In general, C&P from one of my many posts on this subject. I’m determined to go smoke that pipe.
Henry sought to do what was commonplace at the time. He sought a decree of nullity with respect to his marriage to Catherine, in order to make a marriage that would provide him with a legitimate male heir (a thing that had been worrying him for years) and also permit him to scratch an itch that he had recently acquired, re: Anne Boleyn. Seemed reasonable to him.
With respect to the system as it was worked in his day, it was not only reasonable, it was unexceptional. It happened daily. Such was precisely the way in which dynastic marriages were made and unmade, for purposes of state, during this period (Henry’s sister Margaret received a decree of nullity for purely personal reasons, 2 weeks before Henry filed his own case). It was how the system was set up to function.
But to make it happen, Henry had to submit his case (causa) to the system, and wait for a decree of nullity, which he was fully justified in expecting to be forthcoming. His case, at his insistence, was based on the concept of an impediment of affinity in his marriage to Catherine, arising from the prohibition in Leviticus against a man marrying his brother’s wife. This was what as generally known as an impediment of affinity (of which there were many kinds and degrees. Because of this impediment, Julius II had issued a dispensation permitting Henry to marry Catherine in the first place. But a Pope’s authority to dispense impediments was not absolute. Henry’s case maintained that the prohibition was Scriptural, God’s law, not positive Church law, and thus was beyond a Pope’s power to dispense. There are impediments like that; no one can dispense to permit a son to marry his mother for example (canonically, an impediment of consanguinity in the first degree, direct). This meant that he was saying that Julius had made an error and the dispensation exceeded his authority (was ultra vires). In addition, Church rulings on whether the Levitical prohibition was natural or Divine law had varied over the years. Sometimes it was held to be within the Pope’s authority, sometimes, not.
While Henry had a reasonable case, then, it was not an exceptionally strong one. Normally, it would not need to be. And Clement was not an exceptionally strong Pope. As the world turned in those days, that wouldn’t usually matter. However …
While Henry’s argument on the matter was fairly good (not as good as he might have made, in that he did not argue on the basis of an undispensed diriment impediment of the public honesty in his marriage to Catherine, the strongest point he had, see below, but on the weaker Levitical prohibition, against marrying a brother’s widow), it faced the daunting figure of Charles V, Catherine’s nephew. And given the real-politic in that situation, no way was a Pope going to rule for Henry.
There was actually a stronger case lurking in Henry’s history (not that either case would have gotten him the decree of nullity; politics and military power trump canonical law). His stronger case, as Cardinal Wolsey saw, lay in a class of impediments called the justice of public honesty. Without getting into too many technical details, this meant that if a marriage was contracted and consummated between A and B, two types of impediments might arise for person C later wishing to marry A or B. That is, there was the potential for an impediment of affinity, which arose from the consummation of the marriage (affinity arose from the act of coitus, normally, but not necessarily, through marriage), or of the justice of public honesty, which arose from the betrothal/marriage contract.
At the time, the rule was that if a valid marriage was contracted, and consummated, and later a dispensation was sought for someone who would be impeded from marrying A or B, the dispensation need only specifically state that the affinity impediment was dispensed, and the impediment of public honesty was thereby dispensed, implicitly. But, if Catherine and Arthur’s marriage was not consummated, as Catherine maintained all along, and as was likely true, then the justice of public honesty must be explicitly dispensed. Julius didn’t do that. And hence there was a good case for Henry. Precisely the sort of crack the system was designed to allow.
Henry didn’t pursue that, and it didn’t really matter. Given the relationship between Clement and Charles, and Charles and Catherine, no way was Henry going to get a decree of nullity, no how. Clement VII refused Henry’s request for a decree of nullity, after a long time stalling, hedging and wishing the whole thing would go away, primarily because of the relationship between the Papacy and Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor, in 1527. Said relationship was primarily one of captive and captor, after the sack of Rome following the battle of Pavia. Catherine was Charles’ aunt, and had not only appealed to Rome against the attempt to declare her marriage with Henry invalid (as was her right. Clement hoped mightily that the issue would not come to Rome, but be resolved in the English ecclesiastical courts. Or that Catherine would take the veil. Or that someone would just drop dead). She also appealed on a family basis to Charles, the most powerful ruler in Europe. Charles told her not to worry. It wouldn’t happen. It didn’t. An Emperor trumps a King. And an emperor controlling a Pope is stronger still. So Henry didn’t get his decree. He got a Church, instead. He thought it was a good idea, at the time.
What it all means is that, in effect, the system worked as designed. It was supposed to blend the sacramental and the political, and it did. But the political this time was based on the figure and power of Charles V. And Henry was a King, and had some political power of his own. Soon after, he had a Church, too.
Sort of covers the field. There is more.
Pipe time.
