How can God be omniscint if he can't feel pain?

[Kevin12]

God became man and felt pain.

He also laughed, cried, got hungry, angry and tired, saw sin first hand and saw the effects of sin, experienced death, went into Hell and rose from the dead.

This isn’t difficult. God became man. That’s the whole point of Christianity. He isn’t completely unknowable nor is this futile theology. People ate with God and listened to God speak. St John rested his head on God’s chest at the last supper.

God became man so that we could know him. That’s the point.

-Tim-

Like I said, I think this is the most reasonable answer, so I agree if there is an answer this is it.

 

[Kevin12]

All of this silly speculation about God and what he feels or can’t feel points out the ridiculous futility of theologians over the centuries trying to list His attributes. God is supposedly completely unknowable. That’s one of his attributes I think. Long winded discussions like this which conclude nothing serve to drive me closer and closer to atheism. The simple solution to all these speculations seems to be to conclude He doesn’t really exist. That certainly ends the speculation about all His supposed attributes. Some day science will have an answer to the why of the “Big Bang” and I don’t think it will involve the need for a God. Are you ready for that?

If you don’t like theologizing, then you’re probably going to hate theology. That said, it isn’t so much speculation as trying to figure out what statements are compatible with a supposedly omnipotent being. Not to mention that the simple answer isn’t neccesarily the correct answer.

However, I’d point out that Big Bang cosmology doesn’t really have much to do with the issue. To my mind, it is a tremendous leap to suppose that even if there is a non-contingent, necessary existence apart from the universe itself and brought the universe into existence, that said existence corresponds to anything we would call God. Indeed, I know of a certain person from Edward Fesser’s comment box who believes in such an ontologically necessary being but still considers himself an atheist because such a being has almost no relation in his mind to what we call God.

 

[rinnie]

As the question says, it seems that there is an issue with the idea of God being omniscient and at the same time totally impassible, and therefore unable to feel actual pain. If the experience of pain is a kind of knowledge, it means we can say we know something God doesn’t—what it is like to experience pain. This, indeed, seems to be a pretty big problem, because God is supposed to condemn those in Hell to an eternity of sensible pain, something of which he has no knowledge.

Nor does it suffice, I think, to say that God experienced pain in the Incarnation. Most theologians say that while we can attribute the passion to the Person of Christ, who is God and a Man, but not to the Divine Nature nature itself. Furthermore, even if we did say that God experienced pain in the Passion, God would have learned something He didn’t already know, so he wouldn’t have been omniscient until that point.

Nor do I think it will work to say that God knows everything that it is possible for Him to know, as this runs into Plantinga’s “McEar” problem, but with omniscience:

By this definition, a “McTime” like being who can necessarily only know what time it is and always does because he wears a watch would be omniscient.

I disagree God is human and Divine, He came to this world as a human, he experience pain just as he would. He was nailed to the cross, there is no worse pain. Or how he was beaten to death.

But how could God being all knowing mean he cannot feel pain??

 

[Kevin12]

I disagree God is human and Divine, He came to this world as a human, he experience pain just as he would. He was nailed to the cross, there is no worse pain. Or how he was beaten to death.

But how could God being all knowing mean he cannot feel pain??

It is the issue of impassibility.

However, I agree with you that the Incarnation seems to solve this problem (to the extent it can be solved).

 

[clem456]

Like I said, I think this is the most reasonable answer, so I agree if there is an answer this is it.

That is the answer to God subjecting himself to various human conditions: emotions, feelings, time. God entered the human condition “in the fullness of time”.

I thought you were not willing to accept the Incarnation that as an answer.

 

[Kevin12]

That is the answer to God subjecting himself to various human conditions: emotions, feelings, time. God entered the human condition “in the fullness of time”.

I thought you were not willing to accept the Incarnation that as an answer.

If I gave that impression, it was my mistake. I don’t think it’s a perfect answer, but I think it is at least satisfactory, even though there are problems with it because some would say that God can not be said to have truly suffered in his nature, but only his human nature; but since Christ was only one Person, though with two natures, I don’t think it is correct to say that the idea that God suffered in Christ’s passion is merely figurative, because of his unity as a person.

 

[Kevin12]

If I gave that impression, it was my mistake. I don’t think it’s a perfect answer, but I think it is at least satisfactory, even though there are problems with it because some would say that God can not be said to have truly suffered in his nature, but only his human nature; but since Christ was only one Person, though with two natures, I don’t think it is correct to say that the idea that God suffered in Christ’s passion is merely figurative, because of his unity as a person.

Now that I think about it, I have changed my mind. I don’t think we can say that through Christ’s experience of suffering, God has knowledge of the experience of pain, because God cannot both have always had such knowledge, as would be in keeping with his timelessness, and still derive that knowledge from a particular temporal experience. Or at least I don’t understand how this conclusion escapes the implication that God learned something he did not already know.

The only solution seems to be that God has a generalized experiential knowledge of pain in the same way as he has propositional knowledge of evil. Though this still seems very weak as a solution since it implies God has knowledge of an experience he has not had.

 

[ericc]

It is the issue of impassibility.

However, I agree with you that the Incarnation seems to solve this problem (to the extent it can be solved).

It is more than the Incarnation. God knows all our thoughts and that is even before the Incarnation. Which implies that he knows how we feel. And adding foreknowledge to the equation, God knows ahead of what we are going to feel, undergo etc.

But if you are concern as to how can God feel what we feel, we only need to consider that God is everywhere, including us. As simple as abiding in us.

 

[Bob_Crowley]

As the question says, it seems that there is an issue with the idea of God being omniscient and at the same time totally impassible, and therefore unable to feel actual pain. If the experience of pain is a kind of knowledge, it means we can say we know something God doesn’t—what it is like to experience pain. This, indeed, seems to be a pretty big problem, because God is supposed to condemn those in Hell to an eternity of sensible pain, something of which he has no knowledge.

Nor does it suffice, I think, to say that God experienced pain in the Incarnation. Most theologians say that while we can attribute the passion to the Person of Christ, who is God and a Man, but not to the Divine Nature nature itself. Furthermore, even if we did say that God experienced pain in the Passion, God would have learned something He didn’t already know, so he wouldn’t have been omniscient until that point.

Nor do I think it will work to say that God knows everything that it is possible for Him to know, as this runs into Plantinga’s “McEar” problem, but with omniscience:

By this definition, a “McTime” like being who can necessarily only know what time it is and always does because he wears a watch would be omniscient.

For God to create creatures which can feel pain, He would have to know what “pain” was, otherwise He would not be able to create the facility to feel pain. And He knows enough to be able to create both spiritual and physical creatures which can feel “pain” eg. the Lake of Fire. He knows very well that the fiery lake will torment those in it for eternity, and He would be under no illusions as to what it would be like.

I also think He experiences pain through His creatures. When we torture someone, I think God feels it, hence His wrath reserved for torturers (I think He’s got a special place in Hell for torturers).

So even if He doesn’t need to feel pain in what we might call the Beatific Vision, while the war is on between God and the devil, I think God enters into the suffering of His creatures.

He’s in every concentration camp, every abortion clinic, every aborted foetus, every mistreated refugee, every rape victim, every victim of crime.

And if you’d been subjected to that sort of exposure - millions upon millions of offences for thousands of years, it would require God to suffer our sin with “great patience” as St. Paul wrote.

Romans 9:22 NIV “What if God, although choosing to show his wrath and make his power known, bore with great patience the objects of his wrath–prepared for destruction?”

One can also imagine the accumulated wrath which will be poured out at the Final Judgement.

 

[Kevin12]

For God to create creatures which can feel pain, He would have to know what “pain” was, otherwise He would not be able to create the facility to feel pain. And He knows enough to be able to create both spiritual and physical creatures which can feel “pain” eg. the Lake of Fire. He knows very well that the fiery lake will torment those in it for eternity, and He would be under no illusions as to what it would be like.

I also think He experiences pain through His creatures. When we torture someone, I think God feels it, hence His wrath reserved for torturers (I think He’s got a special place in Hell for torturers).

So even if He doesn’t need to feel pain in what we might call the Beatific Vision, while the war is on between God and the devil, I think God enters into the suffering of His creatures.

He’s in every concentration camp, every abortion clinic, every aborted foetus, every mistreated refugee, every rape victim, every victim of crime.

And if you’d been subjected to that sort of exposure - millions upon millions of offences for thousands of years, it would require God to suffer our sin with “great patience” as St. Paul wrote.

One can also imagine the accumulated wrath which will be poured out at the Final Judgement.

According to theologians, all talk of God suffering is supposedly metaphorical not literal. I’ve also noticed that Marian visions seem to emphasize God as having feelings of anger or suffering, but according to “classical theism” that is all just figurative too I guess.

Personally, the more I’ve learned about “classical theism”, the more strained my relationship with God has become, as it basically portrays God as a omnipotent, omniscient computer.

 

[davidv]

According to theologians, all talk of God suffering is supposedly metaphorical not literal. I’ve also noticed that Marian visions seem to emphasize God as having feelings of anger or suffering, but according to “classical theism” that is all just figurative too I guess.

Personally, the more I’ve learned about “classical theism”, the more strained my relationship with God has become, as it basically portrays God as a omnipotent, omniscient computer.

Based on this, are you saying Jesus is not God?

A. Jesus is God
B. Jesus suffered

Conclusion: God suffered.

So if God did not suffer Jesus cannot be God (A) or Jesus did not suffer (B).

 

[Kevin12]

Based on this, are you saying Jesus is not God?

A. Jesus is God
B. Jesus suffered

Conclusion: God suffered.

So if God did not suffer Jesus cannot be God (A) or Jesus did not suffer (B).

No, but in the first place, as I pointed out before, I don’t think the Incarnation works for this problem, because if God only attained knowledge of what it is like to experience pain in the Incarnation, it would be acquired knowledge that God did not already posses.

However, as for the other issue, according to Aquinas:

I answer that, As stated above (2, 1,2,3,6), the union of the human nature with the Divine was effected in the Person, in the hypostasis, in the suppositum, yet observing the distinction of natures; so that it is the same Person and hypostasis of the Divine and human natures, while each nature retains that which is proper to it. And therefore, as stated above (Question 16, Article 4), the Passion is to be attributed to the suppositum of the Divine Nature, not because of the Divine Nature, which is impassible, but by reason of the human nature. Hence, in a Synodal Epistle of Cyril [Act. Conc. Ephes., P. i, cap. 26] we read: “If any man does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh, let him be anathema.” Therefore Christ’s Passion belongs to the “suppositum” of the Divine Nature by reason of the passible nature assumed, but not on account of the impassible Divine Nature.

So the Passion can only be attributed to the “Person” of Christ, who is a union of two natures, human and divine, united. And elsewhere, he says:

In God, Person and Nature are really the same; and by reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the Son of God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different; and hence certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of the Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in I, 39, 5. So, too, in the mystery of Incarnation we say that the Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered.

Note the bolded part. So we can say at the same time that he did suffer under the Person (called here the Suppositum) of the joined human and divine natures of Christ, and yet the Divine Nature (apparently) did not suffer because that would imply change or imperfection. But it isn’t clear to me if Aquinas really means that the the Passion had nothing to do with the Divine Nature at all, which doesn’t seem possible as the Divine Nature and the human body and soul of Christ are as closely united (as I noted in the passage from Eleonore Stump) as body and soul.

This is the sort of convoluted stuff that Classical Theism is made of. And the more I know of it, the more I begin to wonder if the Orthodox aren’t right that Augustine and the Scholastics were all expending a lot of hot air trying to rationalize mysteries.

 

[fisherman_carl]

All of this silly speculation about God and what he feels or can’t feel points out the ridiculous futility of theologians over the centuries trying to list His attributes. God is supposedly completely unknowable. That’s one of his attributes I think. Long winded discussions like this which conclude nothing serve to drive me closer and closer to atheism. The simple solution to all these speculations seems to be to conclude He doesn’t really exist. That certainly ends the speculation about all His supposed attributes. Some day science will have an answer to the why of the “Big Bang” and I don’t think it will involve the need for a God. Are you ready for that?

Its better to know God then to know about him.

 

[fisherman_carl]

You’re just dismissing the question by introducing a bunch of things I never even mentioned. All I’m referring to is pain.

“He doesn’t have to experience something to know it.”

How do you “know” what its like to experience something if you’re never experienced it, or more precisely (because I’m not requiring God to actually be an unemployed farmed) if you are incapable of experiencing it? By definition, you can’t. I’m pointing out that if he doesn’t know the experience of pain, it’s difficult to call God omniscient, because there is something we know that he does not know.

But, by saying God has to learn something through experience you are already saying he is not omniscient. Because there is something he has to yet learn through experience. What I am saying is that if he was truly omniscient he would already know without having to experience.

 

[Kevin12]

But, by saying God has to learn something through experience you are already saying he is not omniscient. Because there is something he has to yet learn through experience. What I am saying is that if he was truly omniscient he would already know without having to experience.

Then consider the question framed atemporally: Is having the knowledge of “What it is like to experience pain” compatible with an impassible being?

 

[Lucretius]

You are wrong..

“Delight is the perfection of activity, perfecting activity as bloom does youth.176 But the activity of the divine understanding is most perfect. If therefore our act of understanding, coming to its perfection, yields delight, most delightful must be the act whereby God understands.”

Even if it is analgous, it is still joy, and in a way that Aquinas is not willing to admit for any other emotion.

But my major point is that Joy and Delight are not of the order per SE of the sensitive appetites, but rather of the order of the intellectual appetite (read: the will). That is, I never said God didn’t experience Joy, but quite the opposite:

There exist therefore in the intellectual appetite, or will, activities specifically similar to the activities of the sensitive appetite, and differing only in this, that in the sensitive appetite they are passions on account of the implication of a bodily organ, but in the intellectual appetite they are simple activities.

On the other hand, pain is of the sensitive appetite/ an emotion, and so God cannot experience it.

Christi pax,

Lucretius

 

[Kevin12]

But my major point is that Joy and Delight are not of the order per SE of the sensitive appetites, but rather of the order of the intellectual appetite (read: the will). That is, I never said God didn’t experience Joy, but quite the opposite:

There exist therefore in the intellectual appetite, or will, activities specifically similar to the activities of the sensitive appetite, and differing only in this, that in the sensitive appetite they are passions on account of the implication of a bodily organ, but in the intellectual appetite they are simple activities.

On the other hand, pain is of the sensitive appetite/ an emotion, and so God cannot experience it.

Christi pax,

Lucretius

I’m only talking about knowledge of what it is like to experience pain, not the experience of pain itself. However, the bolded statement amounts to Nestorianism.

Nevertheless, I have no further desire to debate the issue with you since you seem want to introduce a vague category of knowledge called “transcendent” that is neither experiential nor propositional, so you’re obviously just going to keep dancing around the issue endlessly. If nothing else, it is driving me toward laocmo’s position.

 

[fisherman_carl]

Then consider the question framed atemporally: Is having the knowledge of “What it is like to experience pain” compatible with an impassible being?

I’m not sure what you mean by compatible. You are basically asking the same question with different words. If God is perfect then he is not lacking anything. Nor is he limited by anything. He is omnipresent. There is no where you can go where he is not. Therefore he knows everything, including all your thoughts. There is nothing you know that he doesn’t know. He is your constant companion and friend. He knows the effects of pain and suffering on us. And his answer was to send his Son to suffer with us and for us.

 

[ericc]

I’m not sure what you mean by compatible. You are basically asking the same question with different words. If God is perfect then he is not lacking anything. Nor is he limited by anything. He is omnipresent. There is no where you can go where he is not. Therefore he knows everything, including all your thoughts. There is nothing you know that he doesn’t know. He is your constant companion and friend. He knows the effects of pain and suffering on us. And his answer was to send his Son to suffer with us and for us.

That answer was proffered but either he is mulling a response or avoiding a response. God is not only omniscient, he is also omnipotent. He can abide in each of us totally knowing our thoughts and every action.

 

[clem456]

That answer was proffered but either he is mulling a response or avoiding a response. God is not only omniscient, he is also omnipotent. He can abide in each of us totally knowing our thoughts and every action.

Right
We cannot assign human attributes to God’s divine essence.
His knowledge is not the same as our knowledge.
Christ in his human nature experiences and learns. God the Father does not.
Such a mystery.

What does it mean for God to know? It is beyond head knowledge. Knowing as God does entails intimacy. Knowing the person, not just experiencing things or learning knowledge.