Good Books on, and in refutation of, Atheism

[IWantGod]

To get to God from any of the ‘proofs’, all you are doing is saying: ‘The deity must be God’. Except, as we agreed, you have no proofs that God exists. You need to prove both and then claim that they are one and the same.

By the word deity i assume you mean a God. A metaphysical argument, if it succeeds, proves the existence of that which we consider as Catholics to be consistent with our idea of God.

I’ll step back just a little as well and say that the proofs only show that a powerful entity possibly existed. Past tense. It need not exist now. All else is assumption.

That’s not true for metaphysical arguments such as those put forth by Aquinas. Those arguments, if they succeed, prove that an intelligent un-caused-cause eternally exists and is sustaining the existence of physical reality…

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

To get to God from any of the ‘proofs’, all you are doing is saying: ‘The deity must be God’. Except, as we agreed, you have no proofs that God exists. You need to prove both and then claim that they are one and the same.

By the word deity i assume you mean a God. A metaphysical argument, if it succeeds, proves the existence of that which we consider as Catholics to be consistent with our idea of God.

By the word deity I mean only that which can be shown as being, for example, the uncaused cause. A god-like entity that might have had the power to create this universe. Nothing more.

None of the arguments indicate anything else. The deity could be temporary, it could be indifferent, it doesn’t need to be omniscient and certainly not omnibenevolent. And not even omnipotent. It could be one in a long line of deities. It could be the first of many. It could be one of many. It could be none or all of those things or any combination. Which doesn’t describe the Abrahamic God.

You assume that they are the same. You have no grounds for that.

 

[IWantGod]

None of the arguments indicate anything else. The deity could be temporary, it could be indifferent, it doesn’t need to be omniscient and certainly not omnibenevolent. And not even omnipotent. It could be one in a long line of deities. It could be the first of many. It could be one of many. It could be none or all of those things or any combination.

Actually, Aquinas’ summa theologica challenges all the assumptions that you just made.

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

None of the arguments indicate anything else. The deity could be temporary, it could be indifferent, it doesn’t need to be omniscient and certainly not omnibenevolent. And not even omnipotent. It could be one in a long line of deities. It could be the first of many. It could be one of many. It could be none or all of those things or any combination.

Actually, Aquinas’ summa theologica challenges all the assumptions that you just made.

Then here’s your chance to use it to deny them (rolls up sleeves and gets another beer).

 

[Wesrock]

IWantGod:

Wozza:

To get to God from any of the ‘proofs’, all you are doing is saying: ‘The deity must be God’. Except, as we agreed, you have no proofs that God exists. You need to prove both and then claim that they are one and the same.

By the word deity i assume you mean a God. A metaphysical argument, if it succeeds, proves the existence of that which we consider as Catholics to be consistent with our idea of God.

By the word deity I mean only that which can be shown as being, for example, the uncaused cause. A god-like entity that might have had the power to create this universe. Nothing more.

None of the arguments indicate anything else. The deity could be temporary, it could be indifferent, it doesn’t need to be omniscient and certainly not omnibenevolent. And not even omnipotent. It could be one in a long line of deities. It could be the first of many. It could be one of many. It could be none or all of those things or any combination. Which doesn’t describe the Abrahamic God.

You assume that they are the same. You have no grounds for that.

…

Aquinas’ arguments follow through to an eternal, immutable, boundless, compositionally simple, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being who is pure act of which there can only be one and which is active in conserving every moment of reality. So do other arguments, like one’s based on Liebniz’ argument from the PSR.

 

[IWantGod]

There was no science of the natural world, even though some of the abstract sciences (geometry and some branches of mathematics) were developed rather nicely.

So why couldn’t that be true for metaphysics? Your opinion here amounts to a misguided prejudice. In other-words, such and such was nicely developed but any other method of knowledge that pertains to idea of proving the existence of God was automatically wrong because Aquinas was a product of his times. Can you not see how unreasonable and closed minded that line of reasoning is? And what does modern science have to do with the kind of questions that metaphysics seeks to answer.

I find your response baffling.

 

[Wesrock]

What they miss is that, while the physical sciences of Aquinas’ time are outmoded, our empirical methods presuppose many of the metaphysical first principles that Aquinas and the schoolmen developed, following classical thinkers.

 

[Wesrock]

Do they now? So far I have never seen a coherent and meaningful definition of the concepts of omnipotence and omniscience. One of these days it would be nice to see at least a definition of these concepts. Once there is a definition, it could be examined if these attributes can be parts of some being.

…

For a successful conversation the starting point is essential. I always suggest that we start with a simple concept, namely a faceless, deistic creator or constructor - to avoid any of the theological overtones. That approach is at least logically impeccable, it has no explicit or implicit logical problems. Then we can examine the real world in the light of such creator, and then we can see where does this hypothesis lead.

Such an approach would fit very nicely into the sub-forum of philosophy. So far I never found a partner who would be interested.

The problem is starting with a conception of all. One instead needs to work backwards from what we know to figure out (1) whether there is any type of first principle and (2) what distinctions God (the first principle) has by ruling out what he cannot be. This is the only way to work to knowledge of God.

As for definitions of omnipitence and omniscience, we should, in principle, work backwards as I said in the previous paragraph. But as I don’t have hours to working through it and tearing down every straw man, I’ll just start at the end. Keep in mind I said end: this isn’t a starting premise.

All things that are or could be caused are caused (or would need to be caused) by the First Cause. Therefore the First Cause has the power to cause all real or possible things. This is what it means to be omnipotent.

As effects must be in the cause, but they cannot be in the first cause formally, they must be in the first cause virtually (I said I was starting at the end here, this would need to be fleshed out). This includes all real or possible things and all states of affairs or relationships between them. These truths are all (not just in) God’s essence. But for truths and all relationships to be virtually in something is most analogous to thoughts or knowledge in an intellect. And for all such truths to be in something, real and possible, including what is actual (due to its own action) and what is not is simply what it means to be omniscient.

These certainly are deserving of more background, especially the omniscience portion. But that’s a sketch of the gist of it.

I mean, Aquinas’ Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1 goes through pretty much everything in a cursory way, demonstration of God, ways to know God, ways to understand how we phrase what we know, systematic arguments for various attributes (immutable, eternal, one, omnipotent, omniscient, perfection, goodness) and so on. It’s a bit dense without background knowledge already, and some of the illustrative examples are outmoded (though the same arguments can be restated in more contemporary terms), and there are plenty of contemporary books which do all of this groundwork as well. It is out there.

 

[IWantGod]

In that case metaphysics becomes physics, a true science.

From this statement alone, it’s clear to me you don’t understand what metaphysics is. Someone would literally have to sit down with you and teach you from scratch.

I will leave you to your opinion.

 

[Wesrock]

IWantGod:

So why couldn’t that be true for metaphysics?

Because mathematics, geometry and logic are abstract, deductive sciences, based upon some axioms. They are timeless. Some of them might be applicable to the inductive, real world, but that is just a lucky coincidence.

On the other hand, metaphysics is sheer speculation about the external reality. If the speculation can be substantiated, there is no problem. In that case metaphysics becomes physics, a true science. If it cannot be substantiated it remains empty speculation.

Aquinas’ failure was due to his empty metaphysics, which could never become real “physics”.

What they miss is that, while the physical sciences of Aquinas’ time are outmoded, our empirical methods presuppose many of the metaphysical first principles that Aquinas and the schoolmen developed, following classical thinkers.

Actually you give too much credence to those thinkers. They might have formalized the process, but the empirical approach is much older than you presume. Even animals, without formal thinking process use the “empirical method”. Consider the rats, “who” observe the quick demise of those rats, who ate fast acting poison - and very quickly learn to avoid them. That is why all the modern poisons are slow acting, causing the bleeding of the animals.

Of course they do not formally learn to avoid quick acting poisons, but the “scientific method” is clearly visible: observe, make a hypothesis, experiment and act on the observation. Of course humans did the same. But sheer speculation, without the feedback loop is useless.

See, here you take for granted that experiments can be repeated, that a repeated cause will produce similar effects again and again (in a controlled environment), and other things. This is what allows empirical methods to work. It’s basic first principles like this that Aquinas’ cosmological arguments (and many of those used by others) are rooted in. It is arguments from these metaphysical principles which the physical sciences presuppose that have persisted for Thomists thinkers and others. More can be said, definitely.

 

[Wozza]

The problem is starting with a conception of all. One instead needs to work backwards from what we know to figure out (1) whether there is any type of first principle and (2) what distinctions God (the first principle) has by ruling out what he cannot be. This is the only way to work to knowledge of God.

As for definitions of omnipitence and omniscience, we should, in principle, work backwards as I said in the previous paragraph.

All things that are or could be caused are caused (or would need to be caused) by the First Cause. Therefore the First Cause has the power to cause all real or possible things. This is what it means to be omnipotent.

OK, let’s work backwards from what we know.

We know we exist. We have to take that as a given. But are we alone? We don’t know. Are we the purpose of existence? We don’t know.
We know there is a universe in which we live. Is it the only one? We don’t know. Will it be the only one? We don’t know. Was it especially created? We don’t know. What’s the other side of the Big Bang? We don’t know. Is it infinite? We don’t know.

So let’s assume that this universe required a cause and the cause was some entity.

Does it require a supernatural entity to do so? No. The cause may be natural (we’re only talking about this universe so we’ll skip the ‘infinite regress’).

Does that entity need to be omnipotent? No, it may have created the universe but it may not have any control over how it unfolds.

Does that entity need to be omniscient? No, it may not know how the universe unfolds.

Does that entity need to be omnibenevolent? No, if it cares at all it may care about us as much as we care about amoeba.

Does that entity need to sustain the universe? No, it may be self sustaining (in fact, it gives all the signs of increasing entropy).

Does that entity still exist? No, it could.have ceased to exist at the moment of creation

Now I’ve used arguments like this on many ocassions. And the only answer I get, if you dig around in the responses and parse the replies and keep narrowing the answers to get something clear and distinct emerging from the cloud of obfuscation is: ‘But that’s not God you are describing’.

That is, everyone starts with a definition of God and then selects only the options that can lead to the conclusion they want.

 

[Wesrock]

There’s just so many things wrong here I’m at a loss as to where to begin. I have made an arguement before from the principle of causality that every potential that is actualized must be actualized by another (for something that does not exist yet cannot be the cause of itself): The Existence of God: The Argument From Motion

That is still a very condensed treatment, and I’d do things a bit differently now, though I’m not spending another ten hours working on a new post like I did there.

You could read Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapters 3 through 102, but its admittedly dense, and if you don’t have the background some outmoded illustrations may be hard to follow, and even that was written to aid already educated apologists (https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm).

But, I mean, your post goes wrong in so many places it’s just clear you don’t even understand the basic thrust of the cosmological arguments to begin with. This isn’t about “my conception of God,” but trying to convince a set Young Earth Creationist why “but why are there still monkeys?” isn’t a good objection to the theory of human evolution, except you’ve gone even further off target.

 

[Wesrock]

I don’t even know where to begin with this. Like seriously, bashing my head against a wall and going for a long walk to digest it may be needed. You’re making so many assumptions about what you think the arguments are you’re as off point as the “but why are there still monkeys?!” objection, and unwilling to challenge those assumptions. I don’t know how else to put it to try to make thay clear.

Of course change is an intrinsic part of reality.

Brownian motion of molecules still fits into the original claim I presented.

“Existence doesn’t need to be explained, it just is.” Okay… Nice argument there. We have explanations that have been given. This is just begging the question.

Nothing isn’t treated as ontologically existing. Aquinas and Thomists are quite clear on that.

The arguments, while they could apply to the whole, aren’t based on the whole universe or the start of the universe. They can be made based on any single one of the objects in the “collection” here and now.

Yes, of course there is no outside and no before, Aquinas and his predecessors knew this, though your statement “no causation which would be applicable to the universe” is here not supported and can be argued against.

I suppose I could read the book, though $$$, but I’m pretty certain Smith (knowingly or not) argued against a bunch of strawmen trussed up like Aquinas.

 

[Wesrock]

Alright, ordered.

 

[Wozza]

Note the following which you (@Wesrock) posted some time back:

‘Consider a being that exists in a non-derived way with a potential that was not previously actualized that must be actualized by something else. That means that some manner of existence for this being was not already actualized, and IF this must be actualized by something else, then it is evident that this being was never an Unmoved Mover and its actualized existence is caused by something else.’

Note the IF in the second sentence. Such a small word with such large implications. But you are correct to
use it. If we consider the potential to change then IF it requires an outside source then what follows might be acceptable. IF it doesn’t then the argument stops at that point. Nothing else follows.

The use of that small word means that everything else is an assumption. There is nothing that had been laid out up to that point that requires us to accept that change MUST be externally driven. It may well be an internal process that requires no external source and is indeed necessary for the creation of the universe.

It may well be that whatever ‘being’ you have described up to this point in fact becomes the universe and therefore ceases to exist. To use an analogy, our sun needs to expend itself to the point of non existence to allow life on earth. Nothing external causes the sun to change - it is inherrent in its nature.

 

[Wesrock]

Note the following which you (@Wesrock) posted some time back:

‘Consider a being that exists in a non-derived way with a potential that was not previously actualized that must be actualized by something else. That means that some manner of existence for this being was not already actualized, and IF this must be actualized by something else, then it is evident that this being was never an Unmoved Mover and its actualized existence is caused by something else.’

Note the IF in the second sentence. Such a small word with such large implications. But you are correct to
use it. If we consider the potential to change then IF it requires an outside source then what follows might be acceptable. IF it doesn’t then the argument stops at that point. Nothing else follows.

The use of that small word means that everything else is an assumption. There is nothing that had been laid out up to that point that requires us to accept that change MUST be externally driven. It may well be an internal process that requires no external source and is indeed necessary for the creation of the universe.

It may well be that whatever ‘being’ you have described up to this point in fact becomes the universe and therefore ceases to exist. To use an analogy, our sun needs to expend itself to the point of non existence to allow life on earth. Nothing external causes the sun to change - it is inherrent in its nature.

The sun is composed of parts, and those parts are acting on and being acted upon by each other. I did respond to the substance of this objection near the end of the main argument in post 7 of 8. Refer to Objection 1.

And what you’re responding to here is out of context. It was a hypothetical in which someone proposed that the First Cause did have passive potentialities which could be actualized, which I was proceeding to demonstrate could not be the case by a reductio argument. The “if” is along the lines of “If your proposal is true, then…”

 

[Wozza]

The sun is composed of parts, and those parts are acting on and being acted upon by each other. I did respond to the substance of this objection near the end of the main argument in post 7 of 8. Refer to Objection 1.

From your earlier post:

"OBJECTION 1: An animal moves itself when it walks from one place to another. Therefore the statement “no potential can actualize itself” seems false.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 1: While it can be said that an animal moves itself insofar as the animal displays a unity of being, we should also remember that the animal is composed of parts. The leg moves because the muscles in the leg contract. The muscles in the leg contract because of electrochemical signals from the nerves of the leg, which are caused by other nerve cells, which leads us back to the brain, which itself is moved by other stimuli, and so on. It can be seen that no part of the animal actualizes its own potential for movement."

Of course an animal can make a conscious decision to remain in a particular state or change. One would assume that your uncaused cause makes a decision itself to cause. It cannot logically cause and not-cause at the same time so change is inherent by definition.

 

[edwest]

Then how do you explain the current interest in New Age material or TLDR (Too Long Didn’t Read) among internet users? Just laying on the couch, flipping through your phone for cute cat photos is not education. There is a Church of Satan, so the date on the calendar means little.

 

[Wesrock]

Of course an animal can make a conscious decision to remain in a particular state or change. One would assume that your uncaused cause makes a decision itself to cause. It cannot logically cause and not-cause at the same time so change is inherent by definition.

Augustine: At no time then hadst Thou not made any thing, because time itself Thou madest. (Confessions, Book XI)

Thomas Aquinas: Again. Those beings alone are measured by time that are moved. For time, as is made clear in Physics IV, is “the number of motion.” But God, as has been proved, is absolutely without motion, and is consequently not measured by time. There is, therefore, no before and after in Him; He does not have being after non-being, nor non-being after being, nor can any succession be found in His being. For none of these characteristics can be understood without time. God, therefore, is without beginning and end, having His whole being at once. In this consists the nature of eternity. (Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter 15)

God is immutable, and never moved from not acting to acting. He simply is and does from eternity.

 

[niceatheist]

What they miss is that, while the physical sciences of Aquinas’ time are outmoded, our empirical methods presuppose many of the metaphysical first principles that Aquinas and the schoolmen developed, following classical thinkers.

The problem with all of this is that, well into the era of Classical Physics, both scientists and philosophers started every analysis with a Classical notion of causation. What Quantum Mechanics has brought to the table is the possibility that while causation certainly is a property of the world around us, that doesn’t necessarily follow that causation applied to the very beginning. In fact, to some degree, even Classical and Medieval philosophers understood the conundrum, which is why the notion of a Prime Mover for whom causation was given an explicit exception had to be inserted. It’s that which I object to. It’s that assumption that I find faulty, or if not outright faulty, then still an assumption.

If we imagine an epoch prior to the Big Bang (and remember now, that the Big Bang is not automatically presumed to the beginning of the Universe, but rather the beginning of the expansion of space-time and everything in it, and says nothing about what the Universe looked like or the nature of those primordial laws that governed that epoch), perhaps for whatever definition of infinite one cares to come up with, it was itself timeless. But again even that assumes that time would have any meaning in such an epoch.

At least on the scientific front, there’s no describing such a pre-Big Bang epoch without a quantum theory of gravity. Without that we can’t unify all the fundamental interactions, and thus we can’t really even begin to imagine an epoch that was potentially infinitely dense (in other words a Classical singularity).