Hawking's Theory and Traditional Thomism

[The_Exodus]

Disclaimer: this is part 1 of my thread, which is only a preface. You may skip it if, after reading the last sentence of this post, you agree or wish to proceed.

The God proven by St. Thomas and the God that the Catholic Church says can “be proven with certainty by the natural light of human reason” and which can, “be proved with certainty by the principle of causality” is not the Catholic God of faith. The “proven” God is not equal to the “revealed” God, since revelation speaks to the Trinity, the Virgin birth, the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment, etc. (For the purposes of this post, I will maintain that God’s will, disposition towards creatures, and revelation through Scripture are matters of faith.) What, then, can reason alone prove about God, and what method does it go about making this proof?

The second question seems more fundamental, because how it is answered determines whether or not the proof is rational. For instance, if the method used is fideism or fideistic, the Church’s claim would really be saying nothing more than that it is, in the end, really impossible for reason to prove God’s existence. What is fideistic? Well, contrary to probably some on this board, and contrary to a good many current Christian theologians (i.e. Plantinga, William Craig), the Church has made statements in the past about how ontology - starting a priori a la Anselm and Descartes in the method of an ontological proof - is fallacious and dangerous, and that doing so leads to agnosticism, followed by Kantian idealism, and onward eventually to skepticism/nihilism/existentialism and the schools of the absurd (in fact this order can be seen to develop historically as well as logically). The traditionalist school has always chose, rather, the a posteriori position to start. As St. Thomas says, and he is merely repeating what others said before him, “nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses.” This, then, gives us an entirely different flow of knowledge from Ontologism. Knowing is process that goes from the outside in, rather than from the inside out. We do not project knowledge of existing things. On the contrary, we discover such knowledge. (In fact, since Ontologism starts with the “I” and works outward is why it eventually ends up claiming that the existence of God is undeniably known by every human being in such a way which makes it impossible not to know that God exists. Against this Thomists would say that, were it impossible for a human not to know that God exists, he would have to behold the divine essence itself, from which there is no turning away. This, Thomists say, is impossible in this life.) Thomism, on the contrary, holds that even before we are aware of our own existence, we are aware of other things from sense experience. It also follows from this that no one knows a priori anything about whether or not a certain thing exists. This, then, is half of the answer to the question “what method is used to detect God’s existence”: the same method that is used to detect the existence of any existing “thing” - sense perception.

Now, to answer the other half another distinction about the a posteriori position needs to be fleshed out. Since knowledge moves from the outside in, it would follow that one may proceed by knowing the firstly effects, and then, secondly, causes of those effects. This is because, in the order of the production of a thing, we are constantly experiencing only effects of previous causes. It would be odd to say, for example, that upon the first time discovering an egg, we knew automatically that it came from a chicken. Rather, we move from experiencing or sensing an egg (that is, an effect) to discovering a chicken which layed it (a cause). Thus, the second half of the answer concerning method is: by moving from effects to causes.

To make clear, then, this is what is assumed in my following posts: in order to prove the existence of a thing, it is permissible to proceed from effect to cause, using sense experience.

 

[The_Exodus]

Part 2:

As all probably know, the traditional concept of God is that he is immaterial, unextended, acting on everything that exists in the sense of omnipresent, comprehending everything that exists in the sense of omniscient, infinite in power in the sense of omnipotent, timeless in the sense of changeless, and uncaused in the sense of being umoved.

Now, I say all the above in part 1 to come to this point, the main point of this post: what is the difference - conceptually speaking - between “gravity” and the God of St. Thomas as lain out in the preambula fidei – i.e. the preambles to the faith? Is “gravity” not just another word for the same concept that Thomas and the Church, indeed even Aristotle, proved to exist hundreds of years ago? Before I begin, I want to state that, were this false, that is, were it to turn out that Hawking’s theory was fallacious, it would only discredit his own reasoning. The Catholic proposition rests on the principle of causality and the distinction between potency and act. If, however, science can help by offering untainted evidence, it must be used to wipe away the darkness of our ignorance and make truth shine more brilliantly.

Firstly, this is what I take to be Hawking’s theory, which comes from his own words from his recent book: “Because there is a law such as gravity, the Universe can and will create itself from nothing.”

Let us consider, then, is “gravity”:

Immaterial? Yes. Even Materialists must admit that they can only hold that “gravity” exists by faith, unless they want to abandon their world-view. On the hand, many atheists who are not materialists, and all Christians, would admit here that yes, “gravity” is not made of matter, yet we are reasonable in thinking it exists. Furthermore, what gave rise or “created” matter cannot be matter itself, else, matter would have always and eternally existed.

Unextended? Yes. That which gave rise to space cannot first be extended in space. Furthermore, nothing immaterial can have special extension.

Acting on all things: i.e. omnipresent? Yes, presumably “gravity” would be in “act” on all “things”/matter in the created universe. Indeed, for Hawking’s theory to be consistent, it would have to be true that “gravity” simultaneously affects the entire universe.

Comprehending all things: i.e. omniscient? Yes, in the scientific sense, since, in order for a cause to give rise to an effect, it must have proper “knowledge,” in the sense of ontological comprehension, of the effect. I am not suggesting anything like a human intellect here. I am suggesting that “gravity”, sense it exerts its force upon all physical phenomena, must supersede the phenomena in order to act on it, and in this sense it “knows” it. If it did not supersede the physical in this respect, it would be impotent not only to give rise to it, but to produce any effect in it. Again, this is not to be confused with a “personal” intelligence (indeed, I said above, I assume – whether or not it is in fact true - in this post that God’s will, disposition towards creatures, etc. is a matter of faith). The reason, then, I think I am justified in saying “gravity,” in Hawking’s theory, is omniscient in the above sense is due to a) its ontological status, and b) since materialism and science do not presume to “prove” – indeed some even claim such proofs impossible – ethical values and personal qualities of this sort, these can be dismissed, in the same way, as objections. This is because it would be contradictory for science to say that “gravity” is not omniscient, since it cannot comprehend moral values, since, on their own ground, such values have not been proven to exist. Therefore it is a senseless objection to say x disproves property y about “gravity” since x has not yet been admitted to exist.

• Infinite in terms of power: i.e. omnipotent? Again, yes if you side with Hawking. This is the side of St. Thomas and the tradition of the Church. As the Saint says, “to create from nothing requires infinite power” (ST I I q. 45 a. 5.) If you do not think the universe came into being by “gravity,” but rather “gravity” - i.e. the laws of physics - itself came into being along with matter and energy at the beginning of the universe, then you are not on the side of Hawking.
• • the proposition above - the universe coming to be out of nothing - is not, strictly speaking, “demonstrable” or “reasonable” in the tradition of the Church. But that is only because there has been no science to suggest there was a beginning. If science come along and give evidence for this, so long as the reasoning is sound, then we should proceed to apply logical principles to the given theory. As St.Thomas said, “if the world and motion have a first beginning, some cause must clearly be posited to account for this origin of the world and of motion. That which comes to be anew must take its origin from some innovating cause; since nothing brings itself from potency to act, or from non-being to being" (SCG b. I ch. 13) Yet, his proofs rest on the supposition that the world is eternally changing or in motion, and so, even if it were the case that Hawking’s theory is fallacious, we are losing an additional proof of God, not a necessary one.

 

[The_Exodus]

Part 3

Changeless/timeless? This is less evident, but I still say that the answer must be, on Hawking’s theory, yes. Since “gravity” is presupposed as a “law,” to say that it is therefore subject to change would do two things: a) undermine the validity of his science; and b) appeal to a causally prior cause as to why it did, or is, or will be undergoing change. Insofar if b is true, it would undermine Hawking’s theory, since it rests on the stability and foundation of this law. Insofar if a is true, it would simply fall into a contingent effect in the Thomism system, and Hawking’s theory would become evidence – no more than saying “the rock moves because the stick moves it” – subsumed in the traditional proofs.

Unmoved/uncaused? Yes; the reason like the above answer. If Hawking proposes that “gravity” is what causes things, if it is what causes the interaction between particles/matter and, more importantly, if it is what causes the rise of space/time from previous nothingness - two things follow: a) It would be false to claim that the universe came from metaphysical nothing, since “gravity”, causally speaking is prior to the universe’s existence.The rise of the universe, therefore, had a cause. (I do not mean temporally prior, obviously, since there would be no “time” in which space/time did not exist, since time cannot exist without or before time, but could only, to use a phrase of St. Thomas, exist as “imaginary time”); and b) the universe which “gravity” caused, cannot then be the *cause *of “gravity”. This would result in an impossible and circular process of reasoning: what caused the universe to come into being? “gravity”. What caused “gravity” to give rise to the universe? the universe. “Gravity”, if it did cause or create the universe, cannot then be caused or created by the universe itself, since the universe’s existence presupposes “gravity” causing it to exist. Therefore, if Hawking’s theory is true, then yes, “gravity” must be uncaused and unmoved, at least with respect to the universe. If one wants to posit that perhaps “gravity” is moved by some entirely different species of motion, then, if he is a scientist, we can say that he has left his domain. What evidence is there of any different species of motion? If he is a philosopher or metaphysician, we can, with St. Thomas, say that this may be so, but if his point is to appeal to infinity, this is impossible. This is because the nature of an infinite series of different species of movers, acting on different species of things moved, would be contingent by nature, and therefore would not exist by nature, since the nature of the set of movers would be “things moved after being moved by”. Yet nothing whose nature is “moved after being moved by” moves of itself, since its nature is to move only after having been moved by another. Such a set of infinite species of different movers would be merely a potentially moving set of movers. It would, in order to be actual, have to be caused by something altogether actual or unmoved.

Now, these observations seem to me to be fitting. What are the responses among you all? I think Hawking, if his theory is true, far from disproving God, actually proves the God of the Catholic Church, despite giving Aristotle’s Prime Mover and Aquinas’s Being Whose Essence is Existence the name “gravity.” As Shakespeare said, “a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.”

 

[JohnDamian]

Quite the question.

I cannot see how any major schools of thought could agree with your argument on this point.

Firstly you are correct insofar as to establish that the first principle must be known a posteriori;- although certain a priori principles may be *useful *in refining and understanding a proof (such as discussions from the Ontology in Proslogion; or the Teleology in the Critique of Judgement); it must first be established a posteriori.

Under the definition of omnipotence; this would seem contrary to the understanding posited by the Doctor of the Church St. Peter Damian in De divina omnipotentia; because what the Church understands as “potency” is distinct from that potency which is possessed in Gravity. From the understanding of this Doctor; God must only be capable of all that is in the totality of “aliquid” or something.

Even if we maintain; as Aquinas does; that bringing something out of nothing equates to infinite power; we would still have a distinction from the Churches teachings on Omnipotence. An infinite potency; guided towards an the act of “ex nihilo” creation may equate to an infinite power per se; but it does not equate to Omnipotence in the understanding of the Church. They are clearly distinct; Omina Potentia only extends to both Aliquid (something) and Bona (good); and not to Nihil (nothing) and Mala (bad). Unless we can qualify Gravity with both an infinite capacity in something; we cannot say that it is omnipotent; – now; qualifying the infinity present in quale in the act of ex nihilo creation does not per se qualify the acting agent with full command of the totality of aliquid; for example – gravity can only act uniformly; wheras the potency of God (understood in a formally distinct manner) does not have to act uniformly (as it is a praxis); even if its act is restricted to good. Clearly then; the potential in Gravity is less than that in God.

A Thomist might accept that omniscience is predicated analagorically in essence-existence distinct beings to essence-existence united beings; but I would say that such predication is useless; and if predication is not univocal it is meaningless and equivocal.

 

[Touchstone]

To make clear, then, this is what is assumed in my following posts: in order to prove the existence of a thing, it is permissible to proceed from effect to cause, using sense experience.

Just a small, but I think important, pair of objections.

First, the tautology problem. If an “effect” is "that which has a cause, and a “cause” is that which produces an effect, you have a simple circular definition. Adding that you will “use sense experience” doesn’t help, at least without some separate criteria that breaks the circularity there, some principle that we can apply to see if what we suppose is causal or an effect through our sense actually is (if by no more reason than we know how we might falsify that idea in practice).

Otherwise, you end up in unattached metaphysics, wandering around left field; a causes b, and how do we know? Because b has a for a cause, and if you doubt that, just look at effect b! Nowhere there is a validation principle brought to bear (or maybe you have one in mind, and haven’t brought it out yet). Our senses are just a distraction for our metaphysical fancies, which cannot be contradicted in their musings.

Second, why would we find value in causal changes as proof of existence? I understand causal chains as important in developing a model, and understanding of “how”. But without some independent test for existence, one is open to all sorts of deviations from the way reality works, and one could never detect it. For example, I understand “existence” to be established by meeting the criteria “extended in space/time” (as the short version). While we have many concepts of reality that we accept as real, without direct observation (e.g. quarks), we nevertheless do not find “existence” meaningful unless those effects accord with our criterion for the word: extended in space time. Any “cause” that produced “effects” not in accord with that would not establish existence. Cause->effect products like quarks which we cannot observe (even in principle) do not exist just because they are effects, but because they satisfy independent criteria for existence in doing so (extended in space/time as energy/matter).

Third (hey, I said “pair” above…), I think you may be misunderstanding Hawking’s comment on ‘gravity’. Having gotten nearly to the end of the book now, gravity is not the “ultimate” anything, but just a handy example of the type of dynamic that Hawking understands to be the predicate for the “instability of nothing” which spontaneously produces somethings. Gravity is no different than, say, the “weak nuclear force”; it’s just the dynamic that came to mind when Hawking was making his point. It can’t be different in kind, per M-Theory – it’s just one of the many “dials” that get set as universes pop from the void, in Hawking’s model.

That, of course, means that “physical law” would be your general term rather than “gravity” for your point, and we could substitute it, understanding that there’s nothing special about gravity. And also of course, the caveat that Hawking’s “nothing” is not the “philosophical nothing” but the “physical nothing”, where no “thing”, even space/time exists, but where physical principles nevertheless obtain (this is the basis for the instability of the void, creating universes spontaneously).

-TS

 

[The_Exodus]

Under the definition of omnipotence; this would seem contrary to the understanding posited by the Doctor of the Church St. Peter Damian in De divina omnipotentia; because what the Church understands as “potency” is distinct from that potency which is possessed in Gravity. From the understanding of this Doctor; God must only be capable of all that is in the totality of “aliquid” or something.

I would agree that, among most scientists, gravity is not understood in this way. I think my point still stands, however, since on Hawking’s theory gravity is understood - whether or not his theory is properly scientific or operates out of demonstrable principles - as moving the entire universe from potency to act.

JohnDamian:

An infinite potency; guided towards an the act of “ex nihilo” creation may equate to an infinite power per se; but it does not equate to Omnipotence in the understanding of the Church. They are clearly distinct; Omina Potentia only extends to both Aliquid (something) and Bona (good); and not to Nihil (nothing) and Mala (bad).

Gravity does not exhaust the Church’s understanding of omnipotence. But everything which gravity, in Hawking’s theory, has predicated of it does apply to the understanding of omnipotence. In other words, the concept of gravity can be subsumed under the Church’s understanding, although it does not exhaust that concept.

JohnDamian:

Unless we can qualify Gravity with both an infinite capacity in something; we cannot say that it is omnipotent; – now; qualifying the infinity present in quale in the act of ex nihilo creation does not per se qualify the acting agent with full command of the totality of aliquid; for example – gravity can only act uniformly; wheras the potency of God (understood in a formally distinct manner) does not have to act uniformly (as it is a praxis); even if its act is restricted to good. Clearly then; the potential in Gravity is less than that in God.

I think I agree, and this is why, as I said, one could appeal to other agents which move gravity to act from potency. Now, I would agree with you here that, were someone to say that just because an agent creates an infinite effect in an ex nihlo creation, does not make that agent therefore completely actual. This is why I said that one could appeal to ignorance and say that perhaps other agents of different species gave rise to gravity, and so on. However, eventually, we must reach an agent which is pure act, and does not receive potency from any other.

But again, this does not take anything away from what I’m trying to show: that Hawking’s theory, if true, shows that a agent exists which, is either a) conceptually akin to an immaterial, uncaused cause etc.; or b) is subsumed as simply another contingent agent (in the same category as a stick being moved by a hand); and, in which case, his theory has then failed to prove its point - namely, that there is no God, since gravity then requires explanation, like all other contingent agents, whose nature is “move after being moved;” aka agents which are not complete act.

JohnDamian:

A Thomist might accept that omniscience is predicated analagorically in essence-existence distinct beings to essence-existence united beings; but I would say that such predication is useless; and if predication is not univocal it is meaningless and equivocal.

I think this point may be useless in pursuing, but, the reason, as you are probably aware, that Thomists do not think predication of God is univocal is because then, since we obviously can and do predicate different things about God (i.e that he is just and merciful and omnipotent, etc), these things, if all univocal, must actually be distinct in God, and thus the idea of his simplicity is destroyed.

 

[The_Exodus]

First, the tautology problem. If an “effect” is "that which has a cause, and a “cause” is that which produces an effect, you have a simple circular definition. Adding that you will “use sense experience” doesn’t help, at least without some separate criteria that breaks the circularity there, some principle that we can apply to see if what we suppose is causal or an effect through our sense actually is (if by no more reason than we know how we might falsify that idea in practice).

You are assuming that I’m positing cause and effect as a priori concepts which I bring to reality, and this is why you say the problem is one of tautology. I am not doing this though. These concepts are *themselves *derived from reality through sense experience. Thus, since knowledge comes into the intellect from sense, we are not working in a circle, but a line, which moves from the outside in; from ignorance to knowledge; from darkness to illumination.

Furthermore, this is why it is possible to falsify claims about reality. Hence, I can say there is no pink horse in my living room, since, looking into my living room, I perceive from sense that reality is not such as to be containing a pink horse in the space which is my living room.

touchstone:

Otherwise, you end up in unattached metaphysics, wandering around left field; a causes b, and how do we know? Because b has a for a cause, and if you doubt that, just look at effect b! Nowhere there is a validation principle brought to bear (or maybe you have one in mind, and haven’t brought it out yet). Our senses are just a distraction for our metaphysical fancies, which cannot be contradicted in their musings.

On the contrary, our metaphysical fancies are built upon our senses. A has b for a cause. How do we know? Because we have sensed the truth of this. An egg has a chicken for a cause, not because we have conceptually/a priori brought “cause and effect” to the table, but because, our experience with reality puts these concepts in our intellect, and thus we are able to grasp the truth of reality - that an egg comes form a chicken - which exists independent of our mind recognizing it.

You are falling into the error of Kant, who thought that the traditional arguments which rest on cause and effect are impotent, since (as he believed) they all rest on the ontological argument. This is to completely misunderstand the argument. The traditional position is that cause and effect are principles of reality itself, which are derived through sense experience. Thus we understand the law of noncontradition, etc. not a priori, but through our own experiencing of reality. This is the position that Thomists since Descartes and Kant,who began to muddy the waters, have repeatedly held; and also the position of St. Thomas against Anselm (See here for more: dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer10.htm#12)

touchstone:

Second, why would we find value in causal changes as proof of existence?

By the very fact of recognizing that, when we see a thing in act we know, through sense experience, that there is or was another agent which brought about this act from potency.
This is a truth we learn about reality by experiencing the world; a certain relationship we find - emprically I may add - as the fabric of reality. Hence, in knowing that “causal changes” exist and in knowing the validity of such a relationship, we proceed to an agent which must be entirely act; i.e. an uncaused cause.

Secondly, how, if we dismiss causal changes as proof of the existence of a thing, do you explain why it is reasonable to hold that gravity exists, since we only know gravity’s existence by sensing its effect on matter?

touchstone:

For example, I understand “existence” to be established by meeting the criteria “extended in space/time”

This doesn’t answer much, since you have not stated how it is possible to *detect *phenomena “extended in space/time.” Neither have you demonstrated that all which extends in space/time must be material, or must be sensed by humans in order to be able to exist in space/time. For the Christian, for example, angels and souls exist in space time, though they cannot be known in their essence (though it is my view that the soul can be known to exist by its act, and thus is known *through *its essence).

What then meets your criteria for things “existing in space/time”? Matter only? If so, a) you are begging your own philosophically slanted view, i.e. materialism/physicalism; and b) how, then, do you explain the existence of gravity?; and c) is it true, on your view, that concepts do not exist, indepedent of their physical constituents?

touchstone:

That, of course, means that “physical law” would be your general term rather than “gravity” for your point, and we could substitute it, understanding that there’s nothing special about gravity. And also of course, the caveat that Hawking’s “nothing” is not the “philosophical nothing” but the “physical nothing”, where no “thing”, even space/time exists, but where physical principles nevertheless obtain (this is the basis for the instability of the void, creating universes spontaneously).

I appreciate this observation and agree.

 

[Touchstone]

You are assuming that I’m positing cause and effect as a priori concepts which I bring to reality, and this is why you say the problem is one of tautology. I am not doing this however. These are concepts are *themselves *derived from reality through sense experience. Thus, since knowledge comes into the intellect from sense, we are not working in a circle, but a line, which moves from the outside in; from ignorance to knowledge; from darkness to illumination.

Furthermore, this is why it is possible to falsify claims about reality. Hence, I can say there is no pink horse in my living room, since, looking into my living room, I perceive from sense that reality is not such as to be containing a pink horse in the space which is my living room.

OK, that’s a good response, by me.

On the contrary, our metaphysical fancies are built upon our senses. A has b for a cause. How do we know? Because we have sensed the truth of this. An egg has a chicken for a cause, not because we have conceptually/a priori brought “cause and effect” to the table, but because, our experience with reality puts these concepts in our intellect, and thus we are able to grasp the truth of reality - that an egg comes form a chicken - which exists independent of our mind recognizing it.

Yes, but I might as well say gravity pulls me “down” everywhere. I have sensed the truth of this, as have people before me for thousands of years. It’s only with the discoveries in the last few centuries that we understand that several hundred miles above the surface of the earth, I don’t have the same dynamics, that the “truth” I’ve sensed was true in a general but local way, and doesn’t apply the same way everywhere. This is why we defer to experience to tell is what does happen and where, because our “sensing the truth” has a terrible track record, especially on issues that are far removed from our local, direct experience (outer space, 14 billion years ago, etc.). We jump to “metaphysical truths” as universal principles because we are parochial. It’s weak to say “a chicken must come from an egg” is a principle that applies universally, everywhere. For one thing, if that’s true, you have infinite regress (which may or may not be a problem), but which militates against your other conclusions.

You are falling into the error of Kant, who thought that the traditional arguments which rest on cause and effect are impotent, since (as he believed) they all rest on the ontological argument. This is to completely misunderstand the argument. The traditional position is that cause and effect are principles of reality itself, which are derived through sense experience. Thus we understand the law of noncontradition, etc. not a priori, but through our own experiencing of reality. This is the position that Thomists since Descartes and Kant,who began to muddy the waters, have repeatedly held; and also the position of St. Thomas against Anselm (See here for more: dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer10.htm#12)

My objection doesn’t depend on locating your metaphysic in ontology, but in locating it anywhere. “Cause” is not a grounded principle, and just a placeholder metaphysically, something to attach before an “effect”, which is equally abstract semantically. If that’s not clear, consider principle that has grounded semantics, like the principle of conservation of mass. It’s not perfectly plastic, like “cause” is (“cause is where we see an effect and need a cause”), but bound to something concrete, what Kant would call a synthetic proposition; the principle governs the experiences we expect to have in accounting for mass and energy in measuring phenomena.

As usual, a good rule of thumb to apply – how would this principle be rejected if reality wasn’t thus? With “cause->effect”, you are dealing in purely analytic arguments, even if you are using sense experience as the grist for your “effect mill”. Since you see something that fits “effect”, there must be a cause, a priori. If that’s not the case, then it must be possible in principle to have an effect with out a cause (even the language used here is prejudicial, “effect” connoting a related cause, linguistically, vs. say just "phenomenon).

By the very fact of recognizing that, when we see a thing in act we know, through sense experience, that there is or was another agent which brought about this act from potency.

But it’s not through sense experience that you come to know this. You’ve confused using sense experience as a kind of ‘confirmation’ with sense experience as the basis for the conclusion. You’ve stated just above that cause->effect is a “principle of reality itself”. If so, the matter is conclusively settled, and any sense experience is just forced into that framework; it cannot be otherwise, by axiom.

If that’s not the case, and it’s not assumed, this conclusion, in the premise, then we should be able to lay out what our experiences would be like if the cause->effect chain was only mostly effective as a description of reality. I do not see Thomas, you or anyone else who thinks metaphysics is somehow anything more than a euphemism for our intuitions address this.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

The Exodus:

This is a truth we learn about reality by experiencing the world; a certain relationship we find - emprically I may add - as the fabric of reality. Hence, in knowing that “causal changes” exist and in knowing the validity of such a relationship, we proceed to an agent which must be entirely act; i.e. an uncaused cause.

But that violates the very “principle of reality” you are resting on. It’s not even internally consistent as a metaphysic. It’s special pleading deployed just to get around the idea that offends another intuition – the concept of an infinite regress. Since that intuition gets annoyed by our principle established by another intuition (every effect has a cause), it just gets an ad-hoc chop; way back there somewhere the chaining principle breaks, and this is God. It’s a principle of reality, until it isn’t. God isn’t an effect, because he isn’t. But a universe is an effect, because it is.

Secondly, how, if we dismiss causal changes as proof of the existence of a thing, do you explain why it is reasonable to hold that gravity exists, since we only know gravity’s existence by sensing its effect on matter?

There’s nothing wrong with

This doesn’t answer much, since you have not stated how it is possible to *detect *phenomena “extended in space/time.” Neither have you demonstrated that all which extends in space/time must be material, or must be sensed by humans in order to be able to exist in space/time. For the Christian, for example, angels and souls exist in space time, though they cannot be known in their essence (though it is my view that the soul can be known to exist by its act, and thus is known *through *its essence).

What then meets your criteria for things “existing in space/time”? Matter only?

No, that would leave out lots of things we consider extant, and which are required by performative models – gravity is a good example. Gravity is not matter, or energy (or maybe it is, if one subscribe to the gravitons idea in M-Theory!), but rather a measure of the curvature of space time. So it’s directly observable and measurable as that curvature, and fits our criteria of “extension”, applied to spacetime itself, rather than as energy/matter. The earth, for example is a “pocket of distortion” of spacetime, and gravity is the measure of that distortion. It’s got locale, dimension and properties that are observable, testable, predictable.

If so, a) you are begging your own philosophically slanted view, i.e. materialism/physicalism; and b) how, then, do you explain the existence of gravity?; and c) is it true, on your view, that concepts do not exist, independent of their physical constituents?

I’m not making the argument here, so I’m not begging the question. There is no way to falsify supernaturalism, all that can be done is shown that it doesn’t add anything to natural explanations, and isn’t dispositive on any issue one way or another that we might test. It’s superfluous is all we might say about it. But I don’t have to show materialism obtains here to show that the semantics of what you are presenting are empty, unbound, incoherent. It doesn’t get beyond the analytic, and doesn’t say anything about the real world that is in danger of being falsified under any scenario, so it’s vacuous. If it can’t possibly be false, it is saying nothing to say it is “true”.

On concepts, they exist, as physical phenomena, and only as physical phenomena, so far as I can tell. A supernatural “dimension” or “duality” doesn’t add anything at all to our model of concepts. We simply can’t “feel” or “see” the chemical and electrical patterns that are our concepts in our brains, and thus have this inclination toward magical thinking, the idea that the unfelt, unseen idea is immaterial.

-TS

 

[The_Exodus]

Yes, but I might as well say gravity pulls me “down” everywhere. I have sensed the truth of this, as have people before me for thousands of years, etc

Yes, but the fact that you admit that gravity pulls me down anywhere, demonstrates, not an exhaustive knowledge of a given cause or its given effect, but the very relationship of cause and effect to begin with. You can postulate all different sorts of ways in which a cause may be effected by previous causes, but that doesn’t negate the principle of cause and effect in the first place. On the contrary, it confirms it, since you are using your inherent notion of cause and effect, to argue that, given different circumstances (i.e. your body on the moon, as opposed to the earth), different effects will occur from different causes.

touchstone:

It’s weak to say “a chicken must come from an egg” is a principle that applies universally, everywhere. For one thing, if that’s true, you have infinite regress (which may or may not be a problem), but which militates against your other conclusions.

It is quite weak to hold a chicken must come from an egg. But an egg coming from a chicken isn’t so bad.

But actually, it is unimpeachable to hold that a chicken must come from an egg, insofar as I have sensed this to be true, since what is sensed is this particular chicken giving rise to this particular egg. Hume and co would object, but only on the foundation that we cannot grasp the essence of a thing. This point, however, may be no use arguing, since it would lead to digressions on essences.

Suffice it so say, though, I believe my point still stands: through sense we experience the relationship of cause and effect, as descriptive of reality; i.e. we sense a thing moving from potency to act.

touchstone:

My objection doesn’t depend on locating your metaphysic in ontology, but in locating it anywhere. “Cause” is not a grounded principle, and just a placeholder metaphysically, something to attach before an “effect”, which is equally abstract semantically.

“Cause” is only an abstraction if it is posited a priori - i.e. ontologically. You deny this, though I do not see how your objection follows at all. It seems to me an assertion.

On the contrary, as said above, “cause” is a principle derived from experiencing reality undergoing change, as various agents cause the movement of things in potency to act.

touchstone:

If that’s not clear, consider principle that has grounded semantics, like the principle of conservation of mass…etc.

The principle of cause and effect is grounded the same way in which the principle of conservation of mass is - i.e. by observation and sense experience. You are merely asserting the contrary, when I gave lain out plainly an epistemology which shows that what is in the intellect comes first from what is sensed. Cause/effect is a principle of reality just as much as conservation of mass.

touchstone:

As usual, a good rule of thumb to apply – how would this principle be rejected if reality wasn’t thus?

This on your view is a useless rule of thumb, as I thought you would have noticed, since you continually say cause/effect, indeed even the universe, is “unknowable.” Furthermore, it is absurd, since the “what reality is like” is the term in question to begin with. Therefore, to subject that question to an a priori judgment about reality begs the question, since you assume what you are intending to prove: that reality *is * such and such

touchstone:

But it’s not through sense experience that you come to know this.

This is an assertion, which your entire post has tried to sail on. Do you have any evidence for this claim?

On the other hand I can back up my claim by pointing to a chicken and showing it laying an egg. Y

touchstone:

You’ve confused using sense experience as a kind of ‘confirmation’ with sense experience as the basis for the conclusion.

No. You are simply asserting that cause/effect is an a priori concept I’ve brought to my sense experience. My claim is just the opposite: it is a concept I’ve gained through experiencing reality.

 

[The_Exodus]

But that violates the very “principle of reality” you are resting on. It’s not even internally consistent as a metaphysic. It’s special pleading deployed just to get around the idea that offends another intuition – the concept of an infinite regress. Since that intuition gets annoyed by our principle established by another intuition (every effect has a cause), it just gets an ad-hoc chop; way back there somewhere the chaining principle breaks, and this is God. It’s a principle of reality, until it isn’t. God isn’t an effect, because he isn’t. But a universe is an effect, because it is.

The cause and effect metaphysic is better understood as the metaphysic of potency and act, which is simply thus: nothing gets to be the way it is, unless moved to do so by another agent. Hence, I may possibly stand, but in actuality, I am sitting. In order for me to move from my merely potency of standing, to actually standing, something must happen to give rise to this act: an impulse, say, or whatever the case may be. The point is that, in order for me to stand, something must cause me to stand. Something must move me from potency regarding standing, to actual standing.

The first thing our intellect senses about reality is being, which is constantly in a liquid motion of moving from potency to act. Now, if this principle is really understood - i.e. that everything which receives act, receives act from some other agent which is itself in act - it becomes apparent why an infinite regress is impossible. Since the nature of reality is to from potency to act, this can be stated simply as “moved after being moved by.” Now, if this is the very nature of the universe, stretching back infinitely in causality (time here is irrelevant), then it is impossible for the infinite chain to ever be moved; it is impossible for anything to move from potency to act. This is because the very nature of the chain is “moved after being moved by.” Hence, what is moved is only moved after being moved by. And, if nothing sets this contingent and infinite chain moving, it shall not be moved, since what is not moved by nature is not moved by itself. This is why we must ultimately reach a cause which is unmoved, and moves all other agents which are moved.
touchtone:

No, that would leave out lots of things we consider extant, and which are required by performative models – gravity is a good example. Gravity is not matter, or energy (or maybe it is, if one subscribe to the gravitons idea in M-Theory!), but rather a measure of the curvature of space time. So it’s directly observable and measurable as that curvature, and fits our criteria of “extension”, applied to spacetime itself, rather than as energy/matter. The earth, for example is a “pocket of distortion” of spacetime, and gravity is the measure of that distortion. It’s got locale, dimension and properties that are observable, testable, predictable.

So, this measure of the curvature of space/time, is what, if not an effect of gravity? How do you sense gravity, otherwise than moving from effects to causes, since it is immaterial?