Q
Qoeleth
Guest
It seems those things which we assert or claim to know are either 1) groundless assumption, or 2) things which rest on some other pieces of knowledge or assertion. Now, for the latter category, it we trace the supporting knowledge or principles through sufficient steps, we always arrive at a groundless assumption.
For example, we ‘know’ that “There sun is larger than the moon”, because we have read it in books. We ‘know’ that those books can be believed because we trust the expertise of the authors. We trust the expertise of the authors because the majority of other people seem to do so. But why should we give any particular credence to a majority opinion? Here we have a groundless assumption. The fact that many people agree on this groundless assumption is no proof of its truth, since we know that, in the past, the majority have often agreed upon errors.
And, if the knowledge is derived from our perceptions, why should we trust them? It is only our perceptions which verify our perceptions, and thus the whole complex is circular. To trust our perceptions seems to be a groundless assumption.
Now, if all our knowledge, if traced back far enough, is ultimately based on some groundless assumption, why not simply boldly embrace any groundless assumption at the beginning? Surely a piece of ‘knowledge’ which rests, ultimately, on some fundamental groundless assumption has no more merits than the groundless assumption itself, and surely all groundless assumptions are of equal truth value.
Hence it would seem that what passes as ‘knowledge’ is no better than pure unsupported assertions, since one is no more secure in its epistemological basis than the other.
For example, we ‘know’ that “There sun is larger than the moon”, because we have read it in books. We ‘know’ that those books can be believed because we trust the expertise of the authors. We trust the expertise of the authors because the majority of other people seem to do so. But why should we give any particular credence to a majority opinion? Here we have a groundless assumption. The fact that many people agree on this groundless assumption is no proof of its truth, since we know that, in the past, the majority have often agreed upon errors.
And, if the knowledge is derived from our perceptions, why should we trust them? It is only our perceptions which verify our perceptions, and thus the whole complex is circular. To trust our perceptions seems to be a groundless assumption.
Now, if all our knowledge, if traced back far enough, is ultimately based on some groundless assumption, why not simply boldly embrace any groundless assumption at the beginning? Surely a piece of ‘knowledge’ which rests, ultimately, on some fundamental groundless assumption has no more merits than the groundless assumption itself, and surely all groundless assumptions are of equal truth value.
Hence it would seem that what passes as ‘knowledge’ is no better than pure unsupported assertions, since one is no more secure in its epistemological basis than the other.