manufactured sometime next year, it is simply sloppy wording, though we all know what we are talking about. But those balls do not exist yet, so one cannot speak meaningfully about their color. Of course we can talk properly about their planned color. This is not nitpicking, rather precision, for which there is no need under usual circumstances.

Then the following propositions are also meaningless and do not constitute knowledge: penguins will be birds tomorrow; the Earth will be round tomorrow; the universe will ultimately experience heat death; the laws of logic will hold tomorrow; the scientific method will operate tomorrow as it has in the past; the laws of mathematics will hold tomorrow. Please affirm or deny that the foregoing propositions are meaningless and do not constitute knowledge.

Uh-oh. You mixed several different categories of “knowledge” here - maybe accidentally.

1. The knowledge pertaining to an axiomatic system (laws of logic, laws of mathematics) are time-independent - as long as we stay within that specific axiomatic system. We can say that the Pythagoras theorem “will be true” tomorrow - IF and ONLY IF we stay withing the Euclidean axiomatic system.
2. To say that “penguins will be birds tomorrow” is simply a classification, it does not describe anything axiomatic, or a knowledge about the external reality. We chose to create a category of “bird”, based upon some characteristics, and incorporated the penguins into that class. We may develop a better classification system and then the category of “bird” will be replaced by a more descriptive and better one.
3. The rest of your examples pertain to the external reality: “the Earth will be round tomorrow; the universe will ultimately experience heat death” are not pieces of “knowledge”, they are very probable, educated guesses. It is possible, though very unlikely that the Sun will go nova tonight and then the Earth will be blown into smithereens. To our best knowledge, the “heat death” is a very likely scenario - but that also does not constitute “knowledge”.

I divide the objects of knowledge into several parts:

1. propositions within an abstract, axiomatic system,
2. propositions about the objective, external reality, and
3. propositions about some imaginary environment.

The prerequisites of “knowledge” are not the same. We know something in an axiomatic system, if the proposition is the logical corollary of the axioms. When the proposition is about the external reality, then it qualifies as knowledge if it reflects the external reality. Propositions about some imaginary environment are pretty much irrelevant: “Hamlet’s hair is brown” - such a proposition cannot be decided, and it does not matter if it is true or not.

You need to take a closer look at the correspondence theory of truth. There are solutions to the problem of tense (time dependent) propositions. If the theory of truth to which you hold is as inflexible as this then there are few if any that will agree with you. Best of luck in your studies.

Always. Your posts are helpful in pointing out where I need to concentrate.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

1. The knowledge pertaining to an axiomatic system (laws of logic, laws of mathematics) are time-independent -…

No, are not. They stand whether time exists or not.

1. To say that “penguins will be birds tomorrow” is simply a classification…

Thats not a classification, thatst a rhetorical tautology (the bad kind of tautology). Penguins by definition are birds. As long as it is a penguin yesterday, today and tommorrow it is a bird.

I divide the objects of knowledge into several parts:

1. propositions within an abstract, axiomatic system,
2. propositions about the objective, external reality, and
3. propositions about some imaginary environment.

These are completely imaginary epistemological divisions. Plus, ##1 and #3 are the same thing. You are really just saying you want to have a natural/supernatural division of knowledge. Feel freee but the rest of us know that such a thing is personal opinion, not based on any logical necessity.

…Propositions about some imaginary environment are pretty much irrelevant: “Hamlet’s hair is brown” - such a proposition cannot be decided, and it does not matter if it is true or not.

This is false. Propositions about mathematics are propositions about some “imaginary environment”. They can certainly be decided, and they can certainly matter.