Earnest Bunbury:
The objection I proposed to Aquinas’ first way was that it begged the question: it assumes that the series in question needs a first cause in order to demonstrate that it has one. That is, it assumes the series is finite in order to show that it isn’t infinite.
In response to this objection, I can only discern two replies in your post.
You claim that I and others have misunderstood Aquinas’ argument, making a caricature of it.
You say we misunderstand it because (i) we’re relying on “modern philosophy” and (ii) we think Aquinas is speaking about mechanistic causation when
really, he’s talking about essential causation.
So, it’s to these points that I’ll reply to.
To (i), I must say that I’m not at all confident in your familiarity with contemporary philosophy. The reason I say this is because contemporary philosophers (of the relevant fields at least) take Thomism and Aristotelianism into account.
Cf. John Haldane’s section
A Thomist Metaphysics, in Gale, Richard M.
The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2002.
Loux, Michael J.
Metaphysics: a Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2006. (which has been accused of being way too favoritive of Aristotelianism)
Or even Pruss, Alexander R.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason: a Reassessment. New York: Cambridge UP, 2006. Who is a Roman Catholic philosopher, and who frequently defends points from Thomas and Aristotle’s metaphysics. etc. etc.
So, it’s certainly not the case that contemporary philosophers (of the relevant fields) are ignorant of Thomism and Aristotelianism. Therefore, if they are misrepresenting these philosophies, it’d be shocking, to me at least.
Unless you just mean that if you disagree with Thomism (etc.) then you’re wrong, in which case your argument wouldn’t be interesting until further supported.
To (ii):
As Fergus Kerr notes in
After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, the five ways have many different powerful and persuasive interpretations. He notes, frequently, that the neo-thomist’s have introduced new readings of the arguments utilizing metaphysical principles. This is contrasted by the French interpretation heralded by theologians like the Jesuits Marcel Chossat (1862–1926) and Henri de Lubac (1896-1991). The prestigious
Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique describes this position clearly:
“As for the argument of the prime mover such as Saint Thomas understood it, it is a long time since it has been taught, even in the Thomist camp. . . If the argument is taken in the sense in which Saint Thomas borrowed it historically from the Arabs, it is not conclusive, and the criticism offered by Scotus is decisive . . . The Neo-Thomists, by adverting to metaphysical considerations . . . actually abandon the physical argument of the prime mover, just as do all the other members of the Thomistic school . . . [The argument has only] survived in the ranks of Protestant scholasticism, among certain philosophers and well-intentioned apologists’.” -
Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, vol. 4 (Paris: Letouzet et Ané, 1939): col. 932–5. As cited by Fergus Kerr,
After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism. Malden (Ma.): Blackwell, 2008. p. 53.
So, I don’t think it’s at all clear that Aquinas was talking about essential causation. But, no matter. You can just make a new argument specifying the causation as essential. Does this rebut my objection? No.
Why? Because you’re
still begging the question: assuming the series is such that it requires a first cause in order to demonstrate that it has a first cause.
You make the claim that the series requires a first cause (or unmoved mover) several times:
Even to infinity, something must give the first principle causing power.
This principle must reduce potentiality to act, not by an infinite series of causes, but by not being reducible to potentiality, being pure act
Eventually this regress must terminate in something which here and now actualizes potentialities without itself being actualized, an unmoved mover.
And why does this series require an unmoved mover?
Because. If it didn’t, then
we fail to find the principle that is not moved to act by anything else.
That’s it. That’s the only reason you provided for thinking the series requires an unmoved mover. But this is
precisely what I’m objecting to. So you’ve merely repeated the argument I’m objecting to, in response to my objection. Why can’t the series regress infinitely? Because, then, it wouldn’t have an unmoved mover! Of course it wouldn’t.
As Sobel says:
“[T]he First Way is vulnerable to the apparent possibility of self-moving things that have always been in motion, for Aquinas’s premise that “whatever is moved is moved by another” (ST I q2,a3 p. 22), is presumably meant to be a statement of strict metaphysical necessity. But it seems that at least things in perpetual motion could be self-movers. It seems, in Aquinas’s Aristotelian terms, that they could be at every moment things actually in motion and potentially in motion in the immediate future, their changing potentialities being continuously actualized by the action of their immediately antecedent actualities. This conception of a self-moving perpetual mover does not involve its being “in the same respect and in the same way…both mover and moved” (ST I q2,a3, p. 22).” - Sobel, Jordan Howard.
Logic and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God. Cambridge u.a.: Cambridge Univ., 2009. p. 196.
Picture the series as whole, perpetually moving. No contradiction. (This isn’t to mention that I think the concept of Pure Actuality efficiently causing anything is a contradiction in terms, and yes I’m aware of the distinction between passive and active potentiality).