How do i come up with a good reason why governments shouldn't allow same sex marriage?

[Ben_Carmine]

I don’t think continuing this portion of our conversation is productive. Done with that.

The entire argument is about same-sex households. You’re doing everything you can to avoid the very thing you’re talking about, instead using other studies that have nothing to do with same-sex parent households.

[quotes]
Bizarre statement. I am not connecting homosexuality with pedophilia.

I am connecting child abuse (NOT pedophilia!) with the presence of non-biological parents in the home. All sociologists acknowledge this statistical connection. Sometimes it can’t be helped: I’d rather have a non-biologically related dad than no dad at all!

By my count, (1) applies to all children of gay couples, (2) applies to all gay male couples, and (5) essentially applies to all gay male couples. You don’t have to think that gay men are pedophiles to believe that there’s an increased risk here.

Despite all that, I don’t advocate taking children away from gay couples – no more than I advocate taking children away from single mothers. But I also don’t advocate placing the normative label “marriage” on gay relationships.

This is an even clearer case of that “wheat and oats” analogy. This is so bizarre, you’re basically saying that same-sex households will abuse their children therefore gay marriage shouldn’t be allowed, using studies that again aren’t about same-sex households. Logical people don’t assume innocent people are going to abuse their children simply based on the fact they’re adopting or are surrogates. It’s like saying that fathers get their wife pregnant just so they can have a child that they’ll be able to abuse, using a study that’s got nothing to do with that to back you up.

Ridiculous, illogical, arguments like that are just going to be ignored.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

This is an even clearer case of that “wheat and oats” analogy. This is so bizarre, you’re basically saying that same-sex households will abuse their children therefore gay marriage shouldn’t be allowed, using studies that again aren’t about same-sex households. Logical people don’t assume innocent people are going to abuse their children simply based on the fact they’re adopting or are surrogates. It’s like saying that fathers get their wife pregnant just so they can have a child that they’ll be able to abuse, using a study that’s got nothing to do with that to back you up.

You are either intentionally or unintentionally ignoring what I’m saying. I’m not sure which. At any rate, you seem to be alleging that I’m saying gay people are getting married in order to abuse children. That is SO VERY FAR from what I’m saying that I don’t think it’s worth continuing this conversation.

When you decide to have respect for the people you’re talking to, let me know.

You obviously think that a person cannot rationally disagree with the premise that gay marriage is morally good – which is puzzling, since just about nobody agreed with that premise for thousands of years of human history. I guess we moderns have a monopoly on wisdom.

 

[Skeptic92]

Yours is good, though it should also include the unitive type. This is harder to explain from a secular basis than the procreative type (as Aquinas told us we must be able to do in order to reason with those who do not believe in Christianity), but marriage is unique in its ability to unite two people as one as well. Otherwise, a man who could ejaculate but not penetrate could licitly engage in marital sex and/or licitly get married, and he cannot do either in the Church.

The reason I say it is harder to explain secularly, by the way, is because, at least for lesbian sex, the emotional unification still occurs – in other words, you still feel spiritually bonded to your partner despite the sex not being spiritually unitive. So it is harder to explain why a gay or lesbian couple cannot engage in unitive sex, as the argument “well look at how your genitalia fits!” is on an elementary school level at best and utterly fails from a philosophical standpoint.

I think I can see of a way to argue for the unitive nature of the union. I’ll have to jump into Cronin and Fagothey to see how they argue for it again.

 

[SMGS127]

Not true. Aquinas was a consequentialist. All virtue ethicists are.

The only two kinds of non-consequentialist Christian ethics I’m familiar with are (a) divine command theory and (b) deontology. Divine command theory makes God into an arbitrary dictator, however, and deontology is just bad philosophy.

Perhaps you are confusing consequentialism with utilitarianism?

I agree that utilitarianism is a bad ethical framework.

In my Philosophy class, I was taught that consequentialism was an error inconsistent with Catholicism. Are you sure, Prodigal?

When people deny the premise that “a child deserves a father and a mother”, S, I have to say something.

Okay but see…here’s where I have a problem, and I think in a less politically-charged world where same-sex marriage wasn’t seriously considered and people separated marriage from commitment ceremonies, same-sex adoption/foster care would not be as opposed by the Church.

My reasoning is: yes, a child deserves a mother and a father. But all kinds of random c**p happens. Kids are born every day to unfit parents, whether from drugs, circumstances, anger issues, abusiveness, whatever. Kids are also born to parents who don’t want them, and who may give them up rather than go through an abortion (which is obviously preferable). Kids are orphaned at young ages. And not every one of these children can be placed with a mother and a father. It’s just not feasible. This isn’t a perfect world where every grouping of two parents will be one biological mother, one biological father, both loving and nurturing.

So yes, while every child deserves a mother and a father, some kids won’t have them through no fault of anyone but their parents. And in these cases, I do think a same-sex household (whether romantic or not) is preferable to just leaving them in foster care for their whole life. Just because something is “preferable” does not mean it is “mandatory,” you know? I’ve already been told, through personal inquiry, that the Church does allow for single-parent adoptions in certain cases, so it’s clear that it’s not mandatory in the Church. I think most of the opposition to SS parenting has more to do with people being worried that the parents won’t teach the faith to their kids.

Note that this has nothing to do with SS marriage, which is a completely separate issue.

 

[Skeptic92]

Not true. Aquinas was a consequentialist. All virtue ethicists are.

The only two kinds of non-consequentialist Christian ethics I’m familiar with are (a) divine command theory and (b) deontology. Divine command theory makes God into an arbitrary dictator, however, and deontology is just bad philosophy.

Perhaps you are confusing consequentialism with utilitarianism?

I agree that utilitarianism is a bad ethical framework.

First of all; to say that Aquinas is a Virtue Ethicist is to oversimplify his position.
Second of all; Virtue Ethics and Natural Law Theory are not consequentialist in the relevant sense.

Aquinas’ position is a synthesis on the Moral Action Theory that is Virtue Ethics, and the method of practical reasoning Natural Law Theory. 3 things are taken into account in Natural Law Ethics; the subjective act itself, the objective end of the act, and the circumstances in which the act was done. So whilst this reasoning may include recourse to consequences (in the circumstances, usually a subdivision of known consequences), primarily Aquinas’ Ethics examines the human subject acting, so it acts towards, and the circumstances within which it acts.

There is no sense to be made of calling Aquinas’ position consequentialist; except in a very qualified sense, which is inconsistent with Aquinas’ Theological positions. For instance; an act of murder is always wrong. No matter the consequences of said murder.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

In my Philosophy class, I was taught that consequentialism was an error inconsistent with Catholicism. Are you sure, Prodigal?

Yep. Consequentialism is often misunderstood as utilitarianism – under such a misunderstanding, it is right to condemn consequentialism. But consequentialism, properly understood, is the thesis that “right actions/dispositions are determined by the goodness of their consequences”. Any teleological ethics must, therefore, subscribe to consequentialism, since ends = goods.

Okay but see…here’s where I have a problem, and I think in a less politically-charged world where same-sex marriage wasn’t seriously considered and people separated marriage from commitment ceremonies, same-sex adoption/foster care would not be as opposed by the Church.

I don’t oppose adoptions by same-sex couples. I believe every child has a right to a mother (or father), but I realize that the real world sometimes makes us compromise people’s right – though I don’t have to be happy about that!

But marriage is a normative institution, that informs people growing up in a culture what the ideal situation for child-rearing is. So that’s why I draw the line at marriage.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

First of all; to say that Aquinas is a Virtue Ethicist is to oversimplify his position.
Second of all; Virtue Ethics and Natural Law Theory are not consequentialist in the relevant sense.

Aquinas’ position is a synthesis on the Moral Action Theory that is Virtue Ethics, and the method of practical reasoning Natural Law Theory. 3 things are taken into account in Natural Law Ethics; the subjective act itself, the objective end of the act, and the circumstances in which the act was done. So whilst this reasoning may include recourse to consequences (in the circumstances, usually a subdivision of known consequences), primarily Aquinas’ Ethics examines the human subject acting, so it acts towards, and the circumstances within which it acts.

There is no sense to be made of calling Aquinas’ position consequentialist; except in a very qualified sense, which is inconsistent with Aquinas’ Theological positions. For instance; an act of murder is always wrong. No matter the consequences of said murder.

Would you deny that Aquinas agreed that “right actions/dispositions are determined by the goodness of their consequences”? This is what I understand to be the fundamental thesis of consequentialism.

 

[Skeptic92]

Yep. Consequentialism is often misunderstood as utilitarianism – under such a misunderstanding, it is right to condemn consequentialism. But consequentialism, properly understood, is the thesis that “right actions/dispositions are determined by the goodness of their consequences”. Any teleological ethics must, therefore, subscribe to consequentialism, since ends = goods.

Not quite; whilst fulfilling the ends of the human faculties are good. You can also fulfil these ends through illicit and immoral means (the end does not justify the means- a principle of Natural Law Theory), but also in improper and immoral circumstances. All 3 precepts must be met for an action to be considered good under Aquinas’ Ethics. You are mixing up consequentialism and Teleology; the latter is a metaphysical thesis that Ethics builds upon, the former is that consequences are the only morally relevant aspect of an action. Aquinas’ form of Virtue Ethics would fundamentally contradict that thesis.

To the above post; yes, Aquinas would deny that thesis. As consequences does not equal end; an end is something an action is directed towards, consequences are achieved directly by the action. Consequences would be analysed under circumstances, as foreseeable consequences (and if they can be avoided) is usually given under that precept.

 

[Abu]

Prodigal_Son #318
Aquinas was a consequentialist. All virtue ethicists are.

False.

VERITATIS SPLENDOR (The Splendor Of Truth)
Given in Rome, at Saint Peter’s, on 6 August, Feast of the Transfiguration of the Lord, in the year 1993, the fifteenth of my Pontificate.
JOHN PAUL II
Extracts:
‘75. But as part of the effort to work out such a rational morality (for this reason it is sometimes called an “autonomous morality” )** there exist false solutions**, linked in particular to an inadequate understanding of the object of moral action. Some authors do not take into sufficient consideration the fact that the will is involved in the concrete choices which it makes: these choices are a condition of its moral goodness and its being ordered to the ultimate end of the person.

‘According to these theories, free will would neither be morally subjected to specific obligations nor shaped by its choices, while nonetheless still remaining responsible for its own acts and for their consequences. This “teleologism”, as a method for discovering the moral norm, can thus be called — according to terminology and approaches imported from different currents of thought — “consequentialism” or “proportionalism”. The former claims to draw the criteria of the rightness of a given way of acting solely from a calculation of foreseeable consequences deriving from a given choice.

‘76. Such theories however are not faithful to the Church’s teaching, when they believe they can justify, as morally good, deliberate choices of kinds of behaviour contrary to the commandments of the divine and natural law.

‘78. The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the “object” rationally chosen by the deliberate will, **as is borne out by the insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas.**126 In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. Consequently, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches, “there are certain specific kinds of behaviour that are always wrong to choose, because choosing them involves a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil”.127 And Saint Thomas observes that “it often happens that man acts with a good intention, but without spiritual gain, because he lacks a good will. Let us say that someone robs in order to feed the poor: in this case, even though the intention is good, the uprightness of the will is lacking. Consequently, no evil done with a good intention can be excused. ‘There are those who say: And why not do evil that good may come? Their condemnation is just’ (Rom 3:8)”.128

‘The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who “alone is good”, and thus brings about the perfection of the person. An act is therefore good if its object is in conformity with the good of the person with respect for the goods morally relevant for him.’ [My bold emphasis].
Notes:
126. Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.18, a. 6.
127. Catechism of the Catholic Church, No.1761.
128.* In Duo Praecepta Caritatis et in Decem Legis Praecepta. De Dilectione Dei: Opuscula Theologica*, II, No. 1168, Ed. Taurinen. (1954), 250.
vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html

 

[dkoriginal]

LOL. I am so pleased to be amongst the company of so many perfect people. I’m sorry, I’m not worthy and without sin like the rest of y’all but, please don’t stone me too hard, Catholics.

 

[SMGS127]

LOL. I am so pleased to be amongst the company of so many perfect people. I’m sorry, I’m not worthy and without sin like the rest of y’all but, please don’t stone me too hard, Catholics.

Dude(tte). At least two people debating here are attracted to members of their own sex and completely accepting of it. I, myself, recognize that I am sinful in many manners, trust me. I still don’t like the idea of legalizing spiritual self-harm.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Not quite; whilst fulfilling the ends of the human faculties are good. You can also fulfil these ends through illicit and immoral means (the end does not justify the means- a principle of Natural Law Theory), but also in improper and immoral circumstances. All 3 precepts must be met for an action to be considered good under Aquinas’ Ethics. You are mixing up consequentialism and Teleology; the latter is a metaphysical thesis that Ethics builds upon, the former is that consequences are the only morally relevant aspect of an action. Aquinas’ form of Virtue Ethics would fundamentally contradict that thesis.

I never said consequences are the only morally relevant aspect of an action. Of course they aren’t – any form of virtue ethics is incompatible with that claim. I think you are still confusing consequentialism with utilitarianism. Consequentialism is a theory about VALUE. Utilitarianism is a theory about ACTION.

I’m a virtue consequentialist. I claim that the (non-theological) virtues can be determined by looking at the ordinary results of various habits/dispositions, and comparing these ordinary results to the standards of value: good consequences. The reason murder is always wrong is because a virtuous person would never murder. Why would he never murder? Because it is impossible to be kind (a virtue) and yet murder someone.

There is nothing anti-Christian about this. It’s not precisely Aquinas’s system, but it’s a lot more like Aquinas than most modern Kantian-influenced ethicists are. The notion that some things are right and wrong irrespective of all consequences is DANGEROUSLY false. This notion severs the right from the good.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

False.

VERITATIS SPLENDOR (The Splendor Of Truth)
Given in Rome, at Saint Peter’s, on 6 August, Feast of the Transfiguration of the Lord, in the year 1993, the fifteenth of my Pontificate.
JOHN PAUL II
Extracts:
‘75. But as part of the effort to work out such a rational morality (for this reason it is sometimes called an “autonomous morality” )** there exist false solutions**, linked in particular to an inadequate understanding of the object of moral action. Some authors do not take into sufficient consideration the fact that the will is involved in the concrete choices which it makes: these choices are a condition of its moral goodness and its being ordered to the ultimate end of the person.

‘According to these theories, free will would neither be morally subjected to specific obligations nor shaped by its choices, while nonetheless still remaining responsible for its own acts and for their consequences. This “teleologism”, as a method for discovering the moral norm, can thus be called — according to terminology and approaches imported from different currents of thought — “consequentialism” or “proportionalism”. The former claims to draw the criteria of the rightness of a given way of acting solely from a calculation of foreseeable consequences deriving from a given choice.

‘76. Such theories however are not faithful to the Church’s teaching, when they believe they can justify, as morally good, deliberate choices of kinds of behaviour contrary to the commandments of the divine and natural law.

‘78. The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the “object” rationally chosen by the deliberate will, **as is borne out by the insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas.**126 In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. Consequently, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches, “there are certain specific kinds of behaviour that are always wrong to choose, because choosing them involves a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil”.127 And Saint Thomas observes that “it often happens that man acts with a good intention, but without spiritual gain, because he lacks a good will. Let us say that someone robs in order to feed the poor: in this case, even though the intention is good, the uprightness of the will is lacking. Consequently, no evil done with a good intention can be excused. ‘There are those who say: And why not do evil that good may come? Their condemnation is just’ (Rom 3:8)”.128

‘The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who “alone is good”, and thus brings about the perfection of the person. An act is therefore good if its object is in conformity with the good of the person with respect for the goods morally relevant for him.’ [My bold emphasis].
Notes:
126. Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.18, a. 6.
127. Catechism of the Catholic Church, No.1761.
128.* In Duo Praecepta Caritatis et in Decem Legis Praecepta. De Dilectione Dei: Opuscula Theologica*, II, No. 1168, Ed. Taurinen. (1954), 250.
vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html

This quotation uses the word “consequentialism” as a synonym for “utilitarianism”. To be clear, I think utilitarianism is absolutely wrong. But the word consequentialism is being used much more broadly nowadays.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

LOL. I am so pleased to be amongst the company of so many perfect people. I’m sorry, I’m not worthy and without sin like the rest of y’all but, please don’t stone me too hard, Catholics.

I’m with SMGS on this one, and I assure you’re I’m a greater sinner than you are. The Church is not a museum for saints, but a hospital for sinners.

 

[Skeptic92]

The notion that some things are right and wrong irrespective of all consequences is DANGEROUSLY false. This notion severs the right from the good.

Is an act of murder not always wrong? Natural Law Theorists have held that Abortion is an intrinsic moral evil for centuries, is this not correct? You can not achieve a good end by evil means; for the end does not justify the means. Both the means used to attain said end, and the end itself, must be properly ordered. Only if both these conditions are met then circumstances comes into play, at which point a foreseeable consequence is involved in practical reasoning. There is what has been traditionally known as the Doctrine of Double Effect; even this isn’t consequentialism.

Consequentialism as a whole is the antithesis of Virtue Ethics and Natural Law Theory. As shown by its most able defenders in modern Philosophy setting themselves in juxtaposition to consequentialism, and they are diametrically opposed.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Is an act of murder not always wrong? Natural Law Theorists have held that Abortion is an intrinsic moral evil for centuries, is this not correct? You can not achieve a good end by evil means; for the end does not justify the means. Both the means used to attain said end, and the end itself, must be properly ordered. Only if both these conditions are met then circumstances comes into play, at which point a foreseeable consequence is involved in practical reasoning. There is what has been traditionally known as the Doctrine of Double Effect; even this isn’t consequentialism.

I think murder and abortion are always wrong (indirectly killing innocent life can be OK in certain very stringent circumstances, as you say, but that is not abortion/murder). As I said before, I think this is true because it is inconceivable for a person with the virtues of justice and kindness to kill an innocent.

A virtuous person is incapable of doing something by evil means, no matter how good the proposed end is. But the virtue is a virtue because it tends to lead to good ends. There’s no contradiction there.

Consequentialism as a whole is the antithesis of Virtue Ethics and Natural Law Theory. As shown by its most able defenders in modern Philosophy setting themselves in juxtaposition to consequentialism, and they are diametrically opposed.

Again, you are using consequentialism as a synonym for utilitarianism. I’m not.

 

[Skeptic92]

I think murder and abortion are always wrong (indirectly killing innocent life can be OK in certain very stringent circumstances, as you say, but that is not abortion/murder). As I said before, I think this is true because it is inconceivable for a person with the virtues of justice and kindness to kill an innocent.

A virtuous person is incapable of doing something by evil means, no matter how good the proposed end is. But the virtue is a virtue because it tends to lead to good ends. There’s no contradiction there.

Again, you are using consequentialism as a synonym for utilitarianism. I’m not.

You are using Virtue is a weird way that I hadn’t picked up on until now. Would you agree with this statement A virtue is a habitual trait of the character of man. Which pertain to the achievement of mans ultimate end. So a virtuous man would be he who has attained eudaimonia/beatitudo; depending on which tradition you wish to follow in terms. If so, we agree. And, that isn’t consequentialism. As it isn’t consequences that make the ends good, but our faculties properly directed to achieve our ultimate end teleologically.

Which would be classic Aristotelianism as well. As I have yet to make argument whether eudaimonia/beatitudo is achievable in this life or not; this being one of the central areas Aquinas disagreed with Aristotle.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

You are using Virtue is a weird way that I hadn’t picked up on until now. Would you agree with this statement A virtue is a habitual trait of the character of man. Which pertain to the achievement of mans ultimate end. So a virtuous man would be he who has attained eudaimonia/beatitudo; depending on which tradition you wish to follow in terms. If so, we agree. And, that isn’t consequentialism. As it isn’t consequences that make the ends good, but our faculties properly directed to achieve our ultimate end teleologically.

Which would be classic Aristotelianism as well. As I have yet to make argument whether eudaimonia/beatitudo is achievable in this life or not; this being one of the central areas Aquinas disagreed with Aristotle.

According to both Aristotle and Aquinas, the classical virtues are knowable to the ordinary human intellect, unaided by revelation. According to Aquinas, however, the nature of man’s ultimate end is not knowable to the ordinary human intellect – since it is revealed by God. Therefore, there must be a set of virtues whose culmination is not eternal beatitude, but rather temporal beatitude.

Are you OK with that argument?

Now realize that Aquinas also thinks that we can know that murder is always wrong, that stealing is wrong, that fornication is wrong, etc, without divine revelation. It stands to reason that the wrongness of these actions is connected to a different teleological goal than eternal beatitude. Right? This teleological goal is temporal beatitude.

(I haven’t checked this in the Summa, but Aquinas is pretty logical, so I’m pretty sure he follows through on the logical consequences of his views).

If what I’ve said so far is right, then non-Christians get their moral sense from the teleological goal of Aristotelian eudaimonia, not eternal beatitude. Aristotelian eudaimonia is the anchor of the classical virtues. But the classical virtues are only necessary, not sufficient, for eternal beatitude.

Are we on the same page so far?

(I’m enjoying the back and forth, by the way).

 

[Prodigal_Son]

You are using Virtue is a weird way that I hadn’t picked up on until now. Would you agree with this statement A virtue is a habitual trait of the character of man. Which pertain to the achievement of mans ultimate end. So a virtuous man would be he who has attained eudaimonia/beatitudo; depending on which tradition you wish to follow in terms. If so, we agree. And, that isn’t consequentialism. As it isn’t consequences that make the ends good, but our faculties properly directed to achieve our ultimate end teleologically.

Which would be classic Aristotelianism as well. As I have yet to make argument whether eudaimonia/beatitudo is achievable in this life or not; this being one of the central areas Aquinas disagreed with Aristotle.

Sorry, I never specifically answered your question. I think your definition applies to theological virtues only – or rather, that theological virtues are the only virtues that pertain *perfectly *to man’s ultimate end: divine beatitude. Other virtues pertain to a necessary precondition of man’s ultimate end: ordinary human beatitude.

 

[Abu]

Prodigal_Son #331
This quotation uses the word “consequentialism” as a synonym for “utilitarianism”

False. Take the trouble to actually read what the Saint has written.

**VERITATIS SPLENDOR (The Splendor Of Truth)
Given in Rome, at Saint Peter’s, on 6 August, Feast of the Transfiguration of the Lord, in the year 1993, the fifteenth of my Pontificate.
Saint JOHN PAUL II **
Extracts:
'74. Many of the Catholic moralists who follow in this direction seek to distance themselves from utilitarianism and pragmatism, where the morality of human acts would be judged without any reference to the man’s true ultimate end.

'106. Today’s widespread tendencies towards **subjectivism, utilitarianism and relativism **appear not merely as pragmatic attitudes or patterns of behaviour, but rather as approaches having a basis in theory and claiming full cultural and social legitimacy.

'75. But as part of the effort to work out such a rational morality (for this reason it is sometimes called an “autonomous morality” ) there exist false solutions, linked in particular to an inadequate understanding of the object of moral action. Some authors do not take into sufficient consideration the fact that the will is involved in the concrete choices which it makes: these choices are a condition of its moral goodness and its being ordered to the ultimate end of the person.

‘According to these theories, free will would neither be morally subjected to specific obligations nor shaped by its choices, while nonetheless still remaining responsible for its own acts and for their consequences. This “teleologism”, as a method for discovering the moral norm, can thus be called — according to terminology and approaches imported from different currents of thought — “consequentialism” or “proportionalism”. The former claims to draw the criteria of the rightness of a given way of acting solely from a calculation of foreseeable consequences deriving from a given choice.

'76. Such theories however are not faithful to the Church’s teaching, when they believe they can justify, as morally good, deliberate choices of kinds of behaviour contrary to the commandments of the divine and natural law.

'79. The primary and decisive element for moral judgment is the object of the human act, which establishes whether it is capable of being ordered to the good and to the ultimate end, which is God. This capability is grasped by reason in the very being of man, considered in his integral truth, and therefore in his natural inclinations, his motivations and his finalities, which always have a spiritual dimension as well. It is precisely these which are the contents of the natural law and hence that ordered complex of “personal goods” which serve the “good of the person”: the good which is the person himself and his perfection. These are the goods safeguarded by the commandments, which, according to Saint Thomas, contain the whole natural law.130’
Note:
130. Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 100, a. 1.