How do i come up with a good reason why governments shouldn't allow same sex marriage?

[Prodigal_Son]

This “teleologism”, as a method for discovering the moral norm, can thus be called — according to terminology and approaches imported from different currents of thought — “consequentialism” or “proportionalism”. The former claims to draw the criteria of the rightness of a given way of acting solely from a calculation of foreseeable consequences deriving from a given choice.

The quote says that consequentialism “draws the criteria of the rightness of a given way of acting solely from a calculation of forseseeable consequences deriving from a given choice.” Isn’t that utilitarianism? Am I missing something?

(I recognize that the first paragraph in your quote explicitly says that utilitarianism is something different. But I don’t get how it could be – unless the idea is that “utilitarianism” is act utilitarianism and “consequentialism” is rule utilitarianism.)

My understanding of consequentialism is not a theory of action. Consequentialism is the theory that consequences are of ultimate moral importance.

In the end, we’re arguing about language. Perhaps we should just accept that we use the terms differently.

 

[GaryTaylor]

In the end, we’re arguing about language. Perhaps we should just accept that we use the terms differently.

Did you see this?

google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fconsequentialism%2F&ei=i7zDU9DILOXK8gHx1YCIDQ&usg=AFQjCNFw9TLQ9RC-NEhcuDEXG8WtToeZFw

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Did you see this?

google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fconsequentialism%2F&ei=i7zDU9DILOXK8gHx1YCIDQ&usg=AFQjCNFw9TLQ9RC-NEhcuDEXG8WtToeZFw

Yup.

Note this quotation:

To resolve this vagueness, we need to determine which of the various claims of classic utilitarianism are essential to consequentialism. One claim seems clearly necessary. Any consequentialist theory must accept the claim that I labeled ‘consequentialism’, namely, that certain normative properties depend only on consequences. If that claim is dropped, the theory ceases to be consequentialist.

“Normative properties depend on consequences”. That’s consistent with teleology, since virtues (normative properties) depend on their natural ends (consequences).

 

[Skeptic92]

If what I’ve said so far is right, then non-Christians get their moral sense from the teleological goal of Aristotelian eudaimonia, not eternal beatitude. Aristotelian eudaimonia is the anchor of the classical virtues. But the classical virtues are only necessary, not sufficient, for eternal beatitude.

Are we on the same page so far?

(I’m enjoying the back and forth, by the way).

Yes, you are correct in regards to Eudaimonia (which is why I included it); however, Aquinas argued that Eudaimonia could not be achieved in this life as it related to mans Final/Ultimate End which is beatitudo/eudaimonia which by faith we know to be eternal life with God. This conclusion was also based on his philosophical anthropology which accepted the fallen nature of man; which is an impediment to perfectly embodying the Virtues.

Sorry, I never specifically answered your question. I think your definition applies to theological virtues only – or rather, that theological virtues are the only virtues that pertain *perfectly *to man’s ultimate end: divine beatitude. Other virtues pertain to a necessary precondition of man’s ultimate end: ordinary human beatitude.

Yes; it could be argued that the non-theological virtues are subordinate to the theological virtues. This wouldn’t change the fact they are though directed to the same ultimate end; which would be mans Finality. This still isn’t quite consequentialism for the reasons I gave here; the end isn’t a consequence of action; but what that proper ordering of our faculties achieves given our nature. Given that both means and ends are equally important, in a sense, I see an inherent contradiction with consequentialism.

In any consequentialist Ethic the ends would justify the means; but in Aquinas’ Ethics this principle does not hold true. The ends, means, and circumstance of the act is what renders the act good; you need all 3 for a moral action. Failure on any point leads to the action being immoral.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Yes; it could be argued that the non-theological virtues are subordinate to the theological virtues. This wouldn’t change the fact they are though directed to the same ultimate end; which would be mans Finality. This still isn’t quite consequentialism for the reasons I gave here; the end isn’t a consequence of action; but what that proper ordering of our faculties achieves given our nature.

1. I’m not talking about the consequences of actions. I’m talking about the consequences of virtues.
2. I don’t think the consequence of a virtue is an event. It is a state. Virtues don’t immediately produce states like eudaimonia, but they do *tend to *produce eudaimonia, and this is why they are virtues. (Resentfulness, e.g., isn’t a virtue because it doesn’t tend to produce eudaimonia.)

In sum, I don’t understand how you can talk about an “end” without talking about a consequence. I think this is a distinction without a difference.

 

[Skeptic92]

1. I’m not talking about the consequences of actions. I’m talking about the consequences of virtues.
2. I don’t think the consequence of a virtue is an event. It is a state. Virtues don’t immediately produce states like eudaimonia, but they do *tend to *produce eudaimonia, and this is why they are virtues. (Resentfulness, e.g., isn’t a virtue because it doesn’t tend to produce eudaimonia.)

In sum, I don’t understand how you can talk about an “end” without talking about a consequence. I think this is a distinction without a difference.

Ones teleological and one isn’t. In consequentialist Ethics the consequence follows either necessarily or accidentally from the action. In a Teleological mannner; the virtue is directed towards producing its effect necessarily. This is as the virtues are an efficient cause of beatitudo; it is this relation of efficient to final cause that makes all the difference. Also the core thesis of Consequentialism would be denied by Aquinas, and any Ethicist in the Scholastic tradition. This is as consequences alone is not important to moral evaluation and practical reasoning; but the objective end, the subjective act, and the circumstances within which the subject acts are all equally important to make a human action moral. Yeah; exemplifying all the Virtues perfectly would mean you default order all three precepts properly, exemplification of all the Virtues perfectly though is a rare thing indeed.

You are getting it the wrong way round after this though; virtuous behaviour is formed by habitual doing of the good. Thus the virtuous, alongside infused, are learnt by behaviour and learning. The attainment of the virtues would be a consequence a habitual following of a properly formed conscience, rather than a virtue being the precept to a well formed conscience.

Whilst it is true that mans ultimate end is extrinsic to himself and follows as a consequence to truly virtuous behaviour; this isn’t consequentialism in the relevant sense as used by modern philosophy. As the core thesis would be denied most vehemently by Aquinas and all Scholastics.