Help on Kant and Moral Obligation

[Cartesian]

First, I want to say that I’ve never read any philosophy book (unless fictional books like Sophie’s World, When Nietzsche Wept or couple of Socratic dialogues), although I have a dozen in my reading list, which I never start. So my questions come indeed due to ignorance in this matter, and because of that, probably they are not much clear (to make it worse English is not my native tongue)

My only contact with Immanuel Khant was through some Youtube videos and some slides in one ICT Ethics course last year. I was impressed with the principle of a single moral obligation, and that whole thing of Categorical Imperative (pardon the abstraction, I can not explain better). But anyway, I think deep down I’ve always agreed with these principles, but when reading Kant I turned even more firmly in taking my decisions according to Kant’s moral. I have to say that until today I am kind of very attracted to the things I have read those times about Kant ethics.

Which brings me to my questions. I looked into this forum and I quickly realised how superficial my knowledge may be on this matter.

Hence, my questions:

1. According to Kant, should I feel good/happy if I do something that I think is my moral duty? Is it acceptable that I did something that I think is morally right (using a kind of universal ethics), but then I feel kind of depressed or sad because of it?
   1b: Would the answer change if the question started as: According to a moral law accepted by Catholic Church…?
2. In the threads I found in CAF, amid several banned members on them I could realise that Kant philosophy has problems with Catholic morals at the basics, metaphysics, etc.
   So is there any contradiction within my Catholic faith in me agreeing with this set of principles on single moral obligation (or there are parts of Kant which I can choose)?
3. Lastly, any recommendations for the long summer holidays ahead, of books/philosophers that I should read in order to get deep in this, mainly on philosophers approaching this same matters I talk here about, but entirely in conformity with Catholic Church?

Thanks

 

[hicetnunc]

Kant’s philosophy is very complex and problematic, especially from a Catholic moral point of view. Kant is often thought to be responsible for the shift in philosophy from the emphasis on the objective standard of morality to a subjective perspective. You will find that a number of Catholic philosophers have tried to engage Kant from a Catholic perspective, though not without controversy or a lot of adaption. Ultimately, I would not advise you to base your understanding of morality on Kant, especially if, as you say, you have a limited reading of his overall project. You may find you start adopting problematic premises simply because they seem, on face value, attractive but which may, at the same time, lead you to some conclusions which are inconsistent with Catholic theology. You’d be much better off following the likes of St Thomas Aquinas, and good Catholic moral theologians and philosophers, such as Frank Sheed, Peter Kreeft, John Hardon, and of course the Catechism of the Catholic Church.

I could recommend two excellent and short articles to get you going on some of the problems with Kantian ethics:

Peter Kreeft: The Pillars of Unbelief (Kant):
catholiceducation.org/articles/civilization/cc0011.html

and

Catholic Encyclopaedia: the Categorical Imperative
newadvent.org/cathen/03432a.htm

A great primer on Kant in relation to classical philosophy is Peter Kreeft’s “Socrates Meets Kant”, available on Amazon.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

OK, let’s look at the two formulations of the categorical imperative:

(1) Always act in such a way that the maxim of your action could become a universal law.

This principle has some problems, in the details, but it is generally reconcilable with the Golden Rule – and is in some ways more specific than the Golden Rule.

(2) Always treat humanity (both in your own person and in the person of others) as an end, never merely as a means to your own end.

This principle is an excellent principle, worthy of praise by Christians and non-Christians alike.

So what’s the problem with Kant? Well, one issue is that he focused far too much on actions, and far to little on virtues. Good actions flow from good character; if this is right, then we don’t need to worry so much about following rules – rather, we should have the right attitudes and habits, and we will do the right thing.

As for Kant and subjectivity, this is a red herring. Kant did not think ethics was subjective. He thought ethics was relative to the kind of being someone is. And this is surely true. Dogs do not have the same ethical obligations I have. Since rational beings are capable of understanding and following laws, law is the framework of our obligations. It is, perhaps, strange that Kant says that we ourselves are the lawgiver. But the standards for our lawgiving are outside ourselves, in the structure of the universe.

Who made the universe? God. So there ain’t no subjectivity there.

 

[landon13]

What works of Immanuel Kant are you reading? I have tried to work through many different works of his just out of the sheer philosophical respect associated with his name and they leave me confused. Haha. For an introduction to Kant in his philosophical writings you should read like The Prolegomena or Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. I know that he is very controversial among Catholics but from a philosophical perspective you can gain great insight from his works. I would suggest at all costs to stay away from Critique of Pure Reason because that will make you want to lock yourself in your room and cry!

God bless!

 

[Prodigal_Son]

What works of Immanuel Kant are you reading? I have tried to work through many different works of his just out of the sheer philosophical respect associated with his name and they leave me confused. Haha. For an introduction to Kant in his philosophical writings you should read like The Prolegomena or Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. I know that he is very controversial among Catholics but from a philosophical perspective you can gain great insight from his works. I would suggest at all costs to stay away from Critique of Pure Reason because that will make you want to lock yourself in your room and cry!

God bless!

The Prolegomena will only make you want to go in the corner of the room you are already in, and cry.

 

[hicetnunc]

Always treat humanity (both in your own person and in the person of others) as an end, never merely as a means to your own end.

This principle is an excellent principle, worthy of praise by Christians and non-Christians alike.

I think you should read Pope Benedict’s Encyclical Letter, Spei Salvi, where he critiques this whole basis of morality. In fact, you will be hard pressed to find a good Catholic philosopher or theologian who thinks that this basis of morality is “worthy of praise.” Kant’s Kingdom of Ends is highly problematic from the point of view of virtue ethics, largely on account Kant’s Pelagianism, which has no place for grace, natural law or virtue as objective moral norms.

As for Kant and subjectivity, this is a red herring.

This is just not true. Every Kantian scholar recognises Kant’s “turn to the subject” as a foundation of his entire philosophical system.

Who made the universe? God. So there ain’t no subjectivity there.

Kant’s belief in God is deistic, and is only sustained through his subjective appeal to the rational order of morality. Kant rejects all objective claims to demonstrate the existence of God, including the cosmological and ontological arguments.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I think you should read Pope Benedict’s Encyclical Letter, Spei Salvi, where he critiques this whole basis of morality. In fact, you will be hard pressed to find a good Catholic philosopher or theologian who thinks that this basis of morality is “worthy of praise.” Kant’s Kingdom of Ends is highly problematic from the point of view of virtue ethics, largely on account Kant’s Pelagianism, which has no place for grace, natural law or virtue as objective moral norms.

We’re talking past each other. Surely you don’t advocate using people as a mere means to your own end. Thus, you agree that this principle is – at least – a *constraint *on morality. So it’s a pretty good principle.

It is NOT a good foundation for ethics, since it does not explain *why *people have such inviolable value. So I agree that Kant’s ethics is incomplete.

This is just not true. Every Kantian scholar recognises Kant’s “turn to the subject” as a foundation of his entire philosophical system.

But the nature of the subject is not controlled by the subject. Kantianism is consistent with the notion that we are creatures, and our obligations are based on our “creatureliness”.

Kant rejects all objective claims to demonstrate the existence of God, including the cosmological and ontological arguments.

Rightly so. And the Catholic Church itself nowhere claims that these arguments are authoritative. But the world is charged with the glory of God, and this is evident to all who really look at it. “Proofs” of God’s existence are silly, as Aquinas himself recognized. (It is a great irony that Aquinas’s “ways” are often called “proofs”, a name he explicitly rejected.)

 

[hicetnunc]

We’re talking past each other. Surely you don’t advocate using people as a mere means to your own end. Thus, you agree that this principle is – at least – a constraint on morality. So it’s a pretty good principle.

I beg to differ. While on the surface I can see why it appeals to you (as it has to many, which also explains its far-reaching impact) I don’t think it’s a good principle at all, and I would be concerned about recommending it to any Catholic as a reliable method of moral action. Far from being a constraint on morality, its application has had precisely the opposite, and disastrous, effect in the history of moral philosophy. Kant’s idea of treating people as ends occurs in the context of the individual as a sovereign law-giver. His notion of ends is totally detached from the Divine Law, and is rooted in the exercise of subjective reason and common consent.

Rightly so. And the Catholic Church itself nowhere claims that these arguments are authoritative. But the world is charged with the glory of God, and this is evident to all who really look at it. “Proofs” of God’s existence are silly, as Aquinas himself recognized. (It is a great irony that Aquinas’s “ways” are often called “proofs”, a name he explicitly rejected.)

I don’t know where you get this from. Nowhere does St Thomas reject the notion of a proof. In fact, in reference to his so-called cosmological argument he explicitly refers to his five ways as “viis probari” in the Summa. His demonstration, which Kant rejects, is that the “effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s existence” (ad probandum causum esse). His works are infused with reliance on the notion of proof, which explains in considerable detail in numerous works, including his Commentaries on Metaphysics and both Analytics.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I beg to differ. While on the surface I can see why it appeals to you (as it has to many, which also explains its far-reaching impact) I don’t think it’s a good principle at all, and I would be concerned about recommending it to any Catholic as a reliable method of moral action. Far from being a constraint on morality, its application has had precisely the opposite, and disastrous, effect in the history of moral philosophy. Kant’s idea of treating people as ends occurs in the context of the individual as a sovereign law-giver. His notion of ends is totally detached from the Divine Law, and is rooted in the exercise of subjective reason and common consent.

Can you be more concrete? If you think the principle is a bad one, give a counterexample. In what case is a person justified in treating someone as a mere means to his own end?

Note: Kant does not say that we need to respect a person’s ends – that is, their goals. Far from it! If their goals are bad, we should not respect these goals at all. He says we should respect a person as an end: that is, we should understand that each person is intrinsically valuable. No action of mine, however much good it would accomplish, is permissible if it uses another person without giving a place for that person’s autonomy – i.e., without understanding that people are capable of choosing to do the right thing themselves, and (ordinarily) ought not be forced to do the right thing.

I am quite sympathetic to the view that Kant unnecessarily and dangerously detached morality from God. But the morality he developed was, in many ways, an admirable one. He has been misinterpreted by generations of scholars, who combine his ideas with modern (and anti-Kantian) ideas about the subjectivity of value.

I don’t know where you get this from. Nowhere does St Thomas reject the notion of a proof. In fact, in reference to his so-called cosmological argument he explicitly refers to his five ways as “viis probari” in the Summa. His demonstration, which Kant rejects, is that the “effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s existence” (ad probandum causum esse). His works are infused with reliance on the notion of proof, which explains in considerable detail in numerous works, including his Commentaries on Metaphysics and both Analytics.

From the Summa:

As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Corinthians 15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections — if he has any — against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.

There is another passage that’s more explicit than this, but I haven’t been able to find it today. Basically, Thomas says that his “ways” are not made to convince atheists, but rather to explain to believers how God can be understood to exist. Thomas allows that there is no proof where there is no agreement on premises. Kant, when he discusses proofs of God, is simply pointing out that there are problematic premises in all proofs of God’s existence.

 

[hicetnunc]

Can you be more concrete? If you think the principle is a bad one, give a counterexample. In what case is a person justified in treating someone as a mere means to his own end?

There are two basic problems with Kant’s kingdom of ends. First of all, a person is never an end, either as a means, or in themselves. The teleology of each human person is union with God. Hence, both the individual and the community are oriented to union with God as their proper and final end. Kant does not recognise this. In fact, his overall project is to undo Scholastic metaphysical teleology, and replace it with a deontology of ends established by the sovereignty of reason. Secondly, the way in which an ‘end’ is established is not through any objective law in Kant’s system, such as Divine or Natural Law, but through a subjective evaluation of acts based on his Categorical imperative.

As for your citation from the summa, this in no way supports your contention that for St Thomas the notion of proof is “silly” or that he “explicitly rejects” the notion of proof. The passage you cited is St Thomas’ treatment of Sacred Doctrine, or theology, which cannot establish its principles by way of proofs. This is not an argument against the notion of proof, but the way in which any science establishes its own principles. No science, he tells us, can establish its principles by reference to its own subject, but only in reference to a higher science. This is a well-known Thomistic (and philosophical) axiom and it has nothing to do with dismissing the notion of proof from philosophy, or characterising it as being “silly”.

 

[Cartesian]

You’d be much better off following the likes of St Thomas Aquinas, and good Catholic moral theologians and philosophers, such as Frank Sheed, Peter Kreeft, John Hardon, and of course the Catechism of the Catholic Church.

I could recommend two excellent and short articles to get you going on some of the problems with Kantian ethics:

Peter Kreeft: The Pillars of Unbelief (Kant):
catholiceducation.org/articles/civilization/cc0011.html

and

Catholic Encyclopaedia: the Categorical Imperative
newadvent.org/cathen/03432a.htm

A great primer on Kant in relation to classical philosophy is Peter Kreeft’s “Socrates Meets Kant”, available on Amazon.

Thank You all. Specially hicetnunc for the small articles links, I got a lot of answers to my questions there. Further readings scheduled to vacations soon. Thanks for the books recommendations

 

[Prodigal_Son]

There are two basic problems with Kant’s kingdom of ends. First of all, a person is never an end, either as a means, or in themselves. The teleology of each human person is union with God. Hence, both the individual and the community are oriented to union with God as their proper and final end. Kant does not recognise this. In fact, his overall project is to undo Scholastic metaphysical teleology, and replace it with a deontology of ends established by the sovereignty of reason.

A person is an end. A person is intrinsically valuable; otherwise, God would not have said “it is good” with respect to persons. This claim is perfectly consistent with the claim that the purpose of a human being is to be united with God. Show me the contradiction.

Secondly, the way in which an ‘end’ is established is not through any objective law in Kant’s system, such as Divine or Natural Law, but through a subjective evaluation of acts based on his Categorical imperative.

I’ve already explained why this is false. It is divine action that creates the structure of the man, and it is the structure of the man which constrains morality. The self-as-lawgiver does not legislate arbitrarily, but by looking at the nature of a rational being, a nature which Kant believes that God created.

 

[hicetnunc]

A person is an end. A person is intrinsically valuable; otherwise, God would not have said “it is good” with respect to persons. This claim is perfectly consistent with the claim that the purpose of a human being is to be united with God. Show me the contradiction.

“Every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the Divine Perfection and goodness. Therefore the Divine Goodness is the end of all things.” (ST I, q.44, a.4). Hence, the goodness of the person is derived from the creature’s participation in God, and not on account of any substantial goodness it possesses in its own right; hence, “God is good substantially, but we only by participation in God.” (De Veritate, 21.V).

Hope this helps.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

“Every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the Divine Perfection and goodness. Therefore the Divine Goodness is the end of all things.” (ST I, q.44, a.4). Hence, the goodness of the person is derived from the creature’s participation in God, and not on account of any substantial goodness it possesses in its own right; hence, “God is good substantially, but we only by participation in God.” (De Veritate, 21.V).

Your value as a person derives, historically, from God’s creating you. And your value as a person depends, ontologically, on God’s continually sustaining you. But your value is intrinsic. You are not valuable merely for the sake of something else. If you were, then God would simply be using you as a tool for His glory.

Nevertheless, divine goodness is the end of all things. It is the goal at which things grasp. But affirming human value is a goal that aligns with divine goodness.

Suppose I give my daughter a banana. I might have two goals in this action: (1) to make her happy, (2) to nourish her. The second goal is more important, but this does not make the first goal any less a genuine goal.

Similarly, if I save a drowning child, I might have the goal of (1) affirming the child’s intrinsic value, and (2) glorifying God by participating in His goodness. The first goal is not merely a means to the second goal. The two goals, nevertheless, are complementary.

 

[hicetnunc]

Your value as a person derives, historically, from God’s creating you. And your value as a person depends, ontologically, on God’s continually sustaining you. But your value is intrinsic. You are not valuable merely for the sake of something else. If you were, then God would simply be using you as a tool for His glory.

Value, which is derived from the notion of perfection, is not derived as a “historical” value (this would lead us towards deism and fideism). As for intrinsic value, I don’t have a problem with that at all. Yes, we have intrinsic value, which is derived from God. Just so long as we’re clear that this understanding of intrinsic human value is very different between Kant and Catholic moral teaching.

Suppose I give my daughter a banana. I might have two goals in this action: (1) to make her happy, (2) to nourish her. The second goal is more important, but this does not make the first goal any less a genuine goal.

In fact, I think you’ve just illustrated very well a key difference between Kant and Catholic moral theology. Both Aristotle and St Thomas would say that the first goal is more important, since the highest good of the human person is happiness, and is the reason for being nourished. Happiness (in theology, beatitude) is the highest goal of the human person. This is also affirmed by the Catechism of the Catholic Church (see 1719: God is the end of all human acts, and this end is beatitude). Beatitude is achieved through union with God, through grace and virtues in Jesus Christ. For Kant, the highest good (the ‘summum bonum’) is perfect agreement of reason with the moral law established through the categorical imperative and his version of duty-based ethics. Happiness does not play a large role in Kant’s ethics, and is a consequence of moral action, as opposed to its final cause.

Perhaps we can take a cue from the Church: there is good reason why the Church has repeatedly affirmed the goodness and usefulness of St Thomas as a guide to the faithful on things moral (for example, in Aeterni Patris, Studiorum Ducem, Fides et Ratio, etc.) On the other hand, we do not find a single Church document promoting the thought of Kant for use by the faithful, nor recommending his categorical imperative as a useful guide to the faith.

 

[JP2Admirer]

I would also like to add that Kant’s notion of personhood is limited to possessing rationality in act. Basically, to be treated as an end and not a means is reserved for those conscious of their autonomy.

Thank you for starting this thread. I studied Kant years ago and my memory was fuzzy on him. This inspired me to pick up his books off the shelf. I agree with the above poster in not trusting Kant as a good foundation for Catholic moral philosophy. His tradition is the tradition that spawned Hegel, Marx, schelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. Not exactly friends of the Church.