How Aquinas confuses the First and Second way

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Blue_Horizon said:
OK, fair enough, starting to understand your point there.
I am away until Monday - will come back then if there is still interest here.
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See my post #220 and follow Richa’s explanations as well. I think these will cover most points.

Go Royals!
God Bless
Linus2nd
 
Linusthe2nd said:
Richca;12415146:
The correct translation is, " Whatever is moved is moved by another. " Gilby, great philosopher that he was, is incorrect. I think you translated it correctly in an earlier post. If you have a good library near by check out Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages
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by Fr. John A. Weisheiple O.P. ( RIP ). He has two fascinating chapters, " The Spector of Motor Coniunctus " and " Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur." ( Check with World Cat for the nearest library. You may have to read it on site like I did. )

He explains that there are two kinds of motion in Aristotle, natural and violent ( unnatural ), and that there are two important points in the sentence, " Whatever is moved is moved by another. " One is that everything is in the passive voice. Secondly that it is the ab alio which is most important. Further, the notion that only in certain cases is an accompanying efficient cause to motion necessary. Most generally these would involve some type of violent motion.

However, every motion/change requires an efficient cause some where for each motion/change occurring here and now. But that efficient cause does not have to necessarially be acting simultaneously with the effect. God, for example, is the first efficient cause of all motion/change, but there may be intervening, instrumental efficient causes as well.

Strictly speaking, only in the case of pushing, pulling. carrying, *twrilling/I] or in the case of animal self movement would an accompanying efficient cause be necessary.

And he stresses that natural motions, habits, dispositions, etc of animate and inanimate beings flow from natures which have been caused by an efficient cause, a generator ( i.e. father begets son, etc. ). And of course God would be the ultimate " generator. " The inner nature from which actions flow naturally without an accompanying efficient cause are spontaneous actions. They are not efficient causes. The efficient cause is that which generated the nature in the first place.

He points out that, for Aristotle, for Thomas, and for Albert the Great, nature was an inner principle* of observed natural actions, whereas a cause was always external to a thing.

All this has an application in interpreting Newton’s First Law. There is some cause for his inertial motion and there is a cause for his " uniform motion. " He suggests that the inertial motion is caused by some generator which has transmitted an impetus to the nature of the object which is in uniform motion. The impetus recieved modifies the nature of the moving object such that it continues in motion naturally.

And of course, this nature, susceptible to modification, has an efficient cause, a generator which is ultimately God. Of course it is possible that God could be the direct and accompanying efficient cause of such motion. But, as you say, we can be positive that there is some cause.

God Bless
Linus2nd

Thanks Linus. I’d like to comment on some of your post here as well as share some thoughts in general about Aquinas’ first proof, when I can get around to it…Richca
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Linusthe2nd said:
The First Way is about a special type of efficient cause called motion. Strictly speaking, motion is any change in quantity, quality, or location ( local motion ). Some believe this should also include generation and corruption. But it seems to exclude creation and substantial change.

The Second Way is strictly about efficient causes. And this would include not only motion, as defined above, but also creation and substantial change.

God is the sustainer of any kind of series. There are only two kinds of series, per se
and per accidens. A per accidens series would be like: father begets son, who begets his son, on into infinity, or backwards into infinity. Each of these causes is independent of the other but the series extends to infinity in the past and the future. This kind of infinite is philosophically or logically possible

But each member of this series is or could be a member of a per se series. For example. What causes all my activities, my existence. My father has passed away, yet I still live and act. There must be a cause exising above me with the power to cause me to be and to act. Now if this bing is moved to act by another, then this must be moved by another and so on, and this cannot go on to infinity, there must be a first… But since each of these, if they exist, are themselves moved from potency to act, there must exist some being which is Unmoved and Unmoveable, which is pure act, and this we call God.
But if there are no intervening causes it is the Unmoved Mover, a pure act, who moves me directly to be and to move.
Linus2nd
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Nobody has nor can prove the distinction between per se and accidental with regard to a past infinity. “There must be a cause exising above me with the power to cause me to be and to act. Now if this bing is moved to act by another, then this must be moved by another and so on, and this cannot go on to infinity, there must be a first…” There must be a power that causes me to be, my parents, and them, their parents, ect ect ect “this cannot go on tro infinity.” What’s the difference? As for pure act, Summa Theologica Q XVIII A I reply 1 “if the whole corporeal universe was one animal, as that its movement came from an intrinsic moving force, as some have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies”. If you believe in the possibility of an eternal world, how do you refute that position? Aquinas doesn’t say
 
utunumsint said:
I can see how you reach this conclusion. You are obviously pretty fed up with Aquinas. The way I see it, I have two choices:

  1. *]I can think that Aquinas was having a bad hair day, and just did some sloppy work here and that the two instances are totally referring to the same thing and are obviously in contradiction.
    *]I can think that Aquinas is being more subtle here and he actually means something different in these two passages. I take what makes these two passages to mean something different are the words “by itself” versus “through itself”. Granted this is a fairly small point of difference, yet through and by are not the same word, so I think I have something to work on here. There are a few reasons why I would think this is the case. Aquinas had these argument reviewed and debated while we was still around. Such an obvious and embarrassing mistake as proposed in 1, should have been caught by his Augustinian opponents if not by those sympathetic to his philosophy. Folks spent a lot of time while Aquinas was alive trying to discredit him. Also, I would invoke the principle of charity here and seek further clarity from other texts to see if there was a clear way of resolving this apparent discrepancy. I would not jump to the most damaging interpretation first before examining the other alternatives.

    God bless,
    Ut
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  1. Ye I’ve gotten fairly annoyed with Aquinas lately; I am willing to change my leanings, but I just find too much lack of clarity and focus in his writings lately. Your attempt to defend him on this one point doesn’t work. With honesty I boiled the quote I gave into this simpler form “what is moved by violence is not moved by itself… If it is moved through itself (per se), then it is moved…violently.” What you are ignoring is that the second sentence doesn’t make sense at all, and thus it furthermore contradicts the first. What moves itself does NOT move by violence by definition.

    Off topic, I noticed how Aquinas in his terrible article on whether light is a quality makes a bigger mistake then I though earlier in this thread. “it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.” The part I highlighted should have been the exact opposite right?
 
thinkandmull said:
Ye I’ve gotten fairly annoyed with Aquinas lately; I am willing to change my leanings, but I just find too much lack of clarity and focus in his writings lately.
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This is a fair grip at Aquinas. He also frustrates me at times.
Your attempt to defend him on this one point doesn’t work. With honesty I boiled the quote I gave into this simpler form “what is moved by violence is not moved by itself… If it is moved through itself (per se), then it is moved…violently.” What you are ignoring is that the second sentence doesn’t make sense at all, and thus it furthermore contradicts the first. What moves itself does NOT move by violence by definition.
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The way I understood Linus explain this is that what moves by itself does so by nature. Like a human being deciding to move a rock with a stick. This accords with the first sentence you mentioned. But that does not prevent a self moving being from being moved violently through itself. For example, imagine a giant deciding to pick up a human being to use that human being like a stick, to move a rock. A human being has just become an instrumental cause in a series of movers that ends in the intelligence and will of the giant.

So yes, what moves by itself does not move itself violently by definition, but it can be moved violently through itself.
Off topic, I noticed how Aquinas in his terrible article on whether light is a quality makes a bigger mistake then I though earlier in this thread. “it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.” The part I highlighted should have been the exact opposite right?
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I can’t comment without knowing the source of the quote. I will say this though - many of Aquinas’ examples are faulty because he had a faulty physics to draw on.

God bless,
Ut
 
thinkandmull said:
Ye I’ve gotten fairly annoyed with Aquinas lately; I am willing to change my leanings, but I just find too much lack of clarity and focus in his writings lately. Your attempt to defend him on this one point doesn’t work. With honesty I boiled the quote I gave into this simpler form “what is moved by violence is not moved by itself… If it is moved through itself (per se), then it is moved…violently.” What you are ignoring is that the second sentence doesn’t make sense at all, and thus it furthermore contradicts the first. What moves itself does NOT move by violence by definition.

Off topic, I noticed how Aquinas in his terrible article on whether light is a quality makes a bigger mistake then I though earlier in this thread. “it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.” The part I highlighted should have been the exact opposite right?
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No, it should not be the exact opposite which Aquinas is quite clear on. Light is a quality which means it is an accidental form and an accidental form is not a substantial form. What Aquinas is saying then is not that light changes the substance of air, for if it did you wouldn’t be able to breath and you would die, but that the air receives the accidental form of light and thus the air is made luminous. This is similar to water being heated by fire. The heat from the fire which is a quality of fire, i.e., an accidental form is received into the water and thus the heated water now partakes of heat. It is an accidental quality or form that inheres in the water but it does not change the substance of the water.
 
thinkandmull said:
As for pure act, Summa Theologica Q XVIII A I reply 1 “if the whole corporeal universe was one animal, as that its movement came from an intrinsic moving force, as some have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies”. If you believe in the possibility of an eternal world, how do you refute that position? Aquinas doesn’t say
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  1. From the first proof. The first mover is an unmoved mover. There is movement in the corporeal universe as is indicated in the above statement. Movement does not apply to the unmoved mover. From the outset, this is a pretty clear indication that if the whole universe was one animal, it is not the first mover, i.e., the unmoved mover.
  2. From the second proof. If the universe is not the unmoved mover, it is caused by the unmoved mover, i.e., the first efficient cause.
  3. From the third proof. There is only one necessary being having of itself its own necessity and not receiving it from another. All other beings who have existence have their existence caused by the one necessary being.
  4. From the fourth proof. There is only one Being who is the cause of the being and any other perfections found in other beings. God is the formal cause of all the forms and perfections found in other beings.
  5. From the fifth proof. God is the final cause of things. Natural bodies which lack intelligence, for example, the earth, always or nearly always act for an end, unconsciously of course. The earth rotates and so we have days and nights; it orbits the sun and so we have the seasons. That which lacks intelligence cannot move itself towards an end unless it be directed to an end by a being with knowledge and intelligence. The whole ensemble of the heavenly bodies which lack knowledge and intelligence are being directed in their movements by a being with knowledge and intelligence, namely God.
As we notice, St Thomas does not mention anything about whether the world has always existed or not in the five proofs. This is because it is irrelevant to the arguments. Supposing that the universe has always existed, God would be its first mover, its first efficient cause, its formal cause, and its final cause. God is the first being and He is an eternal and infinite being.

If we are not convinced from the five proofs whether God is the cause of the universe and distinct from the universe or whether the whole universe as one corporeal animal is not itself God. We can proceed to the immediate question following the five proofs in the ST which concerns God’s simplicity, namely question 3.
  1. God is not a body. Now, the whole universe can be considered as one body as the quote you take from Aquinas above says “the whole corporeal universe.” A body is a composite of form and matter. God is not a composite being but is an absolutely simple being.
  2. God is not a composite of form and matter. As just noted, God is not composite at all. Neither is God composed out of matter. Matter can only exist with form and thus anything composed out of matter is composite. Also, matter is pure potentiality. There is no potentiality in God, for He is pure act.
As far as whether the universe was created by God out of nothing from all eternity or whether creation had a beginning in time, St Thomas says that it cannot be demonstrated either way from reason. This is because there is no reason why an eternal cause such as God who has infinite power and an eternal will could not produce an eternal effect. As St Thomas says, God had the eternal will to produce an eternal effect yet it was not in His eternal will to produce an eternal effect. The production of creatures from God does not stem from a necessity of His nature.
If some person holds that an eternal cause cannot produce an eternal effect, then that person needs to demonstrate how that is not possible. The simple fact of the matter is that it is not possible to demonstrate or provide a reason why an eternal cause could not produce an eternal effect. It seems to me, thinkandmull, that your possible source of confusion lies precisely in this, namely, you are trying to find a reason why an eternal cause cannot produce an eternal effect when there is no reason. There is no contradiction in terms in saying that an eternal cause can produce an eternal effect, this is not an impossibility. However, supposing that God created the world out of nothing from eternity, then it is impossible for the world not to have received its existence from Him and its continued existence. Thus considered, God would not be considered as prior to His creation in point of duration, but only in so far as their is an order of origin of cause and effect, and as a principle from which another proceeds.

Finally, we do not have to dwell on the problem whether or not the world is eternal. We have it on God’s word that His creation had a beginning. Not only this, but science speculates at the present moment that the universe is only about 15 billion years old. However, who knows really. Maybe it is twice or three times as old but it is not eternal.
 
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