WillP:
Perhaps, but I think that to make a judgement of anything that goes beyond declaring one instantiation of it is a universal judgement which empiricism doesn’t have the authority to declare. Even something like Einstein’s laws if declared as universal are not something that empiricism could say are something that ‘always apply.’ It falls into the classic problem of induction. Which of course shouldn’t be a problem if we accept Aristotelian causes but that would take us outside of pure empiricism.
Problems, like the “problem of induction” (or, in a more modern, applied sense, Goodman’s Paradox/grue/bleen), are
features, not bugs. Signs of epistemic strength and reasoning ground in real-world feedback loops.
“Accepting Aristotelian causes” is to jump right off the rails. That’s just reckless un uncritical embrace of unaccountable intuitions and superstitions. One would look longingly back at the Hume’s problems, for they are real, engaged, and run the hazards of dealing with real world propositions, and the risk that
these ideas might be falsified or shown to be thoroughly problematic. Aristotelian metaphysics are an abdication of such commitments, a “cop out” that embraces a non-answer as an artificial means of avoiding epistemic difficulties.
Induction is problematic, but it’s also attached to our real world feedback loops. First Causes and final causes are not, and are merely tautologies in comparison to the epistemic problems the empiricist must engage. They are trivializing lines of thought.
More broadly, and I’m always surprised that this needs to be pointed out, “I just know” may be a strong intuition, but it’s not a warrant, and in cases like the question of universals, it most certainly
can be denied without logical contradictions. That is not the case with the question of external stimuli and perception, for example. It’s self-evidence is not logically deniable, and one must affirm it even to take up the task of denying it.
That gets left in, because it cannot be logically left out.
The question of universals and related questions like translational symmetry in nature are great examples of what is NOT self-evident. These are abstract concepts, with various competing hypotheses, many of which are mutually exclusive with respect to each other.
For the scientific thinker, and I guess more generally, just the serious thinker, guarantees and “always applies” are artificial and unreasonable requirements. We live by induction, as problematic as it is, because it works, and is practically effective, even though and despite our inability to provide certainty for such a metaphysical hypothesis, or exhaustive demonstration of that fact, as a fact, a posteriori.
I’m not sure what “pure empiricism” is, but embracing Aristotle’s notions of (metaphysical) causality doesn’t just push one out of any “pure” form of empiricism, such a commitment undermines the foundations of all empirical epistemology.
-TS