How can a person know that something that someone claims to be the revealed truth, in fact is the revealed truth?

[cho_pilo]

Please elaborate.

 

[wanstronian]

Please elaborate.

Unless the claim is something that can be independently and empirically verified, you can’t know. That’s the nature of revelation. And it’s why revelation counts for nothing in terms of truth claims.

 

[In_Spiration]

Unless the claim is something that can be independently and empirically verified, you can’t know. That’s the nature of revelation. And it’s why revelation counts for nothing in terms of truth claims.

According to your own standard, we have no reason to accept these blasphemous claims.

 

[ThinkingSapien]

How can a person know that something that someone claims to be the revealed truth, in fact is the revealed truth?

I don’t think you can. This question has come up in these forums under other titles (ex:Supernatural Epistemology). At most if you can connect the revelation to other knowledge you’ve got you might be able to check it for consistency.

 

[Serious]

According to your own standard, we have no reason to accept these blasphemous claims.

What wanstronian said was not a “revelation” (and why on Earth would it be “blasphemous”???). It is an epistemological principle, which can be accepted or discarded. If one accepts it, one has a working method to separate true and false claims (pertaining to the external reality). If one rejects it then the acceptance of any claim (not just the revelation type) will be according to the person’s whim. It might be: “it sure sounds true to me, and therefore I accept it as true”. Or it might be: “others (whom I hold in high regard) consider it true, wherefore I will accept is as true”. But in neither case is there a foundation or objective method, which can applied by others - who are skeptical of the claims - and which will lead to an objective, independent result to either support the claim or contradict it.

Very important to add: the principle is “not a claim about the external reality”. It is a “claim about the claims about the external reality”. Therefore it is not appplicable to itself. Do not commit the elementary fallacy of attempting to apply the principle to itself.

 

[GEddie]

That is why prophecy is so important. As human beings, we can only know if a statement is true if it is corroborated by contemporaneous, or subsequent, external events.

NB: I am a nonphilosopher and glad to be one.

ICXC NIKA

 

[In_Spiration]

A mediocre student sits in his Science class and the teacher tells everyone that world-renowned physicists have determined the authentic nature of some microscopic elementary particles and then published the truth of their findings after extensive research using state-of-the-art equipment and application of dense, extremely-advanced mathematics, etc.

The student, knowing he’ll never get the necessary empirical access to the relevant data, and that if he did, he would still stand no chance of grasping the techniques used in the formal proof, wonders whether he should accept his teacher’s claim to relaying the scientific discoveries of elite minds. Since, he reasons, he *does *know that his teacher has proven trustworthy regarding a wide range of the scientific claims he’s taught before, on top of the general trustworthy character of the man and the practical uses he’s gotten out of believing what he teaches, the student places his faith in the truth of the scientific conclusion.

In sum, the kid has primarily side-stepped evaluating a claim/conclusion on its empirical merits in favor of an acceptance of it on the basis of authority. And usually his argument for such trust will be based on analogous demonstrations of reliability, which may or may not be empirically-based.

wanstronian’s principle, which is also itself a claim (abstract proposition), cannot be verified empirically, as the relevant data he would need in its support would themselves need to extend beyond the empirical and into something abstract. In other words, the truth of claims is not itself empirical or empirically-based, even if a substantial portion of its *proof *was.

And I’m taking ‘revelation’ in its broad sense, since I presume that wanstronian is issuing a rebuke of all (or almost all) authority-based faith or reasons, not merely scripture-based assertions of divine Revelation from God. At the least, his inclusion of a requirement for empirical verification, which I notice you avoided mentioning in your re-interpretation, was enough to damn his position. Verificationism is ridiculous, and I suspect he espouses it.

 

[In_Spiration]

Oh, and it’s blasphemous, since he said revelation counts for nothing re: truth; and the Holy Bible purports to divinely reveal the Truth Himself, Therefore, he’s making assertions that explicitly contradict and disrespect the legitimacy of not just Catholicism but of all scripture-based religions, and thus God Himself.

 

[Serious]

…wanstronian’s principle, which is also itself a claim (abstract proposition), cannot be verified empirically…

Obviously you did not read the post above, in which I warned about not to confuse “claims about reality”, and “claims about the claims about reality”, and you “cheerfully” committed the elementary fallacy of confusing the two. (Not all claims are equal… some claims are more equal than others… )

By the way, the objective method of verifying and/or falsifying claims has been empirically verified, a few bazillion times. And so far there has never been a “contender” method, much less a “winner” one.

Sure, some people are not well equipped or too lazy to do the verifications themselves, and resort to the epistemological shortcut of accepting a claim based upon authority. But that method is not a substitute for the actual verification. Fortunately for the less educated or lazy ones, there are others who do the verification for them. That is the peer-review process, which is not “foolproof”, but pretty darm effective. This is what is so sorely missing from the pure revelation process, there is nothing behind it, but the revelation itself.

 

[buffalo]

One looks for converging evidence.

For example, if you live in a box and all you can see is confined to the box, you can believe that is all there is. But suppose on the wall of the box is written the words - “there is something outside this box.”

At the outset you have a choice, believe it or not. One day someone appears inside the box and declares " I am from outside the box". Of course, you can doubt it. But suppose he reveals to you more detail? Suppose he introduces you to things or feats that you are pretty certain do not happen in your box. You still doubt.

Next he allows you a glimpse of outside the box by putting in a small window. You still have doubts because you now think he is giving you an illusion, a magic trick.

This goes on and on, but at every step of the way events happen that move you from one of outright skepticism to a maybe.

At one point you have to question the authority of the claimant. What does he represent? Is he honest? Other evidences of his character. Why did he show up all of a sudden? What is his purpose?

So one is walking down the beach and sees left footprints as far as he can see. He wonders why only left ones. Thoughts go through his mind - there is a deceiver at work, a guy with only a left leg, a hopper, etc… You can arrive at no firm conclusion. You keep on walking - and there is a guy sitting on the dunes. You approach him and ask - Why are there only left footprints on the beach? He replies, a guy was walking on the beach and was carefully walking so that the waves only washed one footprint away. So know you are part way there. You ask - How can I be certain that you know this? - he replies “It was I who made them”.

 

[In_Spiration]

Obviously you did not read the post above, in which I warned about not to confuse “claims about reality”, and “claims about the claims about reality”, and you “cheerfully” committed the elementary fallacy of confusing the two. (Not all claims are equal… some claims are more equal than others… )

By the way, the objective method of verifying and/or falsifying claims has been empirically verified, a few bazillion times. And so far there has never been a “contender” method, much less a “winner” one.

Sure, some people are not well equipped or too lazy to do the verifications themselves, and resort to the epistemological shortcut of accepting a claim based upon authority. But that method is not a substitute for the actual verification. Fortunately for the less educated or lazy ones, there are others who do the verification for them. That is the peer-review process, which is not “foolproof”, but pretty darm effective. This is what is so sorely missing from the pure revelation process, there is nothing behind it, but the revelation itself.

My analogy took account of the distinction you mention, and the way you’ve phrased it offers only a trivial difference in terms of my point. Neither a claim about external reality nor a claim about the claims about external reality can be demonstrated strictly empirically, as ultimately your data will have to be known as true, and truth is not itself empirical. The truth about any abstract proposition whatsoever is not, qua truth, acquainted by the senses; the truth resides in the intellect, so reflectively-verified truth is only known through intellectual self-reflection (the object of which isn’t material or physical, which is probably where the real dispute lies).

And if you broaden the meaning of empirical verification this much, then there’s likely no longer any problem with authority-based revelations being known or relied upon on the basis of common sense, non-empirical, abductive, or analogical reasoning. At least not on the level that I’m sure anyone hostile to religion would prefer to admit.

But if his claim is only that in the very end there’s got to be at least some slight foundation on sense perception, then I don’t even disagree. In that case, his principle does nothing to discredit authority-based arguments.

 

[Serious]

Neither a claim about external reality nor a claim about the claims about external reality can be demonstrated strictly empirically, as ultimately your data will have to be known as true, and truth is not itself empirical.

I have no idea what the word “truth” means to you in that highlighted sentence. To me it has two meanings: 1) the logically valid corollary of the axioms in an axiomatic system or 2) the proposition correctly rreflects the external reality.

But if his claim is only that in the very end there’s got to be at least some slight foundation on sense perception, then I don’t even disagree. In that case, his principle does nothing to discredit authority-based arguments.

As I said before, the alleged authority can demonstrate the validity of his claims, or not. If he can demonstrate, then the the “authority” part is irrelevant - we have a proposition which is substantiated. (As the old saying goes: “it does not matter who says it, what matters is what has been said”.) If he cannot demonstrate it, then why should anyone care what he is talking about?

I really don’t limit this religious claims, on the very contrary, I use it in every case. If someone claims that astrology has valid claims about reality, I hold him to the same test. Can he demonstrate it, or not? The usual problem for the claimants of religious claims in not that they are held to a higher standard, rather that they are held to the same standards. And their claims (just like the claims of astrology or the claims about the paranormal) cannot withstand the scrutiny.

 

[cho_pilo]

One looks for converging evidence.

Descartes - a Catholic! - has provided an argument in his “Meditations” that perfection cannot be arrived at or achieved gradually.

How could “converging evidence” possibly lead to perfection of knowledge?
It would be like gradually achieving perfection - according to Descartes’ argument, impossible

For example, if you live in a box and all you can see is confined to the box, you can believe that is all there is. But suppose on the wall of the box is written the words - “there is something outside this box.”

At the outset you have a choice, believe it or not. One day someone appears inside the box and declares " I am from outside the box". Of course, you can doubt it. But suppose he reveals to you more detail? Suppose he introduces you to things or feats that you are pretty certain do not happen in your box. You still doubt.

Next he allows you a glimpse of outside the box by putting in a small window. You still have doubts because you now think he is giving you an illusion, a magic trick.

This goes on and on, but at every step of the way events happen that move you from one of outright skepticism to a maybe.

At one point you have to question the authority of the claimant. What does he represent? Is he honest? Other evidences of his character. Why did he show up all of a sudden? What is his purpose?

So one is walking down the beach and sees left footprints as far as he can see. He wonders why only left ones. Thoughts go through his mind - there is a deceiver at work, a guy with only a left leg, a hopper, etc… You can arrive at no firm conclusion. You keep on walking - and there is a guy sitting on the dunes. You approach him and ask - Why are there only left footprints on the beach? He replies, a guy was walking on the beach and was carefully walking so that the waves only washed one footprint away. So know you are part way there. You ask - How can I be certain that you know this? - he replies “It was I who made them”.

This are two unrealistic examples.

When we are talking about absolutes, about the Divine, we cannot use the kind of plain, ordinary methods of coming to knowledge that we do in everyday life.

 

[In_Spiration]

I have no idea what the word “truth” means to you in that highlighted sentence. To me it has two meanings: 1) the logically valid corollary of the axioms in an axiomatic system or 2) the proposition correctly rreflects the external reality.

Understandable. I’ll consider the merits of (1). I see no problem with (2) for the present purposes, though I’d find it ultimately insufficient if we were to root truth in propositions (say, as essentially a property of things/abstracta). I’d distinguish truth into primary, secondary, and tertiary definitions similar to Aquinas in his De Veritate. Re: this current topic, I’d say truth exists somewhat “in the middle” of external reality and internal “intentionality”. As such, I’m highly dubious of statements like:

wanstronian:

Unless the claim is something that can be independently and empirically verified, you can’t know. That’s the nature of revelation. And it’s why revelation counts for nothing in terms of truth claims.

That’s too bold even if taken as hyperbolic. And yeah, I’m making presumptions about his specific subjective meaning on the basis of the polemical hostility toward Christian beliefs I’ve noticed from him in other threads. I wouldn’t have been quite as glib otherwise.

Serious:

As I said before, the alleged authority can demonstrate the validity of his claims, or not. If he can demonstrate, then the the “authority” part is irrelevant - we have a proposition which is substantiated. (As the old saying goes: “it does not matter who says it, what matters is what has been said”.) If he cannot demonstrate it, then why should anyone care what he is talking about?

I really don’t limit this religious claims, on the very contrary, I use it in every case. If someone claims that astrology has valid claims about reality, I hold him to the same test. Can he demonstrate it, or not? The usual problem for the claimants of religious claims in not that they are held to a higher standard, rather that they are held to the same standards. And their claims (just like the claims of astrology or the claims about the paranormal) cannot withstand the scrutiny.

I think our concerns for intellectual pursuits are more similar than either of us probably thought initially. I’m just very hesitant to discredit much in terms of testimonial knowledge, because (other than the fact I obviously prize religious faith) I suspect this rebuke would logically entail a lot of counter-intuitive consequences, as such reliance is fundamental to practical human endeavors. I’ll direct you to my responses in another thread though. I hope that helps, as I doubt I’ll be able to keep up with any back-and-forth discussion.

 

[Serious]

Understandable. I’ll consider the merits of (1). I see no problem with (2) for the present purposes, though I’d find it ultimately insufficient if we were to root truth in propositions (say, as essentially a property of things/abstracta). I’d distinguish truth into primary, secondary, and tertiary definitions similar to Aquinas in his De Veritate. Re: this current topic, I’d say truth exists somewhat “in the middle” of external reality and internal “intentionality”.

Sorry, I don’t care what Aquinas said. Propositions and “truth-claims” cannot be separated. The nice pun of “Quid est veritas?” - “est vir qui adest” is cute, but irrelevant.

As such, I’m highly dubious of statements like:

Yes, I disagreed with it myself.

I think our concerns for intellectual pursuits are more similar than either of us probably thought initially. I’m just very hesitant to discredit much in terms of testimonial knowledge, because (other than the fact I obviously prize religious faith) I suspect this rebuke would logically entail a lot of counter-intuitive consequences, as such reliance is fundamental to practical human endeavors.

Testimonials are not “inherently” wrong or false. Many times we must and can safely rely on testimonials. They are simply on the lowest level of reliability, especailly when it comes to hearsay (not first hand) testimonies. That is the reason that hearsay evidence is inadmissible in courts.