**Traditionally, sentencing judges have considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt in determining what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant.** See *Payne* v. *Tennessee*, 501 U. S. ----, ---- (1991) (slip op., at 10); *United States* v. *Tucker*, [404 U.S. 443](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?404+443), 446 (1972); *Williams* v. *New York*, [337 U.S. 241](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?337+241), 246 (1949). The defendant's motive for committing the offense is one important factor. See 1 W. LeFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.6(b), p. 324 (1986) ("**Motives are most relevant when the trial judge sets the defendant's sentence, and it is not uncommon for a defendant to receive a minimum sentence because he was acting with good motives, or a rather high sentence because of his bad motives**"); cf. *Tison* v. *Arizona*, [481 U.S. 137](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?481+137), 156 (1987) ("**Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished**"). Thus, in many States the commission of a murder, or other capital offense, for pecuniary gain is a separate aggravating circumstance under the capital sentencing statute. See, *e. g.*, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(5) (1989); Fla. Stat. § 921.1415(f) (Supp. 1992); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(f) (Supp. 1992); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (1992); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-102(h)(vi) (Supp. 1992).