Good Books on, and in refutation of, Atheism

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

“God has no cause” is not a premise of the arguments. Try again.

Then who caused God. I refute the argument by simply stating the cause of God is greater than God himself.

Trust me, “God has no cause” is foundation to these arguments. Call it what you want, “unmoved mover”, “first cause”, “prime moved”, etc. Same thing.

Poisoning the well fallacy. Nowhere is it claimed that everything must have a cause, nor have you demonstrated sufficient knowledge of any of the arguments to even let me know what the starting premises are, to which there is no special pleading.

 

[Wesrock]

I’m willing to listen. What don’t I understand? Keep in mind all my refutations are standard critiques of the Aquinas arguments. There are several more. I didn’t even use the most common and obvious one - “Then who caused God”?

I’m well aware they’re “standard”. It doesn’t change the fact that these oft repeated critiques have nothing to do with Aquinas’ arguments. If you’re open minded, I suggest reading the argument for a Prime Mover I wrote up in my own words here: The Existence of God: The Argument From Motion

I feel I’ve improved since then and could be clearer, but it’s there for critique.

 

[Wesrock]

Actually, meaning physically? Since there are infinitely many possible worlds, you would need omniscience to know what could be “actually” real and what could not be. But only the logically impossible states of affairs could be excluded a-priori. Not even a purple-yellow polka dot covered seven headed and fire breathing dragon, which expresses its thoughts in poems of iambic pentameter could be declared impossible.

Don’t forget, in a different world there could be different laws of nature. In some other world telekinesis could be possible.

Yes, a purple-yellow polka dot covered seven headed and fire breathing dragon, which expresses its thoughts in poems of iambic pentameter is metaphysically possible. So is a world with extremely different laws of nature. So is a world with telekinesis and telepathy.

I am talking about the principles that are prior to any physical laws.

A question, is your thought experiment valid in all possible worlds?

Again, how could you know that? And let’s remember that it was just one of the thought experiments, made very simple precisely since the thought experiment only requires logical possibility - and NOT physical or metaphysical possibility. Another example would be a perfect mirror image of our existing universe, except every particle replaced by the corresponding anti-particle. This hypothetical would be physically possible. And yet, these two physically possible worlds have nothing in common, not even on the sub-atomic level, and therefore the nonexistence of “necessary beings” is established - again.

I’ve no concern with a mirror anti-matter universe. Again, I ask the question, would your thought experiment be valid in all possible worlds?

Two, I’d be interested in what you consider to be actualy brute facts that you believe are so we can expand on this.

A simple example will have to suffice. Looking up from Earth, the virtual size of the Sun and the Moon are about the same, which makes Solar eclipse possible. There is no logical necessity for this. A few thousand or few millions years from now their virtual size will be different. If the distance of the Earth from the Sun or the distance of the Moon from the Earth would be different, there would be no solar eclipse. And none of them are static. This is sheer coincidence.

That’s not a brute fact, that’s sufficiently explained by the sizes of the two bodies and their relative distance from the Earth.

There is no objective epistemological method which could separate the true and false propositions about your suggested metaphysical reality.

Please explain your epistemological method in coming up with this objective truth.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

Further demonstrating you have no idea what the premises of the five ways are.

Once again, the discussion devolves to “You just don’t get it”. You have not challenged any of my refutations, mostly just responding with comments like “that’s not what it means”, following by me quoting your text where you literally use the same term you deny using a few posts later.

I will close with the following - the Five Ways are celebrated not for their validity, but rather they were the first attempt at justifying God’s existence using logic and reason. But as I have demonstrated, and many far more capable philosophers have as well, they fail in many ways. Scientifically. Logically. Even theologically. They have long been refuted and dismissed. Heck, 60%-70% of philosophers are atheists.
As I mentioned above, don’t argue with an atheist. You will lose. My response is that I HOPE God exists, and I truly believe that there is a higher power defined by holistic phenomena. That’s good enough for me, even though all else fails in proving that God exists.

Whatever you say, LateCatholic. I’ve linked you to a demonstration. You can claim that Julius Caesar visited the moon all you want, it doesn’t change the fact that he never did and no serious effort need be made to validate that he never did.

 

[o_mlly]

“Nothing” is just a concept, because if it would exist ontologically, then it would be “something”.

All abstractions are concepts, that is ideas that are non-experiential. Abstraction is the elimination of particulars. “Nothing”, therefore, is simply abstraction in the extreme.

Sometimes the same concept can be expressed in different formats, some of which are easier to analyze than others. If you would separate the set of number between one and ten into two subsets, it is easier to say “numbers less than 9” as opposed to say: “one, two, three, four, five, six, seven and eight”.

Why do you think that facile concepts are superior? The truth in your example applies to both expressions. There is no more facile way to express the concept of “Nothing” than the one word definition.

Let me add: if the set is infinite, then the direct approach cannot work. It is easier to say: “numbers over ten” than to enumerate 11, 12, 13, etc.

Same point as above on facility as inherently superior.

Infinity is not a number but is, itself, a concept. So “numbers over ten” does not include infinity.

So the direct approach: “there is a being that exists in all the possible worlds” cannot work due to the number of possible worlds

Do you have an argument to support the above claim that that concept is unworkable?

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

The first was a linear series, also called an accidentally ordered series (per accidens). Aquinas did not believe an infinite linear series was self-contradicting. It could stretch to infinity without issue.

An hierarchical series, also called an essentially ordered seried (per se) was different. Continued movement required a mover to continue acting. The movee’s movement was constantly derived from higher members in the series. (Movement, here, can indicate any change, or any potency being actualized by another). It was an hierarchical series that he said could not run to an infinite regress as it would be self-contradictory.

On what grounds do you (or Aquinas) assert that the actual physics of reality is correctly described (modeled) by a hierarchical series? This would be the so called “sustaining cause argument” in theological terms (as opposed to the “first cause argument” for the accidently ordered series).

This is prior to physics. Physics doesn’t tell us what change is, or what a natural law is, whether there are such things, whether anyone besides you has actual experiences, or that there’s a world outside your mind. There is no method of empirically testing such claims, or even that your post has actual informational content or logic to it. We must use our reason and the methods of induction.

There’s nothing contrary here to any scientific discovery or model we’ve yet discovered. We certainly know of hierarchical series. A rock continues to move because it continues to be pushed by a stick which continues to be moved by a hand. A lamp continues to hang because the link above it continues to support it because the link above it continues to support. There’s no natural tendencies of such things to actualize such potencies themselves. We can break this down to the atomic level, or consider as part of a much grander scale the motions of the planets, stars, galaxies, and so on.

Of course this model assumes that “poor” God needs to be on his imaginary toes all the time, if his attention would wander for a moment, the whole universe would flicker out of existence immediately. The other model is much more elegant, where God only needed to create the starting condition and the laws of nature and then could step back and enjoy the scenery - and sometimes interfere via a “miracle”, when things deviate from what he would want to see.

This tact is really flippant and not based in anything. The theist view requires no more effort for God than the theist, and the theist view is far more elegant to me. There’s no worry about God’s attention wandering, that’s a ridiculous anthropomorphism.

In other words, metaphysics without a supporting epistemology is empty speculation.

You’re welcome to continue to engage in skepticism of all things and never speaking of what or why things are and only ever speaking with mathematical descriptions.

 

[Wesrock]

The argument logically calls for no intelligence on the part of the cause.

Aquinas presents at least three different ways Intelligence necessarily and logically follows from what he establishes.

Again, there is absolutely NOTHING in the proofs that state this, nor even imply it. You are injecting subjective theology into a logic proof.

I really just don’t know what to say here. I could of course present the arguments (oh wait, I have by linking you to my own arguments in my own words).

Explain WHY you disagree, instead of just having a tantrum about it.

Because that’s not what Aquinas argued. Point blank. You are repeating a lie.

So even if matter and energy can be created from “nothing”, as physics seems to imply, there is still the an underlying mathematical framework - a a vacuum field potential - that must exists, and you can transfer the Aquinas rational to that. But, as I said in my original post, that once again is a DEIST notion, and even if you are correct, you’ve minimized “God” to nothing more than a set of mathematical equations. You want to worship that, you can, but it’s not at all satisfying. THAT is the legacy of the 5 ways.

The medium is a mix of actuality and potency, is composite, extended in space, is not Simple, and so on. Admitting such a thing as God would be special pleading.

 

[Wesrock]

The point to all this is that EVEN IF YOU ARE CORRECT, you haven;t proven anything. Why as a Christian do you put so much value on an argument that at best is Deist or at worst irrelevant - even if correct?

Because as you so conveniently have ignored, Aquinas did not think he could demonstrate that an accidental series must have a beginning, or that there was a beginning at all, so his demonstration has nothing to do with that type of demonstration.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

That’s exactly what I said. I specifically clarified after stating “creating from nothing” that I didn’t mean “nothing” as a medium at all… precisely because it’s not an ontologically existing thing, and even then went on to clarify that the phrase only means no pre-existing material was used.

So now the word “nothing” miraculously does NOT mean “nothing”. Is there no way to have a commonly used dictionary?

I honestly have no idea what you’re objecting to because everything I’ve stated about nothing is in agreement with what you’ve said. There’s no ontological existence to nothing. It’s not a medium. It’s not a thing. It’s not a vacuum. It’s not blackness. It’s not an empty set. It’s not an alternative.

 

[Wesrock]

Two questions for @Trevize on his possible worlds thought experiment.

(1) Is his thought experiment valid in all possible worlds?

(2) Is existence in all possible worlds?

 

[o_mlly]

“Nothing”, therefore, is simply abstraction in the extreme.

Is not the same true for “multiple worlds”? Which still leaves us with the original question: Why do you embrace the latter and dismiss the former in your argumentation? Is that not illogical?

 

[cfernandomaciel]

Atheism Kills, by Barak Lurie.
This book was influential in my process of conversion into Christianity.

https://www.atheismkills.com/

 

[JSAD]

Answering Atheism by Trent Horn.

God bless you on your journey .

 

[o_mlly]

The concept of possible worlds does not assume the ontological existence of different realities. …

Agreed. Reality is singular and independent of the thinking mind.

[The UC] exists in all possible variants of the reality.

As we have agreed reality is singular, how can one then argue from a premise that reality varies?

These all express the same concept, however the last one is easier to analyze.

If I follow, you claim: If there are multiple possible worlds then the UC cannot exist in all of the possible worlds. But I do not see an argument in support of the consequent which is not self-evident from the antecedent. Can you describe one possible world that could exist without an UC?

 

[o_mlly]

The possible reality is not the same as the actual reality. There are infinitely many possible realities.

Metaphysics grounded in one’s imagination is boundless but also meaningless. The principles of reasoning, the minimum grounding for productive metaphysics, cannot be dismissed in an alternate reality.

I have no idea what this [UC] means. I am talking about the concept of necessary being, someone who cannot not exist.

The Uncaused Cause (UC) is the necessary being as discussed in this thread.

The concept of “possible world” is a state of affairs, which does not contain a logical contradiction …

The principle of non-contradiction is not the only rational limitation on an alternate possible world. It seems to me that your imagined possible worlds rely on a misunderstanding of the excluded middle. While it is true that we cannot exclude all possible worlds, we cannot include all possible worlds either. To include the middle ones, one must first set the boundaries. We have one – a world with an UC. What is the other boundary that you propose such that a middle would include a possible world w/o an UC?

 

[Wozza]

Interesting take here from Sir Roger Penrose (a man not to be taken lightly) on the possibility of an infinitely recurring universe.

 

[o_mlly]

This is what the believers wish to substantiate, the “final product”. You cannot declare the assumed result as an unquestionable “axiom”.

Does not that need to substantiate work both ways? The existence of an UC has an argument. The non-existence of an UC in some imagined world lacks an argument but simply denies the universality of the principle of sufficient reason in that world. The claim that there are some brute facts, facts that have no cause, is rather, I believe, an admission of ignorance rather than a denial of the principle. The “brute fact” claim has the same but inverted intellectual underpinnings as the “god of the gaps” claim.

As we disagree on the universality of the principle, we will not find agreement in any derivatives that depend on the truth of the prinicple.

 

[o_mlly]

In a world where there is only one ontological entity, there can be NO “causation”.

? ? ?

You’ve already agreed that a world can exist with only one entity. Further, I believe you’ve agreed we can formally name that entity the Uncaused Cause thereby giving that entity an ontological identity. What argument supports your claim above that such a being cannot be the cause of other beings?

 

[o_mlly]

Well, the name does not change it to be an ontological entity. It can be an elementary particle, a demon, a ghost… anything that has objective, mind-independent existence.

?? The realist (me) believes for sufficient reason everything that exists is mind-independent. To assign a name to a being simply makes the understanding of such a being communal. Yes, naming does not change the ontology of the UC but naming also does not initiate or eliminate the ontology of the thing. So, the UC is an ontological entity; thinking so does not make it so and not thinking so does not send the UC into ontological oblivion.

It [the UC} can, but it is unique to each world - in the example of the “mini-worlds”.

As the “mini-worlds” are not experienced (as is this world), why can I not imagine that all the mini-worlds in this thought experiment are subject to the principle of sufficient reason and also have a necessary being. I submit that the more the imagined mini-worlds dispense of any and all laws assigned to the reality we do experience, the more unreal (non-ontological) they become.

The idea of “necessarily existing object” is that there is some ontologically existing object, which appears in ALL the possible worlds.

I agree. ?

 

[Mike_from_NJ]

Answering Atheism by Trent Horn.

God bless you on your journey .

I have not read Answering Atheism, but if it’s anything like Trent Horn’s “Hard Sayings” it won’t be much of a refutation of atheism.