How do we know Essence and Existence are distinct?

[catholic1seeks]

This is relevant to Aquinas’ proof of God.

Some say, for example, we can know the essence of lion or a unicorn without knowing whether either one exists.

But wouldn’t fully knowing the essence of a lion, for example, entail knowing its existence? In other words, wouldn’t existence be part of its essence? I could conceive that fully knowing a lion’s essence would include knowing its biological reality, and once I know that reality (say, as a product of evolution, etc.), then I would know lions indeed exist.

 

[gregoryphealy]

But wouldn’t fully knowing the essence of a lion, for example, entail knowing its existence?

Is the essence of a lion that exists (in reality) and that of a lion that does not exist the same? If yes, it’s evident that existence is not mandatory in describing its essence, and existence is, therefore, distinct from essence.

 

[Wesrock]

If existence were part of the essence of a lion, then it would follow that lions always existed and will always exist. It would exist necessarily by nature. It wouldn’t be contingent. And it would further follow that things that currently do not exist never could come into existence and never did exist.

Feser further addresses the objection in Five Proofs for the Existence of God by giving an argument made by Guya Klima. Let me post what I’ve got so far and hop on my laptop.

 

[Wesrock]

@catholic1seeks

Feser addresses the objection in Five Proofs for the Existence of God by giving an argument made by Guya Klima. Let me post what I’ve got so far and hop on my laptop.

Okay, I’m on my laptop. In Five Proofs, Feser does tackle the argument from contingency and in that spends a lot of time on the real distinction between essence and existence. I can’t quote all the relevant sections here. I don’t even have space to quote everything he says about people who object to the distinction not being real. But here’s a part:

Now, if the essence of some thing–a lion, say–were really identical to its existence, then the situation should be like this latter case. That is to say, a clear and complete knowledge of a lion’s essence should entail knowledge of its existence. Yet it is not true of a lion, or a stone, or a tree, or of any of the other things of our experience, that if we had a clear and complete knowledge of its essence, we would know its existence.

The critic might respond that this begs the question in supposing that even full and complete knowledge of some thing’s essence wouldn’t yield knowledge of its existence. But as Klima points out, a charge of circularity against an argument can be rebutted if we have independent reason to believe the premises. In this case, as Klima notes, if I know the essence of some thing which is of a certain kind, then I will know a priori of any other thing of that kind that does exist, has existed, will exist, or could exist that it will have the attributes entailed by being a thing of that kind. But I will not know a priori whether any other thing of that kind in fact does exist, has existed, or will exist. I could know that only a posteriori. Now, this gives us a reason to think that knowing the essence of a thing does not entail knowing its existence, and it is a reason I could have whether or not it even occurs to me to ask about whether essence and existence are identical. Hence, I could accept the Thomistic argument for the real distinction without begging the question.

 

[Wesrock]

@catholic1seeks

I’ll add a little more from Five Proofs.

A point made earlier is also relevant to answering the critic’s allegation of circularity. Suppose I know that aspirin is a pain reliever but not that it is acetylsalicylic acid. Then I have an incomplete conception of what aspirin is, but I have not misconceived of what aspirin is. However, if I judge that aspirin is not acetylsalicylic acid, then I have misconceived of what it is. By contrast, if I judge that aspirin does not exist, then while I have judged falsely, I have not misconceived of what aspriin is. Now, this sort of example gives one reason to believe that correctly conceiving of a thing’s essence can come apart from knowing whether it exists, and it does so whether or not it has occurred to one to ask whether essence and existence are identicial. Hence, we have another non-question-begging reason for thinking that full and complete knowledge of a thing’s essence would not entail knowledge of its existence.

 

[kill051]

Forgive my late entry to the thread, and I readily admit I have not read all of it, but asserting that one can know the essence of a creature without the creature actually existing seems to me to be an example of the logical fallacy known as ‘begging the question’. I may be wrong.

 

[IWantGod]

This is relevant to Aquinas’ proof of God.

Some say, for example, we can know the essence of lion or a unicorn without knowing whether either one exists.

But wouldn’t fully knowing the essence of a lion, for example, entail knowing its existence? In other words, wouldn’t existence be part of its essence? I could conceive that fully knowing a lion’s essence would include knowing its biological reality, and once I know that reality (say, as a product of evolution, etc.), then I would know lions indeed exist.

If something comes into being, then it has been given existence, for out of absolutely nothing, comes nothing.

There for it is necessary to make a distinction between existence and the essence that has been given existence, and even after esse has been conjoined with essence we must maintain a real distinction since existing is not intrinsic to it’s essence. If existing is what it’s essence is then it would never not exist. It is not it’s nature to exist, but rather it’s nature has been given existence and is being sustained in existence.

That’s why Aquinas made a distinction between essence and existence. In regards to contingent beings, existence is something given rather than something that contingents being’s are.

 

[steve-b]

This is relevant to Aquinas’ proof of God.

Some say, for example, we can know the essence of lion or a unicorn without knowing whether either one exists.

But wouldn’t fully knowing the essence of a lion, for example, entail knowing its existence? In other words, wouldn’t existence be part of its essence? I could conceive that fully knowing a lion’s essence would include knowing its biological reality, and once I know that reality (say, as a product of evolution, etc.), then I would know lions indeed exist.

Consider this example if one remains unbaptized for example, does that particular “essence” negate their existence? No

However, considering

By definition, One who is baptized has been changed…supernaturally they are THEN, a new creation… If you did the most complex scientific analysis of 2 people, one baptized vs one who is NOT baptized, can any change in the 2 be quantified or seen scientifically? No. Has their essence changed? One of them has changed in essence…BIG Time, supernaturally

 

[veritatisstella]

asserting that one can know the essence of a creature without the creature actually existing seems to me to be an example of the logical fallacy known as ‘begging the question’. I may be wrong.

I think the example of a unicorn shows we can know a creature’s essence without it actually having to exist

 

[IWantGod]

Forgive my late entry to the thread, and I readily admit I have not read all of it, but asserting that one can know the essence of a creature without the creature actually existing

But it’s the very fact that we can know the essence of something without it existing that proves that there is a real distinction. Otherwise we couldn’t conceive of a things essence without it also existing in the world at the same time.

 

[Wesrock]

A polygon with 100 million sides of equal length may never have existed, yet we can still know that such a polygon could be and know geometric truths about it.

 

[IWantGod]

If the essence of any possible thing was the same thing as having existence, then all possible things would exist and would have always existed without change and without a cause.

 

[catholic1seeks]

Is the essence of a lion that exists (in reality) and that of a lion that does not exist the same? If yes, it’s evident that existence is not mandatory in describing its essence, and existence is, therefore, distinct from essence.

Well, what if someone argued that the essence of each of those lions is different – the former being that existence is part of the lion’s essence.

 

[IWantGod]

Don’t mean to butt in, but if it was the nature of the lion to exist, then that lion would always be an existing lion.

 

[catholic1seeks]

(1) WHAT if someone denied the idea of essence?

For example, prior matter existed before the lion – the atoms, molecules, etc existed in certain other structures, say water, air, and other organisms. So what if someone said that essence was merely human categorization?

(2) Also @Wesrock, feel free to keep citing Ed’s book, because your additional comments help me make sense of it. But just note that it is actually Ed’s book (Five Proofs) that has sparked many of my recent questions (which is why I thought of the lion example in the first place haha).

(3) I just REALLY want to nail the Essence-Existence Thomistic proof for God, because if that proof is correct, I consider it to be the one that most naturally results in other attributes of God, like his simplicity and actuality.

 

[catholic1seeks]

Ohhhhhhh I like this example.

Something about the unicorn example (that Ed Feser gives in his book) doesn’t quite catch me as right, because we can’t know much about a unicorn’s essence. Simply saying a horse with a horn isn’t enough. Doesn’t knowing something’s essence imply also knowing, say, its biological structure and history? We don’t know the composition of a unicorn’s horn, for example, or where it fits on the evolutionary tree.

This is also why I said I could why someone would hold the view that knowing an essence would include knowing its existence. Say, the essence of the lion species (or whatever the scientific term). If we knew the biological data, the historical data, etc. associated with lions, we’d know they exist currently (as a species). Maybe not this OR that lion, but in general.

 

[catholic1seeks]

I’m not a philosopher either. If I had read this thread’s title maybe 2 years ago, I’d have absolutely no idea and would immediately lose interest.

But now that I know a bit more, it’s actually really fascinating. Because IF you can prove that existence and essence are distinct, then you are basically on your way to proving God’s existence.

 

[catholic1seeks]

What if I believe in an eternal lion? (Please Note: This uploaded content is no longer available.)

 

[Gorgias]

asserting that one can know the essence of a creature without the creature actually existing seems to me to be an example of the logical fallacy known as ‘begging the question’. I may be wrong.

I think you are.

We don’t really know “the essence of a creature”, per se. So, I can’t really say “the essence of @kill051 is _____.” On the other hand, I can say “@kill051 is a human, and the essence of a human person is _____.”

So, I can know your (personal) existence, and I can know the essence of what you are, but I can never claim that I know the essence of a particular being, as a particular being. That’s why this distinction isn’t “begging the question.”

If the essence of any possible thing was the same thing as having existence, then all possible things would exist and would have always existed without change and without a cause.

Which is precisely why we say that God’s essence is His existence.

Well, what if someone argued that the essence of each of those lions is different – the former being that existence is part of the lion’s essence.

Then he’d be arguing that those lions are are distinct kinds of animals – that is, there is a difference in what they are. So, you’d have to demonstrate that their essence – and not just their accidents (i.e., physical characteristics) are distinct! Once you do that, though, you can’t exactly point to all of them and say “lions!”, can you? You’d have to identify them as different creatures (“lion!” for one, but “flippitywig!” for another, and “smashbadooty!” to the next)! At that point, there are a few problems:

• each being becomes a singleton – a distinct type of being
• the notion of ‘essence’ dissolves into meaninglessness
• our ability to distinguish is severely hampered
• oh … and you’d have to assert what are the distinct characteristics for each creature you’re pointing at, wouldn’t you?

catholic1seeks:

WHAT if someone denied the idea of essence?

For example, prior matter existed before the lion – the atoms, molecules, etc existed in certain other structures, say water, air, and other organisms. So what if someone said that essence was merely human categorization?

The problem is that the prior matter isn’t what a lion is. You can decompose the lion into a variety of subsystems, but… taken as a whole, the lion is something that its components are not. So, this isn’t merely ‘categorization’, but recognition of a distinct entity.

catholic1seeks:

I just REALLY want to nail the Essence-Existence Thomistic proof for God

Right. This discussion helps us reason how God must be fundamentally different than creatures.

catholic1seeks:

Doesn’t knowing something’s essence imply also knowing, say, its biological structure and history?

No. That would be knowledge of particular creatures.

catholic1seeks:

What if I believe in an eternal lion?

Then you’d better have a very good proof of why he’s God.

 

[Wesrock]

But now that I know a bit more, it’s actually really fascinating. Because IF you can prove that existence and essence are distinct, then you are basically on your way to proving God’s existence.

Just to add to this. Proving absolutely would be great, but sometimes the best we’re left with is “a more rational explanation than the alternatives, and the more rational explanation logically entails ____.”