Hi, Perplexity,
I have truly marveled at your dismissive approach to the other posters and what they have presented. But, your bluster has been called to task on this one.
Defend your statement that the first two “…beg the question…”
I am looking forward to your response.
God bless
Sure, in the words of J.L. Mackie:
“Unfortunately this argument is unsound. Although in a finite ordered series of causes the intermediate (or the earliest intermediate) is caused by the first item, this would not be so if there were an infinite series. In an infinite series, every item is caused by an earlier item. The way in which the first item is ‘removed’ if we go from a finite to an infinite series does not entail the removal of the later items. In fact, Aquinas (both here and in the first way) has simply begged the question against an infinite regress of causes.” Mackie, J. L.
The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon, 1982. p., 90
The first way says:
But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover
However, if the series is infinite of course there is no first mover! If there’s a first mover, the series is finite…lol So to say it “cannot go on to to infinity, because there would be no first mover” is to say an infinite series cannot be because it wouldn’t be finite…
The second way says:
“Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one.”
Again, here he lists aspects of a series of finite efficient causes and concludes that because an infinite series wouldn’t have these aspects, then it cannot be. But of course it wouldn’t have these! Otherwise it’d be finite. So, he’s presupposing the conclusion he’s supposed to be demonstrating. i.e., that infinite regression isn’t possible.
Finally, there is also the issue of his question begging and modality. There are different
kinds of possibility.
Metaphysical possibility is concerned with whether something (an event, or state of affairs etc.) can become ‘real’ or ‘actual’. IOW, whether something is
actualizable.
Logical possibility is concerned with whether something’s being real or actual would contradict some logical law.
So, for instance, it’s logically possible for me to run faster than the speed of light without assistance (this doesn’t contradict any laws of logic); but, certainly I could never
really do such a thing: it isn’t metaphysically possible.
Finally, there is epistemic possibility: metaphysical possibility conditioned by a person’s beliefs and knowledge. For example, for some people it’s epistemically possible for God to have created everyone in hell, yet for the one who believes God’s perfect goodness precludes such an action, it won’t be epistemically possible.
So, what does he mean by saying an infinite regression isn’t
possible? Such a regression certainly wouldn’t contradict any logical laws. And what beliefs of ours would preclude such a thing from being real? I can’t even imagine. This only skims the surface.