Some years ago, when I lived in Madrid, I was impressed by the respect shown the citizenry by Los Gris, the police that controlled the areas within the boundaries of the cities. One of the first things one noticed is that, upon walking up to a policeman, he snapped to attention and saluted you. After that respectful introduction, he would ask you for your inquiry. Then, upon departing, he snapped to attention once again and saluted your departure. What one comes to realize is that policemen, in various countries, can operate in a couple of quite variant ways.
First, they can be the law, that is, they can operate as if they are the law. In this mode of policing, it appears that respect for the policed is all but removed. A citizen, under this mode, is not greeted cordially, nor regarded respectfully. This mode of operation can thus easily extend to the general manner whereby a citizenry is treated during and after harsh interactions. Because of this disrespectful mode of regard, it is my opinion that policemen, in America, are not highly respected. Believing themselves to be the law, has not ingratiated them to a sizable percentage of the American public.
Second, they can represent the law, that is, they can function as though they are not the personification of law, but only the Law’s representative. Through this mode of policing, a two-way respect is formed, though not necessarily between all policemen and all citizens, but, between perhaps a higher percentage of policemen and a higher percentage of citizens. This higher mode of operation causes, in some manner, a mutual respect that translates to the interactions between the policemen and the citizens. The policemen, in Spain, were not trained to believe that they were the law. They were trained to understand that they merely represented the law.
Now, the foregoing was not purposed to persuade one towards factual or representational. It was simply to explain them. The modes of truth are quite the same. Truth can either be a facticity, i.e., a fact itself, or, it can be a representation of the fact. Some think of a fact, such as an event, as brute truth (brute fact). Others do not. They, instead, believe that only man’s artificial representation of that fact, in the form of a string of words, is the Truth. While a string of words can represent Truth, by an accurate description of an event, for example, it is not the brute factical itself. We may call a brute fact a “factical” (a generalized version of a noun), that is, an event that is actually occurring or, a thing in being. If it is occurring or, in being, it is a factical; which is no different than regarding it as a truth. If it is not occurring or in being, it is not a factical; it is not a truth.
What seems to put a damper on this is that the extolling of a statement as a truism, can also be a factical. Interestingly, it, too, can either be or, be represented. In either mode, it is a manifestation of something true that undergirds it. The manifestation of a truth cannot be merely its representation, its word-image. The thing or, event, either was or, it was not; it either is or, it is not. The same cannot be reasonably said or thought about a thing or, event, existing or occurring in the future, as it might not yet be or, might not ever take place – and it certainly hasn’t taken place yet. Truth, therefore, is not dependent upon a perceiving, reasoning mind. A perceiving, reasoning mind is accidental to a Truth, not essential to it. A thing or, an event, by its actuality – by its very act of being, past or present – is a factical, i.e., a Truth.
When we define Truth to be that which conforms,or, a statement which conforms, to reality, some tend to think that that’s what a Truth is. We fail to understand that the undergirding for it is the factical itself; that the undergirding can either be or, not be, and this dichotomy is what is essential to coming away with a knowingness of that which is true. If the thing or, event, underlying the fact exists, the fact is factical: it is a truth. If it does not exist, it is not. Thus, in fact, the actual undergirding of Truth is the facticity underlying the representation. Moreover, its veracity and actuality is its referent to the truth of any of its representations; and, there may be several.
God bless,
jd