Grace on top of natural perfection

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Cain and Abel by nature, as human beings, did not have the right to grace. So if Adam failed them in not getting them their grace, why the mark of original sin?
Catechism
404 How did the sin of Adam become the sin of all his descendants? The whole human race is in Adam “as one body of one man”.293 By this “unity of the human race” all men are implicated in Adam’s sin, as all are implicated in Christ’s justice. Still, the transmission of original sin is a mystery that we cannot fully understand. But we do know by Revelation that Adam had received original holiness and justice not for himself alone, but for all human nature. By yielding to the tempter, Adam and Eve committed a personal sin, but this sin affected the human nature that they would then transmit in a fallen state.294 It is a sin which will be transmitted by propagation to all mankind, that is, by the transmission of a human nature deprived of original holiness and justice. And that is why original sin is called “sin” only in an analogical sense: it is a sin “contracted” and not “committed” - a state and not an act.
293 St. Thomas Aquinas, De Malo 4,1.
294 Cf. Council of Trent: DS 1511-1512
419 “We therefore hold, with the Council of Trent, that original sin is transmitted with human nature, “by propagation, not by imitation” and that it is. . . ‘proper to each’” (Paul VI, CPG § 16).

Council of Trent, Session V, June, 1546 under Pope Paul III.
  1. If anyone asserts that this sin of Adam, which in its origin is one, and by propagation, not by imitation, transfused into all, which is in each one as something that is his own, is taken away either by the forces of human nature or by a remedy other than the merit of the one mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ,[9] who has reconciled us to God in his own blood, made unto us justice, sanctification and redemption;[10] or if he denies that that merit of Jesus Christ is applied both to adults and to infants by the sacrament of baptism rightly administered in the form of the Church, let him be anathema; for there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.[11]
Whence that declaration:
Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who taketh away the sins of the world;[12] and that other:
As many of you as have been baptized, have put on Christ.[13]
 
Cain and Abel by nature, as human beings, did not have the right to grace. So if Adam failed them in not getting them their grace, why the mark of original sin?
The selections I quoted from St. Thomas Aquinas’ SCG address this repeatedly:

[11] Clearly, then, from what has been said, the vice of origin in which the original sin is caused comes from the failure of a principle, namely, the gratuitous gift which human nature at its institution had had bestowed upon it. To be sure, this gift was in a sense natural: not natural as caused by the principles of the nature, but natural because it was given to man to be propagated along with his nature.

[17] Be it observed, also, that the actual sin of the first man passed over into nature because the nature in him had been further perfected by the benefit bestowed on the nature.

…For sin does not take away that good of nature which belongs to the nature’s species. But that good of nature which grace added over and above nature could be removed by the sin of our first parent. This was said before.

For, since privation and defect correspond to one another mutually, in that characteristic in original sin are the children made like to the parents in which the gift also, granted the nature in the beginning, would have been propagated to their descendants; for, although the gift did not belong to the essentials of the species, it was given by divine grace to the first man to flow from him into the entire species.

For—as we said above—human nature was established in its first beginning so that the inferior powers were perfectly subject to reason, the reason to God, the body to the soul, and God was by His grace supplying what nature lacked for this arrangement. Now, this kind of benefit which some call “original justice” was conferred on the first man in such wise that he was to propagate it to his descendants along with human nature. But in the sin of the first man reason withdrew itself from the divine subjection. And it has followed thereon that the lower powers are not perfectly subject to the reason nor is the body to the soul; and this is not only the case for the first sinner, but the same consequent defect follows into his posterity and to the posterity in whom the original justice mentioned was going to follow. Thus, then, the sin of the first man from whom all other men are derived according to the teaching of faith was not only personal in that it deprived the first man of his own good, but natural, also, in that it deprived him and consequently his descendants of the benefit bestowed on the entire human nature. Thus, too, this kind of defect which is in others as a consequence from the first parent still has in others the essentials of fault so far as all men are counted as one man by participation in the common nature.

[10] One should consider this, also: The natures origin passes along the defects mentioned because the nature has been stripped of that help of grace which had been bestowed on it in the first parent to pass on to his descendants along with the nature. Now, since this stripping came from a voluntary sin, the consequent defect has the character of fault. Hence, defects of this kind are faulty when referred to their first principle, which is the sin of Adam; and they are natural when referred to the nature already stripped.

So does the ST section I quoted.

Also, please see ST: I-II: Q85: A5, which speaks to original sin and death and other bodily defects.
 
Catechism
404 How did the sin of Adam become the sin of all his descendants? The whole human race is in Adam “as one body of one man”.293 By this “unity of the human race” all men are implicated in Adam’s sin, as all are implicated in Christ’s justice. Still, the transmission of original sin is a mystery that we cannot fully understand. But we do know by Revelation that Adam had received original holiness and justice not for himself alone, but for all human nature. By yielding to the tempter, Adam and Eve committed a personal sin, but this sin affected the human nature that they would then transmit in a fallen state.294 It is a sin which will be transmitted by propagation to all mankind, that is, by the transmission of a human nature deprived of original holiness and justice. And that is why original sin is called “sin” only in an analogical sense: it is a sin “contracted” and not “committed” - a state and not an act.
293 St. Thomas Aquinas, De Malo 4,1.
294 Cf. Council of Trent: DS 1511-1512
419 “We therefore hold, with the Council of Trent, that original sin is transmitted with human nature, “by propagation, not by imitation” and that it is. . . ‘proper to each’” (Paul VI, CPG § 16).

Council of Trent, Session V, June, 1546 under Pope Paul III.
  1. If anyone asserts that this sin of Adam, which in its origin is one, and by propagation, not by imitation, transfused into all, which is in each one as something that is his own, is taken away either by the forces of human nature or by a remedy other than the merit of the one mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ,[9] who has reconciled us to God in his own blood, made unto us justice, sanctification and redemption;[10] or if he denies that that merit of Jesus Christ is applied both to adults and to infants by the sacrament of baptism rightly administered in the form of the Church, let him be anathema; for there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.[11]
Whence that declaration:
Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who taketh away the sins of the world;[12] and that other:
As many of you as have been baptized, have put on Christ.[13]
The sin is something that is each’s “own” Trent says. You can’t own a mere privation
 
The selections I quoted from St. Thomas Aquinas’ SCG address this repeatedly:

[11] Clearly, then, from what has been said, the vice of origin in which the original sin is caused comes from the failure of a principle, namely, the gratuitous gift which human nature at its institution had had bestowed upon it. To be sure, this gift was in a sense natural: not natural as caused by the principles of the nature, but natural because it was given to man to be propagated along with his nature.

[17] Be it observed, also, that the actual sin of the first man passed over into nature because the nature in him had been further perfected by the benefit bestowed on the nature.

…For sin does not take away that good of nature which belongs to the nature’s species. But that good of nature which grace added over and above nature could be removed by the sin of our first parent. This was said before.

For, since privation and defect correspond to one another mutually, in that characteristic in original sin are the children made like to the parents in which the gift also, granted the nature in the beginning, would have been propagated to their descendants; for, although the gift did not belong to the essentials of the species, it was given by divine grace to the first man to flow from him into the entire species.

For—as we said above—human nature was established in its first beginning so that the inferior powers were perfectly subject to reason, the reason to God, the body to the soul, and God was by His grace supplying what nature lacked for this arrangement. Now, this kind of benefit which some call “original justice” was conferred on the first man in such wise that he was to propagate it to his descendants along with human nature. But in the sin of the first man reason withdrew itself from the divine subjection. And it has followed thereon that the lower powers are not perfectly subject to the reason nor is the body to the soul; and this is not only the case for the first sinner, but the same consequent defect follows into his posterity and to the posterity in whom the original justice mentioned was going to follow. Thus, then, the sin of the first man from whom all other men are derived according to the teaching of faith was not only personal in that it deprived the first man of his own good, but natural, also, in that it deprived him and consequently his descendants of the benefit bestowed on the entire human nature. Thus, too, this kind of defect which is in others as a consequence from the first parent still has in others the essentials of fault so far as all men are counted as one man by participation in the common nature.

[10] One should consider this, also: The natures origin passes along the defects mentioned because the nature has been stripped of that help of grace which had been bestowed on it in the first parent to pass on to his descendants along with the nature. Now, since this stripping came from a voluntary sin, the consequent defect has the character of fault. Hence, defects of this kind are faulty when referred to their first principle, which is the sin of Adam; and they are natural when referred to the nature already stripped.

So does the ST section I quoted.

Also, please see ST: I-II: Q85: A5, which speaks to original sin and death and other bodily defects.
Aquinas was wrong. Trent and Augustine were right
 
Aquinas was wrong. Trent and Augustine were right
Saint Augustine:
City of God

For, as soon as our first parents had transgressed the commandment, **divine grace forsook them, and they were confounded at their own wickedness; and therefore they took fig-leaves (which were possibly the first that came to hand in their troubled state of mind), and covered their shame; for though their members remained the same, they had shame now where they had none before. They experienced a new motion of their flesh, which had become disobedient to them, in strict retribution of their own disobedience to God. For the soul, revelling in its own liberty, and scorning to serve God, was itself deprived of the command it had formerly maintained over the body. And because it had willfully deserted its superior Lord, it no longer held its own inferior servant; neither could it hold the flesh subject, as it would always have been able to do had it remained itself subject to God. **

…It may perhaps be supposed that because God said, You shall die the death, Genesis 2:17 and not deaths, we should understand only that death which occurs when the soul is deserted by God, who is its life; for it was not deserted by God, and so deserted Him, but deserted Him, and so was deserted by Him. For its own will was the originator of its evil, as God was the originator of its motions towards good, both in making it when it was not, and in remaking it when it had fallen and perished. But though we suppose that God meant only this death, and that the words, In the day you eat of it you shall die the death, should be understood as meaning, **In the day you desert me in disobedience, I will desert you in justice, **yet assuredly in this death the other deaths also were threatened, which were its inevitable consequence.

…But evils are so thoroughly overcome by good, that though they are permitted to exist, for the sake of demonstrating how the most righteous foresight of God can make a good use even of them, yet good can exist without evil, as in the true and supreme God Himself, and as in every invisible and visible celestial creature that exists above this murky atmosphere; but evil cannot exist without good, because the natures in which evil exists, in so far as they are natures, are good. And evil is removed, not by removing any nature, or part of a nature, which had been introduced by the evil, but by healing and correcting that which had been vitiated and depraved. The will, therefore, is then truly free, when it is not the slave of vices and sins. Such was it given us by God; and this being lost by its own fault, can only be restored by Him who was able at first to give it. And therefore the truth says, If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed;
Anyway, it’s easy to go too far with some of Saint Augustine’s writings, and he was not a systematic writer such as Thomas Aquinas or Duns Scotus. The Church sees him as consistent with its definition, as did Saint Thomas Aquinas and, may I point out, it is VERY well known that Augustine held that all things are good in their nature insofar as they exist and that evil is therefore a privation. It seems that any interpretation of Augustine’s understanding of original sin that neglects this must be flawed.

I’d be interested if you could quote Trent. I already quoted parts of it on original justice that is consistent with the Church’s teaching.
 
The sin is something that is each’s “own” Trent says. You can’t own a mere privation
There are two types of sin: original sin and actual sin. Actual sin is by a free will personal act of an individual; this is personal. Original sin, in the descendants of Adam and Eve, is not personal, so the Church calls it analogical sin, contracted not committed. So you can see that meaning in the canon from the Council of Trent which uses the phrase “as something that is his own” (English translation).
 
Cain and Abel by nature, as human beings, did not have the right to grace. So if Adam failed them in not getting them their grace, why the mark of original sin?
Not sure what you mean here. True, grace is owed to no one by nature. Neither are the preternatural gifts (hence their name). Cain and Abel nevertheless lacked something they would otherwise have had, even if they were not owed it.

Hmm, but there is a sense in which our human nature is said to be damaged by Original Sin, and that would seem to go beyond the lack of gifts that are not part of our nature. Jesus’ human nature was “more complete” than ours in a way that doesn’t just involve His being God or having a perfect intimacy with the Father. Possibly this is what you’re talking about?
 
Not sure what you mean here. True, grace is owed to no one by nature. Neither are the preternatural gifts (hence their name). Cain and Abel nevertheless lacked something they would otherwise have had, even if they were not owed it.

Hmm, but there is a sense in which our human nature is said to be damaged by Original Sin, and that would seem to go beyond the lack of gifts that are not part of our nature. Jesus’ human nature was “more complete” than ours in a way that doesn’t just involve His being God or having a perfect intimacy with the Father. Possibly this is what you’re talking about?
Well not damaged nature, but Council of Orange stated: “the whole man both in body and in soul was changed for the worse”. The Catechism says: “the consequences for nature, weakened and inclined to evil, persist in man and summon him to spiritual battle”.
.
What Adam and Eve had added to human nature is twofold: supernatural gift, which is not human nature, and the preternatural gifts, which the Catechism calls “natural powers proper to it”. Proper means suitable for humans – which perfect the human nature – these gifts are infused knowledge, absence of concupiscence, and bodily immortality.
 
Per Catholic Enclopedia, original sin is The article goes on to look at what can be called original sin, or not:
… concupiscence still remains in the person baptized; therefore original sin and concupiscence cannot be one and the same thing …
*]The absence of sanctifying grace in the new-born child …This privation, therefore, is the hereditary stain.
Do note that Vico has a slightly flawed appreciation of the boldened statement above.
On this thread #102 (forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=14631878#post14631878) he asserts:
Concupiscence is an occasion of sin not necessarily a fault, so is not original sin.
This is not actually what the Catholic Encyclopaedia says above.
It says OS and concupiscence “are not one and the same thing.”

Therefore while concupiscence is not wholly OS, it is a significant component of OS and therefore it is misleading to simply say concupiscence is not OS and leave it at that.

Aquinas goes so far as to say that concupiscence is “material OS”.
Those interested may like to read more at #134 in the above link.
 
Hmm, but there is a sense in which our human nature is said to be damaged by Original Sin, and that would seem to go beyond the lack of gifts that are not part of our nature. Jesus’ human nature was “more complete” than ours in a way that doesn’t just involve His being God or having a perfect intimacy with the Father. Possibly this is what you’re talking about?
Yes you are right, but there are two ways in which human nature can be persistently wounded through the ages:

(a) the very essential form of human nature (the soul) is damaged at the immaterial ontological level which therefore has repercussions for the body and the integrity of the two together.
(b) an ongoing defect in the way that body is formed before or as the soul is infused.
This means the soul is not in fact damaged at all, but the body is not well formed and is not wholly “malleable” or as well fitting with the soul as it should be.

Obviously the Church holds to (b) above.
This is how Aquinas explains it.
He holds Adam’s seed is defective in this respect. So the mechanism for passing down the defect through the generations is not in the soul but in the male seed and presumably the male organ which produces the seed.

We might ask whether the soul must be defective if it always generates a defective male organ I suppose. That is a harder question to explain because Aquinas and indeed all medievals had a far different understanding of sexual biology than us.

They believed the male seed had great formative spiritual power (almost like a soul). It did not actually contribute material to the new embryo at all. It was simply the “Architect”. So they believe it was not really the male organ that was defective but the “soul” or the spiritual powers of the male seed was spiritually defective.

Thus Mary’s child was without OS because no male seed was involved. The formative spiritual principle that worked on the female’s inchoate and passive human protoplasm was the Holy Spirit itself.
 
Do note that Vico has a slightly flawed appreciation of the boldened statement above.
On this thread #102 (forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=14631878#post14631878) he asserts:

This is not actually what the Catholic Encyclopaedia says above.
It says OS and concupiscence “are not one and the same thing.”

Therefore while concupiscence is not wholly OS, it is a significant component of OS and therefore it is misleading to simply say concupiscence is not OS and leave it at that.

Aquinas goes so far as to say that concupiscence is “material OS”.
Those interested may like to read more at #134 in the above link.
This still isn’t quite resolved for me. Aquinas doesn’t say that concupiscence is a *component of OS; he says it is *OS, materially, i.e. the matter of OS is concupiscence, exhaustively. Which doesn’t quite resonate IMO.
 
Do note that Vico has a slightly flawed appreciation of the boldened statement above.
On this thread #102 (forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=14631878#post14631878) he asserts:

This is not actually what the Catholic Encyclopaedia says above.
It says OS and concupiscence “are not one and the same thing.”

Therefore while concupiscence is not wholly OS, it is a significant component of OS and therefore it is misleading to simply say concupiscence is not OS and leave it at that.

Aquinas goes so far as to say that concupiscence is “material OS”.
Those interested may like to read more at #134 in the above link.
A greater portion from Catholic Encylopedia article – it rejects death and suffering and concupiscence and accepts privation of this grace.

… Original sin is not an act but, as already explained, a state, a permanent privation … We shall examine the several effects of Adam’s fault and reject those which cannot be original sin:

(1) Death and Suffering.- These are purely physical evils and cannot be called sin. Moreover St. Paul, and after him the councils, regarded death and original sin as two distinct things transmitted by Adam.

(2) Concupiscence.- This rebellion of the lower appetite transmitted to us by Adam is an occasion of sin and in that sense comes nearer to moral evil. However, the occasion of a fault is not necessarily a fault, and whilst original sin is effaced by baptism concupiscence still remains in the person baptized; therefore original sin and concupiscence cannot be one and the same thing, as was held by the early Protestants (see Council of Trent, Sess. V, can. v).

(3) The absence of sanctifying grace in the new-born child is also an effect of the first sin, for Adam, having received holiness and justice from God, lost it not only for himself but also for us (loc. cit., can. ii). If he has lost it for us we were to have received it from him at our birth with the other prerogatives of our race. Therefore the absence of sanctifying grace in a child is a real privation, it is the want of something that should have been in him according to the Divine plan. If this favour is not merely something physical but is something in the moral order, if it is holiness, its privation may be called a sin. But sanctifying grace is holiness and is so called by the Council of Trent, because holiness consists in union with God, and grace unites us intimately with God. Moral goodness consists in this, that our action is according to the moral law, but grace is a deification, as the Fathers say, a perfect conformity with God who is the first rule of all morality. (See GRACE.) Sanctifying grace therefore enters into the moral order, not as an act that passes but as a permanent tendency which exists even when the subject who possesses it does not act; it is a turning towards God, conversio ad Deum. Consequently the privation of this grace, even without any other act, would be a stain, a moral deformity, a turning away from God, aversio a Deo, and this character is not found in any other effect of the fault of Adam. This privation, therefore, is the hereditary stain.
 
This still isn’t quite resolved for me. Aquinas doesn’t say that concupiscence is a *component of OS; he says it is *OS, materially, i.e. the matter of OS is concupiscence, exhaustively. Which doesn’t quite resonate IMO.
If you do not realise Aquinas is leveraging off the philosophic principle of hylomorphism your comment would be understandable.

However if you understand the relationship of matter and form you will understand what I am saying is more than plausible.

To say a thing has a material aspect and a formal aspect is to say that the thing only exists by the uniting of both as different co-principles.

Thus Aquinas says that the matter of a human being is his body.
Clearly a human being is not his body (it needs to be enlived by a soul - which is the human being formally).

However it is still not quite correct to say that the body is NOT a human being.
Indeed it is, materially.

Which is the very subtle point the Catholic Encyclopedia was making in its very well thought out phrase “original sin and concupiscence are not one and the same thing.”
Vico walked all over this subtlety.

On the other hand “death and suffering” are not only NOT “one and the same thing with OS” but are not even a material component/principle of OS (unlike concupiscence).
Death is NOT OS, it is an effect.
 
If you do not realise Aquinas is leveraging off the philosophic principle of hylomorphism your comment would be understandable.

However if you understand the relationship of matter and form you will understand what I am saying is more than plausible.

To say a thing has a material aspect and a formal aspect is to say that the thing only exists by the uniting of both as different co-principles.

Thus Aquinas says that the matter of a human being is his body.
Clearly a human being is not his body (it needs to be enlived by a soul - which is the human being formally).

However it is still not quite correct to say that the body is NOT a human being.
Indeed it is, materially.

Which is the very subtle point the Catholic Encyclopedia was making in its very well thought out phrase “original sin and concupiscence are not one and the same thing.”
Vico walked all over this subtlety.

On the other hand “death and suffering” are not only NOT “one and the same thing with OS” but are not even a material component/principle of OS (unlike concupiscence).
Death is NOT OS, it is an effect.
I’m just struggling to see how concupiscence is THE, exclusive, material component or aspect of OS. And the CE’s point that concupiscence remains after OS is gone seems to argue against that notion as well. With the soul/body example, we’re already accustomed to separating or distinguishing between those two things, as if they can be separated. But try doing that with a chair. Does the chair exist when either its form or matter are gone?
 
I’m just struggling to see how concupiscence is THE, exclusive, material component or aspect of OS. And the CE’s point that concupiscence remains after OS is gone seems to argue against that notion as well. With the soul/body example, we’re already accustomed to separating or distinguishing between those two things, as if they can be separated. But try doing that with a chair. Does the chair exist when either its form or matter are gone?
I am reviewing the relevant passages of the Summa Theologica further so that i can speak to them without simply quoting. But to start, there are different ways to speak of causation. The cause of light is the source of the light. Remove the source and the light automatically goes away. Or the cause of a car engine failure is a missing component, and when the component is replaced the engine will run again. But you can also have causes and effects that are accidental. If I knock down a pillar, and the stone on top of it falls, I could right the pillar, but the stone that formerly rested on it is still fallen. Or, vack to my engine example, running the car witg the missing component could have caused further damage to the engine. I can remove the cause (by replacing the part), but the engine damage remains.

I’ll try to refine these analogies after further study, but essentially, the wounding of nature is an accidental (not “by accident” as in common use) effect or perhaps even punishment of original sin, and not immediately corrected by grace, though it is God’s desire to eventually perfect us and remove us of these defects. Suffering might remain in these passible bodies to allow us to conform ourselves to the suffering of Christ and so that we might merit (in Christ, according to the Church’s teachings on merit) everlasting glory. It may also be so that people are not drawn to Baptism because they suddenly see perfect and immortal people walking around and desire that, but because of love of God and Christ. So perfection may be delayed until after this life.

And there I went, writing more than I intended.
 
I am reviewing the relevant passages of the Summa Theologica further so that i can speak to them without simply quoting. But to start, there are different ways to speak of causation. The cause of light is the source of the light. Remove the source and the light automatically goes away. Or the cause of a car engine failure is a missing component, and when the component is replaced the engine will run again. But you can also have causes and effects that are accidental. If I knock down a pillar, and the stone on top of it falls, I could right the pillar, but the stone that formerly rested on it is still fallen. Or, vack to my engine example, running the car witg the missing component could have caused further damage to the engine. I can remove the cause (by replacing the part), but the engine damage remains.

I’ll try to refine these analogies after further study, but essentially, the wounding of nature is an accidental (not “by accident” as in common use) effect or perhaps even punishment of original sin, and not immediately corrected by grace, though it is God’s desire to eventually perfect us and remove us of these defects. Suffering might remain in these passible bodies to allow us to conform ourselves to the suffering of Christ and so that we might merit (in Christ, according to the Church’s teachings on merit) everlasting glory. It may also be so that people are not drawn to Baptism because they suddenly see perfect and immortal people walking around and desire that, but because of love of God and Christ. So perfection may be delayed until after this life.

And there I went, writing more than I intended.
I think a main problem here would simply be that a material cause, by definition, cannot be accidental. A motor is still a motor formally and materially with or without damage; nothing essential to its “motorness” changes.
 
I’m just struggling to see how concupiscence is THE, exclusive, material component or aspect of OS. And the CE’s point that concupiscence remains after OS is gone seems to argue against that notion as well. With the soul/body example, we’re already accustomed to separating or distinguishing between those two things, as if they can be separated. But try doing that with a chair. Does the chair exist when either its form or matter are gone?
OK fair enough point.
I think Aquinas is just focused on showing the state of OS is not wholly about concupiscence.
and showing its relation to loss of original justice which is the formal component.

If another formal principle takes over there is probably no reason why the matter cannot remain. After all, the wood in a chair still remains if I turn it into a stool.
So if original justice is restored the form of OS has gone even though the matter remains.
It is the form that defines the object not the matter.

A living human body and a rotting pile of biological material after death share exactly the same matter but have completely different forms.
 
I think a main problem here would simply be that a material cause, by definition, cannot be accidental. A motor is still a motor formally and materially with or without damage; nothing essential to its “motorness” changes.
Think of a statue crafted in a range of different materials, say soft rough sandstone versus purest hard marble.

The form in marble will have a much greater “resolution” and fine detail impossible to render in sandstone.
So there is greater perfection of the form revealed in the marble than in the sandstone.
However the underlying inferred form is in fact exactly the same in both.

Yet the matter does have a role in determining how well the universal form is able to realise itself in actual instances of particular individuals.

Aquinas uses this concept to explain how the celestial bodies (which are perfect and eternal as they admit of no material change other than locomotion) are so godlike. He says their ethereal matter is so perfect and their form so simple, that the matter already perfectly expresses all the potentialities made possible by that form. Therefore there is no possibility of any further accidental change because no potentiality is left for matter to express.

OS expresses the opposite concept.

This I believe is how Aquinas understands OS as wounding humanity without actually damaging the human form/soul itself. The limiting, the concupiscence (and other losses) is in the weakness of the matter/body and the inability of the form to express itself in suitable matter/body as well as it could and “should”.
 
OK fair enough point.
I think Aquinas is just focused on showing the state of OS is not wholly about concupiscence.
and showing its relation to loss of original justice which is the formal component.

If another formal principle takes over there is probably no reason why the matter cannot remain. After all, the wood in a chair still remains if I turn it into a stool.
So if original justice is restored the form of OS has gone even though the matter remains.
It is the form that defines the object not the matter.

A living human body and a rotting pile of biological material after death share exactly the same matter but have completely different forms.
But with that logic once the deprivation of OS is gone, concupiscence should no longer exist either, no? The rotting pile is no longer a man, the stool is no longer a chair.
 
Think of a statue crafted in a range of different materials, say soft rough sandstone versus purest hard marble.

The form in marble will have a much greater “resolution” and fine detail impossible to render in sandstone.
So there is greater perfection of the form revealed in the marble than in the sandstone.
However the underlying inferred form is in fact exactly the same in both.

Yet the matter does have a role in determining how well the universal form is able to realise itself in actual instances of particular individuals.

Aquinas uses this concept to explain how the celestial bodies (which are perfect and eternal as they admit of no material change other than locomotion) are so godlike. He says their ethereal matter is so perfect and their form so simple, that the matter already perfectly expresses all the potentialities made possible by that form. Therefore there is no possibility of any further accidental change because no potentiality is left for matter to express.

OS expresses the opposite concept.

This I believe is how Aquinas understands OS as wounding humanity without actually damaging the human form/soul itself. The limiting, the concupiscence (and other losses) is in the weakness of the matter/body and the inability of the form to express itself in suitable matter/body as well as it could and “should”.
Ok. Do you think that it’s correct to say that concupiscence is OS materially, implying that OS is manifested in no other way if I understand and am wording it correctly?
 
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