How do Aquinas's reasons make sense in this argument?

[fakename]

Aquinas has some thoughts on judging people and I need help understanding him.

"And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect’s perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves."

Now I don’t think we intend to judge people according to singulars in themselves (which is humanly impossible) but according to universals. When I ask “is he evil?” I take the universal idea of evil, and apply it to his actions and I use the universal idea of how thoughts work, to figure out his motivations. That’s how I try to figure out someone’s moral state, certainly it is how I try to figure out mine. So in no way are we trying to get singulars in themselves. So in this instance, is judging a good thing?

"He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former."

Why is it better to be wrong than to be right, if we are in danger of injuring ourselves or others?

"When the truth is declared there is no obligation to accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes. On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority."

There’s no obligation to accept truth? How can this be given that truth is the perfection of the intellect and if people have an obligation to pursue good things, then people should have the obligation to pursue truth? Again, if someone said that God exists and no one pays attention, then these latter persons are not guilty?

"Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (1, ad 1,3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called “perverted” or “unjust”: secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment “by usurpation”: thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it is called judgment by “suspicion” or “rash” judgment."

But judgment is true no matter who says it or from what motives, and since whatever is true is good, then shouldn’t anyone be allowed to speak their mind?

 

[bmullins]

The very first statement seems to imply to me not ‘judging’ as in trying to determine what someone is doing, but giving them the benefit of a doubt. Always trying to see the good in someones actions, which of course means that “may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man” is saying, it’s better to have thought good about someone than to have assumed them evil.

 

[empther]

When we consider the principle “Judge not that you be not judged” etc etc
we must take into account the magnitude and effect of the evil the person is doing.

For example:

If we suspect or even know the neighbor is cheating on his wife, it is not our part to spead the information all over the neighborhood. Maybe the couple will work out their problems themselves if we shut up.

On the other hand,
when Hitler starts rampaging all over Europe killing millions of people,
not only is it out duty to judge him, we must send armies to stop him.

 

[fakename]

user "bmullins":

The very first statement seems to imply to me not ‘judging’ as in trying to determine what someone is doing, but giving them the benefit of a doubt. Always trying to see the good in someones actions, which of course means that “may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man” is saying, it’s better to have thought good about someone than to have assumed them evil.

for the purpose of better understanding I think that the first statement means that "we should judge well of people and not be afraid to be wrong since judgments about people are about contingent singulars, and since the mind is not perverted by making bad judgments about singulars (since the mind is only used for judging universals) we shouldn’t worry about being incorrect.

The link to it is here: newadvent.org/summa/3060.htm

 

[ahs]

Before you try to understand what Aquinas is stating, you first need to understand the difference between “judging” and “giving fraternal correction”. The word “judge” can be used in both cases, with different meanings. This articel will help:

blog.adw.org/2010/06/correcting-the-sinner-is-not-being-judgmental-it-is-an-essential-work-of-charity/

We are not told that it is better to be wrong than to be right. We are told that we are better not to assume the worse of someone…that we should interpret, as far as possible, our neighbor’s thoughts/words/deeds in a favorable way. Yet we should also recognize sin for what it is and be prepared to correct a sinner, as far as our authority to do so stands.

And indeed, we are not forced to accept Truth. God gaves us a free will to choose our own paths. We can choose that of Truth, or that of deceit. What we ARE obliged to do is bear witness to the Truth and refrain from committing offenses against Truth.

 

[Barbkw]

Aquinas’ writings on the sin of detraction:

Thirdly, gossipers break this precept when they repeat whatever they hear: “Six things there are which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth . . . him that soweth discord among brethren.”[14]

CCC:

2477 Respect for the reputation of persons forbids every attitude and word likely to cause them unjust injury.[277]

He becomes guilty:

• of rash judgment who, even tacitly, assumes as true, without sufficient foundation, the moral fault of a neighbor;

• of detraction who, without objectively valid reason, discloses another’s faults and failings to persons who did not know them;[278]

• of calumny who, by remarks contrary to the truth, harms the reputation of others and gives occasion for false judgments concerning them.

2478 To avoid rash judgment, everyone should be careful to interpret insofar as possible his neighbor’s thoughts, words, and deeds in a favorable way:

Every good Christian ought to be more ready to give a favorable interpretation to another’s statement than to condemn it.

But if he cannot do so, let him ask how the other understands it.

And if the latter understands it badly, let the former correct him with love.

If that does not suffice, let the Christian try all suitable ways to bring the other to a correct interpretation so that he may be saved.[279]

CCC which references St. Thomas Aquinas concerning the 8th Commandment:

2469 "Men could not live with one another if there were not mutual confidence that they were being truthful to one another."263

The virtue of truth gives another his just due.

Truthfulness keeps to the just mean between what ought to be expressed and what ought to be kept secret: it entails honesty and discretion.

In justice, "as a matter of honor, one man owes it to another to manifest the truth."264

263 St. Thomas Aquinas, STh II-II,109,3 ad 1.
264 St. Thomas Aquinas, STh II-II,109,3, corp. art.

 

[fakename]

user"ahs":

And indeed, we are not forced to accept Truth. God gaves us a free will to choose our own paths. We can choose that of Truth, or that of deceit. What we ARE obliged to do is bear witness to the Truth and refrain from committing offenses against Truth.

First, let me say that I never implied that we were forced to accept truth, but only that we are obliged to accept it when we hear it. But I think that Aquinas rejects this. I think that the reason may lie in the different senses of “hearing truth”. We either hear truth as such and then we must accept it, or we hear truth per accident and so in this sense we aren’t obligated to accept truth since we may very well believe the truth to be false or we may not even be able to understand a truth per se. And per se particulars are things which we are not obliged to know because we cannot know them . Do you think that this is a good analysis of the problem?

I’ve also devised a partial answer to my own question: contingent things are either known frequently or infrequently, and not in themselves. So per se, contingent things aren’t necessary to be known. So whether this particular man is good/evil is not a rational subject of study. However there’s nothing wrong with knowing if this particular man is evil because he is an instantiation of a universal judgment about evil things( that is because you have evident proof). Do you think this is okay?

If you do, then let me continue by saying that we shouldn’t judge unless we have evident proof which is clear from the above since evident proof is in the universal and not in the particular. Furthermore, it is also established that per se, we don’t know anything about any particular person so that we should not judge them good or bad. But Aquinas I think, makes the point that if we judge them to be neither, then we may injure their honor or reputation. Therefore, we must judge them to be good, and also we have better epistemological reasons for believing that things are good and not bad, since we universally know that all created things are intrinsically good, so the man next to you is good too unless proven otherwise. If you think that this is a good interpretation then let me introduce you to additional problems and further questions to ask:

Is it true that, even if we are correct in our universally derived judgments of people, we should not judge even in this way since we will not always be correct even in principle? Perhaps, yet if that were true then the judgment “Hitler was bad” is not good.

But observe that sometimes universal judgment or deduction uses uncertain particular information and other lacunae. In this case, it is definitely possible for us to have a duty to abstain from judgment. And yet, another question arises; is it even judgment or is it rather opinion to claim that such and such a person is evil? After all, uncertain premises in arguments yield uncertain conclusions no matter how well-founded. If that is true, then these types of arguments or judgments must be only opinions. Therefore, if I make an uncertain judgment of a person, is that even judgment proper or is it rather opinion. And if it is not judgment, then is it not a sin?

Thanks