HELP! Confused about the Trinity

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Where has the CHurch taught that the processions of the Son and Holy Ghost are necessary and not contingent on the Father’s decision??
The Father is the source and origin of the whole divinity, yet there is only one Divine Will and one Divine Intelligence.

"Because of this unity the Father is entire in the Son, entire in the Holy Spirit; the Son is entire in the Father, entire in the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is entire in the Father, entire in the Son. No one either excels another in eternity, or exceeds in magnitude, or is superior in power. For the fact that the Son is of the Father is eternal and without beginning. and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son is eternal and without beginning.’’

“It condemns also any others whatsoever who place grades or inequality in the Trinity”
  • Bull “Cantata Domino,” 1442 A.D.
 
I’ve played the devil’s advocate with Aquinas, but he comes through, although people are free to agree more with Descartes or Suarez. Anyway, “Because of this unity the Father is entire** in** the Son, entire in the Holy Spirit; the Son is entire in the Father, entire in the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is entire in the Father, entire in the Son.” Since there can be nothing in the trinity that is not personal love, there is a relation of Father to Son, Son to Father, Father to Holy Spirit, Holy Spirit to Father, Son to Holy Spirit, and Holy Spirit to Son. But Aquinas in speaking of properties instead of relations does not speak of the relation of Spirit to Father and then to Son

The Trinity can make my head spin
 
I’ve played the devil’s advocate with Aquinas, but he comes through, although people are free to agree more with Descartes or Suarez. Anyway, “Because of this unity the Father is entire** in** the Son, entire in the Holy Spirit; the Son is entire in the Father, entire in the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is entire in the Father, entire in the Son.” Since there can be nothing in the trinity that is not personal love, there is a relation of Father to Son, Son to Father, Father to Holy Spirit, Holy Spirit to Father, Son to Holy Spirit, and Holy Spirit to Son. But Aquinas in speaking of properties instead of relations does not speak of the relation of Spirit to Father and then to Son

The Trinity can make my head spin
In Summa Theologica, Q32, he addresses Holy Spirit to Father and Holy Spirit to Son, which is called “common spiration” but is not a personal property because it belongs to two persons.

Therefore, there are Five notions in God: “innascibility,” “paternity,” “filiation,” “common spiration” and “procession.” Of these only four are relations, for “innascibility” is not a relation, except by reduction, as will appear later (33, 4, ad 3). Four only are properties. For “common spiration” is not a property; because it belongs to two persons. Three are personal notions–i.e. constituting persons, “paternity,” “filiation,” and “procession.” “Common spiration” and “innascibility” are called notions of Persons, but not personal notions, as we shall explain further on (40, 1, ad 1).
 
So “procession” is one “Of these only four… relations”. So therefore the relation of the Spirit to Son and Spirit to the Father is a true relation, no???
 
So “procession” is one “Of these only four… relations”. So therefore the relation of the Spirit to Son and Spirit to the Father is a true relation, no???
Yes, but not personal, as he explained, because it is common.
 
From the Son and Father’s action, yes. But from the Holy Spirit’s perspective, He loves the Son and the Father. I wonder why Thomas Aquinas didn’t speak of that
 
Although I’ve pointed out a spiritual dimension, I think that Aquinas was emphasizing the tradition in spirituality that the Holy Ghost is the love between the Father and Son.
 
From the Son and Father’s action, yes. But from the Holy Spirit’s perspective, He loves the Son and the Father. I wonder why Thomas Aquinas didn’t speak of that
Active spiration: from Father and Son to Holy Spirit.
Passive spiration: from Holy Spirit to Father and Son.

Summa Theologica, Q27, A5
I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love.
 
Active spiration: from Father and Son to Holy Spirit.
Passive spiration: from Holy Spirit to Father and Son.

Summa Theologica, Q27, A5
I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love.
He did not include the Loves relation to the Father and then to the Son in his relation, notion, and property set up
 
He did not include the Loves relation to the Father and then to the Son in his relation, notion, and property set up
He does give more in Q27 A3:

Reply to objection 3: Even though the intellect and will are not distinct in God, nonetheless, it ispart of the nature of an intellect and will that the processions that involve their actions have a certain ordering with respect to one another. For there is no procession of love except in relation to the procession of a word, since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived by the intellect. Therefore, just as the Word is ordered to the principle from which it proceeds, despite the fact that in God the substance of the intellect is the same as the intellect’s conception, so, too, despite the fact that the intellect and will are the same in God, the procession of the Love has an ordering distinct from the procession of the Word in God, because it is part of the nature of love that it should proceed only from a conception of the intellect.
 
A theological treatise on the Love of the Spirit for the Father and also for the Son: has this ever been done and is it a good topic?
 
A theological treatise on the Love of the Spirit for the Father and also for the Son: has this ever been done and is it a good topic?
One quote from St John Damascene:
“The Holy Spirit is a substantial power contemplated in his own distinct hypostasis, who proceeds from the Father and reposes in the Word” - The Orthodox Faith, I, 7

From The Pontifical Council for Christian Unity, The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit

The divine love which has its origin in the Father reposes in “the Son of his love” in order to exist consubstantially through the Son in the person of the Spirit, the Gift of love. This takes into account the fact that, through love, the Holy Spirit orients the whole life of Jesus towards the Father in the fulfilment of his will.

ewtn.com/library/CURIA/PCCUFILQ.HTM
 
I was wondering tonight about nominalism and whether the Church during the Middle Ages ever condemned it (Some claim that Blessed Duns Scotus was a nominalist but I doubt that). Defining this would be hard to pin down, but I think in respect to the Trinity they would say that it was at least hypothetically possible for the Persons of the Trinity to “proceed” more members with God’s nature (fourth person, or fifth ect). I don’t think they would go so far as to say this could happen, because of revelation. But the philosophical question here does relate to what was discussed earlier in the thread
 
I was wondering tonight about nominalism and whether the Church during the Middle Ages ever condemned it (Some claim that Blessed Duns Scotus was a nominalist but I doubt that). Defining this would be hard to pin down, but I think in respect to the Trinity they would say that it was at least hypothetically possible for the Persons of the Trinity to “proceed” more members with God’s nature (fourth person, or fifth ect). I don’t think they would go so far as to say this could happen, because of revelation. But the philosophical question here does relate to what was discussed earlier in the thread
In the thirteenth century all the great Scholastics solved the problem of the universals by the theory of Moderate Realism (Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus), and are thus in accord with Averroes and Avicenna, the great Arab commentators of Aristotle, whose works had recently passed into circulation by means of translations. St. Thomas formulates the doctrine of Moderate Realism in precise language, and for that reason alone we can give the name of Thomistic Realism to this doctrine (see below). …

Nominalism, which is irreconcilable with a spiritualistic philosophy and for that very reason with scholasticism as well, presupposes the ideological theory that the abstract concept does not differ essentially from sensation, of which it is only a transformation. The Nominalism of Hume, Stuart Mill, Spencer, Huxley, and Taine is of no greater value than their ideology. They confound essentially distinct logical operations–the simple decomposition of sensible or empirical representations with abstraction properly so called and sensible analogy with the process of universalization.

De Wulf, M. (1911). Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
newadvent.org/cathen/11090c.htm
 
I believe one can be a moderate nominalist and still be a good Catholic. Duns Scotus did, despite my previous post, say that things are good because God’s will make them good, not that they are good because of God’s laws of Reason. The Catholic Encyclopedia seems to be saying that conceptualism alone is consistent with spirituality, but isn’t that concept simply that when a man thinks of a dog the dog is, in a sense, in the man? I think modern scientific descriptions are fine, but I can be a tad liberal sometimes
 
I was speaking of conceptualism as explained in an old Britannica Encyclopedia (and as used by Descartes). The Old CE takes it to mean moderate nominalism I see. That Catholic Encyclopedia was written in an age when certain writers (many in number, but agreeing on most points) other than Fathers of the Church were held up in great honor, and this was so because of the onslaught of modern philosophy. If a new Encyclopedia was written today in Rome today I don’t think that it would decide “for or against” in the cut and dry sense that the old one does
 
Although I’ve pointed out a spiritual dimension, I think that Aquinas was emphasizing the tradition in spirituality that the Holy Ghost is the love between the Father and Son.
Augustine said the Father was the Lover the Son the Beloved and the Holy Spirit the love that flows between them. Aquinas agreed, however, it sort of makes the Son and the Holy Spirit seem subordinate to me, and they are not subordinate. The Holy Spirit is as much as Person as the Father and the Son.
 
I believe one can be a moderate nominalist and still be a good Catholic. Duns Scotus did, despite my previous post, say that things are good because God’s will make them good, not that they are good because of God’s laws of Reason. The Catholic Encyclopedia seems to be saying that conceptualism alone is consistent with spirituality, but isn’t that concept simply that when a man thinks of a dog the dog is, in a sense, in the man? I think modern scientific descriptions are fine, but I can be a tad liberal sometimes
So have you worked out the Trinitarian ontology using moderate nominalism, i.e., that nominalism which recognises tropes?

A trope then is a particular entity either abstract or consisting of one or more concreta in combination with an abstractum. - Williams “On the Elements of Being: I.” The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Sept.), p. 7.
 
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