Something happened that had never happened before; two things actually. When interest rates were soaring, and the global pool of money was looking for more, bigger, investments and the FED decided to keep the interest rate of something that the global pool usually invests in, namely U.S. Bonds, very low, 1%. Greenspan basically said F U to the global pool of money. So, the global pool of money looked elsewhere for something to invest in. It found this in mortgage backed securities.
The way a mortgage backed security works is that a bunch of mortgages are cut. These mortgages are then traunched into a security and that security is sold. As the people make the payments on their mortgages the people who own the security make money.
So the loaner has no vested interest in the loane being able to pay it back. The loaner only has a vested interest in being able to sell the mortgage for more that the origination amount, but less than the total pay-back.
When the loaner looses a vested interest in your ability to repay the loans get riskier and riskier because the loaner is protected from this risk through sale of the loan. For example let’s say I loan you $1,000.00 at 10% interest to be paid back over the next year. So at the end of the year You’ll have paid me $1,100.00, and I make money by you actually repaying the loan. I have a vested interest in you repaying the loan – it is the only way I make money. Now, let’s say that instead of holding your marker I sell the loan to my friend Bill for $1,050.00. I have just make a $50.00 profit instead of a $100.00 profit. However, my risk has been reduced to zero and Bill has assumed my risk. This is how a mortgage backed security works. The person actually cutting the loan is not assuming the risk and the person assuming the risk is buying thousands of mortgages traunched into a security. It has no regulation because the agencies that over see securities do not oversee their creation they only over see their sale after creation and the agencies that over see mortgages only oversee mortgages that are handed out by banks.
It does have to do with de-regulation, but the government did not force the banks to do this. Heck, the majority of these risky loans weren’t even underwritten by banks, they were underwritten by mortgage brokers so that they could avoid the regulations placed on banks. I do not think that a bank ever cut a No Income No Asset loan.
Listen to the Money Pit trilogy from This American Life for a better description than I can give.
I have no argument with that until the last two paras.
The government did force the lowering of standards in the Nineties. When the banks balked, the government put the arm on Fannie Mae to buy the loans from the banks. That’s what got the originating banks off the hook.
How did they make Fannie Mae cave in? FM was created as a government agency in 1938. It was spun off in 1968 as a quasi-independent agency. The president still apponted half(?) the board of directors, and the market considered the FM bonds to be backed by the government. The government never disputed the implicit backing of the bonds, although it had many opportunities. Government auditors accepted FM bonds as governement agencies for reserve requirements.
Clinton threatened FM that he would explicitly deny governemnt backing of the FM bonds if they didn’t buy the mortgages from the originating banks. So, FM bought the paper and sold bonds at a lower rate. (It could sell bonds at a lower rate than anyone else because of the implicit gov backing.) That’s where the bundling started.
The originating banks loaned $100k on Monday, charged a $1000 fee, pocketed the fee, sold the paper to FM on Tuesday, and loaned the $100k out again on Wednesday. FM sold bonds at 1/2 less than the mortgages paid. Housing prices rose, so defaults didn’t matter. Unquals got loans. Clinton claimed victory in providing affordable housing. Everyone was happy.
Risky loans were made by both brokers and banks. Note the risk wasn’t confined to the LMI community, but spread across the whole range of borrowers because lowering credit standards applied to everyone, not just LMI. Mortgage brokers could ally with a bank so the bank got credit for the mortgage loaned to a LMI.
In early 1998 Booksley Borne, chairman of the CFTC, outlined the disaster that was about to take place, and issued regulations to control the predicted surge in credit default swaps that would result from the FM action and expected Wal Street copying of FM… Clinton and Rubin fought it, and Congress voted to give regulatory authority to the SEC which did not agree with the CFTC.
Up until here, the whole system was changed to make more affordable housing for LMI folks. The increase in money supply you mention hadn’t happened yet. Noble, but misguided.
In late 1998 Bear Sterns noticed FM was making a fortune and created the first mortgage backed security. In 2000 the senate voted 95-0 to prohibit regulation of credit default swaps by government agencies. Li created the gaussian copula function in 2002(?) and allowed bundles of unknown quality to be rated higher than any component by using CDS prices as a surrogate for normal due diligence. Bla bla bla…
I don’t need the Money Pit Trilogy. I lived it. Again, there are no single necessary and sufficient conditions. All I have done here is give a brief summary of how governemnt action created a systematic problem. The fact that I have said nothing about many other condidtions does not mean I dismiss them or they are unimportant. I just don’t have about 450 pages to write it all down.